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Good faith is a principle prominent in civil law countries but less so in common law countries, and which allows courts to deviate from black letter law. It provides them with flexibility to change the outcome of a deductive legal decision if they regard it as absurd. The principle of good faith thus empowers the judiciary to deviate. It can be used for an indefinite number of cases and might lead to almost all conceivable legal consequences. For instance, the judge can invalidate the contract, change the price, suspend or change a clause in the contract, or grant injunctive relief, compensation of damages, the disgorgement of profits or a removal claim. We argue that if the principle of good faith is used to develop contract law into an instrument for redistributing wealth in favor of poor parties, this can destroy the concept of contract as a social mechanism for generating mutual gains for parties, which might lead to unwanted economic consequences in terms of efficiency losses. We argue that the principle of good faith must be carefully and reluctantly used to reconstruct the fully specified contract and that well-informed judges, who understand the factual environment of a contract well should ask how fair bur self-interested parties would have allocated the risk in a pre-contractual situation. If the courts restrict the application of the good faith principle to these functions, this provides elasticity that otherwise would not exist if courts would strictly use the rules laid down in black letter law. Moreover, it saves transactions costs and is therefore in line with economic reasoning. We look at the most important Turkish cases and find that the Turkish Supreme Court following Continental European doctrines of good faith actually uses this principle to curb opportunistic behavior of parties and not to achieve redistribution from the rich to the poor by way of interfering into contract law.

The diversity of contract laws is said by the Commission to discourage cross-border trade and hinder the development by SMEs of a pan-European commercial policy. An optional instrument containing both facilitative general contract rules and mandatory consumer protection rules, one of the solutions proposed by the Commission, is gaining rapid support from key stakeholders. Drawing from firms' own views on the problems of legal diversity, and insights from organisational science, this article sets out the circumstances in which firms will likely consider a European optional code. Results are mixed: some firms may consider it, while others may ignore it. Much depends the firm's aspirations (i.e. SMEs cannot be assumed as-yet to have pan-European aspirations), how the firm perceives the problems of legal diversity, and how it searches for and decides upon solutions. It would appear that a European optional instrument may not be as useful or widely considered as its proponents would like to believe.

We argue that the proposed introduction of the doctrine of economic impossibility in Article 137 of the reform draft of the Turkish Code of Obligations is in line with economic considerations and facilitates business transactions. This new rule gives courts the explicit power to terminate a contract and relieve the party, which owes specific performance of its obligation, without imposing any duty to pay expectation damages to the other party. We argue that a court's decision to terminate a contract under economic impossibility should be based on three tests. First, a low-probability-event occurs between contract formation and performance. Second, this event causes an excessive increase in the costs of specific performance. Third, the concept of an excessive increase should take into due consideration the other party's interest in specific performance. The reform draft includes explicitly the first two tests, but not the third test. We also show under which conditions an excessive performance difficulty should not lead to termination of the contract but rather to an adjustment of the agreed price. We argue that the rule of economic impossibility, if diligently adjudicated, saves the parties transactions costs in comparison to a rule under which the law insists on specific performance or damage payments. We also argue that a specific rule of economic impossibility leads to better and more business-oriented solutions to the underlying problems than the alternative, which is to solve such problems under the broad and unspecific cover of the "good faith" or the "Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus" doctrine. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

The paper is an exercise in a neo-Austrian based economic analysis of product liability. After a short historical introduction, we take two of the basic premises of Austrian economic thought and see which system of product liability results. If costs are subjective and entrepreneurship is the essence of an efficient market process, a system of caveat emptor and vendor results. For judges to assess damages, in the way others advocate judges to do, judges would need to measure costs, something that cannot be done according to Austrian economics. The paper also answers some possible criticisms from the mainstream neoclassical perspective