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This paper, on the basis of a sample of Chinese listed firms, investigates the relationship between both real and accrual-based earnings management activities and firms' capital investment behavior. We apply the threshold model proposed by Hansen (1999) and find firms managing earnings can either over or underinvest, depending upon firms' return on equity (ROE) level. The study results show an inverted relationship between earnings management and firms' investment, which changes from negative to positive with ROE rising beyond certain threshold levels. We also find that the level of ROE affects whether managers use real and accrual manipulations jointly or as substitutes in affecting firms' investment. Our evidence is important because it sheds new light on the relationship between earnings management activities and firms' investment behavior by showing that ROE may act as an important determinant in this relationship. This finding has important implications for policymakers such as the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) as it shows that the regulatory benchmarks they set may have a significant impact on firms' investment behavior. • The relationship between investments and earnings management activities is not linear in return on equity (ROE) • Firms managing earnings can either over or underinvest, depending upon the level of firms' ROE • Level of ROE affects if managers use real and accrual manipulations jointly or as substitutes in affecting firms' investment [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]