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How do people acquire modesty? A simple answer is: if people see that modesty is a worthy trait, they will incorporate it into their character. However, sometimes the knowledge that one is modest would undermine one's modesty. So, Driver claims that the modest person must not know his merits. If we are to accept Driver's claim, it would be difficult for us to conceive how learners can consciously acquire this virtue. In response, Bommarito puts forward a more moderate claim. The modest person does not need to be ignorant of his good qualities; even if he knows about them, he must not pay attention to them. Bommarito's explanation opens a space for Asian philosophers to engage in the debate. Asian philosophers generally emphasize the importance of practice and how practitioners must attend to the state of their consciousness so that they are not carried away by their desires. With regard to this, I put forward two ideas in this paper. First, I propose a third account of modesty, the knowledge account. I argue that modesty, in its worthy form, requires an agent's understanding of his temptations and weaknesses. Second, I will explain the Confucian view of moral education in regard to this discussion. I introduce strategies regarding learners' acquisition of virtues, including self-cultivation and cultivation through following rituals in interpersonal affairs. I believe that the Confucian view of moral education would enable agents to acquire virtues without the self-denial that troubles Driver and Bommarito. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the pedagogical implications of John Dewey’s claim that his definition of experience is shared by Daoists. It compares characteristics of experience with those in Daoism, and then considers the similarities and differences between key cultivation practices each proposes, focusing on the roles of the teacher and sage. My main reference to Daoism is the translation of the Daodejing by Roger Ames and David Hall, who use Dewey’s conception of experience to explain the character of Daoism. There are two facts that Dewey chooses to define experience and link with Daoism—what it is not, and what it is. Comparisons of these facts with Daoism support Dewey’s claim: both define the ‘what is’ as the principle of unity of opposites. While sharing this view, their proposals for its cultivation reveal similarities, but also some significant differences. The Daodejing gives the Daoist sage a major role to play in the cultivation process of other persons, as does Dewey for the teacher. However, unlike Dewey’s teacher who guides the process, the sage is to create a cultivating environment, thus allowing the sage to ‘let go.’ The Daoist practices offer new ideas to consider in the quest for experience in lessons. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An introduction is presented to a special issue on Confucian views of learning in relation to humanistic pedagogy in East Asia, noting issue articles on topics such as a comparison of Socratic and Confucian views on learning, Neo-Confucian philosophy in relation to Western approaches, and the role of self-transformation in Confucian thought.

The contribution focuses on Neo-Confucian texts as collected by Zhu Xi (朱熹 1130–1200) and Lü Zuqian (1137–1181) and is a look from the ‘outside’, from the perspective of German theories of Bildung (‘self-cultivation’). It aims at demonstrating that among other insights that today’s readers may gather from Neo-Confucian literature, one aspect protrudes from others: that learning can be considered as a virtue—even a meta-virtue—a form of life and mode of self-formation of the person. It does not seem exaggerated, from this perspective, to state that Neo-Confucian philosophy is—to a large extent—a philosophy of learning and self-transformation which offers fruitful irritants for questioning the widespread habits of thinking about skills and their development in today’s strong and problematic discourses and corresponding educational policies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper attempts to do a comparative study on two traditions of humanistic pedagogies, West and East, represented by the Socratic and the Confucian teachings. It is intended to put into question our common misunderstanding reflected in the stereotyped contrasts between the Socratic self and the Confucian self: an intellectualist vs. a moralist, an active vs. a passive learner, and a political progressive vs. a political conservative. In this attempt, I will focus on the clarification of the idea of ‘self-knowledge’ in each thinker, especially in its connection to our being virtuous or good. This bold attempt will give us a chance to view Socratic and Confucian teachings from an unfamiliar perspective, which will in turn lead us to see where and how the two thinkers’ teachings can converge and diverge in a new light for our humanistic teaching. It will also show how a comparative study in philosophy of education can contribute to constructive intercultural conversations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The term ‘humanism’ is Western in origin. It denotes the tradition that places special emphasis on cultivation of letters for education. In the West, this tradition was originated with sophists and Isocrates, established by Cicero, and was developed by Renaissance humanists. East Asia, however, also has its own humanistic traditions with equal educational relevance. One of these is a Japanese version of Confucian humanism established by Ogyu Sorai (1666–1728). This tradition is based on the interpretation of Confucius as a lover of poetry and a teacher of rites. In this article, we discuss the main features of East Asian humanism represented by Sorai and Confucius. Then, after an overview of Western humanism, we aim to elucidate both the convergence and divergence of the two traditions. The investigation will help us (hopefully) to envision humanistic education of the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An editorial is presented in which the author discusses Eastern and Western cultural foundations underlying philosophical and ethical views on learning, highlighting the views of philosophers Socrates and Confucius. The author considers differences in the ethical thought of Socrates and Confucius, and he considers problems with the approach of comparative philosophy.

The article presents the author's opinions and response to the essay "Socrates and Confucius: the cultural foundations and ethics of learning," by Michael A. Peters, published in the 2013 volume of the journal. Topics addressed include examination of the commonalities shared between the Eastern and Western educational philosophies of Socrates and Confucius, discussion on the merits of cross cultural studies, and suggestions for further inquiry surrounding different prominent figures.