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For over twenty years the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have been discussing and negotiating over who should do what about the ever-increasing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). This year the COP meeting in Paris will see another attempt to reach a binding international agreement on the reduction of GHG emissions, along with deciding on measures to respond to the now inevitable damages from human induced climate change. Policy failure is perhaps most evident in the designation of 2 degreesC as an acceptable target for global warming, associated by the UNFCCC with stabilising GHGs at 450 part per million (ppm) CO2 equivalent, a level which has in fact already been exceeded. Response now means substantive adaptation, and that raises issues of compensation for those having costs imposed upon them including dislocation.

Drawing on the recognition that questions of discourse and power are vital components in analysing the public participation in environmental governance, this paper examines the ways in which dominant scientific discourses about the Earth's climate inform the types of public talk facilitated in and by mini-publics, particularly when they are 'scaled up' to address environmental issues such as climate change. World Wide Views on Global Warming (WWViews) serves as a case study. Conceived and organised by the Danish Board of Technology, WWViews was a historically unprecedented public forum in which participants, invited from a range of nations, were given the opportunity to deliberate on key themes addressed in the negotiations taking place during the United Nations Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen (COP 15). The overarching purpose of this analysis is to invite reflection on the practices and assumptions that serve to make up publics in relation to issues that have been framed, predominantly, as scientific, universal and global.

Whether and how to intervene in nature to maintain or restore values is a contested issue among scholars within ecological restoration, protected area management and environmental ethics, but also among the practitioners and public officials who shape how nature is actually managed. This article analyses how the issue of intervention is debated in the case of protected forest area management in Sweden, a country with a traditionally strong preservationist discourse centred on maintaining areas as ‘untouched’ as possible. The analysis shows how this traditional view is challenged by a more interventionist discourse centred on adaptive management for biodiversity, but also how there are still attempts to reaffirm a preservationist discourse and practice. The implications of this as-yet-unsettled debate are discussed, concluding by pointing to a need to examine critically not only the older preservationist discourse and ‘naturalness’, but also the ascendant interventionist discourse and ‘biodiversity’.

Preston's (2011) challenge to the moral presumption against geoengineering is applied to carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) in Scotland, United Kingdom. Qualitative data is analysed to assess if and how Preston's arguments play out in practice. We argue that the concepts of 'lesser evil' and prioritising human well-being over non-interference in natural processes do bring different value positions together in support of CCS, but that not all people see short-term carbon abatement as the 'least worst' option or a suitable way to prioritise human well-being.

Within the EU, Germany took a pioneering role in the production and promotion of biofuels. To explain this role the article analytically examines public discourses on biofuels. The analysis points out how the subject is interpreted and positioned by relevant actors and thus results in a specific public perception of biofuels in Germany. This perception in turn influences political decision-making processes. Since the analysis of discourses contributes to a better understanding of today's biofuel policy in Germany, the article characterises the biofuel discourse during the genesis of this policy. Additionally, it analytically traces changes of discourse constellations in the course of the biofuel policy path.

The notion of 'resilience' is rapidly emerging as a research topic in its own right, with the notion of 'social resilience' rapidly gaining importance. Yet, due to the relative novelty of the research field, discussions about processes of social resilience are not yet fully developed, especially with regard to how the inbuilt 'memory' of a local community helps shape resilience pathways (social memory). Interlinkages between social memory and community resilience are the focus of this study, with emphasis on analysis of the importance of rites, traditions and social learning processes for shaping community resilience/vulnerability.

This study explores the relationship between people's values, loci of control and pro-environmental behaviours. 'Locus of control' refers to the extent to which people attribute control over events in life either to themselves or to external sources beyond their influence: in the former case, the individual is described as having an internal locus of control, and in the latter, an external one. The study hypothesised, and subsequently concluded, that self-transcendent values and internal loci of control were positively related to pro-environmental behaviours, and also that loci of control moderate the link between people's values and behaviour; people with a low degree of self-transcendence values behave pro-environmentally if they have an internal locus of control.

Deliberative processes provide an important alternative input to environmental politics as they may, in contrast to often used market simulations, provide an arena for 1) discussion of lay participants' values, 2) articulating arguments grounded in other values than consequentialistic, and 3) capturing weakly comparable values. A case study of a Citizens' Jury (CJ) on genetically modified plants was used to investigate how the framing of the process affected the attitude formation among the citizens. The formal set up of this specific CJ made value discussions less relevant. While it opened for value plurality, it failed to facilitate the articulation of weakly comparable values.

Technologies for mitigating and adapting to climate change are inherently political. Their development, diffusion and deployment will have uneven impacts within and across national borders. Bringing the governance of climate technologies under democratic control is imperative but impeded by the global scale of governance and its polycentric nature. This article draws on innovative theorising in the deliberative democracy tradition to map possibilities for global democratic governance of climate technologies. It is argued that this domain is not beyond the reach of democracy. Civil society has a unique and expanded role to play in generating democratic legitimacy by fostering public deliberation; translating and transmitting concepts, ideas and messages; and promoting and facilitating deliberative accountability.

Obligations to reduce one's green house gas emissions appear to be difficult to justify prior to large-scale collective action because an individual's emissions have virtually no impact on the environmental problem. However, I show that individuals' emissions choices raise the question of whether or not they can be justified as fair use of what remains of a safe global emissions budget. This is true both before and after major mitigation efforts are in place. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to establish an obligation to reduce personal emissions because it appears unlikely that governments will in fact maintain safe emissions budgets. The result, I claim, is that under current conditions we lack outcome, fairness, promotional, virtue or duty based grounds for seeing personal emissions reductions as morally obligatory.

While structural approaches to sustainability have remained unable to muster wider political support, green political theory has for some time taken a voluntarist turn, arguing that deep changes in attitudes and behaviour are necessary to reduce the ecological debt of the rich countries. Within environmental citizenship theory it is believed that justice requires each individual to start living within his or her 'ecological space'. Firmly rooted in the pollution paradigm, environmental citizenship theory holds that the path to sustainability goes through a dramatic reduction in economic activity and international trade. Since such cuts in material welfare run counter to the preferences of many, doubts can be had about their political plausibility. More seriously, with a world population of more than seven billions, it is doubtful that even such harsh sacrifices would suffice to ensure environmental sustainability. This article challenges environmental citizenship theory by arguing that it is tied to a conception of sustainability which is both theoretically misleading and strategically unfortunate in a rapidly industrialising world. Instead of further individual guilt, there is an urgent need to define new collective progressive projects aimed at universal affluence and natural restoration. Fashionable as a sense of individual guilt may be, it fails to recognise the responsibility of the rich world to provide new technologies capable of securing global environmental sustainability.

In this paper I examine the controversy over genetically modified canola (GM canola) in Australia as an ontological politics, drawing on recent work in Science and Technology Studies that extends actor-network theory and its commitment to the contingency of reality. I examine three different and overlapping performances of GM canola: as an agronomic object, a risk object and a market object. I focus on how each performance effects similarities and differences between GM and conventional canola that are productive of ontological distinctions that make GM canola controversial. I argue this analysis offers useful insights that are not revealed by more traditional explanations of controversy.

Why should anyone bother about social or environmental problems beyond responding to the signals in society to behave in an appropriate and caring manner towards others? This is a conundrum which has repeatedly surfaced and continues to resurface in the literature on environmental values and more generally in political theory. That is, what is the responsibility of the individual to society, others, the unborn, non-humans or inanimate Nature?

International audience; This study examines the multiple dimensions of the agdal system, a traditional Berber form of environmental management that regulates access to communal natural resources so as to allow the regeneration of natural resources. In fact, this ingenious system of agro-pastoral land rotation is ultimately beneficial for the conservation of the bio-physical environment, the performance of the present-day local economy and the maintenance of prevailing social cohesion and cultural coherence. Hence, agdals constitute a key element for the reinforcement of the sustainability of existing agro-pastoral societies and ecosystems, but need to be better understood in order to explore necessary adaptations in the changing world of today.

Both Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Baylor Johnson hold that under current circumstances, individuals lack obligations to reduce their personal contributions to greenhouse gas emissions. Johnson argues that climate change has the structure of a tragedy of the commons, and that there is no unilateral obligation to reduce emissions in a commons. Against Johnson, I articulate two rationales for an individual obligation to reduce one's greenhouse gas emissions. I first discuss moral integrity, which recommends congruence between one's actions and positions at the personal and political levels. Second, I draw on a Confucian, relational conception of persons to offer a critique of the collective action/tragedy of the commons framework itself. Under the relational conception, commons problems can be reconceptualised so as to dissolve the stark contrast between the individually and the collectively rational. This perspective can inform our approach to climate change and help reconcile individual and political action to mitigate it.

UK radioactive waste management policy making is currently taking place within a participatory and analytic-deliberative decision-making framework; one that seeks to integrate public and stakeholder values and perspectives with scientific and technical expertise. One important aspect of this socio-technical reframing of the radioactive waste problem is an explicit recognition that legitimate and defensible policy making must take into account important ethical issues if it is to be a success. Thus, there is a need for tools to incorporate adequate assessment of ethical issues in a way that is compatible with this approach. The 'ethical matrix' is one such tool used recently to address a range of agricultural and natural resource issues that shows promise for this field. This paper assesses the strengths and limitations of the matrix and outlines a framework for the development of alternative tools to better satisfy the needs of ethical assessment in radioactive waste management decision-making processes.

In response to what has been called the discursive dilemma, Christian List has argued that the nature of the public agenda facing deliberative bodies indicates the appropriate form of decision procedure or deliberative process. In this paper I consider the particular case of environmental policy where we are faced with pressures not only from deliberators and stakeholders, but also in response to dynamic changes in the environment itself. As a consequence of this dilemma I argue that insofar as the focus of a policy forming body is on the formation of viable environmental policy, rather than on a set of pre-existent ideological commitments, deliberative agents should be responsive as a unified body to the pressures of precedent, the best available science, and their own best individual judgments. In the case of environmental policy the dilemma pressures deliberative bodies to display what Ronald Dworkin has called integrity even in cases where this requires those deliberative bodies to sacrifice being maximally responsive to the preferences of individual deliberators.

The central contention of theories of deliberative democracy is that deliberative arrangements should encourage (but by no means guarantee) the support of interests that are general to all. Democratic theorists have also suggested that the natural environment will be a likely beneficiary following public deliberation, given the inherent rationality in supporting interests that will lead to the long-term survival of the planet. This paper addresses the question of general environmental interests through two case studies in Australian local government and argues there are at least three factors that affect the ability of notionally deliberative arrangements to deliver outcomes that appear favourable to the natural environment.

The building of a railway tunnel through the Hallandsas ridge in the southwest of Sweden resulted in sinking groundwater levels and a toxic spill for the local community. As a result, this highly technological project expanded from the addressing of technological and economic issues of rail traffic and tunnel building to include issues of environmental harm and how to assess and manage the geology of the ridge. A central concern for local residents as well as for the developer has been how to view and interpret the resource of groundwater. This article focuses on groundwater as a boundary object, bordering the domains of the technologists and the local community. In this situation, technological understanding and knowledge confronts an experience-based understanding and a symbolic interpretation of the water resource.

This paper discusses the impacts of different formal and informal institutions upon the Regional Forest Programme of Southwest Finland (1997-2001). The divide between formal and informal institutions is a binary distinction: it is used as a discursive tool for identifying social structures and processes and for articulating their significance in development and environmental planning, valuation and decision-making. In the end part of the paper, there is a brief discussion of how normative and moral issues can be explicitly and more creatively integrated into the practice of environmental policy.

This essay explores three case studies that illustrate the exemplary use of economic analysis in environmental decision-making. These include: 1) the creation of a market in tradable grazing rights in the American West; 2) a cost analysis that facilitated a negotiated rulemaking at a power plant in Arizona; and 3) a conception of production-based pollution allowances that led to an agreement for regulating Intel microprocessor production plants. The paper argues that cost-benefit analysis may be less useful than other kinds of economic analysis that can guide and inform rather than judge and second-guess the outcome of negotiated and collaborative decision-making.

When people use a resource without a co-ordinated plan the result is often a tragedy of the commons in which the resource is depleted. Many environmental resources display the characteristics of a developing tragedy of the commons. Many believe that each person is ethically obligated to reduce use of the commons to the sustainable level. I argue that this is mistaken. In a tragedy of the commons there is no reasonable expectation that individual, voluntary action will succeed. Our obligation is not fruitlessly to reduce individual use, but to support a collective agreement to reduce everyone's use to the sustainable level.

In this age of debate it is not news that what constitutes 'truth' is often at issue in environmental debates. But what is often missed is an insight that the speakers of Middle English understood a millennium ago: that truth comes from trust, which, is the central theoretical position of this paper. Our point is that truth depends essentially on social relations - relations that involve power and knowledge, to be sure, but also identity. Thus, challenges to what constitutes the 'truth' are equally challenges to identities and the social networks of trust in which that truth is embedded. We therefore attempt to move beyond Foucaultian discursive theory by reintroducing the subject as both the product and producer of discourse. For Foucault, the subject is reduced to the discursive relations of power/knowledge. In his effort to free us from the Cartesian cogito and the modernist absolutisms that eventually followed, Foucault lapses into a kind of postmodern functionalism. We argue that we should not speak of power/knowledge, as Foucault suggested, but of power/knowledge/identity, recovering the actors and concrete social relations that produce discourse, and are not only produced by it. We then argue that these social relations become constituted (and reconstituted) in particular moments of phenomenological challenge - discursive moments that confront the existing social relations of knowledge and their dialogue of trust and truth. We illustrate the implications of a threat to the social relations of environmental knowledge through an analysis of one such moment of phenomenological challenge: a dispute over whether or not the power plant in the community where we used to live, Ames, Iowa, is producing dioxin.

Environmental organisations have been active since the early 1960s in putting environmental issues on the political agenda and in strengthening the environmental consciousness of the public. The struggle has been successful in the sense that there is now a strong demand for practical solutions among all kinds of actors. It is, however, difficult for states and political actors to manage environmental problems by traditional forms and instruments, due to the complex character of the problems. Therefore, environmental organisations take their own initiatives to participate in policy-making by developing new forms, within new arenas, with the help of new instruments (voluntary rules or standards). Special attention is paid to the possibilities of identifying and developing constructive roles in relation to other actors and institutions as well as the capacity to organise standardisation projects and to mobilise and make use of power resources such as symbolic capital and knowledge. In order to interpret characteristics and implications (possibilities and limitations) of standardisation strategies, I draw on the ecological modernisation perspective. Empirically, I refer to the role of Swedish environmental organisations in standardisation projects such as eco-labelling.

Recent years have seen a proliferation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with a mission to help redress various social and environmental problems, but the effectiveness of these organisations in carrying out their stated goals is rarely assessed or critically examined. It has become increasingly clear, however, that these organisations vary greatly in their level of competence and professionalism. Many of them are ineffective, and in some cases they may even exacerbate the problems they set out to solve. These difficulties are based upon flawed assumptions about how civil society can correct social ills, and about how institutions that are intermediate between the individual and the state can carry out effective change. To illustrate these points with an environmental example, we present the case of Jamaica's coral reefs, which have been under stress for decades. Both the causes of reef degradation and the solutions to these problems can be clearly outlined. Many well-intentioned organisations and individuals have been involved in the attempt to stem or reverse the damage, and significant funding has been channelled through these agencies. In spite of this, there has been no documented improvement in the condition of the reefs, apart from some natural regeneration that owed nothing whatever to any human activity. The problem is that the known solutions have not been implemented. This has happened for several reasons. First, government organisations have actively encouraged NGOs to undertake the responsibility of protecting sections of the coastline, but without any proper assessment of the capacity of those organisations to do so, and in some cases actively preventing them from acquiring that capacity. Second, the proliferation of NGOs (in part a response to the availability of funding) has been counter-effective, resulting in duplication of effort, competition for limited funds, and conscious or unconscious misrepresentation of results. Third, the utilisation of NGOs to solve environmental problems often results in an increase in the number of levels of management, resulting in inefficient utilisation of funds. The known solutions to the degradation in the Jamaican marine environment principally involve (a) reducing fishing pressures at a national level and (b) the reduction of pollution by local municipalities. The effective role of NGOs in bringing about these two solutions therefore differs: where national changes are necessary, government centralisation and effective enforcement are necessary, although NGOs could still play a useful auxiliary or augmenting role. With local problems like municipal pollution, NGOs may be better able to lead in catalysing and implementing change, although the government could usefully provide co-ordination and support. These differences illustrate the fallacy in the simplistic assumption that rising public concern, increased levels of funding and a growing number of people and/or organisations involved in conservation will lead to environmental improvement. Effective hierarchical organisation is still a prerequisite for bringing about effective solutions, although the mode of organisation adopted should be a function of the particular solution necessary. Finally, since many NGOs have effectively functioned as parasitical organisations that have consumed public funding without any discernible public benefit, NGOs should be subject to the same scrutiny and assessment as any private sector organisation contracted to the government and/or donor agencies, and those who fail to perform should be barred from further receipt of public funds.

Biodiversity initiatives have traditionally operated within a 'science-first' model of environmental decision-making. The model assumes a hierarchical relationship in which scientific knowledge is elevated above other knowledge systems. Consequently, other types of knowledge held by the public, such as traditional or lay knowledges, are undervalued and under-represented in biodiversity projects. Drawing upon two case studies of biodiversity initiatives in Canada, this paper looks at the role that constructivist conceptions of education play in the integration of alternative knowledge systems in environmental decision-making. In so doing, it argues that the conservation, sustainable use and equitable sharing goals outlined by the Convention on Biological Diversity (signed in 1992 under the auspices of the United Nations Environmental Programme) demand new models of governance which embrace the adaptive management qualities of learning organisations.

The debate about genetic modification (GM) can be seen as characteristic of our time. Environmental groups, in challenging GM, are also challenging modernist faith in progress, and science and technology. In this paper we use the case of New Zealand's Royal Commission on Genetic Modification to explore the application of science discourses as used by environmental groups. We do this by situating the debate in the framework of modernity, discussing the use of science by environmental groups, and deconstructing the science discourses evident within environmental groups' submissions to the Commission. We find science being called into question by the very movement that has relied on it to fight environmental issues for many years. The environmental groups are challenging the traditional boundaries of science, for although they use science they also present it as a culturally embedded activity with no greater epistemological authority than other knowledge systems. Their discourses, like that of the other main actors in the GM debate, are thus part of the constant re-negotiation of the cultural construct of 'science'.

A recurring question about cost-benefit analysis (CBA) concerns its scope. CBA is a decision-making method frequently employed in environmental policy-making, in which things which have no market price are treated as if they were commodities. They are given a monetary value, a form of price. But it is widely held that some things cannot be meaningfully priced, thus substantially limiting the scope of CBA. The aim of this paper is to test some aspects of this broad claim, focusing on problems of incomparability and incommensurability. In particular, the role of rough equality as a putative form of comparison is investigated. I argue that while an assessment of the full significance of rough equality for practical decision-making awaits resolution of a number of important technical questions, it does not provide a strong enough form of comparison to support CBA.

Two initiatives in community-based biodiversity conservation are examined. I describe key aspects of the formation in the mid 1990s of the Malpai Borderlands Group of the Southwest US, and the reorganisation of the Kenya Wildlife Service during 1994-6 and their legacies since then. I review how history, ownership, membership, and valuation were appealed to, created, maintained, and contested in defining what should be saved, by and for whom, and how in each. I also suggest the central role of science and relatively mundane technologies in co-ordinating these parameters. Success or 'best practice' as applied to the conjunction of biodiversity conservation and development depends upon this work in contesting and establishing history, ownership, membership and valuation.

While fraught with ambiguities, support for greater public participation in environmental policy making is experiencing a renaissance amongst sections of government and academia, particularly within the field of land-use planning. There is concern within this cohort that the planning system silences public voices through its current mechanisms for community involvement. Proponents of participation often presuppose that more public participation will produce both 'better' decisions and environmental benefits, but to date research has focused on the front-end, or 'processes', of participation rather than the 'products' that result. While procedural aspects of public participation are important it is imperative that critical consideration is also given to what emerges from the participation that is being exalted. This paper addresses this concern by focusing on the products of a public participation exercise conducted in Luton, South-east England in order to consider what it is that 'silence knows'.

Contingent valuation surveys have tended to yield results that seem to go contrary to what is standardly seen as 'rational choice'. We argue that some of the inconsistencies arise because bids for public environmental goods in contingent valuation surveys are often (at least partly) motivated by moral considerations and ethical beliefs. We analyse the expected results of CV surveys given the existence of such ethical motivations, including the valuation of actions as well as states. It is found that we cannot expect bids made on this basis to reveal preferences which obey the rules commonly assumed in the theory of consumer choice. The two standard reactions to these anomalies have been to attack the validity of the method, or to urge greater rigour in survey design and application. By contrast, we conclude that the usefulness of the method for evaluating options concerning environmental public goods depends critically on the problem definition. The method should be used for the direct evaluation of realistic policy packages, rather than to try to extract abstract values for invaluable goods. The conclusion accords with current trends, including the move towards the use of deliberative methodologies.

This paper will explore some of the implications of attending to the performative aspects of language for the sociological understanding of issues of risk and trust among lay communities. Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens have alerted us to the way that in late or reflexive modernity trust in authority cannot be taken for granted, but increasingly has to be actively earned and actively invested. For his part, Brian Wynne has pointed out that lay judgements are relational and hermeneutic, including as they do judgements about the behaviour of relevant expert institutions, and about the risk to one's self-identity incurred by being caught up in relationships of dependency. Wynne has also argued that public avowals of trust can often mask deep private distrust, and thus be expressions more of fatalistic acceptance than of genuine trust. However, all of these analyses work from a basic model of 'trust' as being the result of a cognitive process - as a judgement as to the trustworthiness of others. Yet trust is frequently 'active' in an even stronger sense than this. To take a posture of trust towards another can often be best understood not just as a cognitive judgement but as an attempt to bind the 'trusted' into a relationship and attitude of responsibility - and thus perhaps to alter their behaviour - through the taking up of a position in a social ritual. Speech act theory can help us be sensitive to this sort of use of the language of 'trust', by reminding us that language can perform a number of different functions - not just that of describing the world, or of acting out ascribed roles and identities, but also that of trying to change the world. The analysis of public discourse about risk, trust and mistrust must thus be sensitive to the range of things that people might be attempting to do when they are saying things if it is to avoid drawing misleading conclusions about public attitudes to risk.

This special issue brings together contributions from nine scholars who have been working at the frontiers of the comparative study of risk. Most of the papers that follow use a cross-national approach to investigate public attitudes to risk in a broad range of settings including Germany, Sweden, Denmark, England, and the United States. Two of the authors represented here adopt more creative interpretations for carrying out comparative studies that reach considerably beyond conventional methodologies of country-level contrasts. One contributor highlights the temporal dimensions of novel forms of environmental uncertainty and a second selection, grounded in the sociology of language, compares the different objectives that lay people seek to satisfy when they speak about risk. In this sense, this issue provides a farrago of perspectives on the most befitting way to exploit the utility of comparative methodologies.Political scientists interested in the effects of different regulatory regimes and systems of governance have been responsible for most comparative risk research conducted to date. The papers in this issue depart from this tradition and instead draw on insights derived from social theory. There has been over the past decade a dramatic upswelling of interest in risk among theoretically-inclined sociologists and several writers have suggested that a pervasive sense of anxiety is a central feature of the current phase of modernity (e.g., Giddens, 1990; Beck, 1992). This collection represents an initial attempt to situate these recondite impressions in distinct contexts and to scrutinise them from a variety of comparative perspectives.

This paper tests the claims of cultural theory using the formation of climate change policies in Sweden, the United States, and Japan as case studies. The theory posits that any social group consists of three main cultural types: the egalitarian, the market-oriented, and the hierarchical. Though all groups contain elements of each type, one cultural type usually prevails, giving the group its unique decision-making character. This paper applies cultural theory at the national level, testing to what extent the theory is able to project how countries will respond in addressing the issue of global warming. The results suggest that cultural theory may be useful to those involved in developing international agreements, enabling them to formulate regimes which are compatible with various cultural styles.

Strategies of environmental organisations in the Netherlands regarding the ozone depletion problem have been analysed both at the cognitive level and at the operational level. The first objective of this analysis was to describe their strategies over a period of time. Secondly, it aimed to increase understanding of the linkage between cognitive and operational aspects of the strategies. The third objective was to find out to what extent strategies are constant features of an organisation and how far they are defined by particular problems. The results indicate that each of the organisations concerned with the ozone depletion problem adopted several different strategies, that the strategies of the organisations did not change much over time, and that there was no one-to-one linking of different aspects of the strategy of the organisations. Strategies seem largely to be defined by the problem encountered.

One characteristic of tradeable emission permits is that efficiency and justice considerations can be separated. While Pareto optimality is an accepted efficiency principle, there is not a consensus on a 'best' equity principle. In this article, conventional justice principles are used to evaluate alternative allocation rules for tradeable CO 2 permits, and a distribution proportional to population is recommended. Arguments against the population rule are discussed, especially those pertaining to political feasibility. While justice and political feasibility may indeed contrast, it still may be possible to emphasise the population rule in the future.

This paper presents a critical evaluation of Mark Sagoff's critique of economistic approaches to environmental decision-making in The Economy of the Earth. Whilst endorsing many of Sagoff's specific arguments against the use of extended versions of cost-benefit analysis in making such decisions, it criticises the conceptual framework within which these arguments are developed. In particular, it suggests that what Sagoff represents as a tension between consumers and their public roles as citizens is better understood as one between culturally shared values concerning both the protection of nature and the pursuit of consumption; and that this conflict has itself to be resolved by them as citizens.