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Abstract: In this paper I take up the question of whether and in what sense action might be the conclusion of practical reasoning and argue against the answer provided by Sebastian Rödl's account of practical reasoning. Rödl's account aspires to steer a middle ground between the attitudinal and the neo‐Aristotelian accounts of practical reasoning, by proposing that its conclusion is at once a thought and a movement. This account is worth considering for it promises to explain both practical reasoning's practicality (that it brings about action) and its rationality (that it is subject to thought governing norms) in one move. But, I argue in this paper, a Rödlian account—an account which grants Rödl's central theses—fails to deliver on its promise. The reason is that, like others, a Rödlian also assumes that the only sense in which practical reasoning is practical is the sense in which it has a conclusion. Challenging this assumption in the right way, I finally suggest, helps us reassess the task of explaining practical reasoning in a way that goes beyond Rödlian, attitudinal and neo‐Aristotelian accounts alike. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses an interpretation of Kant's conception of transcendental subjectivity, which manages to avoid many of the concerns that have been raised by analytic interpreters over this doctrine. It is an interpretation put forward by selected C19 and early C20 neo-Kantian writers. The article starts out by offering a neo-Kantian interpretation of the object as something that is constituted by the categories and that serves as a standard of truth within a theory of judgment (I). The second part explicates transcendental subjectivity as the system of categories, which is self-referential and constitutes objects (II), in order to then evaluate this conception by means of a comparison with Hegel's absolute subject (III). Rather than delineating the differences between neo-Kantian writers, the article systematically expounds a shared project, which consists in providing the ultimate foundation for judgments by means of an anti-psychologist and non-metaphysical interpretation of transcendental subjectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What capacities for discrimination must a subject possess in order to entertain singular thoughts? Evans has suggested that a subject must be able to discriminate his referent from all other entities in order to be able to do so; what he calls Russell's Principle. Evans' view has few followers, and he has been repeatedly accused of presenting no argument in its favour. In this paper I present what I take to be Evans' argument. I suggest that he has been misinterpreted as introducing Russell's Principle for the purpose of fixing reference. Rather, he introduces it in order to ensure that our conceptual capacities have the functional complexity to allow for objective thought. I suggest that the logical types of our thought are constituted by their inferential potential and argue that, even though singular thought may be possible without the satisfaction of Russell's Principle, singular thought that forms part of an objective world view is not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A definitive feature of Kant's moral philosophy is its rationalism. Kant insists that moral theory, at least at its foundation, cannot take account of empirical facts about human beings and their circumstances in the world. This is the core of Kant's commitment to 'metaphysics of morals', and it is what he sees as his greatest contribution to moral philosophy. The paper clarifies what it means to be committed to metaphysics of morals, why Kant is committed to it, and where he thinks empirical considerations may enter moral theory. The paper examines recent work of contemporary Kantians ( Barbara Herman, Allen Wood, and Christine Korsgaard) who argue that there is a central role for empirical considerations in Kant's moral theory. Either these theorists interpret Kant himself as permitting empirical considerations to enter, or they propose to extend Kant's theory so as to allow them to enter. With some qualifications, I argue that these interpretive trends are not supported by the texts, and that the proposed extensions are not plausibly Kantian. Kant's insistence on the exclusion of empirical considerations from the foundations of moral theory is not an incidental feature of his thought which might be modified while the rest remains unchanged. Rather, it is the very centre of his endeavours in moral philosophy. If we disagree with it, I argue, we have grounds for moving to a distinctly different theoretical framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On its face, Hume's account of mental representation involves at least two elements. On the one hand, Hume often seems to write as though the representational properties of an idea are fixed solely by what it is a copy or image of. But, on the other, Hume's treatment of abstract ideas (and other similar cases) makes it clear that the representational properties of a Humean idea sometimes depend, not just on what it is copied from, but also on the manner in which the mind associates it with other ideas. Past interpretations of Hume have tended to focus on one of these elements of his account to the neglect of the other. But no interpretation of this sort is likely to capture the role that both copying and association play within Hume's discussion. In what follows, I argue that the most plausible way of understanding Hume's discussion involves attributing to him a unified account of mental representation in which both of these elements play a central role. I close by discussing the manner in which reading Hume in this way would alter our understanding of the relationship between Hume's thought and contemporary philosophy of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Barry Stroud suggests that when we want to explain a certain kind of knowledge philosophically we feel we must explain it on the basis of another, prior kind of knowledge that does not imply or presuppose any of the knowledge we are trying to explain. If we accept this epistemic priority requirement (EPR) we find that we cannot explain our knowledge of the world in a way that satisfies it. If we reject EPR then we will be failing to make all of our knowledge of the world intelligible all at once. I respond to this dilemma by questioning EPR and arguing that it is, in any case, a requirement that is satisfied by explanations of our knowledge in terms of non-epistemic seeing. Since non-epistemic seeing is not a form of knowing, such explanations show how knowledge of the world can come to be out of something that is not knowledge of the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author offer views concerning the commentary of Bernard Williams on British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's notion about idealism. He explains that the conclusion of William's paper implies an objection to the later conception of Wittgenstein's philosophy. The author then claims that there is a possibility that William's understanding of Wittgenstein might be inflected to its determinant and benefits.

The article examines the response of Jaegwon Kim to the argument concerning his developed notion about mental properties. An overview of the supervenience and the generalization arguments that was formulated by Kim is presented. It analyzes the level/order distinction and the relation of functionalism, realizers versus role functionalism. It then argues that a proper analysis of the belief by Kim undermines supervenience arguments by showing that mental properties are being construed.

The article explores the framework of rationalism on obligation. It discusses that the idea does not shape practical deliberation solely by constituting a point in favor of fulfilling it. It specifies that like a command, it also constraints a person's practical deliberations. According to philosophers, it must be overriding practical considerations that a person obliged to do is also what makes most sense to do. Meanwhile, a simple rationalism exemplifies that duties and obligations have no special normative force attached to them and without distinctive role playing in practical deliberation.

The article discusses issues and topics related to the development of first-person authority. It presents the epistemic model that emphasizes certain structural features that will disable the model from providing ready explanation of the link between the first-person authority and the psychological capability of an agent. It presents an argument over the replacement of epistemic model with an agency alternative and the version of philosopher Richard Moran which was considered unattractive implications for evaluating rational agency and moral performance.

The article discusses issues related to the paper of philosopher John McDowell, being a good objection to the argument of Bernard Williams against externalism. It mentions the significant contribution of the paper to the debate over the existence of external reasons. It presents the author's view concerning the appeal to conversion by McDowell and the latter's positive account which do not seriously engage with the views of Williams about reasons and explanations. The article further examines McDowell's reply to the argument of William.

The article discusses transcendental philosophy by Johann Gottlieb Fichte and the writings related to the allegations of atheism that were lodged against Fichte in the autumn of 1798. It explores the understanding of transcendental philosophy as a theory of experience and the reasons underlying Fichte's reminder to philosopher Karl Leonhard Reinhold about the essence of transcendental philosophy. It examines how transcendental philosophy bears on the allegation that the Wissenschaftslehre is a crypto-atheistic philosophy.

The article discusses the differences between philosophers Nicolas Malebranche and David Hume on the religious aims of the experimental science of man. It stated that the work of Malebranche was motivated by an attempt to understand human nature and the errors to which it is prone. It seeks to alter a false philosophy that confuses man's appreciation on his dependence on God. The article examines two major areas of the issue, which is the causation and the self, and presents various aspects of such relation. A background on the project of Malebranche and a comparison of it to the work of Hume are given.

The article discusses the phenomenological description of the difference between non-positional and positional self-consciousness by philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre and self-reference by Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein. It explores the mutation within Sartre's view and the significance of the two-fold convergence to the nature of one's relation to himself. It examines the distinction between non-thetic and thetic self-consciousness and the difference between the use of "I" as subject and use of "I" as object. The article further discusses the revisions that each view respectively underwent and shows how the revisions converge. It outlines what remains a limit in the views of Sartre, which he shares with the Wittgenstein view.