Search

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024 9(1), 131-144 | European Forum Insight of 18 June 2024 | (Table of Contents) I. The citizenship of the Union: an evolving, slippery ground. - II. The case-law concerning the loss of the EU citizenship. - ii.1. Case-law overview: characterization and main features. - ii.2. Legal principles of EU citizenship law established by the Court. - III. The proportionality test and its effectiveness. - iii.1. Individual examination. - iii.2. Effective possibility to recover the nationality ex tunc. - IV. Individual examination and due process rights: information and reasonable time. - V. Concluding Remarks | (Abstract) The judgment in Stadt Duisburg, concerning the loss of German (and, thus, EU) citizenship in the context of naturalization proceedings, adds a new chapter to the “judicial saga” of loss of a Member State’s citizenship and compatibility of its national measures with EU law. This Insight focuses on such a case-law of the Court of Justice (“ECJ” or “the Court”), which reflects the compromise between the “untouchable” State sovereign competence in nationality matters and the gradual consolidation of a “procedural armour” assisting the loss of the EU citizenship and the rights attached thereto. Building on this assumption, the Insight retraces and examines the main principles of EU citizenship law elaborated by the Court via its case-law, inaugurated with its 2010 leading case Rottmann, and complemented with the latest additions of the 2024 judgment in Stadt Duisburg. The main idea emerging from this jurisprudence is that, essentially, the competence to establish criteria for the loss of nationality is, and remains, firmly in the Member States’ hands. Its exercise, though, is increasingly made contingent on the respect of basic, legal principles of EU procedural law, i.e., proportionality, effectiveness and due process of law. In other words, the ECJ does not intervene on the substantial side of the Member States’ competence (the “if”), but rather on the procedural one (the “how”), thereby influencing its concrete exercise.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(1), 399-408 | European Forum Insight of 20 July 2022 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Facts and background of the case. - II.1. The JY case: acquisition of nationality and EU citizenship. - II.2. The background of the case: the relationship between EU citizenship and nationality of a Member State. - III. Analysis. - III.1. The scope of EU law. - III.2. The proportionality test. - III.3. Reflecting further: the condition of British nationals after Brexit. - IV. Conclusion. | (Abstract) In case C-118/20 JY v Wiener Landesregierung ECLI:EU:C:2022:34, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice addressed another preliminary question regarding the relationship between nationality and EU citizenship. The case builds on the two previous cases Rottmann and Tjebbes. This time, the Court was confronted with the decision to revoke an assurance of naturalisation to a citizen who had already lost the nationality of another Member State. The Grand Chamber ruled that the situation at stake falls within the scope of EU law and offered a demonstration of the proportionality assessment that national authorities must undertake in such cases. In this Insight, I argue that this case constitutes another step in the case law progressively built up by the Court on EU citizenship. I also address the question whether this case may be relevant in the context of Brexit, given that British nationals have permanently lost the rights attached to EU citizenship as a consequence of the UK's withdrawal from the Union.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(3), 1061-1074 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Citizenships in Europe: harmony and conflict. - I.1. A curious legal status perched on limitations. - I.2. EU citizenship: two lessons. - II. EU citizenship: questioning the established narrative. - II.1. Empowering the citizen - Humiliating the State. - II.2. Promoting democracy - Undermining democratic outcomes. - II.3. Promoting non-discrimination - Undermining equality. - II.4. Implications for the rule of law: the sole possibility of one type of constitutionalism. - III. We have time: the new picture is here to stay. | (Abstract) European citizenship, although derived from the nationalities of the Member States, came to play a significant independent role in reforming European constitutionalism in unanticipated ways by undermining some of the key assumptions underlying the notions of citizenship, equality and democratic accountability. Instead of lingering merely as a super-structure atop Member State nationalities, it instead reshuffles the constitutional basics and not all Europeans emerge as winners as a result. This brief Article provides an introductory background for the Special Section on EU citizenship and rights of European Papers, Vol. 3, 2018, No. 3 and outlines some of the core tensions which EU citizenship brings to light.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(3), 1269-1291 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction: recent trends in the practice of the European Union concerning the protection of European citizens vis-à-vis a third State. - II. The quest for competence: arts 20 and 23 TFEU. - III. The quest for competence: the EU-UK agreements. - IV. The quest for competence: customary law on diplomatic protection. - V. Legal entitlement to exercise diplomatic protection under international law. - V.1. A functional interpretation of international law on diplomatic protection. - V.2. A functional notion of "nationality". - VI. The EU citizenship and the bond of allegiance. - VI.1. The founding Treaties. - VI.2. The practice of the European Union. - VII. The effects of the practice of the international organisations on customary law. - VIII. The effects of the practice of the Euro-pean Union on customary law. - IX. The actual scope of the effects of the practice of the European Union on customary law. - X. Concluding remarks: is there an individual right to diplomatic protection vis-à-vis the EU? | (Abstract) Recent international practice of the European Union features a certain attention to the need to protect European citizens whose interests have been affected by a breach of international law by a third State. Strikingly, this practice seems to find a more solid basis in international law than in EU law. This Article explores the actions performed by the European Union through the lens of customary international law on diplomatic protection. It aims at ascertaining whether these actions prompted a development of international law which entails that, in force of the European citizenship, the Union is entitled to protect its citizens.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(1), 211-218 | European Forum Insight of 11 June 2021 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction and facts of the case. - II. Fine-tuning settled case-law: the Court's judgment. - II.1. The scope of Union citizenship in extradition cases. - II.2. The limits of Member States duty to request additional information from the third State. - II.3. Member States obligation to refuse extradition and conduct criminal prosecution. - III. Conclusive remarks. | (Abstract) Case C-398/19 Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin (Extradition vers l'Ukraine) introduces relevant developments to the case-law on extradition of Union citizens to third countries. The Court of Justice establishes that the rules defined in its previous case-law apply to a Union citizen who has acquired the nationality of a Member State after having moved to another Member State. However, it denies the existence of two further obligations stemming from EU law: namely the duty to request additional information from the third State to enable the home Member State to decide on the surrender of its national for prosecution purposes and secondly, the host Member State's duty to refuse extradition and take charge of the prosecution if admissible under its national law. This Insight analyses the reasoning of the Court and the Advocate General, discusses the case in light of the previous jurisprudence, and offers some reflection on the practical issues arising from the implementation of the "Petruhhin doctrine".

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(1), 155-165 | European Forum Insight of 18 May 2021 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Facts of the case. - III. Opinion of AG Rantos. - IV. Comment. - IV.1. Police resources as social assistance? - IV.2. How many more "individual examinations"? - IV.3. A strange return to formalism. - V. Conclusion. | (Abstract) What is the point of expelling illegally residing EU citizens when they would be able to immediately return in an open-border Europe? This Insight critically discusses the opinion by Advocate-General Rantos in the FS v Staats-secretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid case (C‑719/19), where an EU citizen had been expelled from the Nether-lands for lacking employment and sufficient resources but returned a month later to claim a renewed right of residence under art. 6 of the Citizenship Directive. It is argued that the Advocate-General's line of reasoning and solution for the problem should have shown more awareness of existing legal doctrine and the actual functioning of Member State administrations. Specific criticism is directed at his attempt to frame "police resources" as part of the social assistance system, his return to formalism in the adjudication of EU citizens' rights and his use of (another) "case-by-case" assessment as a solution to the problem. A presumptive threshold of three months absence seems least bad amongst alternatives to assess whether EU citizens comply with an expulsion decision, especially in light of clarity and legal certainty for both EU citizens and national authorities.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2020 5(1), 3-40 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Family life as a European legal form. - I.1. Family life and social life: the impotence of European Union law? - I.2. The family as a "form of life": an existential approach to European Union law. - I.3. Law and forms of European family life: starting with concrete lives. The case of citizenship. - II. The European de-formation of family life figures: biological life and emotional life. - II.1. The "spouse": the conjugal form of life. - II.2. The parent: the parental form of life. - II.3. The child: the "filial" form of life. - III. Functionalism and essentialism in the European form of family life: juridical life and ethical life. - III.1. The functionalist form of family life: from pragmatism to formalism. - III.2. The essentialism of family life: from the superior interest of the child to the "good" and "bad" parents. - IV. The European re-formation of family life: the emergence of the concept of "dependency". - IV.1. The qualification of dependency. - IV.2. The gradation of dependency. - IV.3. The recomposition of dependency. - V. Conclusion. | (Abstract) Considering European Union law through the prism of the "form of life" is part of an effort to go beyond an analysis that most often adheres to the institutional foundations of law. The challenge is to show that the European legal discourse contains language that contributes to a reconfiguration of the way we live and conceive our lives. Following this existential approach of the "form of life", EU law can be seen as the place of a complex and subtle interaction between the lived and the imagined life. From this meeting comes the foundation as well as the transformation of our relationship to individual and collective life. The Article attempts to illustrate this interaction by unveiling how EU law and its interpretation express, often implicitly, a way of practicing and representing family life, its formation, functioning, and the values which drive it, thus giving birth to a European social imaginary in family matters.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2019 4(1), 409-415 | European Forum Insight of 25 April 2019 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Background and facts. - III. Comment. | (Abstract) Tjebbes (Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2019, case C-221/17 [GC]) builds on and extends the scope of a line of existing cases that has started to redefine the relationship between EU citizenship and Member State nationality. This Insight inquires on which legal grounds the Court of Justice could justify its bold intervention in the domain of nationality law. The Court offered two justifications, saying that the Member States must "have due regard to EU law" when deciding on the attributions of nationality and that EU citizenship "is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States". I argue that neither justification is persuasive and possible to square with the Treaties. The Insight also examines the requirement introduced by the Court of Justice that the rules on the loss of nationality must have due regard to the principle of proportionality and allow for an individual examination of the consequences of that loss. I argue that the desirability of such a proportionality requirement is not nearly as self-evident as the Court takes it to be.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(3), 1333-1352 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. EU citizens and their family members: "autonomous" vs. "derived" residence rights. - III. Residence rights enjoyed by EU citizens as inalienable rights? - III.1. Residence rights of UK nationals and their family members in the EU27. - III.2. Residence rights of EU27 citizens and their family members in the UK. - III.3. Intermediary conclusion. - IV. Brexit and residence rights: an essential issue for any negotiated solution. - IV.1. Changing citizenship statuses at the EU level. - IV.2. Preserving residence rights for EU27 citizens/UK nationals and their family members. - V. Concluding remarks. | (Abstract) One of the fundamental pillars of the European Union is the right of EU citizens and their family members to move freely between and reside in the different EU member States. In recent case law, the Court of Justice has made it abundantly clear that EU citizens derive these rights directly from their EU citizenship status, whereas their family members have only "derived" residence rights, which are dependent on the EU citizen having exercised his freedom of movement. The impact of Brexit on the free movement of persons between the UK and the remaining EU Member States has remained one of the most controversial and politically sensitive issues ever since the British people voted to leave the EU. This Article tries to shed some light on the legal arguments underlying this debate. On the one hand, it provides an overview of a number of arguments deriving from EU law or international law on the basis of which, according to some scholars, EU citizens and their family members would continue to enjoy the residence rights attached to citizenship after Brexit. On the other hand, it will analyse a number of legal principles which would, according to some scholars, have to be respected by any withdrawal agreement between the EU27 and the UK and which, arguably, provide a basis for continued residence rights after Brexit.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(3), 1378-1399 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Revisiting the admissibility test. - II.1. Possibility of partial registration. - II.2. Possibility of influencing ongoing negotiations. - III. Managing expectations at the post-registration stage. - III.1. False expectations in case of partially inadmissible initiatives. - III.2. Difficulty of influencing ongoing procedures. - IV. Brexit-related initiatives as a case study. - IV.1. Towards a more flexible admissibility test. - IV.2. Shortcomings at the post-registration stage. - V. Conclusion. | (Abstract) In the era of Brexit negotiations, which will determine the future of citizens' rights in terms of the bilateral relations between the UK and the EU, EU citizens from different Member States have used the instrument of the European citizens' initiative in order to bring forward their claim for retaining the same rights also in the post-Brexit era. The present Article analyses the current legal framework for European citizens' initiatives against the benchmark of general principles of EU law, in particular the principles of good administration, legal certainty and legitimate expectations. On the basis of this analysis, the Brexit-related citizens' initiatives are used as a case study marking a change in the Commission's administrative practice, towards more openness and cooperative spirit in the phase of the admissibility check. However, this new approach bears the risk of creating false expectations to organisers and signatories as to the real prospect of an initiative. The Article concludes that, in order to enable the full potential of citizens' initiatives, the Commission should strengthen the cooperation mechanisms when registering initiatives in line with the principle of good administration.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(3), 1353-1378 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - I.1. Mapping out the constitutional and legislative framework for EU citizenship law. - I.2. The multiple constitutional functions of Art. 21 TFEU. - I.3. Tensions between primary and secondary law: the UK Settlement as an illustration. - II. Deconstitutionalising the perimeters of EU citizenship law: from Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern to Brey as reflected in the UK Settlement. - II.1. Enshrining EU citizens' rights in EU primary law: "constitutional engineering". - II.2. The adoption of new legislation: fresh political guidance. - II.3. Legislation acting as a gateway to EU citizenship rights. - II.4. Interim conclusion: deconstitutionalisation. - III. Constitutionalising the perimeters of EU citizenship law: from Metock to Lounes, via the UK Settlement. - III.1. EU legislation and the rights attached to EU citizenship: from Singh to Akrich. - III.2. Ambiguities on the sources of rights: the adoption of a new legislative framework revirement in Metock. - III.3. Shifting to Art. 21, para. 1, TFEU: from the UK Settlement to Lounes. - III.4. Interim conclusion: constitutional protection? - IV. Soul searching: acknowledging the political dimension of EU citizenship law and locating the debate at legislative level. - IV.1. Art. 21, para. 1, TFEU and Directive 2004/38: the Directive as a gateway to EU primary rights? - IV.2. Concluding remarks on the relationship between primary and secondary rights. | (Abstract) In a series of recent cases on the rights of mobile EU citizens who do not perform an economic activity, the Court of Justice of the EU "deconstitutionalised" its understanding of key aspects of the free movement of EU citizens. The Court moved the discussion to the secondary law level, having kept it at the primary law level for many years. This line of cases sheds light on the ability of the Court to reframe the interplay between primary and secondary law as well as between the judicial and political guidance. The post-Brey case law provides a remarkable, if not unique, example of deconstitutionalisation following a period of intense constitutionalisation. The practical implications of this process are well illustrated in the context of the debate on Brexit that tests the relationship between treaty and legislative rights. This Article makes an enquiry into whether the trend towards a broader deference to political guidance in EU citizenship case law has been mirrored in other areas of citizens' rights having been subject to controversy in the context of Brexit, such as the status of third-country national family members.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(3), 1265-1288 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The unique case of the Cyprus Investment Programme. - III. Restrictions on free movement of capital. - III.1. Capital movement, its restrictions and justifications. - III.2. Application of these principles to the Cypriot case. - IV. Citizenship of the EU. - IV.1. Investment migration schemes in the EU and the evolving nature of Union citizenship. - IV.2. The Cyprus Investment Programme: revocation of Union citizenship, discrimination, family members and the right to leave. - V. Conclusions. | (Abstract) This Article focuses on the consequences of the acquisition of Cypriot citizenship through Cyprus's new Investment Programme, adopted in 2013. One of the criteria for the acquisition of citizenship is the investment of Euro two million in Cypriot banks, immovable property or companies which must be retained on Cypriot territory for at least three years. However, immovable residential property to a value of Euro 500,000 must be retained in Cyprus indefinitely or there is a risk of citizenship being revoked. These criteria raise concerns, particularly in light of EU law on citizenship and the free movement of capital. This Article analyses the possible violations of EU law in this context and argues against the conditional nature of the citizenship provided by the Programme, which results in violation of the free movement of capital and restricts the genuine enjoyment of the status of EU citizenship. Case law by the Court of Justice and academic literature analysing the right to the free movement of capital and revocation of citizenship in an EU context will be examined to determine the repercussions of the Cyprus Programme. This topic is extremely relevant today, as it sheds light on the developing nature of EU citizenship and the relationship between EU citizenship rights weighed against the national interests of the Member States.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(3), 1179-1208 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. A five-step evolution: integration, lawful residence and social benefits. - II.1. Step 1: the early cases. - II.2. Step 2: the reign of vague legal formulas. - II.3. Step 3: the Förster judgment as a turning point. - II.4. Step 4: Ziółkowski Szeja and the (new) dominance of Directive 2004/38. - II.5. Step 5: Dano, Alimanovic and beyond: the inevitable and logical next step? - II.6. The relationship between primary and secondary law. - II.7. Evolution, not revolution. - III. Beyond step no. 5 - the consequences of the Court's case law. - III.1. The marginalization of the precariat and the Janus-faced approach of the Court. - III.2. Automatic findings of illegality and the demise of individual proportionality assessments. - III.3. The ever increasing scope of "social assistance" under Directive 2004/38. - IV. Conclusion. | (Abstract) Much attention has been given to recent decisions in the field of EU citizenship, such as Dano and Alimanovic (Court of Justice: judgment of 11 November 2014, case C-333/13, Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v. Jobcenter Leipzig; judgment of 15 September 2015, case C-67/14, Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v. Nazifa Alimanovic and Others). It is often claimed that the Court of Justice has undermined the value of Union citizenship in order to quell the rising tide against immigration and the free movement of persons within the EU. This Article will depart from this commonly held view, by claiming that rather than being a revolutionary act, the Court's decision in Dano is merely the logical evolution of the case law on Union citizenship after the adoption of Directive 2004/38. The Court treats Directive 2004/38 as a closed system and will only accept residence fulfilling the conditions mentioned in the Directive as legal residence. The consequences of this evolution are Janus-faced: whilst some Union citizens lose out from the current approach, a strict reliance is beneficial to other categories of Union citizens. An exclusive focus on the Directive can be problematic due to the lack of individualised proportionality assessments, as well as an increasing range of social benefits that can be subjected to residence tests. However, the Court is merely accepting the political choices made by the EU legislature, and thus any criticism of the legal situation of EU citizens under Directive 2004/38 may be better placed against the EU legislature, rather than the judiciary.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(3), 1319-1331 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Deprivation of Member State nationality. - II.1. Adults. - II.2. Minor children. - III. Member State withdrawal from the Union. - IV. Associate EU citizenship. - V. Final remarks. | (Abstract) This Article addresses questions concerning the loss of Member State nationality and the possible implications for EU citizenship. The Author first revisits Rottmann (Court of Justice, judgment of 2 March 2010, case C-135/08) and reflects on the limitations that EU places on decisions of Member States to deprive a person of his/her nationality. In addition, the contribution considers whether the Rottmann case law, and the logic underpinning it, can be extended to situations in which Member State nationality is lost as a result of a decision of a Member State to withdraw from the Union. Having answered the latter question in the negative - for UK nationals Brexit implies loss of EU citizenship - the author briefly discusses the recent proposal to introduce an associate EU citizenship for nationals of former Member States.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(3), 1209-1243 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Reverse discrimination: colliding constitutional principles in EU law. - III. Abuse of EU law: definition and background. - IV. Abuse in the context of family reunification rights. - V. The case-law of the Court of Justice on family reunification law abuse. - VI. The Commission Communication with guidelines for the implementation of Directive 2004/38. - VII. The follow-up. - VIII. Abuse v. non-applicability of EU law. - IX. Concluding remarks. | (Abstract) Equality is a fundamental principle of EU law but protection of the Member States' competence to regulate their own nationals' legal position, anchored in the division of competences, may cause inequality among citizens. Reverse discrimination occurs when EU citizens who reside in their own Member State and are in a purely internal situation are subject to the law of this Member State, while EU citizens who fall within the scope of EU law through the use of free movement rights benefit from more lenient EU rules. Both equality among EU Member States and the division of competences are important principles of EU constitutionalism. Proposed remedies should, therefore, fit within the constitutional system of the EU. In its case-law, the Court makes EU citizenship rights more accessible and empowers EU citizens to change the legal regime that applies to them by moving across a border. This case-law opens up a possibility to circumvent national immigration law. This Article inquires whether the use of EU law for this purpose should be considered to be abuse of law. In addition, it discusses the role of the European Convention on Human Rights in the protection of families, when EU law does not apply. The first part of the Article discusses the constitutional background in which reverse discrimination and family reunification are situated. The second part studies the concept of abuse of law in the context of EU citizenship and the question when family reunification on the basis of EU law can be classified as such, as well as the implications thereof.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(3), 1139-1158 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Setting the scene: legal characteristics of the "triangular" fundamental rights protection system. - III. The modern protection of fundamental rights. - IV. The Court's "substance of the rights" doctrine. - V. The way forward: taking the "substance of the rights" doctrine a step further. - V.1. Delimiting the proposal in accordance with Art. 2 TEU. - V.2. Another use of rights. - V.3. The paradigm of effective judicial protection. - VI. Concluding remarks. | (Abstract) The financial crisis has revealed gaps in the protection of EU citizens against unjust deprivations of their rights, including the right to effective judicial protection, due to the difficulty in challenging the consequences of the conditionality imposed. This Article suggests that the deficient protection derives from the limited scope of application of fundamental rights under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter) and its unstable judicial interpretation, along with the fact that EU citizenship rights have not developed sufficiently. I will, however, argue that there is a duty to protect citizens within a constitutionalised Union, against any deprivations of their rights contrary to the values of the Union itself. This Article aims to fill these gaps, by developing the connection between EU fundamental and EU citizenship rights, using the judicially developed "substance of the rights" doctrine. Various attempts have been made to achieve this end, yet some loose ends remain which are largely addressed in this Article through the establishment of a new jurisdictional test, which combines a dynamic reading of Art. 20 TFEU and the "substance of the rights" doctrine, and Art. 2 TEU and fundamental rights as general principles of EU law.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(3), 1075-1113 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Setting the scene. - II.1. Applicable nationality - Ranking and mobility quality. - II.2. Constellations. - II.3. Right to return - Conditions (Home MS(/MS) movement MS/Home MS). - II.4. "Circular" right to return - (Home MS/MS movement Home MS/Home MS). - II.5. Naturalisation - Lounes (Home MS/MS residence MS/Home MS). - III. Lounes judgment. - III.1. Dual nationality and the Directive - Home MS rank always applicable. - III.2. Dual nationality and Art. 21, para. 1, TFEU. - III.3. Discussion. - IV. "New" issues. - IV.1. Does Lounes apply only in the Member State of naturalisation? - Geographical scope. - IV.2. To whom does Lounes apply? - Individual scope. - IV.3. Emphasis on having the mobility quality. - V. Conclusion - A choice: Nationality competence or abandonment of reverse discrimination. | (Abstract) This Article will introduce the principle of ranking of nationalities and mobility quality in EU free movement law and will explain how this applies to dual EU citizens. It describes how the right to return case-law was detrimental to dual EU citizens moving between Member States of nationality and how the recent Lounes judgment (judgment of 14 November 2017, case C-165/16) affects this. The Article furthermore explains how Lounes should be applied by reference to the geographical and individual scopes, as well as the consequences of this judgment. The conclusion drawn is that, in the near future, the Court of Justice will be faced with a major choice: either it will extend the right to return, by largely abandoning the principle of reverse discrimination, as well as by revising its case-law on individuals who lost the nationality of their Member State of origin and the rights attached thereto; or it will restrict the nationality laws of Member States as to the duty to renounce nationality, and the automatic loss of nationality upon acquisition of a nationality.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(3), 1289-1292 | Article | (Abstract) EU citizenship played a central role in the debate preceding the Brexit referendum and during the Brexit negotiations. It is inevitable, therefore, that, in the context of Brexit the concept of EU citizenship was and continues to be deeply challenged. This Special Section takes the process of Brexit and the challenges raised against the process of European integration in this context as an invitation to critically reflect on the current state of EU law by focusing, more particularly, on the concept of EU citizenship.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(2), 761-780 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Union citizenship as a status of integration: being and time and the passive citizen. - III. The reactive turn: the indigent and the criminal and the absence of integration - III.1. Economic activity and access to social benefits. - III.2. Crime and integration. - IV. Qualitative criteria of integration and the rise of the responsibilised citizen. | (Abstract) Union citizenship has witnessed a reactive turn in recent years with citizens' rights being more easily restricted. Key to this development is a shift in the use of the concept of integration. This article traces this development through two key areas of law, namely access to social benefits and the effect of criminal behaviour on citizens' rights. It further argues that this shift in the use of integration entails a greater emphasis on the agency of the individual and the responsibilisation of the citizen. An image of the "good EU citizen" emerges as productive and law-abiding.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(2), 833-841 | European Forum Insight of 10 October 2018 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Facts/Context. - II.1. Case C-331/16, K. - II.2. Case C-366/16, HF. - III. Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe. - IV. Judgment of the Court of Justice. - V. Comment. | (Abstract) The case of in K and HF (Court of Justice, judgment of 2 May 2018, joined cases C-331/16 and C-366/16) turns on a very specific set of facts, namely the restriction of Union citizen's residence rights on the basis of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Nonetheless, in its judgment the Court of Justice continues its development of the expulsion regime for Union citizens to incorporate an offence based, moralised interpretation of public policy and public security. In doing so, it develops an expressive dimension to the expulsion regime, using it to express the values of the Member States and the Union legal orders.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(3), 2499-8249 | European Forum Insight of 22 October 2018 | (Table of Contents) I. Brief introductory remarks: citizenship, national sovereignty and naturalization in the EU legal order. - II. The debate on reverse discrimination and freedom of movement. - III. The exercise of the freedom of movement as a sufficient link with EU law. - IV. From U-turners to naturalized citizens: the role of Art. 21, para. 1, TFEU. - V. Concluding remarks: how long does a mover need special protection? | (Abstract) The Insight addresses reverse discrimination in the field of free movement and derived residence rights for EU citizens' family members who are third country nationals. It outlines the debate concerning the justification for differential treatment and discusses the role of the EU and the Member States in relation to reverse discrimination. While the Court of Justice has traditionally considered the exercise of the freedom of movement as a sufficient link with EU law, the recent case law shows that the coherence of this approach is under pressure. As the Lounes preliminary ruling shows (judgment of 14 November 2017, case C-165/16, Lounes [GC]), when movers settle in the host State, are fully integrated and eventually naturalize, differential treatments between movers and statics can be hardly justified and urge the Member States to address this phenomenon.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(2), 659-662 | Article | (Abstract) This Introduction guides the reader through the special section "Social Integration in EU Law: Contents, Limits and Functions of an Elusive Notion". The Authors underline the multi-faceted essence of this concept, which has both an integrative potential and a defensive function. Social integration is closely connected to the enjoyment of rights: the higher the degree of integration is, the more rights a person benefits from. However, the recent practice of the European institutions and the Member States reveal that a lack of integration can be a powerful tool for managing intra-EU mobility and migrations flows from third countries.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(2), 911-922 | European Forum Insight of 21 June 2018 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The dispute at the main proceeding and the preliminary question. - III. The Opinion of AG Bot. - IV. The CJEU ruling and the enhanced application of Directive 2004/38. - V. Non-discrimination and right to family life: the marginalisationof fundamental rights. - V.1. EU citizenship and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality: two sides of the same coin. - V.2. The CJEU vis-à-vis the "right to family life": limiting or enhancing its potential? - VI. The additional value of the Toufik Lounes ruling: its implications for Brexit. - VII. Concluding remarks. | (Abstract) This Insight tackles a recent judgment of the CJEU, Toufik Lounes (Court of Justice, judgment of 14 November 2017, case C-165/16, Toufik Lounes v. Secretary of State for the Home Department), where the CJEU was asked to rule on the case of a EU national, Ms García Omazábal, who had exercised her free movement rights, later acquiring the citizenship of the host State while also retaining her nationality of origin. The Court has further investigated the scope ratione personae of Directive 2004/38 and Art. 21, para. 1, TFEU, so to clarify whether, in the scenario above, the EU national and her third-country national spouse could still be considered "beneficiaries" under Directive 2004/38. The CJEU answered as follows: while Directive 2004/38 is not applicable in the situation above, Art. 21, para. 1, TFEU shall instead be applied so as to prevent the EU national holding a dual citizenship to be treated less favourably than a EU national having the citizenship of his country of origin only, and therefore having the EU national's right to family life unreasonably disrupted. Against this backdrop, the Insight first highlights the merits of the decision, by also investigating its positive effects within the Brexit process. Secondly, it discloses a main shortcoming that is likely to weaken the overall protection granted to EU citizens, i.e. the CJEU choice to disregard the connection between the provisions on the EU citizenship and the respect of fundamental rights.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2017 2(1), 209-222 | European Forum Insight of 18 April 2017 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Facts and legal background of the case. - III. Extradition of an EU citizen to a third State in light of Art. 18 TFEU. - III.1. Introduction. - III.2. Does extradition of EU citizens to third States on a basis of a bilateral agreement with the Member State fall within the EU law domain? - III.3. Is extradition of an EU citizen to a third State discriminatory within the meaning of Art. 18 TFEU? - III.4. Justification of discrimination of EU citizens in extradition cases. - IV. Protection of EU citizens against extradition to a third State under the Charter. - V. Conclusions. | (Abstract) Extradition agreements between Member States and third States fall within the competence of Member States, but the ruling in Aleksei Petruhhin (Court of Justice, judgment of 6 September 2016, case C-182/15 [GC]) shows that Member States must exercise this competence in light of EU law if extradition may affect an EU citizen's fundamental rights protected under the Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This can be the case if the EU citizen who is subject to extradition has exercised his right to free movement by moving from his home State to another Member State. Extradition of Petruhhin, an Estonian citizen, was requested by Russia while he was exercising his right to freedom of movement and residence in Latvia. As is the case in many States, the national law of Latvia does not extend the same level of protection against extradition to foreign citizens, as to its own nationals. The Court of Justice ruled that in such a case, extradition of an EU citizen to a third State is generally prohibited under Art. 18 TFEU and can only be justified if the prosecution in the home Member State is not possible. In addition, this case confirms earlier rulings that the extradition of an EU citizen will not be permitted if his fundamental rights under the Charter will be endangered in the requesting State. The case concerns prohibitions of absolute character, such as prohibition against torture and degrading treatment. To determine the possibility of breach of rights under the Charter, the Member State must undertake a rigorous verification of the level of protection of human rights in the relevant third State before deciding whether to grant the extradition request.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2016 1(3), 2499-8249 | Editorial | (Abstract) The flawed EU's attempts to enforce the rule of law, both in Hungary and Poland, dramatically underline the EU institutions' weakness. How can legal academics provide the EU with new tools to tackle these violations of the rule of law? Not only in better equipping the EU with tools to impose EU law or sanctioning recalcitrant member States. Legal academics could start from populist discourses themselves. In particular, two critiques of the EU's action must be dealt with. The first one is the absence of predictability and clarity of the EU's action. The second one is the source of EU's action: "in the name of whom" is the EU sanctioning is the question that must urgently be answered to.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2016 1(2), 763-764 | (Abstract) The García-Nieto judgment concerns a Spanish family who moved to Germany and applied for subsistence benefits. As the father was economically inactive and had not lived in the host Member State for the minimum time required (three months), he was refused the allowance. The Court of Justice of the European Union was asked through a preliminary ruling to pronounce on the compatibility of this German rule with EU law - more precisely with Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States and Regulation (EC) 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems. The Court decided that the German regulation did not breach the latter, confirming the Dano-Alimanovic "restrictive" recent line of jurisprudence on EU citizenship.