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Public reporting on the quality of care is intended to guide patients to the provider with the highest quality and to stimulate a fair competition on quality. We apply a difference-in-differences design to test whether hospital quality has improved more in markets that are more competitive after the first public release of performance data in Germany in 2008. Panel data from 947 hospitals from 2006 to 2010 are used. Due to the high complexity of the treatment of stroke patients, we approximate general hospital quality by the 30-day risk-adjusted mortality rate for stroke treatment. Market structure is measured (comparatively) by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and by the number of hospitals in the relevant market. Predicted market shares based on exogenous variables only are used to compute the HHI to allow a causal interpretation of the reform effect. A homogenous positive effect of competition on quality of care is found. This effect is mainly driven by the response of non-profit hospitals that have a narrow range of services and private for-profit hospitals with a medium range of services. The results highlight the relevance of outcome transparency to enhance hospital quality competition., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

The introduction of prospective hospital reimbursement based on diagnosis-related groups (DRG) has been a conspicuous attempt to decelerate the steady increase of hospital expenditures in the German health sector. In this work, the effect of the financial reform on hospital efficiency is subjected to empirical testing by means of two complementary testing approaches. On the one hand, we apply a two-stage procedure based on non-parametric efficiency measurement. On the other hand, a stochastic frontier model is employed that allows a one-step estimation of both production frontier parameters and inefficiency effects. To identify efficiency gains as a consequence of changes in the hospital incentive structure, we account for technological progress, spatial dependence and hospital heterogeneity. The results of both approaches do not reveal any increase in overall efficiency after the DRG reform. In contrast, a significant decline in overall hospital efficiency over time is observed.