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Four experiments investigated judgments about voluntary human actions and physical causes that were embedded in causal chains ending in negative outcomes (e.g., a forest fire). Causes were judged for their explanatory quality, their effect on the probability of the outcome, and the extent to which they could be socially controlled. Results supported legal theorists' claim that voluntary actions are judged better explanations than physical causes. Indices derived from theories of probability change generally failed to predict the preference for voluntary actions. In contrast, this preference was mediated by the perceived extent to which voluntary versus physical causes may be brought under social control. These results suggest that causal explanation, at least within causal chains, is not driven solely by changes in the probability of an outcome when a cause is added, and that observers recognize the potential social function of explanations in drawing attention to socially controllable causes.

Two studies examined lay people’s understanding of goals and intentional actions, which are key concepts in folk psychology. The studies show how predictions of goals and actions are affected by actors’ beliefs about their abilities and their actual possession of the preconditions required for the actions. In some conditions, the beliefs and the preconditions were contradictory. Actors’ beliefs about their abilities shaped observers’ goal ascriptions, whereas actual preconditions dominated predictions about action accomplishment. Participants judged the relationship between goals and actions to be stronger when preconditions were present. Participants judged that neither beliefs nor preconditions were necessary for the actor to have action fantasies. These studies clarify how folk psychological concepts of desires, beliefs, and preconditions relate to each other and how they relate to attributions of goals and actions. Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The context of intergroup relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand was investigated using perceptions of history by Maori (Polynesian-descended) and Pakeha (European-descended) samples from university and the general public. There was strong consensus that the Treaty of Waitangi was the most important event in New Zealand's history, but only Maori, the subordinate ethnic group, showed in-group favouritism in their judgments regarding the Treaty. Pakeha, the dominant group, showed outgroup favouritism, and distanced themselves from past injustices using linguistic strategies. Maori students showed interest in their ethnic origins (ontogeny), rating the distant past and Polynesian history higher, and free-recalling more events prior to European arrival than other groups; Maori in the general population shared a more similar perception of history to Pakeha. Both in-group favouritism and ontogeny were found in sentence-completion choices. Historical perceptions were strongly related to positions on current political issues. Results are related to social identity theory, social representations theory, and social dominance theory. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Recent research on causal inference suggests that common actions tend to be attributed to goals, whereas difficult actions, if obstructed, are attributed primarily to preconditions. The present studies examine the way that the framing of causal questions influences ratings of goals and preconditions for common actions. The studies test the view that ‘why’ questions favour goal explanations, by presenting causal questions framed as ‘why’ questions or ‘explain’ questions. Structured and free-response measures were used. They show that when the question is expressed as asking why an action occurs, goals are rated better than preconditions, regardless of the presence of obstacles, whereas if the question is framed as requesting an explanation of the action, preconditions are deemed better explanations than goals for obstructed actions. Goals remain better explanations when the action is unobstructed. These findings confirm the importance of the framing of causal questions for research on causal explanation, and suggest that the phrasing of causal questions influences the focus of explanations. Copyright © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

We investigate whether people prefer voluntary causes to physical causes in unfolding causal chains and whether statistical (covariation, sufficiency) principles can predict how people select explanations. Experiment 1 shows that while people tend to prefer a proximal (more recent) cause in chains of unfolding physical events, causality is traced through the proximal cause to an underlying distal (less recent) cause when that cause is a human action. Experiment 2 shows that causal preference is more strongly correlated with judgements of sufficiency and conditionalised sufficiency than with covariation or conditionalised covariation. In addition, sufficiency judgements are partial mediators of the effect of type of distal cause (voluntary or physical) on causal preference. The preference for voluntary causes to physical causes corroborates findings from social psychology, cognitive neuroscience and jurisprudence that emphasise the primacy of intentions in causal attribution processes.

Recent critical attempts to modify or replace attribution theory have focused particularly on two issues: the relationship of the reason—cause distinction to attribution theories and actor/observer differences in attribution, and the emphasis in attribution theories on inferential, as opposed to self-presentational, processes. In dealing with these two issues, some critics also point out ethnocentric and ideological influences on attribution theories. The issues raised are important, as both intentional (reason) explanations and self-presentational factors have been under-represented in attribution theories. But the new attempts to build these factors into theories of lay explanation are not wholly satisfactory. Authors make several stipulations about reasons and causes that are unsupportable, and they employ arguments about differences between actors and observers that are unsatisfactory in other respects. Nonetheless a number of their claims can be reconceptualized and supported by using definitions and parameters that do not confound the variables being examined. Claims that attribution theories have ignored self-presentational factors underestimate the extent to which self-presentational factors are being examined in attribution studies, but the proposition that self-presentational factors account for most aspects of explanations is unconvincing. Authors are also mistaken to assume that ethnocentric or ideological factors are particular to attribution theories. The errors, exaggerations and other difficulties in the authors' arguments do not nullify the attempt to expand or transcend attribution theory. Where flaws in the arguments are pointed out, alternative ways of tackling the same issues are referred to or proposed. Plusieurs tentatives recentes visent a modifier ou a remplacer les theories attributives. Deux aspects de celles-ci furent particulierement vises : la relation entre les differences d'attribution acteur-observateur et la distinction cause-raison des theories, d'une part, et l'emphase mise dans ces theories sur les processus inferentiels par opposition a des processus d'autopresentation, d'autre part. Certains critiques firent egalement remarquer des influences ethnocentriques et ideologiques sur les theories. Ces questions sont importantes puisqu'il est vrai que l'on a neglige a la fois les explications de type intentionalite (raison) et les facteurs d'auto-presentation. Toutefois, les tentatives d'inclusion de ces facteurs dans les theories d'explication naive ne sont pas completement satisfaisantes. Certains auteurs etablissent certaines conditions a propos de raisons et causes qui sont insoutenables et ils emploient des arguments insatisfaisants a propos des differences entre acteurs et observateurs. Neanmoins, certaines de leurs affirmations peuvent ětre reconceptualisees et acceptees en employant des definitions et des parametres qui ne confondent pas les variables qui doivent ětre examinees. L'affirmation suivant laquelle les theories attributives ont ignore les facteurs d'auto-presentation, sous-estime le nombre d'etudes concernant l'attribution dans lesquelles de tels facteurs sont examines. La proposition suivant laquelle de tels facteurs rendent compte de la plupart des aspects des explications, ne convainc toutefois pas. De měme, certains auteurs se trompent egalement quand ils affirment que des facteurs ideologiques ou ethnocentriques sont particuliers aux theories attributives. Les erreurs, exagerations et autres difficultes dans les argumentations n'invalident pas les tentatives pour etendre ou depasser les theories attributives. Lorsque des deficiences dans les arguments sont relevees, d'autres voies pour aborder le probleme sont signalees ou proposees.