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Antisthenes (444 - 365 BC.), a predecessor of the Cynic philosophical school, brings an original conception of temperance as a defence against the negative consequences of the excessive pursuit of delight. Antisthenes places an emphasis on experience; he refuses Plato's attempts to define theories of ideas. He examines the power of the word and pursues moral objectives. His "naturalistic economy of rational choice" prepares the ground for the Cynics' shift to nature. The theory of "austerity" is discussed in relation to behavioural economy and the theory of rational choice. The main premise is Antisthenes' nominalist logic and his well-known ability to persuade, which presupposes a dialogue of free people, as well as love, friendship and cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to present recent Socratic studies as offered in the collected papers edited by Ugo Zilioli titled From the Socratics to the Socratic Schools: Classical Ethics, Metaphysics and Epistemology (2015) in the context of Slovak researches in this field. The paper has twofold ambition: to be informative about contemporary Socratic studies as well as to be protreptic for further reading and the exploration of the Socratic tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper offers a new interpretation of the relation between cynic philosophy and pythagoreism. It tries to shed light on the Antisthenian concept of philosophy as a peculiar blend of socratic and pythagorean attitudes and concepts. Its first part deals with Diodoros of Aspendus and his characteristics as a cynic. In the second part, some of the fundamental aspects of cynic philosophy going back to mythical Heracles and his pythagorean lore are traced. The investigations end with the conclusion that there is no contradiction between the cynic philosophy and pythagorean way of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper offers a reconstruction of Antisthenes' understanding of practical wisdom, based on the comparison of doxographic reports on Antisthenes with Xenophon's portrait of the philosopher. The comparison shows that Antisthenes links wisdom with perseverance and self-control - with an asceticism that results in excellent decisions. The therapeutic function of wisdom consists in eliminating all deceptive assumptions about what it means to live a good life. However, wisdom alone is not enough for anyone to live a happy life. Wisdom requires Socratic education, i.e. instructions concerning our attitudes to others as well as ourselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper deals with the Socratic ethics as developed by Antisthenes and conceived by the doxografical tradition as the basis of Diogenes' Cynicism. The author tries to show that Antisthenes' thought as a whole is connected with paideia (education). Thus Antisthenes' interpretations of Homer as well as his logical paradoxes have ethical aiming. There is a close connection between Antisthenes' logic and his ethics of the care of the self. Socratic thought in Antisthenes' fragments is neither skeptical nor dialectical. Contrary to both "intellectualistic" tendencies Antisthenes puts stress on the wise continually practicing ethics. By using of logical paradoxes (mainly ouk estin antilegein) Antisthenes probably hoped to demonstrate the anti-Platonic priority of ethics over metaphysics and logic. From this point of view Antisthenes can be seen as the predecessor of practical Cynical bios (way of life). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Antisthenes' concept of paideia, which, undoubtedly, must have been inspired by Socratic tradition. The decisive fragment - "the beginning of education is the research in names" - points to a connection between logic and ethics as it is witnessed in Xenophon's and Plato's dialogues. However, there are several differences as well. The author compares Antisthenes' paideia with the rhetorical ideal of Isocrates. Then he displays several variations of the Socratic model inside the Socratic circle. Antisthenes shows no interest in the metaphysical development of his Teacher's thought and offers a positive ethical ideal to be followed. This is the point where Cynics and Stoics carried on the Socratic tradition, the former putting stress on ethics and the letter completing it with logical studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper gives an outline of Antisthenes' ethics. The first part questions the accounts of modern historians, who try to include Antisthenes in one or another philosophical schools of that time (sophistics, socratism, kynicism). In the second part it shows the affiliations between Antisthenes' thinking and socratic tradition: It comes out, that the interconnection between the former and sophistics and kynicism might have come into existence as late as in the later doxographic accounts of his doctrine. The third part deals in more details with the writings Kyros and Heracles, which exemplify a mimetic depiction of the way of acting of a socratic sapient. The analysis of the preserved fragments shows, that the Antisthenian ethics is practical, differing from the Platonic conception of practice in that in it moral knowledge and moral action became one. Thus it represents a non-theoretical expansion of socratic ethics and as such cannot be grasped by the classical approaches which draw a sharp line between socratics and sophistics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the account of language or the so-called logos by Antisthenes, and the role played by logical paradoxes in Antisthenes' thought. The author tries to show the link between the use of logic by Antisthenes and the ethics of taking care of the self by Socrates. It notes that Socratic thought in the fragments of Antisthenes is neither dialectical nor skeptical wherein Antisthenes underlines the continual ethical activity of the wise.

The article provides a discussion on Antisthenes and his accounts of Homer. It provides an overview of the works of Antisthenes and the development of approaches in studying Homer's works. The article also examines the accounts of Homer in the "Aiax" and "Odysseus" and Antisthenes' use of the Socratic tradition.