Search

En aquest article mostraré l'aparició d'un nou tòpic en la filosofia alemanya del present: la caracterització de la nova societat postsecular. El filòsof Jürgen Habermas ha contribuït a la discussió. Habermas ha argumentat que una societat postsecular revitalitza el paper de la religió en l'esfera pública. Mostraré que les idees del filòsof alemany sobre aquest tema estan desencaminades.

Call for papers: vers una sociologia de l'exercici filosòfic.

Call for papers: Towards a sociology of philosophical practice.

Aquest article examina alguns dels arguments a favor de considerar la pau com una obligació política que es pot trobar en una de les fundadores més rellevants del moviment pacifista, Jane Addams. El focus principal es troba en el seu llibre de 1907, Newer Ideals of Peace, que sovint ha estat llegit com idealista i obsolet i, sobretot, més com un manifest activista que una contribució seriosa tant a la filosofia com a la teoria política. Aquí argument que això es deu principalment a una ambigüitat de les crítiques de Addams a la defensa tradicional i kantià - cosmopolita de la pau pel que fa a ideal polític, a l'ambigüitat entre problemes pràctic - polítics i conceptuals. Tot i això, Addams aconsegueix identificar un profund problema en els ideals de pau tradicionals, o fins i tot en els ideals il · lustrats centrats en les institucions, és a dir, el col · lapse d'aquest ideal en casos de violacions de tractats de pau explícits entre nacions, ja que les violacions d'aquests acords equivalen a la pèrdua de tot compromís amb els drets de l'altra nació. Això revela que les condicions imposades per aquests ideals són com molt necessàries, però no suficients, per a la pau, i per tant el concepte basat en elles no és un concepte complet de les condicions per a la pau duradora entre humans. Un cop s'hagi considerat el treball de Addams (i en particular la seva atenció als recursos de solidaritat ia les pràctiques de concessió de drets més enllà i fora d'acords explícits entre governs) com dedicat a resoldre els problemes que comporta aquest problema fonamental, la seva tasca pot ser entesa com el desenvolupament d'una concepció de la pau més adequada, coherent, comprensiva i alhora més pràctica. En el curs d'aquest desenvolupament també es pot veure com Addams fa ús d'eines epistemològiques crucials i filosòficament més tècniques que estan més estretament relacionades amb el pragmatisme clàssic però que apareixen en part (encara que majoritàriament de forma obliqua durant la seva aplicació a un cas particular) i per primera vegada en el tractat de Addams. Per als filòsofs, doncs, el treball de Addams té més que un simple interès activista i polític. No obstant això, aquest article també explica l'estatus de Addams com una contribuent important a concepcions adequades de pau mundial i la comprensió de certs fenòmens en l'organització de la formació de la voluntat pública precisament indicant que sense alguna de les seves propostes orientades cap al futur, com la inseparabilitat de polítiques per a la pau i el desenvolupament o la necessitat de protegir i promoure institucionalment l'acció solidària espontània, la millor obra contemporàniasobre la pau no hagués estat possible.

When discussing genetic prenatal enhancement, we often encounter objections related to “eugenics.” Those who want to defend prenatal enhancement either try to avoid using the term “eugenics” or talk about “liberal eugenics”, implying that what was wrong with the old eugenics was its coercive character, and claiming that while old eugenics went against reproductive freedom, the new liberal eugenics promotes freedom. In this paper we first explore the objection that genetic enhancement is a form of eugenics that limits parental freedom. We then show how the same objection appears in other bioethical debates. Finally, we answer the objection, showing that genetic enhancement does not limit reproductive freedom in any important sense.

This paper elaborates some of the conceptual implications of Derrida’s call for “another thinking of life” in Voyous: Deux essais sur la raison. The paper first argues that Derrida’s deconstruction of the opposition between metaphorical and literal uses of the discourse of life in La vie la mort is radicalized in Voyous when he argues that democracy’s “autoimmunitary suicide” should be the point of departure for rethinking life in general. To understand further these autoimmune-suicidal tendencies, the paper turns to Derrida’s engagement with Aristotle’s conceptual figure of the prime mover in Voyous. The paper argues that Derrida turns to Aristotle because the prime mover illustrates the ways in which the concept of life remains historically and structurally informed by the philosophical value of ipseitocratic sovereignty, which is allergic to the disseminatory, proliferating, and improper qualities that the philosophical tradition has always ascribed to democracy. Autoimmunity thus provides a way for thinking of a democratic life that is not entirely determined by the teleological power of any divinely good life.

This article reflects on how the issue of the Real allows us to rethink the human of today in a more complete and up-to-date way. And for this purpose, two apparently dissimilar perspectives of understanding the Real are discussed: that of the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, which is rooted in Lacan’s psychoanalysis, and that of the Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri, which is born from a deep critical dialogue with Heidegger’s ontology. This paper will show the unity of two visions of the Real that lie at the heart of what is human and that allow us to criticize certain very influential psychoanalytic thought, centred on Jacques-Alain Miller, which cannot account for what is happening to us radically in the current era, or, perhaps, in any era.

Lévinas believed that Blanchot identified artistic inspiration with his understanding of the il y a, that is, an inauthentic attitude toward life and the Other. Lévinas, who tried to overcome the neutrality of the il y a, criticised Blanchot’s desire to establish ethics as a prima philosophia. Lévinas asked himself in what way the artwork could give access to the ethical, which is why he explored the relationship between expression and responsibility. He concluded that poetic speaking was excluded from his understanding of ethical language. Therefore, Lévinas was against poetic activity, in ethical terms, because poetic activity (dis)possessed the subject/artist in such a way that the creator was not able to control his writing, which converted art into the worst kind of irresponsibility. This paper will focus on Lévinas’ first aesthetic period, and on the ideas collected in the essay La Réalité et son ombre, published in 1948.

This paper explores various notions of aesthetic affordance recently developed through embodied, situated and enactive approaches to aesthetic experience by Maria Brincker and Shaun Gallagher, and the similarities and differences between them and the idea of affective affordance put forward by Joel Krueger and Giovanna Colombetti. This discussion is a way to try to offer some answers to the question of what aesthetic affordances particularly afford compared to affective affordances. I will focus on the affordances that we perceive during various aesthetic experiences in which we find ourselves more moved by the object, event or person(s) causing the experience than we had anticipated. I will argue that these experiences emerge as opportunities to carry out an active exploration of aspects of the narrative self that we feel is related to features of the experience; and that one particular brain network likely to be involved in these experiences – i.e. the default network – might help us to understand how these experiences meaningfully change our relationship with ourselves and with the social context of which we are a part.

The paper examines the international law principle of the permanent sovereignty over natural resources from a critical perspective of its conflict with demands for global environmental protection and sustainability. It is argued that state framed resource sovereignty per se does not represent an obstacle in the path of greater global environmental justice. The principle is strongly justified as a distinct economic expression of post-war state sovereignty and the ramification of the universalization of such principles as decolonization, self-determination, territorial rights, and sovereign equality of states. It is instead the interpretation of sovereignty and the set of practices established in the name of permanent sovereignty over natural resources that undermine international environmental law – the extension of sovereign resource rights beyond state borders, the continuous priority of unrestricted resource rights and development rights over international standards for environmental protection and sustainable use of resources, and the failure to reinforce notions and principles, both conceptually and legally, that better correspond to the global nature and comprehensive demands of ecological systems. The paper argues that the plausibility of resource sovereignty depends on the interpretation of the concept of sovereignty and how it incorporates self-limiting standards in its exercise. A parallel is established between limiting resource sovereignty using environmental sustainability standards and ecological stewardship and human rights as a widely accepted constraint on the exercise of state power over the population.

A la secció 25 de la dissertació tercera de La genealogia de la moral, en el context de la recerca de «l’antagonista natural de l’ideal ascètic», es descriu l’antagonisme «Plató contra Homer» com «l’antagonisme autèntic i total». Aquest article emmarca aquest antagonisme en el conjunt de l’obra nietzscheana i, després d’analitzar com es planteja en la República de Plató, fa algunes remarques sobre el paper que interpreta en el pensament de l’últim Nietzsche. El seu propòsit és argumentar que la presa en consideració de la interpretació i l’ús que Nietzsche fa de l’antagonisme «Plató contra Homer» permet obtenir una perspectiva hermenèutica des de la qual es poden contemplar aspectes habitualment desatesos de l’antagonisme decisiu, i no menys total, que té com a camp de batalla les últimes obres nietzscheanes: el «combat contra Plató» del mateix Nietzsche, que coincideix amb el seu combat per l’abandonament de la metafísica i l’autosupressió de la moral.

In this paper, I explore the difference between expression of intention and expression of emotion through a discussion of a passage from G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention, where she claims that expression of intention, unlike expression of emotion, is “purely conventional”. I argue that this claim is grounded on the fact that, although emotions can be described, expressions of emotion are not descriptions at all (e.g. of some present feeling or experience). Similarly, expressions of intention are not descriptions of a present state of mind but are rather the expression of a special sort of foreknowledge of a purported action. They are, in this respect, distinct from expression of emotion, since they are a description of some future happening (the purported action). Now, the centrally descriptive character of expressions of intention is what makes them “purely conventional”. But of course, Anscombe argues, one can have an intention without expressing it. And having an intention does not amount to having some description in mind.

Aquest treball explora la concepció de l'anàlisi de Moore tot relacionant-la amb la sevadefensa del sentit comú i el llenguatge ordinari com el seu vehicle d'expressió. La secció 1 estudiael paper que l'anàlisi representa en la seva filosofia, així com la seva importància perafrontar problemes filosòfics. La secció 2 descriu en què consisteix l'anàlisi segons Moore, discuteixels criteris que ha de satisfer una anàlisi correcta, i classifica els diferents tipus d'anà-lisi trobats en els escrits de Moore, alhora que nega que se'ls pugui considerar lingüístics oconceptuals. La secció 3 aclareix les nocions de sentit comú i llenguatge ordinari, subratllantla preeminència d'aquell. La discussió es proposa de resoldre dues qüestions: a ) c o mes pot reconèixer una proposició del sentit comú, i b ) com es pot reconèixer si tal proposicióés vertadera. Finalment, ens concentrem en el paper concedit al sentit comú i/o llenguatgeordinari com a pedra de toc a l'hora d'acceptar o rebutjar arguments filosòfics.

Under one particular reading of it, Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ is considered a seminal text in the revival of virtue ethics. Seen thus, Anscombe is implying that it is possible to do ethics without using concepts such as ‘moral ought’ or ‘moral obligation’, the perfect example being Aristotelian ethics. On the other hand, Anscombe claims that it is not useful at present to engage in moral philosophy since she finds that ‘philosophically there is a huge gap… which needs to be filled by an account of human nature, human action, …and above all of human “flourishing”’ (Anscombe, 1958: 18). The gap Anscombe refers to appears where there should be a ‘proof that an unjust man is a bad man’. My aim in this paper is to discuss the various ways in which Anscombe’s theses can be interpreted, recalling two other philosophers for whom Aristotelian virtue ethics was also essential: P. Foot and J. McDowell. I will argue that Anscombe did not expect Aristotelian ethics to answer the problems modern ethics poses.

Elizabeth Anscombe is well-known for her insistence that there are absolutely prohibited actions, though she is somewhat obscure about why this is so. Nonetheless, I contend in this paper that Anscombe is more concerned with the epistemology of absolute prohibitions, and that her thought on connatural moral knowledge – which resembles moral intuition – is key to understanding her thought on moral prohibitions. I shall identify key features of Anscombe’s moral epistemology before turning to investigate its sources, examining the roots of connaturality in Aquinas and comparing it with rationalist ethical intuitionism, which Anscombe differs from in rejecting “good” as a simple, non-natural property. I then develop a two-stage argument about absolute prohibition: The first will be loosely Thomistic, while the second will suggest how Anscombe’s absolute prohibitions can be seen as a continuation of Wittgenstein’s anti-scepticism in On Certainty. I develop an account of absolute prohibitions as a form of Wittgensteinian hinge proposition – they are not the conclusions of deductive arguments, but the foundations for intelligibility in action.

This paper argues that there was considerably more philosophy of action in moral theory before 1958 (when Anscombe complained of its lack under the banner ‘philosophy of psychology’) than there has been since. This is in part because Anscombe influenced the formation of ‘virtue theory’ as yet another position within normative ethics, and her work contributed to the fashioning of ‘moral psychology’ as an altogether distinct (and now increasingly empirical) branch of moral philosophy.

The objective of this paper is to focus on the Umwelt-Welt dichotomy by means of which Heidegger and Gehlen attempt to describe the grounds for the ontological difference between human and animal. Despite their profound differences, both Heidegger and Gehlen, due to their common belief in the ontological specificity of the human compared to the animal, assume as their own the classical metaphysical point of view according to which an appropriate definition of man’s essence can only be attained by excluding every element of animality from humanity. On the basis of these premises, I criticize this theoretical assumption as shared by Heidegger’s The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (1929-1930) and Gehlen’s Man. His Nature and Place in the World (1940).

Medieval philosophers before Ockham are usually said to have treated relations as real, monadic accidents. This “Standard Account” does not, however, fit in with most discussions of relations in the Latin tradition from Augustine to the end of the 12th century. Early medieval thinkers minimized or denied the ontological standing of relations, and some, such as John Scottus Eriugena, recognized them as polyadic. They were especially influenced by Boethius’s discussion in his De trinitate, where relations are treated as prime examples of accidents that do not affect their substances. This paper examines non-standard accounts in the period up to c. 1100.

The paper will discuss the theory of Iris van der Tuin’s New Materialism together with Karen Barad’s Agential Realism. The purpose of this approach is to find differing practices that help to construct a turn to what is considered a relational ontology in which ethics, epistemology, ontology and methodology merged into each other. This new paradigm is a transversal approach that generates genealogies of minoritarian philosophies and feminist theories in order to approach matter as a dynamic, agentive and relational entanglement in which human and non-human practices intra-act equally. As a result, a different point of departure is produced in order to generate knowledge, since instead of thinking through separate entities, new materialism and agential realism depart from the relations of those entities understanding them as dynamic processes. Apart from an active approach to matter, these theories are framed under an affirmative approach to theory making, queering the traditional sense of linearity and moving away from dichotomical binaries.

The traditional view of Schopenhauer’s ethical thought is to see renunciation from the will-to-life as the truest, most ethical response to a world such as ours in which suffering is tremendous, endemic, and unredeemed. In this view, Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion, which he encapsulates in On the Basis of Morality in the principle “Harm no one; rather help everyone to the extent that you can” is a second best way of living, valuable only as a step along the path to “salvation” from the will-to-life in complete renunciation. In this paper, we suggest that this traditional picture of the ethics of compassion as ultimately a way station to the normatively preferable option of renunciation masks a fundamental conflict at the heart of Schopenhauer’s ethical thought. Instead, we argue, Schopenhauer should be interpreted as offering two independent, mutually antagonistic ethical ideals: compassion and renunciation. Bracketing Schopenhauer’s resignationism, we then pursue his ideal of compassion and offer a reconstruction of Schopenhauer’s ethics that espouses ‘degrees of inherent value’ among living beings. We aim to show that on this reconstruction, Schopenhauer offers a hybrid Kantian/moral sense theory of ethics that has considerable novelty and philosophical attractions for contemporary ethical theorizing.

En aquest article es mostra que el concepte de medi ambient, quan es pren com a categoria principal d’una visió del món que busca reconèixer, valorar i protegir els espais naturals, condueix inevitablement a conseqüències contradictòries: d’una banda, devalua el paper (i el valor) de cada particular i el subsumeix en conjunts i totalitats; de l’altra, contraposa rígidament allò humà i allò no humà com dues esferes separades. Per contra, una visió del món basada en el paisatge, una categoria sintètica que integra la base natural amb dimensions humanes, permet recuperar harmonies i modes d’encontre en un món marcat per profundes divisions i preocupants signes de la desintegració d’allò humà.

Mathematics stand in a privileged relationship with aesthetics: a relationship that follows two main directions. The first concerns the introduction of mathematical considerations into aesthetic discourse. For instance, it is common to mention the mathematical architecture of certain artistic productions. The second leads from aesthetics to mathematics. In this case, the question is that of the role and meaning that aesthetic considerations may assume in mathematics. It is indeed a widely held view among mathematicians, of whatever socio-historical context, not only to see their discipline as presenting a strong aesthetic dimension, but also to consider that this dimension plays a fundamental role in the process of developing and understanding mathematics. The main ambition of this paper is to show how Nelson Goodman’s aesthetics can be used to justify this point of view and to propose a thesis concerning the aesthetic functioning of mathematics. This first result allows to resituate Goodman’s aesthetics within a very classical tradition that will be described. Finally, the underlying ambition is to show the keys provided by Goodman’s theory for the philosophy of mathematics.

Hi ha diverses raons que expliquen per què mai com ara s'havia parlat tant de paisatge, i una d'elles és el paper rellevant que el paisatge té i ha tingut sempre en la formació i consolidació d'identitats territorials. Aquesta és la raó que explica que el paisatge actuï a manera de catalitzador, d'element vertebrador de la creixent conflictivitat de caràcter territorial i ambiental palpable en la nostra societat. Davant la pèrdua de la idiosincràsia territorial local deguda a processos no consensuats i gairebé sempre mal explicats, la societat civil reacciona de manera cada vegada més indignada, generant un estat d'opinió que, al seu torn, connecta perfectament amb un corrent de fons que reclama , des de fa anys, una nova cultura del territori.

En aquest treball, em proposo fer una avaluació crítica d'alguns aspectes de la Ley41/2002, relatius al paper del consentiment dels menors a l'hora de practicar unaintervención mèdica sobre ells. El punt de partida és la defensa del valor central de laautonomía personal-entesa com la capacitat per al judici racional i independent-i de la legítima actuació de l'Estat, per sobre dels representants (padreso tutors), per salvaguardar certs béns-objectivament considerats - dels menoresno capaços. La fonamentació d'aquest paternalisme rau en la preservació delsoporte (la vida i integritat física) del que serà exercici futur de l'autonomia. En eltrabajo, es descarten altres defenses de la consideració de l'autonomia del menor madur (destacadament l'anomenat «paternalisme de la voluntat») i es participa de laconsagración que de la noció «material» i «gradual» de competència per al consentimientoinformado s'ha fet en la Llei 41/2002 en relació amb els menors. Es destaquen, però, algunes incoherències en la dita normativa en relació amb altres normasdel sistema jurídic espanyol, s'analitza en particular el supòsit de la interrupcióndel embaràs.

La constitucionalització dels drets mediambientals pot contribuir a la justicia medioambiental global. Això rebat l'argument que sosté que tal constitucionalizaciónde els drets mediambientals en les societats opulentes no afectaria la situació-i fins i tot la empitjoraria-dels països pobres. La primera secció demostra perquè és necessari centrar-se, per al desenvolupament de la justícia global mediambiental, en els derechosmedioambientales a nivell estatal. La segona explica per què els interessos de lospaíses pobres no han de oposar-se a la promoció dels drets mediambientals constitucionalesen els països rics; al contrari, aquests països han d'assegurar aquests drets paraellos mateixos. La secció 3 indica la manera en què el desenvolupament constitucional dels derechosmedioambientales té un paper constructiu en els països menys avantatjats, on s'han originat alguns dels precedents més importants en aquest terreny.

Parafrasejant el famós llibre de Ronald Dworkin, Taking rights Seriously, em proposo, en aquest treball, defensar el caràcter ple, fonamental i universal dels drets deBienestar, moltes vegades relegats a un paper secundari en l'anàlisi dels derechoshumanos i observats amb sospita i recel, sobretot quan col · lisionen amb els derechosciviles i polítics. Per a això rebutjaré la dicotomia radical que sol establecerseentre un i altre tipus de drets, atenent a quatre arguments: el cost dels drets, la seva universalitat, la seva relativitat i la seva justiciabilitat. Abundem així en la doctrinade les Nacions Unides sobre la indivisibilitat i interdependència de tots els derechoshumanos.

In this paper, I examine some of the arguments that have been put forward against Levinson’shistorical account of art. These arguments focus upon the conceptual impossibility ofdefending a historical account of art when we take into consideration issues regarding theidentification of art in other cultures or worlds. Levinson has tried to make his positionclearer defending himself from these criticisms in a way that seems quite persuasive. However,as I argue at the end of this article, Levinson’s attempt cannot successfully grasp ameaning of art that could be identified universally. At the end, his account can only worksif we restrict our application of «art» to works that already belong to our own history ofart and that, correspondingly, satisfy one or more of the artistic regards that have been relevantin our culture.

La teoria de causació de Dowe (1992) de quantitats conservades contenia les bases sobre les que intenta donar compte de la causació; reciéntemente en (2000) Dowe presenta la teoria en un estat de desenvolupament que permet aplicar-la amb més detall als casos pretesos. En aquest treball presentarem alguns contraexemples a la teoria inicial que no poden ser resolts tampoc per la teoria detallada, i mostrarem de quina manera es pot obtenir tot un seguit d'aquests contraexemples. Analitzarem quin tipus d'entitats, processos o interaccions són candidats a jugar el paper de causes i efectes, mostrant com la línia d'exemples pot estendre a un altre tipus de casos que recentment van ser abordats en la teoria detallada. Mostrarem a més com la teoria de Dowe podria fer immune a aquesta família d'exemples i quin seria el cost d'aquesta possible solució.

Seventy-five years after the publication of SuZ, this work still not interpreted in the light of the question of being — few exceptions notwithstanding. To commemorate the seventy-fifth anniversary of the publication of SuZ, it is fitting to take up this question, and to attend to its structure and hermeneutic ramifications. Returning to this question we come upon and experience a phenomenon which Heidegger calls «retro- or forward relatedness of being» and which constitutes the foremost hermeneutic pre-condition for gaining access to his entire thought. It is the purpose of this paper to indicate that this relatedness sustains Heidegger’s trascendental-horizonal as well as his being-historical thinking.

This paper is a critical examination of Putnam's theory of truth as it evolves from metaphysical to internal realism. First, I analyze the model-theoretic argument that led Putnam to abandon the metaphysical concept of truth as correspondence and to adopt and epistemic view of truth. Though a powerful critique of the metaphysical realist conception of truth, this argument does not establish conclusively that the concept of truth has any epistemic content. Secondly, I discuss Putnam's idealization theory of truth, arguing that the identification of truth with “acceptability under ideal conditions” is at odds with the claim that truth is context-transcendent, since the notion of justification is intrinsically context-dependent and no amount of idealization can reedeem its contextual character. Finally, I suggest that the realist intuitions that Putnam's internal realism tries to capture call for no more than a deflationary view of truth. Acceptance of this view requires abandoning not only the idea that truth is an epistemic property, but also the idea that truth is a substantive property that all true statements share and, therefore, a proper object of philosophical theorizing.

This paper proposes a reassesment of Rarnon Llull's thought in the history of philosophy. A previous reconsideration of the history of medieval thought is required. The author refuses a finalist interpretation of the Christian thought that reduces the “rationalist” slant of Anselm and the Victorines to a philosophical moment overpassed, even buried, by Thomist criticisms. Therefore, he recognizes in the Anselmian stream a philosophical tradition of its own, historically transcending the Middle Ages and becoming one of the principal sources of Renaissance metaphysics. By reeenacting and transforming the terms of that current, R. Llull became one of its most decisive components.

Aquest article ofereix un esforç de precisió i hermenèutica sobre les principals explicacions sobre el marc antropològic al voltant de la reflexió asistemàtica de Ricoeur sobre el tema que es refereix a les manifestacions humanes fonamentals: símbols, textos i l'acció. Per dur a terme aquesta tasca, es planteja un cercle hermenèutic entre la filosofia reflexiva i la filosofia de l'expressió: el subjecte, inaccessible en si, ha de ser capturat en les seves manifestacions; però al seu torn, la interpretació d'aquests, impulsa de forma obligatòria a una investigació sobre les seves condicions antropològiques i ontològiques. Es requereixen cinc punts per dibuixar el cercle hermenèutic: 1. El "jo" insubstancialitzat: El "jo" no ha de ser concebut com un objecte constituit, sinó com un procés dinàmic. L'hermenèutica sobre les principals mediacions humanes es converteixen en un imperatiu per al mètode fenomenològic. 2. La pre-reflexiva i els altres nivells de la intencionalitat: Ricoeur s'acosta a l'hermenèutica de Heidegger i de Gadamer per expressar la terra el Cogito al nivell pre-reflexiu que s'ha d'entendre com una síntesi intencional. 3. Una filosofia de la llibertat, que flueix entre dos pols: l'activitat i receptivitat, projectant-se més enllà de intel·lectualisme i l'existencialisme, i que es converteix en acriticisme tant l'idealisme i l'ateisme. 4. L'ésser humà, una inestabilitat ontològica entre la seva afirmació fonamental -nivell infinit- i la seva diferència existencial - nivell finit-. 5. L'ésser humà, autor d'una síntesi dialèctica: la progressió teleològica només es pot fer a través de regressió arqueològica, la imaginació pren un paper fonamental en aquest procés. El tractament d'aquests cinc punts conflueixen en tres estats principals que podrien ser entesos com la base de l'antropologia de Ricoeur: 1. El subjecte és capaç de conèixer-se a si mateix només a través de les seves pròpies manifestacions. 2. L'ésser humà és una constant tensió entre la Naturalesa i Absolut. 3. L'ésser humà fa una síntesi dialèctica de la progressió arqueològic.