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This paper responds in its first sections to a series of articles in which Rainer Schmalz-Bruns developed a concept of legitimate governance beyond the constitutional state, which he called ‘deliberative supranationalism’ and contrasted with what Jürgen Neyer and the present author had suggested under the same title. The Epilogue of the paper first comments on more recent critiques brought forward especially by contributors to this Special Issue of the ELJ and then on the programmatic rejection of comitology by the European Commission’s White Paper on Governance in the EU. Our querelles allemandes were not specifically Teutonic: while Schmalz-Bruns presented his approach as a systematic elaboration of the theories of deliberative democracy, based, in particular, on recent contributions by Joshua Cohen, Michael Dorf, and Charles Sabel, Jürgen Neyer and I had offered an interpretation of institutional innovations and decision-making practices as observed in the European market-building project. This discussion has had precursors and follow-ups in various contexts, among both lawyers and political scientists. This essay should hence be understood as a contribution to an ongoing debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The word 'governance' has become an increasingly central policy motif in the European Union and elsewhere yet its meanings are ambiguous and often poorly understood. This article examines the genealogy of that concept focusing in particular on the European Commission's claim to have developed a new, more open and progressive model of 'European governance'. The paper is set out in four steps. The first analyses the European Commission's claims for 'governance' as a concept integral to its new vision for Europe. The second interrogates some of the conflicting definitions and meanings inherent in the term and examines the highly selective paradigm of governance that has been developed in official Commission discourse. The third addresses two specific areas where the Commission's governance model has been applied: the Green paper on The Future of Parliamentary Democracy and the Open Method of Coordination. The fourth turns to analyse these findings using critical social theory. I conclude that far from laying the grounds for a more inclusive, participatory and democratic political order, the Commission's model to governance represents a form of neoliberal governmentality that is actually undermining democratic government and promoting a politics of exclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Parliament has often been understood along the lines of theories of European integration—compared to regular parliaments by Federalists or belittled as merely an international assembly by intergovernmentalists. This paper proposes an understanding of the European Parliament not along theories about what the EU should become, but what it is and surely will continue to be, that is a very distinct federal structure. The European Parliament is a parliament in an executive federalism—with farreaching consequences for its form and functions. After outlining the characteristics of this federal structure, these consequences will be demonstrated by analyzing the European Parliament in contrast with two ideal types of parliaments: the working parliament, separated from the executive branch and centered around strong committees (like the US Congress), and the debating parliament, characterized by the fusion of parliamentary majority and government as well as plenary debates (like the British House of Commons). Dwelling thus on a comparison to a legislature in a non-parliamentary federal system, like the US Congress, this paper argues that the European Parliament might best be understood as a special case of a working parliament. Finally, it will be proposed to consider the influence of executive federalism not only as fundamentally shaping the European Parliament but also as rendering the EU generally a semi-parliamentary democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During recent years, the concept of European civil society has gained increasing popularity. The European Institutions themselves have developed a discourse on civil society and civil dialogue. Institutional interests have shaped this discourse. Reframing the normative context for EU democracy, this discourse suits some institutions better than others. In particular, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Commission have made recourse to it; the former to redefine its proper role and combat the risk of marginalisation within the European institutional set-up; the latter first to build support for policy initiatives in the social sphere and subsequently to respond to the legitimacy crisis of the Brussels’ bureaucracy. These institutional interests have inspired a conceptualisation of civil society as ‘functional participation’ and ‘functional representation’ rather than as ‘politicisation’ or ‘decentralisation’. However, while the Commission and the ESC have had some success in selling their discourse, to be successful in the longer run some problematic assumptions of the discourse should be tackled and both the different rationales for civil society involvement as well as the multi-level character of European civil society and European policymaking should be taken into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theme ‘law and disorganised civil society’ raises the fundamental question concerning the junction between legal order and disorder, hence the passage from instituted legal order to the institution of legal order. The emblematic manifestation of this passage, in the framework of the European legal order, is the acquis communautaire: what is the nature of the process that leads from acquired community to acquiring a community? In a first, preparatory, step, it will be argued that determinate conceptions of truth, time and the giving and taking of reason underlie the process of acquiring a European community. These findings are confronted, in a second step, with Antonio Negri's theory of the multitude as a constituent power, which opposes revolutionary self-determination to representation. Deconstructing this massive opposition, this paper explores three ways in which representation is at work in revolutionary self-determination. As will become clear in the course of the debate, instituting (European) community turns on the interval linking and separating law ‘and’ disorganised civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From a social-market perspective, European integration has reduced the capacity of democratic politics to deal with the challenges of global capitalism, and it has contributed to rising social inequality. The article summarises the institutional asymmetries which have done most to constrain democratic political choices and to shift the balance between capital, labour and the state: the priority of negative over positive integration and of monetary integration over political and social integration. It will then explain why efforts to democratise European politics will not be able to overcome these asymmetries and why politically feasible reforms will not be able to remove them. On the speculative assumption that the aftermath of a deep crisis might indeed create the window of opportunity for a political re-foundation of European integration, the concluding section will outline institutional ground rules that might facilitate democratic political action at both European and national levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids through a regulatory lens in order to determine its effectiveness as a regulatory mechanism. A central regulatory problem for European legislators is to determine the optimal balance between harmonisation and diversity, and the directive reflects the balance which was struck. The article questions whether the resulting ‘light regulatory touch’ may have jeopardised the existing efficient self-regulatory regime which operates in the UK (the largest European takeover market), while simultaneously undermining the directive's goal of facilitating takeovers and yielding a level playing field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Securing energy supply for Europe has been for decades at the forefront of the energy policies of individual European Community member countries. However, dealing with energy issues in general and securing energy supply in particular is a new phenomenon within the EU's regulatory framework. One important issue which has not yet been discussed by legal scholars and which has been questioned repeatedly by energy experts, is the question who is actually responsible to guarantee security of energy supply in Europe? Is it the European Community alone? Is it the Member States alone? Or is it both? This question cannot be answered without a detailed legal analysis of the EU law in general, and EU law on division of competences between the Community and the Member States in particular. This article seeks to highlight the complications of this area of law within the EU and expand it to cover the energy sector in order to determine who and under what circumstances is responsible for guaranteeing security of energy supply for the consumers within the EU borders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the impact of the creation of the European Convention on the academic dispute of constitutional change in the European Union. Agreement on the comprehensive constitutional settlement; Evaluation of rhetorical strategies contributed to forge agreements; Need to make tricky compromises to reach an agreement on the creation of a convention.

In the polycentric judicial architecture of the Community, there is a rich, constant interplay between national procedural rules and European interventions. In the making of the European legal order, EC law depends on national procedural law and therefore, substantive EC supremacy depends; existentially, on procedure. In this context, the author argues that the traditional sharply defined dichotomy of national procedural autonomy versus Community law effectiveness no longer reflects the implicit course of action lam down by the Court of Justice. Instead, the European legal order has moved, as a praxis, from national procedural autonomy to a more subtle combination of national procedural competence and European procedural primacy. The rationale behind this trend testifies both to the importance of the interrelationship between procedure and substantive law in the making of Europe and to the flexibility of procedural law; EC law depends on procedural law and procedure readily submits to the demands of a new legal order In doing so, it also creates new choices and venues for European supremacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The twin concepts of constitutionalism and democracy, which offer a complex template for the structural organisation of a polity, can be understood in terms of a dialectic of complementary but competing values, values represented by responsiveness to an existing order and innovation towards a potentially new order. Recognising this necessarily dynamic relationship, an essentialist reading of a constitutionalisation of the demos is abandoned, and an examination of the extent to which the dialectic can credibly or legitimately be played out in a supranational ‘community’ and in the context of an emerging transnational civil society can be undertaken. Rather than seeking credibility or legitimacy through the rationalisation of a community by an ethical consensus as in some forms of republicanism and communitarianism, the dialectic opens up the norms and boundaries of the polity and leads to an understanding of the ‘community’ in less rigid and more diffuse, even plural, terms. Once understood in this way the possibility emerges for legitimacy to be pursued through a public sphere enlarged by a context-transcending constitutional discourse mediated by transnational civil society. Alternatively the normative ‘openness’ of the polity might be prioritised and with it the uncertainty/fluidity of the constitutional arrangement itself; in this way the legitimate pursuit of constitutionalism is understood in terms of a never-ending agonistic struggle or experimental practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The true governance challenge within Europe remains the resolution of conflict within the Internal Market and the identification of efficacious solutions, to its regulatory and redistributive problems. Absent the legitimising sovereign power once furnished by the national constitutional settlement and without recourse to a pre-political principle of pluralist self-limitation, Europe’s law must supply a pluralist and contested internal market polity with authoritative adjudication on the meaning and content of institutions of market governance, including ‘law’ itself. In the endeavour to ‘socialise the market’, or to re-establish the determinative links between society, politics, and the market place caste asunder by a rationalising process of European economic integration, Europe’s law is seemingly returning—via judicial dialogue between national and European courtrooms—to the ancient legal grammar and semantics of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘equity’. Such an adjudicative return serves: (i) the processing of reasonable pluralism within the market in the light of deliberative values: and (ii), the re-establishment and maintenance of the law’s factual (non-natural), logical (internally coherent and impartial) and moral (real-world) legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Different forms of law are perceived of as possessing differing degrees of legal quality. A quality continuum suggests itself, running from 'high quality' national law, through to 'lesser quality' European law and to 'low quality' international law. This article seeks to explain the perceived differences in the quality of these laws with reference to legal theoretical perceptions of what it is that constitutes the law's quality. It argues that only a theory of law which identifies the core of the law's integrity as lying in its ability to act as a fulcrum between spheres of social and public discourse and the exercise of power can fully explain the divergence in legal quality between national, European and international law. With specific regard to the quality of European law, it concludes by arguing that it is weakened by its relative lack of social internalisation-in comparison with a higher degree of legal and political internalisation-within the European public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a study which argued that the role of national courts in the process of integration in Europe. Role of the European Court of Justice in politics; Details on a theory fit for its communities of courts.

The problem raised by popular sovereignty in the framework of the EU is not whether it is relevant to European integration; it is. The problem is another, namely the identity and, thus, the boundary of a democratic polity. The very idea of 'European' integration suggests that integration is only imaginable by reference to the closure provided by an identity, a boundary that is normative rather than merely geographical. In this minimal sense, a European people is the necessary presupposition of integration, not merely its telos. Bluntly, there is no integration without inclusion and, also, no integration without exclusion. This, then, is the real problem raised by popular sovereignty in a European context: if there is no such thing as non-exclusionary integration, how can a reflection on the boundedness of European integration be more than a rationalisation of exclusion? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]