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Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 through direct, person-to-person contact has been recognized since the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic (1). However, mounting evidence suggests that the virus can be transmitted through [...]

Since 1996, H5 A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (Gs/GD) lineage of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) originating in Asia have caused outbreaks in Asia, Europe, Africa, and North America (1). The H5N1 Gs/GD [...]

We investigated a cluster of SARS-CoV-2 infections in a quarantine hotel in Taiwan in December 2021. The cluster involved 3 case patients who lived in nonadjacent rooms on different floors. They had no direct contact during their stay. By direct exploration of the space above the room ceilings, we found residual tunnels, wall defects, and truncated pipes between their rooms. We conducted a simplified tracer-gas experiment to assess the interconnection between rooms. Aerosol transmission through structural defects in floors and walls in this poorly ventilated hotel was the most likely route of virus transmission. This event demonstrates the high transmissibility of Omicron variants, even across rooms and floors, through structural defects. Our findings emphasize the importance of ventilation and integrity of building structure in quarantine facilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N6) virus of clade 2.3.4.4 was detected in a domestic duck found dead in Taiwan during February 2017. The endemic situation and continued evolution of various reassortant highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in Taiwan warrant concern about further reassortment and a fifth wave of intercontinental spread. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]