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Dissipative accounts of structure formation show that the self-organisation of complex structures is thermodynamically favoured, whenever these structures dissipate free energy that could not be accessed otherwise. These structures therefore open transition channels for the state of the universe to move from a frustrated, metastable state to another metastable state of higher entropy. However, these accounts apply as well to relatively simple, dissipative systems, such as convection cells, hurricanes, candle flames, lightning strikes, or mechanical cracks, as they do to complex biological systems. Conversely, interesting computational properties—that characterize complex biological systems, such as efficient, predictive representations of environmental dynamics—can be linked to the thermodynamic efficiency of underlying physical processes. However, the potential mechanisms that underwrite the selection of dissipative structures with thermodynamically efficient subprocesses is not completely understood. We address these mechanisms by explaining how bifurcation-based, work-harvesting processes—required to sustain complex dissipative structures—might be driven towards thermodynamic efficiency. We first demonstrate a simple mechanism that leads to self-selection of efficient dissipative structures in a stochastic chemical reaction network, when the dissipated driving chemical potential difference is decreased. We then discuss how such a drive can emerge naturally in a hierarchy of self-similar dissipative structures, each feeding on the dissipative structures of a previous level, when moving away from the initial, driving disequilibrium.

In theoretical biology, we are often interested in random dynamical systems—like the brain—that appear to model their environments. This can be formalized by appealing to the existence of a (possibly non-equilibrium) steady state, whose density preserves a conditional independence between a biological entity and its surroundings. From this perspective, the conditioning set, or Markov blanket, induces a form of vicarious synchrony between creature and world—as if one were modelling the other. However, this results in an apparent paradox. If all conditional dependencies between a system and its surroundings depend upon the blanket, how do we account for the mnemonic capacity of living systems? It might appear that any shared dependence upon past blanket states violates the independence condition, as the variables on either side of the blanket now share information not available from the current blanket state. This paper aims to resolve this paradox, and to demonstrate that conditional independence does not preclude memory. Our argument rests upon drawing a distinction between the dependencies implied by a steady state density, and the density dynamics of the system conditioned upon its configuration at a previous time. The interesting question then becomes: What determines the length of time required for a stochastic system to ‘forget’ its initial conditions? We explore this question for an example system, whose steady state density possesses a Markov blanket, through simple numerical analyses. We conclude with a discussion of the relevance for memory in cognitive systems like us.

Active inference is a normative framework for explaining behaviour under the free energy principle -- a theory of self-organisation originating in neuroscience. It specifies neuronal dynamics for state-estimation in terms of a descent on (variational) free energy -- a measure of the fit between an internal (generative) model and sensory observations. The free energy gradient is a prediction error -- plausibly encoded in the average membrane potentials of neuronal populations. Conversely, the expected probability of a state can be expressed in terms of neuronal firing rates. We show that this is consistent with current models of neuronal dynamics and establish face validity by synthesising plausible electrophysiological responses. We then show that these neuronal dynamics approximate natural gradient descent, a well-known optimisation algorithm from information geometry that follows the steepest descent of the objective in information space. We compare the information length of belief updating in both schemes, a measure of the distance traveled in information space that has a direct interpretation in terms of metabolic cost. We show that neural dynamics under active inference are metabolically efficient and suggest that neural representations in biological agents may evolve by approximating steepest descent in information space towards the point of optimal inference., Comment: 12 pages, 3 figures