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Yardstick competition is a regulation regime that forces local monopolies to compete against a variable cost or total cost benchmark. The variable cost benchmark ignores the fixed capital, creating a strong incentive to over-invest, whereas the total cost benchmark assumes all costs to be variable, ignoring the investment risk. We propose theoretical, methodological, and operational advances to increase applicability of yardstick competition in energy regulation. In the proposed conditional yardstick regime capital is treated as a fixed input, and the local monopolies compete against the variable cost conditional on the fixed input. We develop a benchmarking method that can handle multiple outputs, heterogeneity, and shape constraints to ensure incentive compatibility. We discuss the real-world application of the proposed regime to the Finnish electricity distribution firms in 2016--2023. We argue that smarter regulation of network industries can contribute to lower risk premiums and help to achieve win-win solutions both in terms of reliability and affordability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unbundling of vertically integrated utilities has become an integral element in the regulation of network industries and has been implemented in many jurisdictions. The idea of separating the network, as the natural monopoly, from downstream retailing, which may be exposed to competition, is still subject to contentious debate, as there is much empirical evidence that unbundling eliminates economies of vertical integration, though evidence on overall price effects is still lacking. In this paper, we study the effect of legal unbundling on grid charges in the German electricity distribution industry. Using panel data on German distribution system operators (DSOs), we exploit the variation in the timing of the implementation of legal unbundling and the fact that not all DSOs had to implement unbundling measures. We are also able to identify heterogeneous effects of legal unbundling for different types of price regulation because we observe a switch in the price regulation regime from rate-of-return regulation to incentive regulation during our observation period. Our findings suggest that legal unbundling of the network stage significantly decreases grid charges in the range of 5% to 9%, depending on the type of price regulation in place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unbundling of vertically integrated utilities has become an integral element in the regulation of network industries and has been implemented in many jurisdictions. The idea of separating the network, as the natural monopoly, from downstream retailing, which may be exposed to competition, is still subject to contentious debate, as there is much empirical evidence that unbundling eliminates economies of vertical integration, though evidence on overall price effects is still lacking. In this paper, we study the effect of legal unbundling on grid charges in the German electricity distribution industry. Using panel data on German distribution system operators (DSOs), we exploit the variation in the timing of the implementation of legal unbundling and the fact that not all DSOs had to implement unbundling measures. We are also able to identify heterogeneous effects of legal unbundling for different types of price regulation because we observe a switch in the price regulation regime from rate-of-return regulation to incentive regulation during our observation period. Our findings suggest that legal unbundling of the network stage significantly decreases grid charges in the range of 5% to 9%, depending on the type of price regulation in place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Yardstick competition is a regulation regime that forces local monopolies to compete against a variable cost or total cost benchmark. The variable cost benchmark ignores the fixed capital, creating a strong incentive to over-invest, whereas the total cost benchmark assumes all costs to be variable, ignoring the investment risk. We propose theoretical, methodological, and operational advances to increase applicability of yardstick competition in energy regulation. In the proposed conditional yardstick regime capital is treated as a fixed input, and the local monopolies compete against the variable cost conditional on the fixed input. We develop a benchmarking method that can handle multiple outputs, heterogeneity, and shape constraints to ensure incentive compatibility. We discuss the real-world application of the proposed regime to the Finnish electricity distribution firms in 2016-2023. We argue that smarter regulation of network industries can contribute to lower risk premiums and help to achieve win-win solutions both in terms of reliability and affordability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I examine the effects of privatization, in the form of acquisitions, in the Swedish electricity distribution sector. As the majority of the distribution networks have remained publicly owned, I use a synthetic control method to identify the effects on price and labor efficiency. In comparison to their synthetic counterparts, I find that the acquired networks increased labor efficiency by 8-18 percent depending on model specification, while no effect is found on price. Thus, the evidence suggests economically meaningful efficiency gains but that these are not fed through to consumer prices. Robustness results using a conventional difference-in-differences estimator largely confirms the results, although the estimated efficiency gains are either comparable to or less pronounced than their synthetic control counterparts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the hypothesis that changes to high-powered incentive regulations have a positive efficiency and productivity growth effects in a regulated electricity distribution industry. We estimate an input distance function using the stochastic frontier analysis method to compute technical efficiency scores for 121 Norwegian utilities over the period 2004-2012. We explore sources of productivity growth by parametrically decomposing the Malmquist productivity index into efficiency change, technical change, and scale change. Unlike previous studies, we examine the difference in performance across two regulatory regimes: yardstick competition (2007-2012) and RPI-X incentive regulation (2004-2006). Results show significant efficiency and productivity growth improvements with embodied technical change as the main driver. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses a Bayesian approach to analyzing cost efficiency of Distribution System Operators when model specification and variable selection are difficult to determine. Bayesian model selection and inference pooling techniques are adopted in a stochastic frontier analysis to mitigate the problem of model uncertainty. Adequacy of a given specification is judged by its posterior probability, which makes the benchmarking process not only more transparent but also much more objective. The proposed methodology is applied to one of Polish Distribution System Operators. We find that variable selection plays an important role and models, which are the best at describing the data, are rather parsimonious. They rely on just a few variables determining the observed cost. However, these models also show relatively high average efficiency scores among analyzed objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we estimate the short-run, long-run and overall efficiency of Norwegian electricity distribution companies for the period 2000-2013 controlling for both noise and company effects. Short-run inefficiency is the part of inefficiency that is allowed to adjust freely over time for each company, but long-run (persistent) inefficiency remains constant over time, although it is allowed to vary across companies. For robustness check we also consider two additional models in which either company effects are not controlled or these are treated as inefficiency. The production technology is represented by a translog input distance function in all three models. We find that technical change and returns to scale are quite robust across the models. However, the efficiency scores across the three models we consider are not correlated strongly. We conclude that the regulators and practitioners should take extra caution in using the proper model in practice, especially when the efficiency measures are used to reward/punish companies through incentives for better performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1990s, electricity distribution networks in many countries have been subject to incentive regulation. The sector regulators aim to identify the best performing utilities as frontier firms to determine the relative efficiency of firms. This paper develops a nested latent class (NLC) model approach where unobserved differences in firm performance are modelled using two 'zero inefficiency stochastic frontier' (ZISF) models nested in a 'latent class stochastic frontier' (LCSF) model. This captures the unobserved differences due to technology or environmental conditions. A Monte Carlo simulation suggests that the proposed model does not suffer from identification problems. We illustrate the proposed model with an application to Norwegian distribution network utilities for the period 2004-2011. We find that the efficiency scores in both LCSF and ZISF models are biased, and some firms in the ZISF model are wrongly labelled as inefficient. Conversely, inefficient firms may be wrongly labelled as being fully efficient by the ZISF model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under increasing penetration of distributed resources, regulators and electricity distribution utilities face greater uncertainty regarding the evolution of network uses and efficient system costs. This uncertainty can threaten revenue adequacy and challenges both cost of service/rate of return and incentive/performance-based approaches to the remuneration of distribution utilities. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a novel methodology to establish allowed utility revenues over a multi-year regulatory period. This method combines several "state of the art" regulatory tools designed to overcome information asymmetries, manage uncertainty, and align incentives for utilities to cost-effectively integrate distributed energy resources while taking advantage of opportunities to reduce system costs and improve performance. We use a reference network model to simulate a large-scale urban distribution network, demonstrate the practical application of this regulatory method, and illustrate its performance in the face of both benchmark and forecast errors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Electricity industries are experiencing upward cost pressures in many parts of the world. This paper focuses on productivity trends in electricity distribution. We apply two methodologies for estimating productivity growth--an index based approach, and an econometric cost based approach--to data on 73 Ontario distributors for the period 2002 to 2012. The resulting productivity growth estimates are approximately -1% per year, suggesting a reversal of the positive estimates that have generally been reported in previous periods. We implement flexible semi-parametric specifications to assess the robustness of these conclusions and discuss the use of such statistical analyses for calibrating productivity and relative efficiency within a price-cap framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]