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Though almost no postwar union contracts indexed wage rates to prices of the employer's products, union agreements linking wage rates to product prices, known as sliding scales, were common in some industries in the United States and Britain from the 1860s through the 1930s. This paper explains why sliding scales disappeared after the 1930s, and examines what practical experience with sliding scales revealed about fundamental constraints on wage indexation. Paradoxically, the history of sliding scales confirms that workers' information about product prices and materials costs is generally imperfect, in ways that would substantially constrain wage indexation in long-term contracts. Sliding scales were not indexed long-term contracts, but rather devices to forestall costly strikes in the absence of contracts by revealing employers' private information about product demand. In the postwar US, unions and employers failed to link wage rates to product prices because they had gained the ability to enter binding contracts, which could achieve the benefits of preventing strikes without incurring the extra negotiation costs and information problems associated with product-price indexation. I present a model to show how sliding scales could forestall strikes by revealing information, and how the introduction of binding union contracts reduced incentives to link wages to product prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last two centuries, the reallocation of labor out of agriculture has been a dominant feature of structural change and economic growth in the United States. This paper uses an accounting framework founded in economic theory to decompose this reallocation into three components: a demand-side effect due to the low income elasticity of demand for agricultural goods (Engel effect), and two supply-side effects, one due to differential sectoral productivity growth rates (Baumol effect), and the other to differential capital deepening. The results show that the Engel effect accounts for almost all labor reallocation until the 1950s, after which the Baumol effect becomes a key determinant. Our framework provides a unified account of long-run structural change, and demonstrates that historical interpretations and theoretical models that emphasize only one dimension of this process cannot properly account for the dramatic history of labor reallocation in the United States. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This paper conducts an econometric test of Diamond and Dybvig’s [Diamond, D., Dybvig, P., 1983. Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91, 401–420] theory of bank runs as interpreted by Chari [Chari, V.V., 1989. Banking without deposit insurance or banks panics: lessons from a model of the U.S. national banking system. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 13, 3–19] and Calomiris and Gorton [Calomiris, C., Gorton, G., 1991. Origins of banking panics: models, facts, and bank regulation. In: Hubbard, R.G. (Ed.), Financial Markets and Financial Crises. NBER and Univ. Chicago press, Chicago, pp. 109–173]. We test whether or not seasonal deposit drains on New York banks coincide with the bank panics of 1873 and 1893 in the United States. We use individual bank level data to illuminate the reason for withdrawals. The evidence reveals that the panic of 1873 could have included a seasonal interior drain. A seasonal interpretation of Diamond and Dybvig’s model cannot be applied to the bank panic of 1893. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]