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In this study, we investigate how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) influences corporate tax avoidance using a dataset of listed firms from 22 countries spanning 1999 to 2019. Our findings align with the agency motive, showing that as EPU increases, firms tend to decrease their tax avoidance practices. Further analysis reveals that this negative relationship is particularly strong among unconstrained firms. We also observe that strong firm-level governance is associated with reduced tax avoidance during periods of heightened EPU. Furthermore, we investigate how institutional characteristics at the country level influence the relationship between EPU and firms' tax avoidance strategies. We find that firms in countries with strong governance, situated in developed economies, and adhering to stringent auditing standards are less inclined to engage in tax avoidance amid increasing EPU. Conversely, firms in countries with low GDP per capita, low governance scores, and located in emerging economies demonstrate a positive association between tax avoidance and EPU. Overall, our research highlights EPU as a key driver of corporate tax management, offering policymakers valuable insights into its potential impact on tax planning. • EPU and tax avoidance are negatively associated. • Less tax avoidance during the periods of rising EPU is to reduce agency issues • Firm-level and country-level governance can reduce tax avoidance during uncertain times [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a sample of Chinese local listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2008 to 2020, we find that provincial State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) leaders' work experience at local companies significantly improves local SOEs' investment efficiency. This effect is stronger for local SOEs with shorter pyramidal layers and those in regions with weak institutional environments. Moreover, mechanism tests show that provincial SASAC leaders' work experience at local companies improves local SOEs' investment efficiency by decreasing agency costs and weakening policy burdens. Overall, our study highlights the important role of regulators' characteristics in determining the investment efficiency of SOEs. • Provincial SASAC leaders' work experience at local companies significantly improves local SOEs' investment efficiency. • This effect is stronger for local SOEs with shorter pyramidal layers and in regions with a weak institutional environment. • Agency costs and policy burdens are channels through which such work experience improves local SOEs' investment efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through a proprietary dataset of listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, we establish a positive link between firms' financial technology (Fintech) business and their corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices. Such a link can be more pronounced among firms of stronger political connections, lower agency costs, and better internal control. Enhanced supply of bank loans, internal capital market, public scrutiny, and firms' strategic differences are underlying the link. Fintech business may also effectively curb firms' corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) behaviour. Fintech business may have become a strategic endeavor to sustain long-term economic growth in the digital age. • Fintech business positively contributes to firm CSR practices. • The impact is strengthened by political connections, lowered agency costs, and internal control. • Bank loans, internal capital market, public scrutiny, and strategic differences are underlying elements. • Fintech business also curbs corporate social irresponsibility behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the impact of CEO power on corporate performance in Sri Lanka, characterized by demarcated ethno-linguistic and religious boundaries and devastating ethnic conflicts with subsequent reconciliation. We focus on a CEO's social-dominance power, based on ethnicity, gender, and political connections. Social-dominance power (lack of ethno-religious-linguistic and gender diversity) augments agency conflicts and worsens corporate performance and financial stability in the post-civil-war era. Board inclusiveness (representing different ethnicities, religions, languages, and gender) at the top decision and monitoring levels of corporations positively affects performance. • Social dominance power of the CEO depends on membership of ethnic-religious-linguistic groups and gender. • Board inclusiveness positively affects corporate performance and decision making. • High social-dominance power boosts agency conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior literature argues that, given the existence of information asymmetries and agency costs, higher competition may increase financial constraints by reducing banks' incentives to build lending relationships. Using a sample of listed firms for six Latin American countries, we analyze the relation between banking competition and financial constraints. We find evidence in line with prior research that banking competition increases financial constraints. This result is robust and heterogeneous. We include other country-specific variables and check the robustness of our findings; the main results hold. Our results show that the effect of competition differs across firms and industries. Specifically, consistent with the information hypothesis, the negative impact of competition is higher for small quoted firms and for low-assets tangibility industries. Also, as expected, we find evidence that firms are more affected by financial constraints during the last crisis. This negative effect is larger for firms in more competitive banking industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine whether firms' political connection affects their corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagements and how the effects vary with different political ties, namely symbolic and material connections. These ties reflect different degrees of political embeddedness, interest alignment, network size, and monitoring with the government, and therefore impart divergent effects on managerial incentives for CSR practices. Our analysis indicates that CSR in firms with symbolic connection is much more associated with agency cost than CSR in firms with material connection. We also find that large firms with symbolic connection exhibit lower CSR performance than those with material connection, probably because the former group tends to substitute the prestige of their political capital for the goodwill associated with CSR engagement. These results show that accounting for the effects of different types of political connection on managerial incentives contributes some clarity to the debate about the compatibility of CSR with primary corporate mandates. • We examine whether a firm's political connection affects its CSR engagements • CSR engagement in firms with symbolic connection is associated with agency cost • CSR engagement in firms with material connection is associated with good governance • Large firms with symbolic connections exhibit lower CSR performance [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research is not conclusive whether information asymmetries or managerial discretion are the cause of observed investment-cash flow sensitivity. This paper examines the effect of family firms' governance heterogeneity on firm's investment-cash flow sensitivity in Brazil. The Brazilian economic and corporate governance context present several idiosyncratic features, including weak minority shareholder protection, an underdeveloped capital market, macro-economic uncertainties, the presence of controlling shareholders (especially families), and the excessive use of control-enhancing mechanisms, allowing us to explore in greater detail the drivers of investment-cash flow sensitivity. We find that investment is more sensitive to cash flow for firms with a highly entrenched family presence (divergence between corporate control and voting rights coupled with family management) than in less entrenched family firms. This result emerges primarily due to financial constraints from asymmetric information, rather than agency problems of free cash flow from abuse of managerial discretion. Our findings shed new light on the role of excessive control rights in investment decisions, allowing family managers to reallocate capital to cope with financial constraints in times of economic uncertainties. • Family entrenched firms reduce the investment-cash flow sensitivity. • Entrenched owners are stewards in times of economic uncertainty. • Underinvestment due to information asymmetries seems to prevail. • There is no evidence of private benefits of control in family entrenched firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This study focuses on firms that are audited by a big auditor and examines the differentiation in the earnings management potential and the level of conservatism. It also investigates whether being audited by a big auditor would lead to lower agency costs and lower cost of equity. The study focuses on emerging common-law South Africa and code-law Brazil, and seeks to identify whether there are material differences given their dissimilar institutional characteristics. The study reports that even though firms may be audited by high quality auditors, their institutional differences influence significantly firms'' earnings conservatism, agency costs and cost of equity. Client firms of big auditors in both common-law South Africa and code-law Brazil exhibit lower discretionary accruals. The study has found evidence of more conservative earnings for South Africa but insufficient levels for Brazil. For common-law South Africa, the presence of effective corporate governance mechanisms reduces agency costs. For code-law Brazil, the corporate governance mechanisms generally display an insignificant impact on reducing agency costs. For common-law South Africa, firm-level performance, growth and market determinants tend to lead to a lower cost of equity. For code-law Brazil, it is found that significant discretionary accruals, market beta and analyst forecast dispersion would result in higher uncertainty and would consequently raise the cost of equity. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This paper investigates the benefits and associated agency costs of using internal capital markets through affiliating with groups using data of 2000 firms from 9 East Asian economies. We find that mature and slow-growing firms with ownership structures more likely to create agency problems gain more from group affiliation, while young and high-growth firms lose more. Agency problems are important determinants of the distribution of internal markets value gains in economies outside Japan, but less so in Japan. Consistent with the literature, financially constrained firms benefit from group affiliation. Our results are robust to different time periods and estimation techniques. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

We examine the effect of family control on firm value and corporate decision during Thailand's constitutional change arising from the 2014 coup d'état. We find that Thai family firms perform poorly when compared to non-family firms during the period of political uncertainty. The effect is more pronounced when firms have high expected agency costs from outside investors. Further, we find that family firms delay their investments, hold less cash, pay smaller dividends and have poorer access to debt financing sources relative to non-family firms. The reductions in investment and financing activities may at least partially account for their underperformance. Our evidence is consistent with the view that family control enhances firms' survivorship by establishing political connections in times of political uncertainty at the expense of minority shareholders. • Family firms performed poorly compared to non-family firms during Thailand's 2014 coup d'état. • The effect is more pronounced in firms with higher expected agency costs from investors. • Family firms delay their investments, hold less cash, pay smaller dividends and have poorer access to debt financing sources. • The reduction in investment and financing activities underscore their inferior performance. • To survive, family control establishes political connections at the expense of minority investors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]