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Over a wide range of doctrinal issues, the Labour Party has confused inheritance which owes as much to Methodism as to Marxism. Whilst Labour's socialist doctrines have always been amenable to interpretation and re-interpretation as the need arose, this task has often proved more difficult in situations where they have been associated with specific policies. The devolution issue posed serious problems of doctrine and policy, which the Labour Party had largely avoided since its inception at the turn of the century. Before the First World War, many of the socialist ideas in general currency in Great Britain were anti-statist and reflected the prevailing Marxist analysis that the state was an instrument of class exploitation. The anti-statist tradition within the Labour Party which had made it receptive to the concept of home rule was one of the later casualties of the First World War. By the early 1920's, the party gradually moved towards an acceptance of the paramountcy of economic issues and with it the need for central economic planning. The shift in doctrinal emphasis was eased in Wales by the gradual decline of forces which had given a nationalistic character to Welsh politics. However, new political realities demanded a fundamental reappraisal of the party's sympathy for Welsh nationalism and home rule.

With the 1960's, a new form of nationalism emerged in French Quebec. It wanted a vast expansion of powers of Quebec provincial government, so that it could truly function as a national state. In all respects, this neo-nationalism of the 1960's differed markedly from the previous manifestations of nationalism among Quebec Francophones. In Quebec, the recent wave of nationalism does not constitute a totally new phenomenon. In the case of Quebec, a common identity was fashioned in the seventeenth century, while Quebec was still a French colony. An important nationalist movement can be located in the early decades of the nineteenth century. During the 1820's, the Patriote movement emerged, which demanded more autonomous political institutions which would be clearly responsible to the colony's population, with its French speaking majority. In attempting to explain this neo-nationalist outburst of the 1960's, one might well begin with the political institutions which Confederation put in place. The ultimate emergence of Quebec nationalism can be traced to the rise of threats to Quebec's provincial autonomy. In the case of Quebec, neo-nationalism is supported by new middle class. These are salaried individuals who possess educational or technical qualifications.

Nationalism has a lengthy history in both Wales and Quebec, but it was only in the 1960's that nationalism emerged as a radical force. In both Canada and Great Britain, the 1960's saw the emergence of an atmosphere of greatly increased tolerance to reform. In the case of Wales, a spate of minor explosions set by a tiny underground movement in the period leading up to the investiture of the Prince of Wales in 1969 was the occasion for the launching of a sustained attack by the authorities, aiming to discredit nationalism. In Wales, the nationalist program focuses on the creation of Welsh-based political, economic and cultural institutions. In Quebec, it was precisely the existence of a set of distinctive institutions. In Wales, where only 21 percent of the population speaks Welsh language, by contrast, language continued to divide the nation rather than to bind it together. Welsh nationalist movement appears to have been preoccupied with cultural institutions and their future at the expense of a more general concern with other spheres of state activity. However, it appears that this is not so much a result of an obsession with language as a political symbol as the outcome of a rational concentration of effort on matters of greatest relevance to the defense and pursuit of the interest of the Welsh-language community.

Political behaviour in Wales has long been characterized as being slightly deviant from the established British norm. The resurgence of Welsh and Scottish nationalism in late 1960's cast doubt upon the universality of a class basis to British politics. This article investigates the bases of political behaviour in Wales. The Welsh electorate can be divided on the basis of the two characteristics of language and national identity. Data gathered about the speaking of the Welsh language ought to be more objective than that referring to identity. The obvious division between Welsh and English speakers within Wales, together with geographic concentration of Welsh-speaking population, has led many commentators to devise various geographical subdivisions within Wales. Many of the peculiarities of Welsh politics and historical development have been ascribed to the influence of religion. Welsh speakers are predominantly nonconformist. Non-Welsh speakers are predominantly members of the Church in Wales. From the evidence presented, certain preliminary conclusions may be drawn. Whereas language is a specific and geographically concentrated characteristics, identity is general and diffuse. Welsh speakers are usually Welsh identifiers. But non-Welsh speakers are divided in their identity between Welsh and British.

This article discusses various discourses involved in the referendum debate in Wales. Although all discursive formations focus upon the issue of the Referendum Act, a great variety of discursive formations can be expected than merely a duality in favor and opposed to the Act. The opposition to the Bill spoke strongly and firmly from the place of the Centrex with the integrity of the continued unity of Great Britain as its main concern. It is axiomatic that a region is only part of a totality which has a Centrex which constitutes the place from which the above discourse emanates. The totality is Great Britain. Thus Wales is represented as a region of Great Britain. England is not treated as a region in the same way as Wales. This is because, England is held to be a plurality of regions and therefore cannot be seen to be a region. Nationalists are eager for Wales to become a separate state. Nationalists are the strongest supporters of a Cardiff assembly. However, others feel that the unity of Great Britain has given Wales and Scotland a common history, heritage and a rich way of life.

The rise of ethnic nationalism in the last two decades is associated with the emergence of supranational state and a postindustrial global economy. By ethnic nationalism is meant the struggle for recognition, higher economic and social status, and political power by the minorities. There has been a significant emphasis upon ethnicity as a force to be reckoned with both economically and politically. This resurgence of ethnicity in advanced industrial societies has surprised sociologists and political scientists. The success or failure of ethnic minorities in maintaining their separate identities, institutions and organizations, will depend upon the outcome of power struggle. The emergence of postindustrialism has profound implications for the future of ethnic consciousness, ethnic organizations and ethnic nationalist movements. Ethnic nationalism can survive under the conditions created by theocratic states as long as the ultimate power rests with religious authorities. Among first generation immigrants in an industrialized society, the maintenance of strong ethnic loyalties was seen as unpatriotic. As the second and later generations of various ethnic origins established themselves in industrialized countries, they sought to overcome the prejudice and discrimination which previous generations had suffered. Ethnic nationalism will merge with claims of other provincial and regional interest groups seeking greater economic and political influence.

The article presents information on Catalan nationalist ideology and the role of ideas of Volksgeist, a scientific concept that would aid in it's formation. Catalan national identity was recreated on the basis of the idea of Volksgeist. The idea of a Volksgeist as an active spiritual or psychological principal has been an unremitting feature in the history of the Catalan discourse on nationalism. In the late nineteenth century the ideologists of Catalanism, were convinced that they had found, in the idea of Volksgeist, the scientific concept that would allow them to demonstrate that Catalonia qualified as a nation. This idea was central for the constitution of a credible Catalanist ideology and allowed to put forward certain criteria which would allow people to clearly differentiate Catalonia from Castile. In the intellectual horizon of the period a number of empirical criteria were available: race, language, law, territory, art, etc. Catalan nationalists, however, did not focus their attention so much on specific factors but on the rather more general, mediating notion of Volksgeist. This idea, both in its metaphysical and psychological dimensions, was particularly appropriate to the Catalan situation. There is no doubt that the notion of Volksgeist helped to strengthen the Catalan case. With hindsight it is possible to say that, in the long run, the psychological aspect of the Volksgeist was to prove itself more effective than the metaphysical one. There is no evidence, though, that this was also the case during the time of its formulation at the turn of the century.

The case of the Scottish National Party (SNP) received particular attention, principally because it threatened to alter fundamentally the British political landscape, and also because it was thought by many respected scholars that Britain was the paradigm par excellence of the integrated nation-state. SNP electoral success was quite a surprise, and in the effort to explain it a whole host of frameworks, propositions, and explanations were offered. A common characteristics of all the approaches, and in particular those which emphasize structural or long-term factors, is a heavy reliance on macro social and especially economic variables to explain increased voter support for the SNP. The argument of this assay is that macro level variables should be considered opportunities as well as constraints for political mobilization, viewed as factors which may lead to an increase or drop in support for a nationalist movement. The starting point in explaining the decline of the SNP from 1977 to 1981 is the general observation that to a certain extent the party was a victim of its own success.

Elements of modernization theory are capable of providing crucial insights into the process of social mobilization in multicultural societies, especially in relation to nationalism as a prime political movement. The article explores some of the emerging issues and apparent contradictions left by the legacy of modernization theory in the 1960s, as well as the potential research utility for socio-linguists of concentrating directly on the relationship between social mobilization and nationalism. Attention will focus on three issues: the implications of adopting either a nation-building or nationality-formation approach to nationalism; claims and counter-claims that social mobilization is central to nationalist success through its reduction of the ethnic elite; and the attempt by psychologists to account for national loyalty, the desired product of social mobilization in multicultural societies. One of the central concerns of sociologically oriented theories of nationalism relates to the question how and why ethnic group cohesion grows and develops at specific times among some people and not others to a sufficient degree of intensity to become politically significant. Theories of national integration, on the other hand, begin with an examination of the state and ask how loyalties transcending those of primary groups are built, and how attachments to the institutions of state authority are developed among diverse peoples.

The article takes a look at political mobilization, political institutionalization and maintenance of ethnic conflict in the Republic of Ireland. An ethnic group and a nation is distinguished in terms of the inherent political dimension of the latter. Ethnic groups are those groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or customs or both or because of memories of colonization and migration. A nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own. Thus what distinguishes nationalist conflict from ethnic conflict in general is that nationalist conflict is, to some extent, about political institutions. This may be seen as a proclivity towards statehood, or as simply the claim to distinctive political treatment. Though some of what follows has relevance for ethnic conflict as a whole, the main focus is on nationalist conflict. Adapting a theory developed for the purpose of explaining party systems and voter alignments, political mobilization and institutionalization as a major source of the persistence of nationalist attitudes has been emphasized.

With the proliferation of studies on the resurgence of ethno-regionalism there has been a welcome move towards a more comprehensive treatment of social factors and a progression from the issue of the non-assimilation of a recalcitrant periphery. The State and its central planning agencies, particularly in a highly centralized nation such as France, have perceived certain locations as more favorable for growth and modernization than others. There is a need to look more closely at the differential penetration of exogenous factors into a region as part of the basic mechanism stimulating the resurgence of ethno-regionalism. A number of reasons lie behind territorially and socially homogenous explanations. What one needs to determine is the relationship between the confrontation of exogenous factors with the regional social forces resulting from their differential penetration. One finds that the relationship between social conflicts engendered by the unequal penetration of development and modernization, and the regionalist/autonomist movements in Corsica, revealed a high degree of mutual support and the integration of diverse interests.

Using Scotland and Wales as case studies, the article has argued that the upsurge in ethnic nationalism in Western advanced, industrial societies can be explained in terms of psychological consequences of post-1945 regional differences in modernization rates having shifted to favor traditionally subordinate ethnic groups. This shift redistributed power resources, largely expressed in the de facto form of education and wealth, to the advantage of these groups, a process which led in turn to the crystallization of a sense of collective deprivation and the belief that nationalism offered a better future than the continuation of the political status quo. The translation of this sense of collective deprivation into remedial political action was consummated by the emergence of an able and articulate nationalist leadership cadre in both Scotland and Wales. Ethnic identity was thereby translated into nationalist party growth.

The article examines the Marxist-oriented liberation struggle in the western African country of Guinea-Bissau and the Guinean opposition to it in order to try and understand the relationship between Marxism and liberation in its ethnically complex environment. Partido Africano de Independencia da Guinea-Bissau e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) struggled to liberate the country from Portuguese control between 1956 and 1974. The leadership of the PAIGC devised an ideology based in part on Marxism but certainly greatly influenced by the economic and social reality of Guinea-Bissau. Their Marxist vision led them to emphasize economic and social issues and to de-emphasize ethnic divisions. Chief ideologue and founder of the PAIGC, Amilcar Cabral and others all represented a single group in Guinea-Bissau. Socially they come from the small commercial and civil service elite. Cabral explained the stubbornness of ethnic differences as the product of colonially reinforced social relationships. He employed the Marxist-Leninist practice of tolerating cultural differences, allowing them to continue and be fully practiced, while insisting on tight political unity within the party and the areas it controlled.

The article presents the ethnicity and factionalism prevalent in Zimbabwe between the period 1957-1979, with the content support from various writings by African writers focusing on the problem of racism, black versus white. The writer Nathan Shamuyarira writes mainly about the struggle between blacks and whites in Zimbabwe, depicting lost opportunities for an early accommodation between the two races and foresees a larger conflict in his writing "Crisis in Rhodesia." Enoc Dumbutshena's "Zimbabwe Tragedy," decries the suffering and struggles of Zimbabwe's black people, who are unique in every respect having overcome many odds placed in their way by the white people. Race relation is a very important issue in Zimbabwe but the matter related to ethnicity or tribalism has largely been ignored in the country. The reason for delay in self analysis is mainly the pre-occupation with self-preservation among the would-be analysts of nationalist politics. The term ethnicity refers to as all groups of society characterized by a distinct sense of difference owing to culture and descent.

This article presents three models of nation formation, all of which predict different outcomes if certain conditions prevail. The propositions which constitute the basis of diffusion and internal colonialism models refer to the degree of integration at the political, economic and cultural levels. While the diffusion model predicts a steady incorporation of peripheral regions into a new political and cultural system, the internal colonialism model suggests that this would be the exception rather than the rule. Analyzing the case of Italy, it was found that the process of unification revolved around the alliance of the core dominant classes and the southern governing elite. Statistical tests confirmed that southern Italy could not be considered as a politically integrated periphery, as suggested by diffusionist hypothesis, nor as a center of separatist organization, as the internal colonialism model would predict. Instead, it would appear that clientelistic loyalties are pervasive throughout southern Italy with the exception of two or three regions which have shown strong anti-center postures in the past.

Leon Wasilewski, who lived from 1870-1936, became an activist, editor and publicist for the Polish Socialist Party. His facility with languages and his knowledge of cultures were tapped by the party and he became its nationalities' expert. What is more, he became a devoted follower and friend of Joseph Pilsudski, the founder of modem Poland. Like his mentor, Wasilewski was an ardent patriot. Unlike Pilsudski, whose socialism was problematical, Wasilewski always remained a socialist. When Pilsudski resumed power by coup d'état in 1926, Wasilewski went into opposition to struggle for democracy and socialism. As a propagandist for independence Wasilewski had to justify why a socialist involved himself with national problems rather than devoting exclusive interest to the class struggle. His explanations led him to a study of the process of the survival or demise of ethnic groups. Finally, he had to defend his position from attacks of nationalists like Roman Dmowski, socialists like Rosa Luxemburg and in time, all of Russian Social Democracy, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks.

Ethnoregional movements, that is, movements for regional autonomy or secession in the name of ethnic self-determination have intensified. They probably represent the most important source of armed conflict in the world. By definition, Ethnoregional movements rest upon regional claims to ethnic distinctiveness. This is what distinguishes ethnoregionalism from other kinds of regionalism. Ethnic distinctiveness results from the imputation of meaning and honor to linguistic, religious, or phenotypical markers. An Ethnoregional movement ultimately rests on communal association based in the traditional culture. Language societies, cultural festivals, and dissident religious sects provide the necessary internal organizations of the region that is prerequisite for a social movement. They are the institutional base from which ethnoregionalism originates. This suggests that ethnoregional movements are most likely to form in those areas where the cultural institutions are most prevalent. Complete analysis of ethnoregionalism must include processes operating at widely different levels of aggregation, starting at microscopic settings for interaction, then moving to the level of state, and finally to the level of international system as a whole.

The internal model is useful for analyzing regional variations in Finland. Sweden was one of the Western European states which had culturally distinct peripheries, and upto 1809, most of the Finnish-speaking regions, which later came to make up Finland, remained on the periphery of Swedish state. Finland is composed of areas that were at one time peripheral regions of Sweden. The colonization of this region gathered momentum in the sixteenth century, contemporaneous with the consolidation of absolutism in Sweden. At that time, it was a reclamation area where slash-and-burn cultivation was predominant. It was followed by capitalist transformation of Finland during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In Eastern Finland, functional sectionalism became predominant following the capitalist transformation. The region was culturally integrated with the core regions of Finland. Class conflicts seem crucial factors in determining party support at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was the interplay of class structure and the specific mode of territorial integration that determined the formation of the regional party system.

This article discusses internal colonialism and Quebec's inter-regional relations. During the first 200 years of its existence, Quebec stood not as an internal colony, but as an overseas colony. Founded by a small band of French settlers in 1608, the colony of Quebec remained in French hands until the conquest of 1759, when it was transferred to British control. Within the British Empire, Quebec was the colony of Quebec until it was united with Ontario to form United Canada's. In Quebec, Francophones were soon displaced from leading economic roles by British entrepreneurs. The colony's political structures were directed by British colonial administrators, who preferred British immigrants when making political appointments. Turning to the question of cultural integration, majority of Quebec population has retained a cultural difference from the rest of Canada. According to the 1971 census, 79 per cent of Quebec population is of French descent, of whom 97.5 per cent continue to use French as regular language of communication. While the persistence of cultural difference and identity in Quebec can perhaps be best traced to the continued presence of comprehensive French-language institutions, there is a need for broader interpretation of nationalist movements, which seek the political autonomy or independence of Quebec.

In out of the way country districts there are still indications of what one can call village and parish characters; those who belong to small communities attribute specific psychological traits to themselves and to members of neighbouring local groups whom they consider foreigners. On the national level collective psychology is more developed. On the international level, generalizations about nations go further. The literature of travel, journalism, and works with academic pretensions, all offer highly developed and modulated accounts of how the Swede, the German, the Frenchman and the Russian are constituted. In recent decades attempts to define racial characteristics have also been common. The author begins with the assumption that there is a certain number of races, and that there must be psychological differences corresponding to the physical differences. One element from the old concept of clearly distinguished national characters survived in contemporary academic debate. There are differences between nations, but those are said to be superficial characters of custom and behavior.

One of the most volatile and dangerous global issues today is the growth of political separatism. In Africa it has become a major factor in the East-West power struggle, where it threatens the integrity of fragile new states. In Asia it has provided intractable problems for the many military regimes. In the view of several commentators, is the renaissance of ethnic nationalisms in the West, in the old established and democratic states of Western Europe. A more important distinction is that between ethnic and territorial movements for autonomy and separation. In the latter, geography itself played the major role in inducing populations to regard themselves as distinct and separate. Given the state of social communications at various periods, it is not difficult to see how, with the growth of local networks, distant islands such as Iceland and the West Indies should grow away from the imperial or mother-country. Similarly with overseas colonies. In many of these cases, it was the sense of distance and of remote government that spurred a sense of apartness. The classic instance is that of the thirteen colonies, whose ethnic fusion and nationalistic phase began after the War of Independence, but whose leading strata had even before felt themselves different and standing apart from their counterparts in the British Isles.

The theme of the paper is that the most significant factor accounting for the divergence between scholarly expectations and actuality has been a basic misunderstanding concerning the nature of nationalism. The most fundamental error involved in scholarly approaches to nationalism has been a tendency to equate nationalism with a feeling of loyalty to the state rather than with loyalty to the nation. The error of improperly equating nationalism with loyalty to the state is the consequence of a much broader terminological disease that plagues the study of global politics. It would be difficult to name four words more essential to global politics than are state, nation, nation-state and nationalism. But despite their centrality, all four terms are shrouded in ambiguity due to their imprecise, inconsistent and often totally erroneous usage. It is particularly paradoxical that the widespread misuse of the most elemental terms should be tolerated during a period in which so many authorities within the discipline are emphasizing the need for more precise and scientific vocabulary.

The article presents a case study related to language and nationalism in Wales. Wales is not a politically independent state but has, nevertheless, remained a partially distinct administrative entity following the Act of Union with England in 1536 and has retained a separate ethnic identity. Initially this identity was closely associated with the Welsh language in an essentially rural context. In the English-speaking north-eastern and southern margins of the country a Welsh ethnic identity is also retained, although this is now as much related to specifics of the industrial history of these regions, in an increasingly English-speaking environment, as to its former linguistic basis. As a reaction to the decline in the use of the language, the Wales Nationalist Party was founded in 1925. Following the continued decline in the use of the Welsh language from 26 per cent of the population in 1961 to 20.8 per cent in 1971, the future of the language and the resurgence of Welsh Nationalism have emerged as major social issues in Wales. The article concludes that it is highly likely that the use of Welsh will continue to decline in the future in the predominantly English-speaking areas. In contrast the situation appeared relatively stable in the Welsh-speaking core area, while positive expansion in the use of Welsh was recorded only amongst the pupils attending Welsh-medium schools.

In this article, a distinction has been drawn between those conditions which tend to heighten the awareness of the ethnic divide, termed ethnic salience, and those which increase the intensity of attachment to the putative culture of a group. It is argued that conditions which produce the latter are endemic to the colonial situation. On this basis a theory was proposed that would predict heightened sense of nationalism, accompanied by the lowering of ethnic allegiance, at the colonial periphery in the period immediately prior to the cesation of political domination from the external core. Where nothing had been done to alter the fundamental inequalities of the colonial experience, the theory would then predict a new consolidation of the core internally. The internal periphery would now be expected to re-emerge with a heightened sense of ethnic allegiance. It was suggested that the period from 1930 to 1956 in Trinidad marked the first phase, concluding with the emergence of Creole nationalism. Subsequently, heightened ethnic attachment took place at the periphery and, over time, the strengthened of Creole ethnicity at the core declined as the normal situation became defined in terms of Creole dominance. The theory advanced her would predict lessened attachment to ethnic identities in conditions of internal decolonization and at least tolerable levels of ethnic salience with sustained economic growth.

The article presents a few of the key issues that were raised in a seminar held under the Humanities Research Council of Canada. Sociologists examining the question of ethnic survival in advanced industrial societies generally agree that the persistence of ethnicity, as a basis of social organization in modern world, is problematic. There was much discussion about the meaning of concepts and the use of terms such as system, revolution, new middle class, fractions of the bourgeoisie, ideology, as well as questions as birthplace, language and ethnicity. One of the major issues on which there was considerable debate was new middle class among ethnic minorities. Participants could not reach on an agreement concerning the impact of modern telecommunications, satellite stations and ethnic television. Since the seminar was held, a number of significant events have occurred on both sides of the Atlantic. In Great Britain, the feeling of loss of empire is still strong enough to mobilize patriotic sentiment. For the time being, questions of ethnic nationalism in Great Britain and Canada will take second place to global economic crisis, the price of oil and international conflicts. They focus attention on the self-determination of peoples and questions of autonomy. It may no longer be the question of whether particular groups or nations survive. The very future of humanity may be at stake.

There are arguments that ethnic identity is not likely to be a specially vital force in peoples lives unless and until they find themselves in a situation of structured inequalities and perceive economic gain as a reward for political mobilization along ethnic lines. The underlying premise is that culturally molded world view and intrinsic cultural biases are relatively minor considerations in so-called plural societies; hence that there is good reason for being optimistic about the capacity of such societies to overcome differences and achieve firm national identity, once they have freed themselves from the residues of colonialism. The author criticizes the view of sociologist Malcom Cross that Trinidad is a place with relatively low level of economic inequality and therefore minimum ethnic tension and high potential for national integration. Sociologist Kelvin Singh portrays the overwhelming majority of East Indians in late 19th century Trinidad as a profoundly despised and exploited people victimized by whites and blacks alike.

Ethnic and Racial Studies has sought over the years to cover a wide range of debates about the study of race, ethnicity and nationalism. In doing so we have by no means always succeeded in covering fully questions about teaching and pedagogy. The periodical produced a special issue in 1996 that was framed around the teaching of race and ethnicity in a number of disciplines (vol. 19, No.4) and there have been occasional articles about this theme in the period since. A major part of this issue of Ethnic and Racial Studies is taken up by a special Symposium on the teaching of ethnic and racial studies. An important facet of research in this field is that in practice researchers have been pulled in a variety of directions, by both political and academic pressures. Given the rapid growth in both the research and teaching components of ethnic and racial studies in recent years it is perhaps not surprising that there has emerged an undercurrent of concern about the shifting boundaries of this field of scholarly inquiry.

The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s have seen a marked reassertion of national identities in the socialist states of Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. While, according to formulations of Marxism-Leninism, national distinctions were expected to fade away to be replaced by the class-based identity of proletarian internationalism, in reality these national identities have remained remarkably resilient, and have demonstrated considerable political power. There are various aspects which address certain problems of national identity in this context. In some cases this aspect of national identity has been difficult of access. Soviet reluctance to confront the evidence of lasting national differences under socialism has resulted in a dearth of research in the Soviet Union on the character of national identities. Researchers have conducted detailed survey of attitudes of non-European Soviet Jews to their own and others identities, demonstrating the strength of specific self images and stereotypes.

In this article, the author replies to the comments of primatologist Pierre L. van den Berghe. He talks about sociobiological theory in the interpretation of animal society. This has become a central interest for a number of primatologists, as well as for some zoologists and others in related fields. The author says that according to van den Berghe, both ethnicity and race are extensions of the idioms of kinship, and therefore, ethnic and race sentiments are to be understood as an extended and attenuated form of kin selection. Kinship often becomes the basis of these powerful sentiments called nationalism, tribalism, racism and ethnocentrism. Human kinship and marriage are both biological and cultural, however, advocates of sociobiology adhere to a simple-minded casual model of one-gene-one-behavior-one-culture-trait. The author agrees that it is foolish to ignore the biological bases of human behavior. However, he wonders what those biological bases are, and concludes that they are physiological limitations rather than genetic predispositions.

A correction to the article "Social Mobilization and Nationalism in Multicultural Societies," that was published in the July 1982 issue is presented.