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This Scientific Report addresses a mandate from the European Commission according to Article 31 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 on the welfare of cats and dogs in commercial breeding establishments kept for sport, hunting and companion purposes. The aim was to scrutinise recent recommendations made by the EU Platform on Animal Welfare Voluntary Initiative on measures to assist the preparation of policy options for the legal framework of commercial breeding of cats and dogs. Specifically, the main question addressed was if there is scientific evidence to support the measures for protection of cats and dogs in commercial breeding related to housing, health considerations and painful procedures. Three judgements were carried out based on scientific literature reviews and, where possible a review of national regulations. The first judgement addressed housing and included: type of accommodation, outdoor access, exercise, social behaviour, housing temperature and light requirements. The second judgement addressed health and included: age at first and last breeding, and breeding frequency. Judgement 3 addressed painful procedures (mutilations or convenience surgeries) and included: ear cropping, tail docking and vocal cord resections in dogs and declawing in cats. For each of these judgements, considerations were provided indicating where scientific literature is available to support recommendations on providing or avoiding specific housing, health or painful surgical interventions. Areas where evidence is lacking are indicated., (© 2023 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by Wiley‐VCH GmbH on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

This Scientific Opinion concerns the welfare of Domestic ducks ( Anas platyrhynchos domesticus ), Muscovy ducks ( Cairina moschata domesticus ) and their hybrids (Mule ducks), Domestic geese ( Anser anser f. domesticus ) and Japanese quail ( Coturnix japonica ) in relation to the rearing of breeders, birds for meat, Muscovy and Mule ducks and Domestic geese for foie gras and layer Japanese quail for egg production. The most common husbandry systems (HSs) in the European Union are described for each animal species and category. The following welfare consequences are described and assessed for each species: restriction of movement, injuries (bone lesions including fractures and dislocations, soft tissue lesions and integument damage and locomotory disorders including lameness), group stress, inability to perform comfort behaviour, inability to perform exploratory or foraging behaviour and inability to express maternal behaviour (related to prelaying and nesting behaviours). Animal-based measures relevant for the assessment of these welfare consequences were identified and described. The relevant hazards leading to the welfare consequences in the different HSs were identified. Specific factors such as space allowance (including minimum enclosure area and height) per bird, group size, floor quality, characteristics of nesting facilities and enrichment provided (including access to water to fulfil biological needs) were assessed in relation to the welfare consequences and, recommendations on how to prevent the welfare consequences were provided in a quantitative or qualitative way., (© 2023 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by Wiley‐VCH GmbH on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

This scientific opinion focuses on the welfare of pigs on farm, and is based on literature and expert opinion. All pig categories were assessed: gilts and dry sows, farrowing and lactating sows, suckling piglets, weaners, rearing pigs and boars. The most relevant husbandry systems used in Europe are described. For each system, highly relevant welfare consequences were identified, as well as related animal-based measures (ABMs), and hazards leading to the welfare consequences. Moreover, measures to prevent or correct the hazards and/or mitigate the welfare consequences are recommended. Recommendations are also provided on quantitative or qualitative criteria to answer specific questions on the welfare of pigs related to tail biting and related to the European Citizen's Initiative 'End the Cage Age'. For example, the AHAW Panel recommends how to mitigate group stress when dry sows and gilts are grouped immediately after weaning or in early pregnancy. Results of a comparative qualitative assessment suggested that long-stemmed or long-cut straw, hay or haylage is the most suitable material for nest-building. A period of time will be needed for staff and animals to adapt to housing lactating sows and their piglets in farrowing pens (as opposed to crates) before achieving stable welfare outcomes. The panel recommends a minimum available space to the lactating sow to ensure piglet welfare (measured by live-born piglet mortality). Among the main risk factors for tail biting are space allowance, types of flooring, air quality, health status and diet composition, while weaning age was not associated directly with tail biting in later life. The relationship between the availability of space and growth rate, lying behaviour and tail biting in rearing pigs is quantified and presented. Finally, the panel suggests a set of ABMs to use at slaughter for monitoring on-farm welfare of cull sows and rearing pigs., (© 2022 Wiley‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KgaA on behalf of the European Food Safety Authority.)

This document provides methodological guidance developed by the EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare to produce Scientific Opinions in response to mandates received from the European Commission in the context of the Farm to Fork Strategy. The mandates relate to the welfare of (i) animals during transport, (ii) calves, (iii) laying hens, (iv) broilers, (v) pigs, (vi) ducks, geese and quails, and (vii) dairy cows. This guidance was developed in order to define the methods and strategy to be applied for responding to the Terms of Reference (ToRs) of the mandates. The mandates each consist of a set of General ToRs which refer to the husbandry systems used in the production of each animal species or the current transport practices for free moving animals and animals transported in cages, and a set of specific ToRs for which difficulties in ensuring animal welfare have been identified and where specific scenarios are envisaged. Part I of the guidance includes a description of welfare consequences for the animals. Part II includes a new methodology for providing quantitative recommendations regarding animal welfare. The proposed methodology follows the assumption that the effect of an exposure variable (e.g. space allowance) on animal welfare can be quantified by comparing the expression of an animal-based measure (ABM) under 'unexposed conditions' (e.g. unlimited space) and under high exposure (e.g. restrictive conditions). The level of welfare as assessed through this ABM can be quantified for different levels of the exposure variable (e.g. at increasing space allowances) and quantitative recommendations can thus be provided. The final version of the methodological guidance was endorsed for public consultation, which took place between 14 February 2022 and 31 March 2022. The comments received are integrated in this document., (© 2022 Wiley‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KgaA on behalf of the European Food Safety Authority.)

Pigs at different stages of the production cycle may have to be killed on-farm for purposes other than slaughter (where slaughter is defined as killing for human consumption) either individually (e.g. severely injured pigs) or on a large scale (e.g. unproductive animals or for disease control reasons). This opinion assessed the risks associated with the on-farm killing of pigs and included two phases: 1) handling and moving of pigs and 2) killing methods (including restraint). The killing methods were subdivided into four categories: electrical methods, mechanical methods, gas mixture methods and lethal injection. Four welfare consequences to which pigs can be exposed to during on-farm killing were identified: pain, fear, impeded movement and respiratory distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal-based measures were described. In total, 28 hazards were associated with the welfare consequences; majority of the hazards (24) are related to Phase 2 (killing). The main hazards are associated with lack of staff skills and training, and poor-designed and constructed facilities. Staff was identified as an origin of all hazards, either due to lack of skills needed to perform appropriate killing or due to fatigue. Corrective measures were identified for 25 hazards. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, animal-based measures, hazard origins, preventive and corrective measures were developed and mitigation measures proposed., (© 2020 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

The killing of pigs for human consumption (slaughtering) can take place in a slaughterhouse or on farm. The processes of slaughtering that were assessed for welfare, from the arrival of pigs until their death, were grouped into three main phases: pre-stunning (including arrival, unloading from the truck, lairage, handling and moving of pigs); stunning (including restraint); and bleeding. Stunning methods were grouped into three categories: electrical, controlled atmosphere and mechanical. Twelve welfare consequences the pigs can be exposed to during slaughter were identified: heat stress, cold stress, fatigue, prolonged thirst, prolonged hunger, impeded movement, restriction of movements, resting problem, negative social behaviour, pain, fear and respiratory distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal-based measures were described. In total, 30 welfare hazards that could occur during slaughter were identified and characterised, most of them related to stunning and bleeding. Staff were identified as the origin of 29 hazards, which were attributed to the lack of appropriate skill sets needed to perform tasks or to fatigue. Corrective and preventive measures for these hazards were assessed: measures to correct hazards were identified, and management was shown to have a crucial role in prevention. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, animal-based measures, origins and preventive and corrective measures were developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise welfare consequences are proposed., (© 2020 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Rabbits of different ages may have to be killed on-farm for purposes other than slaughter (where slaughter is defined as killing for human consumption) either individually or on a large scale (e.g. for production reasons or for disease control). The purpose of this opinion was to assess the risks associated to the on-farm killing of rabbits. The processes during on-farm killing that were assessed included handling, stunning and/or killing methods (including restraint). The latter were grouped into four categories: electrical methods, mechanical methods, controlled atmosphere method and lethal injection. In total, 14 hazards were identified and characterised, most of these related to stunning and/or killing. The staff was identified as the origin for all hazards, either due to lack of the appropriate skill sets needed to perform tasks or due to fatigue. Possible corrective and preventive measures were assessed: measures to correct hazards were identified for five hazards and the staff was shown to have a crucial role in prevention. Five welfare consequences of the welfare hazards to which rabbits can be exposed to during on-farm killing were identified: not being dead, consciousness, pain, fear and distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal-based measures were described. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, animal-based measures, origins, preventive and corrective measures were developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise welfare consequences are proposed., (© 2020 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

This opinion on the killing of rabbits for human consumption ('slaughtering') responds to two mandates: one from the European Parliament (EP) and the other from the European Commission. The opinion describes stunning methods for rabbits known to the experts in the EFSA working group, which can be used in commercial practice, and which are sufficiently described in scientific and technical literature for the development of an opinion. These are electrical stunning, mechanical stunning with a penetrative and non-penetrative captive bolt and gas stunning. The latter method is not allowed in the EU anymore following Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009, but may still be practiced elsewhere in the world. Related hazards and welfare consequences are also evaluated. To monitor stunning effectiveness as requested by the EP mandate, the opinion suggests the use of indicators for the state of consciousness, selected on the basis of their sensitivity, specificity and ease of use. Similarly, it suggests indicators to confirm animals are dead before dressing. For the European Commission mandate, slaughter processes were assessed from the arrival of rabbits in containers until their death, and grouped in three main phases: pre-stunning (including arrival, unloading of containers from the truck, lairage, handling/removing of rabbits from containers), stunning (including restraint) and bleeding (including bleeding following stunning and bleeding during slaughter without stunning). Ten welfare consequences resulting from the hazards that rabbits can be exposed to during slaughter are identified: consciousness, animal not dead, thermal stress (heat or cold stress), prolonged thirst, prolonged hunger, restriction of movements, pain, fear, distress and respiratory distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal-based measures (indicators) are described. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, indicators, origins, preventive and corrective measures are developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise welfare consequences are also proposed., (© 2020 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Poultry of different ages may have to be killed on-farm for purposes other than slaughter (in which slaughtering is defined as being for human consumption) either individually or on a large scale (e.g. because unproductive, for disease control, etc.). The processes of on-farm killing that were assessed are handling and stunning and/or killing methods (including restraint). The latter were grouped into four categories: electrical methods, modified atmosphere, mechanical methods and lethal injection. In total, 29 hazards were identified and characterised, most of these regard stunning and/or killing. Staff were identified as origin for 26 hazards and 24 hazards were attributed to lack of appropriate skill sets needed to perform tasks or due to fatigue. Specific hazards were identified for day-old chicks killed via maceration. Corrective and preventive measures were assessed: measures to correct hazards were identified for 13 hazards, and management showed to have a crucial role in prevention. Eight welfare consequences, the birds can be exposed to during on-farm killing, were identified: not dead, consciousness, heat stress, cold stress, pain, fear, distress and respiratory distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal-based measures were described. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, animal-based measures, origins, preventive and corrective measures were developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise welfare consequences were also proposed., (© 2019 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

The killing of poultry for human consumption (slaughtering) can take place in a slaughterhouse or during on-farm slaughter. The processes of slaughtering that were assessed, from the arrival of birds in containers until their death, were grouped into three main phases: pre-stunning (including arrival, unloading of containers from the truck, lairage, handling/removing of birds from containers); stunning (including restraint); and bleeding (including bleeding following stunning and bleeding during slaughter without stunning). Stunning methods were grouped into three categories: electrical, controlled modified atmosphere and mechanical. In total, 35 hazards were identified and characterised, most of them related to stunning and bleeding. Staff were identified as the origin of 29 hazards, and 28 hazards were attributed to the lack of appropriate skill sets needed to perform tasks or to fatigue. Corrective and preventive measures were assessed: measures to correct hazards were identified for 11 hazards, with management shown to have a crucial role in prevention. Ten welfare consequences, the birds can be exposed to during slaughter, were identified: consciousness, heat stress, cold stress, prolonged thirst, prolonged hunger, restriction of movements, pain, fear, distress and respiratory distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal-based measures were described. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, animal-based measures, origins, and preventive and corrective measures were developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise welfare consequences were also proposed., (© 2019 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans (Bsal) is an emerging fungal pathogen of salamanders. Despite limited surveillance, Bsal was detected in kept salamanders populations in Belgium, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and in wild populations in some regions of Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. According to niche modelling, at least part of the distribution range of every salamander species in Europe overlaps with the climate conditions predicted to be suitable for Bsal. Passive surveillance is considered the most suitable approach for detection of Bsal emergence in wild populations. Demonstration of Bsal absence is considered feasible only in closed populations of kept susceptible species. In the wild, Bsal can spread by both active (e.g. salamanders, anurans) and passive (e.g. birds, water) carriers; it is most likely maintained/spread in infected areas by contacts of salamanders or by interactions with anurans, whereas human activities most likely cause Bsal entry into new areas and populations. In kept amphibians, Bsal contamination via live silent carriers (wild birds and anurans) is considered extremely unlikely. The risk-mitigation measures that were considered the most feasible and effective: (i) for ensuring safer international or intra-EU trade of live salamanders, are: ban or restrictions on salamander imports, hygiene procedures and good practice manuals; (ii) for protecting kept salamanders from Bsal, are: identification and treatment of positive collections; (iii) for on-site protection of wild salamanders, are: preventing translocation of wild amphibians and release/return to the wild of kept/temporarily housed wild salamanders, and setting up contact points/emergency teams for passive surveillance. Combining several risk-mitigation measures improve the overall effectiveness. It is recommended to: introduce a harmonised protocol for Bsal detection throughout the EU; improve data acquisition on salamander abundance and distribution; enhance passive surveillance activities; increase public and professionals' awareness; condition any movement of captive salamanders on Bsal known health status., (© 2018 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans ( Bsal ) has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on the eligibility of Bsal to be listed, Article 9 for the categorisation of Bsal according to disease prevention and control rules as in Annex IV, and Article 8 on the list of animal species related to Bsal . The assessment has been performed following a methodology composed of information collection and compilation, expert judgement on each criterion at individual and, if no consensus was reached before, also at collective level. The output is composed of the categorical answer, and for the questions where no consensus was reached, the different supporting views are reported. Details on the methodology used for this assessment are explained in a separate opinion. According to the assessment performed, Bsal can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL. The disease would comply with the criteria as in sections 4 and 5 of Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in points (d) and (e) of Article 9(1). The assessment here performed on compliance with the criteria as in Section 1 of Annex IV referred to in point (a) of Article 9(1) is inconclusive. The animal species to be listed for Bsal according to Article 8(3) criteria are species of the families Salamandridae and Plethodontidae as susceptible and Salamandridae and Hynobiidae as reservoirs., (© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Previous introductions of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) to the EU were most likely via migratory wild birds. A mathematical model has been developed which indicated that virus amplification and spread may take place when wild bird populations of sufficient size within EU become infected. Low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV) may reach similar maximum prevalence levels in wild bird populations to HPAIV but the risk of LPAIV infection of a poultry holding was estimated to be lower than that of HPAIV. Only few non-wild bird pathways were identified having a non-negligible risk of AI introduction. The transmission rate between animals within a flock is assessed to be higher for HPAIV than LPAIV. In very few cases, it could be proven that HPAI outbreaks were caused by intrinsic mutation of LPAIV to HPAIV but current knowledge does not allow a prediction as to if, and when this could occur. In gallinaceous poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality was identified as the most effective method for early detection of HPAI outbreaks. For effective surveillance in anseriform poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality needs to be accompanied by serological surveillance and/or a virological surveillance programme of birds found dead (bucket sampling). Serosurveillance is unfit for early warning of LPAI outbreaks at the individual holding level but could be effective in tracing clusters of LPAIV-infected holdings. In wild birds, passive surveillance is an appropriate method for HPAIV surveillance if the HPAIV infections are associated with mortality whereas active wild bird surveillance has a very low efficiency for detecting HPAIV. Experts estimated and emphasised the effect of implementing specific biosecurity measures on reducing the probability of AIV entering into a poultry holding. Human diligence is pivotal to select, implement and maintain specific, effective biosecurity measures., (© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

The A(H5N8) highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic occurred in 29 European countries in 2016/2017 and has been the largest ever recorded in the EU in terms of number of poultry outbreaks, geographical extent and number of dead wild birds. Multiple primary incursions temporally related with all major poultry sectors affected but secondary spread was most commonly associated with domestic waterfowl species. A massive effort of all the affected EU Member States (MSs) allowed a descriptive epidemiological overview of the cases in poultry, captive birds and wild birds, providing also information on measures applied at the individual MS level. Data on poultry population structure are required to facilitate data and risk factor analysis, hence to strengthen science-based advice to risk managers. It is suggested to promote common understanding and application of definitions related to control activities and their reporting across MSs. Despite a large number of human exposures to infected poultry occurred during the ongoing outbreaks, no transmission to humans has been identified. Monitoring the avian influenza (AI) situation in other continents indicated a potential risk of long-distance spread of HPAI virus (HPAIV) A(H5N6) from Asia to wintering grounds towards Western Europe, similarly to what happened with HPAIV A(H5N8) and HPAIV A(H5N1) in previous years. Furthermore, the HPAI situation in Africa with A(H5N8) and A(H5N1) is rapidly evolving. Strengthening collaborations at National, EU and Global levels would allow close monitoring of the AI situation, ultimately helping to increase preparedness. No human case was reported in the EU due to AIVs subtypes A(H5N1), A(H5N6), A(H7N9) and A(H9N2). Direct transmission of these viruses to humans has only been reported in areas, mainly in Asia and Egypt, with a substantial involvement of wild bird and/or poultry populations. It is suggested to improve the collection and reporting of exposure events of people to AI., (© 2017 European Food Safety Authority, © European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and © European Union Reference Laboratory for Avian influenza EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

A new fungus, Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans (Bsal), was identified in wild populations of salamanders in the Netherlands and Belgium, and in kept salamander populations in Germany and the United Kingdom. EFSA assessed the potential of Bsal to affect the health of wild and kept salamanders in the EU, the effectiveness and feasibility of a movement ban of traded salamanders, the validity, reliability and robustness of available diagnostic methods for Bsal detection, and possible alternative methods and feasible risk mitigation measures to ensure safe international and EU trade of salamanders and their products. Bsal was isolated and characterised in 2013 from a declining fire salamander ( Salamandra salamandra ) population in the Netherlands. Based on the available evidence, it is likely that Bsal is a sufficient cause for the death of S. salamandra both in the laboratory and in the wild. Despite small sample sizes, the available experimental evidence indicates that Bsal is associated with disease and death in individuals of 12 European and 3 Asian salamander species, and with high mortality rate outbreaks in kept salamanders. Bsal experimental infection was detected in individuals of at least one species pertaining to the families Salamandridae, Plethodontidae, Hynobiidae and Sirenidae. Movement bans constitute key risk mitigation measures to prevent pathogen spread into naïve areas and populations. The effectiveness of a movement ban is mainly dependent on the import volumes, possibility of Bsal to remain viable outside susceptible/tolerant species, and the capacity to limit illegal movements. Duplex real-time PCR can be used to detect Bsal DNA, but has not been fully validated. Quarantining salamanders, enacting legislation that requires testing of animals to demonstrate freedom from Bsal, before movement can take place, restricting salamander movements, tracking all traded species, hygienic procedures/biosecurity measures before and during movements, and increasing public awareness are relevant measures for ensuring safe intra-EU and international trade of salamanders., (© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)