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The European Union is interested in balance, efficient governance and economic progress at its eastern borders. In this context, Joint Operational Programmes were established between EU states and non-EU states on the eastern part of the old continent. Thus, the Eastern Partnership was proposed as a specific Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy, its main objective being the creation, the intensification and the advancement of the necessary conditions for both political association and for the acceleration of the economic integration in the EU of Eastern European partner countries. Romania-Ukraine-Moldova Cross-Border Cooperation Programme 2007-2013 was an effective tool used for improving the economic and social situation, in the context of secure borders, by enhancing cooperation between partners on both borders, which led to the continuation of the project, in 2014-2020, with two distinct programmes, i.e. Romania-Ukraine and Romania-Moldova. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to highlight the results of Romania-Ukraine-Moldova POC 2007-2020, obtained as a result of the ex-post analysis as well as an ex-ante analysis of the new Romania-Ukraine Cooperation Programme 2014-2020, according to the model of evaluation on objectives. Finally, based on the results obtained, we shall try to outline proposals and forecasts for this programme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Finland's security is integrally linked with its immediate surroundings, Europe, and global development. Given that Finland considers Russia to be one of the main challenges to its security, cross-border security cooperation with it is limited. Over the years the Finnish border authorities have, nevertheless, developed effective joint working practices with their Russian counterparts which provide a unique communication channel, even in the present geopolitical climate. The present paper address the Finnish-Russia security cooperation, and its lack, within a wider European frame and pits the practical experiences against ongoing theoretical discussion on security and threat perceptions. It argues that despite the more multifaceted understandings of borders and the EUropeanised rhetoric, the Finnish-Russian border is still very much a classic state border guarded by two states from their respective perspectives. In the Finnish-Russian case the content of cooperation has more to do with border management than with more coherent border security, as the former is build on a more common ground than the latter. Increased cooperation and Russian convergence with EU models of border security and management would certainly be of benefit, but Russia's willingness to cooperate seems half-hearted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After Lithuania's secession from the USSR and the ensuing disintegration of the Union, the Kaliningrad region, which was a part of the Soviet Union in 1945-1991, became a Russian exclave. Its administrative land border turned out to coincide with the state border of the Russian Federation. The barrier function of the border of the Kaliningrad region started to increase, which became especially pronounced after the accession of Poland and Lithuania first to NATO and then to the European Union. As a result of successful international negotiations, Russian cooperation with Poland and Lithuania, as well as NATO and the EU, the contact function of the Russian-Lithuanian and Russian-Polish borders is gradually increasing. The most indicative examples are the Russian-Lithuanian agreement on the simplified transit document, which is issued instead of a visa for the travel of Russian citizens from the Kaliningrad region to other Russian regions via Lithuania, as well as the Russian-Polish agreement on local border traffic, which has simplified the travel of the residents of the Kaliningrad region to the neighbouring Polish voivodships and that of the residents of the latter to the Kaliningrad region. The development of the Kaliningrad region as a "development corridor" between the Russian Federation and the European Union will contribute to a further decrease in the barrier and an increase in the contact function of the Russian-Polish and Russian-Lithuanian borders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The profound socio-spatial transformations that have occurred in Post Cold-War Europe are becoming visible in border regions in terms of the influence of civil society cooperation, intermarriage, business networks, the increasing mobility of labour, local cross-border trade and tourism, etc. These processes suggest an acceleration of rapidly re-territorializing (e.g. 'post-national') dynamics in Europe. The Finnish-Russian case of 'Karelia' highlights the complexity of re-territorialisation in 'emerging' European Borderlands. Karelia is, on the one hand, a regional idea - part of an attempt to selectively use history, geographical representations and discourses of regional integration in order to create a sense of common purpose. This paper will present evidence of regionalisation processes taking shape in 'Finnish-Russian' Karelia based on the construction of 'familiarity' This region-building strategy harks back to the well-known Euroregion model developed within the context of European integration. However, if Euroregions can be seen as largely public sector projects of 'place-making' the construction of familiarity is a much more socially grounded process. In concluding I will speculate to what extent this European Borderland can be seen as a laboratory of post-national identity-formation and development practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]