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In recent decades, it has often been argued by environmental ethicists that human beings and the natural world ought to be considered as equals in some basic sense. The aim of this paper is to make sense of this view by examining what role, if any, the idea of equality ought to play in environmental ethics. Specifically, we have two aims: the first aim is to identify those environmental claims that are distinctively egalitarian. The second aim is to show these claims do not rest on a principled and convincing justification. Our main contention is therefore that equality has no place in environmental ethics. There are other promising ways to argue that our relationship with the natural environment must be fundamentally revised. By bringing clarity to this debate and dispelling the possibility of equality-based arguments, we hope to contribute to this endeavor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Biocentric egalitarianism is the view that all living things share an equal fundamental moral status qua living things. In light of the well-known problems with past philosophical attempts to argue for this position, this paper proposes a way biocentric egalitarian claims might be understood and possibly vindicated. Relying on frameworks developed in recent discussions of the "basis of equality" in human-centered ethics, the paper argues that thinking of egalitarian claims as justified by (rather than as justifying) social ideals provides the best way of understanding the basis of biocentric egalitarian claims in environmental ethics. The paper first reviews arguments for biocentric egalitarianism and their central flaws and proceeds to survey different models for justifying egalitarian claims among humans. The paper argues the Social Ideal approach to justification is the one most likely to be helpful to biocentric egalitarians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A literary criticism of the book "Mobilizing Hope" by Darrel Moellendorf is presented. It highlights that while Moellendorf's focus on global poverty and its central role in climate ethics is significant, his treatment of the Arcadian ideal and nonanthropocentric values raises concerns. It argues that Moellendorf's dismissal of the Arcadian ideal and his analogizing of nonanthropocentric ethics to art's value overlook nuanced ethical considerations.

The article focuses on responding to Rut Vinterkvist's objection to the claim that environmentalists must attribute intrinsic value to some natural entities for consistent protectionist views. Topics include the hypothetical case of the "insignificant species," the objection raised by Vinterkvist, and the argument against relying solely on indirect reasons for environmental protection.

The article focuses on responding to Lars Samuelsson's assertion that environmentalists must ascribe intrinsic value to nature to defend their protectionist claims. Topics include the definition of intrinsic value, the construction of hypothetical cases, and the argument against the necessity of intrinsic value for environmental protection.

This article considers the possibility of constructing an authentic environmental ethic from Buddhist sources. It first outlines the major critiques of historical Buddhist approaches to the natural world and parses some of the philological and linguistic barriers to such a construction. It then considers some of the recent philosophical critiques of such a project and reviews the major points of tension between the Buddhist philosophical tradition and the kinds of environmental ethics found in the land ethic and deep ecology. Ultimately, this article asserts that such tension is relieved if we begin from Buddhist philosophical principles and construct an environmental ethic from the ground up. It argues a Buddhist environmental ethic emerges from the combination of the goal of liberating all sentient beings from du'kha, an understanding of du'kha as dependently arising, and a novel recognition of the environment as a major cause of this du'kha. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A cursory reading of Thomas Aquinas’s work can give the impression he condones a despotic or exploitative relationship between humans and the environment. Many philosophers and theologians have sought to dispel this impression and draw out a more robust Thomistic environmental ethic. In this paper, I support this endeavor by describing how, in Thomas’s work, the environment is God’s artistic property and how this notion qualifies our use of the environment. Next, I consider two concepts related to artistic property: vandalism and showcasing. I explore these concepts as they relate to the environment and find they give us reasons not to deface or destroy creatures and to look to creation for guidance in problem-solving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In three parts, this article sketches the version of African environmental ethics that was developed and promoted by Chigbo Ekwealo who was a renowned environmental philosopher in Africa. The first part is a sketch of the principles and doctrine of his environmental ethics. The second part traces the intellectual history of his environmental ethics, the influences on it and its influence on the global environmental ethics movement. The third part is a critique of his environmental ethics based on contemporary and global circumstances. It is demonstrated how Ekwealo’s environmental ethics attempted to consciously depart from earlier versions of African environmental ethics in terms of its rejection of the neo-materialist, polemical, and supernatural features of other views. This article contributes to a reconstruction of the environmental thought of one of the founders of the African environmental movement whose thoughts are not accessible to most contemporary environmental philosophers today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses articles in the issue on topics including egalitarian biocentrism by Katie McShane, with a response by Giacomo Floris and Constanza Porro, and reflections on Darrel Moellendorf's book "Mobilizing Hope" by several commentators.

The value of nature has been extensively debated in environmental ethics. There has been less discussion, however, about how one should understand the relation between this value and normativity, or reasons: if something in nature is seen as valuable, how should we understand the relation between this fact and claims about reasons to, for example, protect it or promote its existence? The "commonsense" view is that value gives rise to reasons. The buck-passing account of value (BPA), on the other hand, implies that for an entity or state of affairs in nature to be valuable just is for it to have properties (other than that of being valuable) that provide reasons to promote or have a pro-attitude towards it. BPA has been extensively debated, but has received little attention in environmental philosophy. In this paper, it is argued that the view suggests a "reasons first" approach to environmental ethics, and that it should be preferred to competing accounts of value in the context of environmental ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three recent developments in environmental ethics--interest in virtue and character, concern for psychological realism, and collective action required to address global ecological challenges--are in tension with one another. For example, virtue ethical approaches in environmental ethics face objections from "situationist" critique and the strategic dimensions of collective action. This article proposes a conception of reciprocity as a response to this challenge for environmental virtue ethics. Environmental ethics has been traditionally skeptical of reciprocity due to its associations with self-interest, instrumental rationality, and well-defined contractual interactions. However, reciprocity can also be understood as a moral disposition of social agents who wish to respond proportionately and fittingly to the benefits they receive from others. Reciprocity is a psychologically robust moral disposition appropriate to contexts of strategic interaction underlying a variety of conservation and common pool resource challenges. As an environmental virtue, reciprocity's example demonstrates that environmental virtue ethics need not give up psychological realism or concern with collective action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to question the value of impartiality in environmental ethics by highlighting a problem internal to the bioethics approach known as sentiocentrism. The principle that all beings with the same degree of consciousness should receive the same moral treatment would lead to a trilemma, i.e., the need to choose among three morally unacceptable choices. I argue those problems are related to the premise, shared by Utilitarianism and rights-centered theories, that impartiality is the constitutive feature of the moral point of view. In the last part of my article, I discuss how this problem points to some advantages of a virtue ethics approach to environmental ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades now, environmental philosophers from Arne Næss to Freya Mathews have dreamt of environmental ethics that "make things happen." We contend such ethics can be found in Nordic children's tales--those scriptures of moral guidance, and influential propellers of environmental action. In this essay we discuss the moral-imaginative worlds of fictitious animateurs in Nordic children's tales, choosing some of the most canonical stories of the Nordics as our focal point. We argue the complex and often inconsistent philosophical mediations between human and more-than-human worlds as imagined by Astrid Lindgren, Selma Lagerlöf, Thorbjørn Egner, or Tove Jansson are as viable philosophical works as other, more systematic studies in environmental ethics. Further, we argue that places, or indeed larger geographical regions, animate the moral imagination of the characters who live there, suggesting there is a reciprocal and mutually enhancing relationship between dwelling, thinking, and acting, between being animated and becoming animateur. Indeed, we may speak of this animated and animating, cultural-ecological topos as part of a genuine Nordic Ecosphere. Coruscating in this ecosphere are the sparkles of 'literary ecological ethics,' which influence human actions, not as much through analysis, documentation, or argument as through world-making stories, images, and models of environmental heroines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New techniques for modifying the genomes of agricultural organisms create difficult ethical challenges. We provide a novel framework to replace worn-out ethical lenses relying on 'naturalness' and 'crossing species lines.' Thinking of agricultural intervention as a 'negotiation' of 'integrity' and 'agency' provides a flexible framework for considering techniques such as genome editing with CRISPR/Cas systems. We lay out the framework by highlighting some existing uses of integrity in environmental ethics. We also provide an example of our lens at work by looking at the creation of 'cisgenic' (as opposed to 'transgenic') potatoes to resist late potato blight. We conclude by highlighting three distinct advantages offered by the integrity framework. These include a more fitting way to look at the practice of scientific researchers, a more inclusive way to consider ethics around agriculture, and a more flexible way to provide the ethical grounds for regulation in different cultural contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The complex interactions and ruptures between contemporary settler colonialism, environmental ethics, and Indigenous rights and worldviews often emerge in projects of civil engineering. The continued capture, control and burial of natural water courses in Aotearoa-New Zealand is a case in point, and exemplifies a failure to stay abreast of evolving understandings and renewed relationships we seek with our waterways, our ancestors. Wai-Horotiu stream used to run down what is now Queen Street, the main road in Auckland, Aotearoa-New Zealand's largest city. Treasured by Māori as a source of wai (water) and mahinga kai (food), it is also the home of Horotiu, a taniwha or ancestral guardian--a literal 'freshwater body'. However, as Tāmaki-Makaurau transitioned into Auckland city, Wai-Horotiu became denigrated; used as an open sewer by early settlers before being buried alive in the colonial process. How, now, can we know this buried waterway? Te Awa Tupua Act 2017 that affords the Whanganui River juristic personality and moral considerability offers one possible solution. It acknowledges that waterways, incorporating all their physical and metaphysical elements, exist in existential interlinks with Māori as part of their whakapapa (genealogical networks). This paper asks, can a corresponding and appropriate ethics of association and care be fostered in and expressed by the political descendants of British settlers (Pākehā) and later immigrants who live here under the auspices established by Te Tiriti o Waitangi in 1840? Here is a conversation between a Māori earth systems scientist and a Pākehā interdisciplinary scholar. Where Hikuroa speaks from and to direct whakapapa connections, beginning with pepeha, Lythberg's narrative springboards from public art projects that facilitate more ways of knowing Wai-Horotiu. Together, we contend that a regard for Indigenous relationships with water can guide best practice for us all, and propose that creative practices can play a role in attaching people to place, and to waterways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accounts of grounded normativity in Indigenous philosophy can be used to challenge the groundlessness of Western environmental ethical approaches such as Aldo Leopold's land ethic. Attempts to ground normativity in mainstream Western ethical theory deploy a metaphorical grounding that covers up the literal grounded normativity of Indigenous philosophical practices. Furthermore, Leopold's land ethic functions as a form of settler philosophical guardianship that works to erase, assimilate, and effectively silence localized Indigenous knowledges through a delocalized ethical standard. Finally, grounded normativity challenges settlers to question their desire for groundless normative theory and practice as reflective of their evasion of ethical responsibility for the destruction and genocide of Indigenous communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The voices of Native American philosophers, scientists, and storytellers need to be amplified to problematize and decolonize the often taken-for-granted concept of species in environmental ethics. Especially in the context of climate change, concepts such as cross-species native, invasive, and endangered species have become cornerstones for understanding and evaluating moral obligations to other lives. Yet, even as the species concept does ethical work, it has not itself been subject to critical ethical evaluation. Instead, uncritical treatment of the species concept can naturalize Western metaphysical conceptual habits in ways that both support settler colonial organization of the world and conflict with Indigenous ontological and ethico-epistemological understandings of species. This can be especially problematic as scientists and environmentalists increasingly seek to engage Indigenous knowledge of particular species (for the purposes of conservation, for example) while assuming the sovereignty and objectivity of Western scientific taxonomies and species concepts. Yet, far from being objective and neutral with respect to culture, Western species concepts and taxonomies were first universalized and naturalized in part through the cooption and dismissal of Indigenous species knowledges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The so-called "Paradigm of the Wild" means either environmental ethics or environmental aesthetics has gone wild. According to Holmes Rolston, III, "philosophy has gone wild." Chinese traditional environmentalism takes another anthropocosmic way, and it has a global applicability in cultural diversity. The dichotomy of "nature-culture" is already out of date, and humans have to face the new relation of humanized-nature today. From the perspective of "ethics and aesthetics" in Chinese Confucianism, a different passageway between environmental ethics and environmental aesthetics can be shaped. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2016, a Cincinnati Zoo worker shot and killed a Western lowland gorilla to protect a three-year-old boy who had fallen into the animal's enclosure. This incident involves a variant of the classical trolley problem, one in which the death of a human being on the main track might be avoided by selecting an alternate track containing a member of an endangered species. This problem raises two important questions for environmental ethics. First, what, if anything, imbues a human child with greater value than a member of a critically endangered species? Second, is it ethical for zoos to house species such as gorillas? With regard to the first question, at a minimum, it is not obvious whether a human child or a gorilla has the greater value (i.e., that whatever evaluation one wishes to make, it requires an argument beyond simple speciesism). With regard to the second question, an appeal can be made to Japanese environmental philosophy, particularly the ethical paradigm of kyōsei (symbiosis) and the aesthetics of Yuriko Saitō. Members of endangered species have intrinsic value, which entails human obligations to protect the species as a whole and minimize harm to its specimens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental ethics is a major topic of discussion and enactment in China. The government is committed to work toward an "ecological civilization," a society in which concerns for a healthy natural environment are interwoven with concerns for a healthy human society and healthy human relations with nature. Whereas in the United States concern for the environment is rarely consciously philosophical, Chinese history has made people aware that philosophy underlies and shapes public policy. Whitehead's thought has been welcomed as a way of clarifying and supporting the commitment to ecological civilization, which has been strongly reemphasized by President Xi. It also helps in reviving and incorporating classical Chinese thought without threatening the great advances China has made in science. This organic thinking has expressed itself in government policy in shifting from the industrialization of agriculture to support for eco-villages and in dethroning GDP as the measure of progress. The interest in Whitehead is expressed by thirty-six universities setting up Centers for Process Studies, extensive discussion of a process book--Organic Marxism--and numerous other publications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Muir can be interpreted to have employed a similar strategy in his earliest conservation advocacy writings as the strategy Ralph Waldo Emerson employed to overcome the public futility of his personal ideals. Like Emerson, Muir came to offset the despair he felt at the political impotence of his conscience with a positive outlook on his potential to embody his subjective ideals both in his personal character and in his contributions to concrete forms of social practice. Muir thus can be shown to have standing in the environmental virtue ethics tradition by dint of his appreciation for the necessity of virtuous political participation in movements for social reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Justifications for the environmental restoration of the Pumalín National Park, originally known as Pumalín Nature Sanctuary, in Chile can be analyzed from a philosophical and ethical point of view. The environmental stage to which the park should be restored is defined as a moral choice, rather than an ecological one, that is based on "climax" as an a priori value that supports and guides the main restoration actions carried out in the park. This climax is a pre-settling or pre-colonization condition. Defined philosophically, climax is both an ethical and political value. For these actions, the ecosystem's health can be treated the same as that of a human's health: each society defines the criteria and the acme of health, as well as the valid efforts to restore it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent books promote Alexander Humboldt as an environmental hero, dismissing Humboldt's partner in exploration, the botanist Aimé Bonpland, in a few inaccurate phrases: left Europe, went native somewhere in South America, did some farming. Bonpland's writings and his forty years of regional development, botanical research, ethno-pharmacology, and environmental conservation in Argentina and Brazil present a better model for an environmental ethics than Humboldt's climb to fame in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The anthropocentric destruction of nature can be viewed as a form of self-destruction, which affects individuals and also the human species. It entails active destruction of the natural surroundings that are vital for the preservation of the planet's biodiversity. But should ecocide, or environmental self-destruction of the life of certain species, be considered an "interruption" to the life of such species, or it is part of their natural life course? Are ecocide and environmental destruction identical, or substantively different, phenomena? Prevention of the death of biotic species, and of the massive destruction of abiotic species, constitutes the ultimate challenge for both environmental and animal ethics. Modern mass extinction of species can be understood as a form of speciesism, and the prevention of such extinction is the most urgent challenge for any ethics centered on the recognition of the value, or rights, of nonhuman species. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nonhuman animals play various roles in environmental ethics, often as charismatic symbols of wilderness or active participants in the natural dramas we seek to preserve. Sometimes, however, nonhuman animals do not fit into--and may even threaten--the "nature" that we value. There are two especially problematic animals: white-tailed deer and feral cats. Together, these creatures shine light on a number of important issues in environmental ethics, including the tensions between animal welfare and environmentalism, the ways human interests and categories pervade even ecocentric perspectives, and the complex place of science in environmental ethics and advocacy. Thinking through the issues raised by debates about deer and cats can contribute to a more adequate treatment of nonhuman animals in environmental thought and advocacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of humans as relational individuals living in a milieu can provide some solutions to various obstacles of theorization that are standing in the way of an ethics of sustainability. The idea of a milieu was developed by Tetsuro Watsuji as a web of signification and symbols. It refers to the environment as lived by a subjective relational human being and not as artificially objectified. The milieu can neither be separated from its temporal—or historical—dimension as it is directly related to the “now” of perceptions and actions in the world. In other words, elements of the natural milieu can be said to have a constitutive value as they contribute to our well-being by helping us make sense of our life and our world. In their temporal and relational dimensions, Watsuji’s notions of the milieu and human being are thus directly related to the notion of sustainability. This concept offers some convincing solutions to overcoming the problem of temporal distance, by shifting the center of argumentation from unknown, passive, and biologically dependent not-yet-born people to the transmission of a meaningful historical milieu. The turning point here is that if what matters is the survival of ideal and material projects that people live (and sometimes die) for, then future generations have tremendous power over them, as the actions of those future people will determine the success or failure of the projects started by present generations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Space provides the major context for environmental interactions, both social or physical. In Africa the use of space is mediated by sociocultural values, beliefs, and norms. Segments of space from the room to the village square and surrounding natural environment have domains of cultural rules, symbols, and meanings assigned to them with import for environmental behavior and action among elders, children, and women. They illuminate aspects of the social enforcement of three forms of environment-related rules: “prescriptive,” mediating, and community-assigned environmental codes/taboos, some of which may require purification rites for violations. Several transgenerational eco-thoughts and eco-fantasies embedded in social practices have significant bearing on sustainable environmental conservation. Five major contexts are in deep interplay between community environmental ethics and environmental action: (1) the adoption and evocation of spiritualized rules in regulating the use of space; (2) the declaration of sacred grounds and territories to bound people; (3) the evolution of time-and place-related rules; (4) the use of physical designs to secure behavioral expectations; and (5) the role of “regulatory social institutions” in the enforcement of environmental codes. They point to the fact that cultural and social meanings assigned to the ordinary physical environment are important in deconstructing peoples’ use of space. While traditional communal environmental norms can be given preeminence, their correlates in cosmopolitan societies are exemplified in the complex formal rules sometimes employed in regulating the use of space, creating a juridical order in the drive for efficiency and profit in capitalistic societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant’s doctrine of the “categorical imperative” with respect to ratiocentrism needs to be examined for its implications for environmental ethics. Kant’s argument is that moral actions must be categorical or unqualified imperatives that reflect the sovereignty of moral obligations that all rational moral agents could figure out by virtue of their rationality. For Kant, humans have no direct moral obligations to non-rational, nonhuman nature: only rational beings, i.e., humans, are worthy of moral consideration. I argue that this position is excessively anthropocentric and ratiocentric in excluding the nonhuman natural world from moral consideration. While conceding that nonhuman nature is instrumentally valuable owing to some inevitable existential, ontological considerations, moral obligation should be extended to the natural world in order to achieve environmental wholeness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In environmental ethics, the conception of possession is generally criticized, since land, plants, and animals should not be objectified, controlled, or owned. Yet, Aldo Leopold planned to title A Sand County Almanac "Great Possessions." His title emphasized a point that Leopold thought important. In contrast to a sense of possession as domination, Leopold articulates a deeper, moral sense of possession in which the person claims and is claimed by others. For example, not only does Leopold claim his pines, his wife, and his chickadees, but he is also claimed by them. In this sense, possession is an act of love, care, and willingness to work on the behalf of others with passion and commitment. This sense of possession is worthy of our understanding and our emulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The philosophy of René Descartes has been attacked by environmental ethicists for supposedly being pivotal in preventing the formulation of proper environmental concerns and attitudes. Yet, Descartes' philosophy if read charitably is, in fact, effective in developing a proper environmental ethic. He believed God created two kinds of substances, mental and physical; humans are composed of a mental and physical substance, plants and animals of only a physical substance. He argued that humans, animals, and plants, despite their difference in substance, share the same status of creatures and interact with one another. Morally, Descartes argued that humans properly serving God receive theistic pleasure from promoting the welfare of their communities. Humans, animals, and plants exist in an ecological community with one another. Thus, Descartes' philosophy naturally develops a theo-ecocentric environmental ethic as humans will receive theistic pleasure in promoting the welfare of ecological communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Karen Warren's work has helped to transform the landscape of environmental philosophy, contributing theoretical grounding for Western ecofeminism and opening the range of theoretical perspectives one can adopt when doing Western environmental ethics. Although her work is laudable, there are substantive worries about how potential subjects of oppression are characterized in her later work. Warren's work and relevant secondary literature can be used as a foil to illuminate inadequate justification for the failure to include all living entities as potential subjects of the harm of oppression. The failure to provide conceptual room to include all entities that can rightfully be the potential subjects of oppression limits our understanding of oppression and the multiple ways in which it functions. Additionally, failure to attend to all potential subjects of oppression limits practical opportunities for anti-oppressive solidarity in political action. If oppression is correctly described as the harm of particular group members by others, and the class of living entities can be subjected to harm, then nonhuman living entities can potentially be subjects of oppression. The aim here is to provide conceptual support for the possibility that nonhuman life can be oppressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since environmental ethics research started in China in the 1980s, it has been deeply influenced by environmental ethics theory in the United States. Some Chinese environmental philosophers have adopted the key concept of intrinsic value to construct Chinese environmental ethics. However, in recent decades, the concept of intrinsic value has been criticized by scholars in both the United States and China. Many Chinese have found that environmental ethics in the United States that is founded on the concept of intrinsic value is incompatible with Chinese philosophy and culture. They have begun a new effort that is aimed at developing a localized environmental ethics based on traditional Chinese philosophy. However, the Chinese scholars' theoretical effort neglects the important concept of wilderness that is emerging from preservation and conservation practices in China. In this context, the emotion of wonder and its interrelationship with intrinsic value is the new paradigm for constructing a Chinese environmental ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The perception of modern environmental ethics in China has been greatly influenced by two factors: scholarship of environmental ethics in Europe and the United States on the one hand, and ideological resources from traditional Chinese culture on the other. In practice, while Chinese governmental agencies, enterprises, and social organizations are paying more and more attention to the perspective of environmental ethics in technology assessment and social governance, they are still faced with the challenge of a large number of realistic problems. Behind these intellectual features, there is the potential impact of cultural backgrounds, including traditional views of nature, epistemology, methodology, and axiology in China. Modern environmental ethics in China is growing into a kind of environmental ethics with the characteristics of the philosophy of organism, which can meet the requirements of sustainable development and responsible innovation, so that it may play its unique role in the era of globalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The significance of scientific research into the evolution of altruism for environmental ethics can be highlighted through an analysis of recent debates over William Hamilton's theory of inclusive fitness. Recent debates over how to explain altruism have become particularly charged with ideological weight because they are seen to have some consequence for how we understand the human moral project, especially with regard to nonhuman life. By analyzing the place of evolutionary theory in the work of environmental ethicists some conclusions can be drawn about the extent to which these debates, and evolutionary research into behavior more generally, are and are not significant for environmental ethics. In particular, the most important issues at stake for environmental ethicists concern the conditions under which altruistic forms of behavior can thrive and the degree to which we can consider intensive forms of altruism to be unstable and anomalous, or rather stable and predictable outcomes of social evolution given favorable conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the guest editors discuss the theme of the issue, Environmental Ethics.