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This paper focuses on the adoption of a number of Community regulations, each for a specific sector, to be implemented not just by a supranational administration (central or peripheral), but by a plurality of national, supranational and sometimes mixed authorities, with a special role assigned to a Community office set up by the same legislation for a given sector, and granting it legal personality. The purpose of this paper is to verify whether the various regulations by sector ought not to be regarded as variants of an emergent general model of joint exercise of certain Community functions. It is argued that such general model is still in the making, but it is in the process of becoming consolidated, notwithstanding the variety of approaches adopted by European legislators. Such a pattern is characterised by specific, differentiated organisational and procedural features. This conclusion is relevant in several different ways, the first of which is that it provides new conceptual tools for interpreting and explaining the process of administrative integration between supranational and national public authorities, in particular by specifying the taxonomy of the patterns through which a Community function can be carried out by two different authorities acting jointly. Second, the decentralised integration model should be considered as a sound and feasible option for the administrative evolution of the Community legal system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though the impact of EC law on the legal status of national powers has been fairly well examined, little attention has been paid to the overall evaluation of the relations developed between national authorities. The paper argues that the mutation of the Judiciary and the Executive role vis-à-vis the Legislature appears to be an application of an emerging doctrine in EC public law that conspicuously resembles the 'Checks and Balances' theory of American constitutionalism. The action of one public authority is— or must be—countered by the reaction of another for the benefit of EC law. Apart from identifying the features of this 'principle' in comparison to its equivalent American doctrine, the paper deals with the question of a possible coexistence of this new model of governance with the traditional one. The comparative perspective is necessary here. Whereas in Germany the constitutional model appears to cope with European demands, in France it seems largely opposed to such a dynamic conception of the separation of powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The paper reviews key aspects of the new constitutional framework for the European Union, once the Treaty of Amsterdam has been ratified, in the light of the core challenges of managing flexible integration in an enlarged Union and securing adequate legitimacy for the integration project. Reviewing briefly the general debates on flexibility, and its relationship to different constitutional and political futures for the Union which are suggested by those involved in the debates, the paper examines the principal provisions governing what is termed `closer cooperation' within the new Union treaties. The emphasis is placed on the framework provisions of the TEU, and those in the First Pillar. It is noticeable that the Treaty takes a `non-ideological' approach to flexibility, eschewing direct support for those who interpret flexibility as meaning more or less integration in the future. It provides a framework for future cooperation which is likely to be too restrictive to be workable, except in very limited circumstances. However, particular instances of flexibility are provided in the Treaty, in the form of the opt-outs from the new free movement title and the communitarisation of Schengen for the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, and some might even describe these as `pick-and-choose'. The paper concludes by reviewing the flexibility debate against the background of the ongoing legitimacy challenge for the Union, arguing that, as currently conceived, flexibility is more to do with balancing political interests than with securing or enhancing legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Last year the European Commission published itsAction Planon European contract law. That plan forms an important step towards a European Civil Code. In its Plan, the Commission tries to depoliticise the codification process by asking a group of academic experts to prepare what it calls a‘common frame of reference’. This paper argues that drafting a European Civil Code involves making many choices that are essentially political. It further argues that the technocratic approach which the Commission has adopted in the Action Plan effectively excludes most stakeholders from having their say during the stage when the real choices are made. Therefore, before the drafting of the CFR/ECC starts, the Commission should submit a list of policy questions regarding the main issues of European private law to the European Parliament and the other stakeholders. Such an alternative procedure would repoliticise the process. It would increase the democratic basis for a European Civil Code and thus its legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to contribute both to the ‘Refgov’ project, which is focused on the ambition to find ways of promoting human rights within the EU, but also, more in general and apart from the project, to an improved understanding of the crucial place conflict of law rules occupy in the building of a common Europe—a highly political question behind apparently technical issues. In the study the author deals with the parameters, points of interest, etc in relation to private international law which should be heeded if European Member States ‘look at’ each other's laws, and—in the context of the ‘Refgov’ project—if the idea is to exchange ‘best practices’ or harmonise substantive law, or to harmonise private international law, etc further through a type of open method of coordination. The contribution also shows that private international law issues are decisive in respect of every evaluation of the impact of European integration on human rights, both if this integration process takes place through ‘negative’ harmonisation (for example by falling back on the principle of mutual recognition) and through ‘positive’ harmonisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently the European Court of Justice has been shedding a new light on the limits of Community competence for defence. This article analyses the rulings in Sirdar, Kreil, and Dory with regards to two interrelated issues. First it discusses the effect of Community law on the equality of men and women in the armed forces of the Member States. Second, it deals with the impact of these decisions on the constitutional order of the European Union. The article argues that Community law has a considerable impact on defence-related national law. Therefore the analysis ultimately contributes to a narrow aspect of the constitutional debate: the demarcation of competencies between the Member States and the Community in matters related to defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the polycentric judicial architecture of the Community, there is a rich, constant interplay between national procedural rules and European interventions. In the making of the European legal order, EC law depends on national procedural law and therefore, substantive EC supremacy depends; existentially, on procedure. In this context, the author argues that the traditional sharply defined dichotomy of national procedural autonomy versus Community law effectiveness no longer reflects the implicit course of action lam down by the Court of Justice. Instead, the European legal order has moved, as a praxis, from national procedural autonomy to a more subtle combination of national procedural competence and European procedural primacy. The rationale behind this trend testifies both to the importance of the interrelationship between procedure and substantive law in the making of Europe and to the flexibility of procedural law; EC law depends on procedural law and procedure readily submits to the demands of a new legal order In doing so, it also creates new choices and venues for European supremacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the question of the relevance of the most recent soft policy instrument of the EU, the open method of coordination (OMC), for organising actions at European level in politically sensitive areas. In addition to describing its origins and operational principles, we will compare its application to the areas of employment and social inclusion. Two hypotheses make up the structure of the text. The first is that the discourses produced in the framework of OMC in the areas of employment and social inclusion are broad enough to cater to the different welfare models, but that the changes to be made by the Member States to be in line with the European discourses differ considerably, depending on their welfare state family and their initial situation. The second is that the form of OMC is variable, depending on policy area. Our conclusions confirm both of these hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comments on the article written by Federico Mancini which appeared in the March 1998 issue of the `European Law Journal' that deals on the case for European Union (EU) statehood. Arguments against EU statehood; Examination on the arguments of Mancini in support for EU statehood; Political reality in Europe; Nature of the debate in Europe about the European integration; Challenge faced by the European Court of Justice from national courts.