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The article looks at international relations between Japan and the rest of Asia. Where 15 years ago China was merely a pariah with economic potential, having recently massacred protesters in Tiananmen Square, it now has a better international reputation and a much admired economy. In both economic and political terms, Japan is no longer alone in Asia. There have been mass demonstrations in both communist China and democratic South Korea against Japan, accusing it of refusing to face up to its past. Japan has a poor relationship with both China and South Korea. If China's economy, its regional clout and its defence spending all continue to grow at something like their current rates, then China threatens to overshadow the whole region and, more pertinently, Japan, during the next quarter-century or so. That would injure Japan's national pride but could also hurt its national interests.

The article comments on relations between China and Japan, Asia's two greatest powers. Last year, China overtook America to become Japan's biggest trading partner. Japan has been China's biggest trading partner in three of the past four years. Trade rows have virtually disappeared. The two economies are increasingly integrated. But tensions are rising again. China and Japan have been rivals for the best part of a millennium. While the two economies are complementary in terms of output, they are competitors for resources. In both China and Japan these days opinion towards each other is quite varied. Tensions between these two great powers, both fully conscious of their economic and political interests and of the weight of history, probably cannot be defused altogether for as long as the two countries' political systems remain so different, with China communist and Japan a democracy. Tensions might be defused, though, if both governments agreed to seek ways to make history, and thus nationalism, less of a flashpoint.

Says that the Japanese are coming to feel more at home with Western intellectual tradition. The country's new self-assurance; Its new kind of nationalism and the various ways it is emerging; Effect on the outside world; How Japan sees its future.

The author discusses the cabinet announced by Shinzo Abe, the prime minister of Japan, on December 26, 2012, arguing that the cabinet consists of radical nationalists that support reinterpretations of the Japanese militarist era. Topics include economic conditions and policy in Japan, the Liberal Democratic and Democratic political parties, and a dispute with China over the Senkaku islands.

The article discusses politics and government in Japan as of November, 2012, focusing on the potential impact of anticipated shifts in power in 2013. Topics include Japan's foreign relations with South Korea and China, the Japanese economy, nationalism, and the politician Shinzo Abe. Tensions between political parties including the Liberal Democratic Party, the Japan Restoration Party, and the Democratic Party of Japan are mentioned.

The article focuses on the anti-Japanese protests occurring in China in 2012 stemming from the two countries' dispute over ownership of the Senkaku Islands. Topics include the U.S. pledge of mutual defense with Japan, how the leadership change in China could impact the dispute, and how Chinese nationalism influences protests.

The article examines politics and government in Japan. A split within the governing Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) created by an increase in the sales tax proposed by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda is discussed. The use of nationalism as a political asset by the opposition Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is examined, particularly a proposal to alter the country's constitution.

The article examines foreign relations between Japan and China. A decline in relations between the two countries following a September, 2010 incident in which a Chinese fishing boat captain was arrested by Japan is discussed. It is noted that China has remained officially unsatisfied by Japan's release of the prisoner. Protests against Japan by Chinese citizens are considered. China's continued hostility is partially attributed to internal political considerations.

The article discusses the annual summit of G7 nations on May 26, 2016 in Japan. Emphasis is given to topics such as a visit by U.S. president Barack Obama to Hiroshima, the meeting of G& leaders at the Shinto shrine in Ise in Mie prefecture, and prime minister Shinzo Abe in the Shinto Seiji Remnei organization. Other topics include Abe's increase of the defense budget and nationalism in the post-war order of Japan.

The article examines the response of the Chinese government to anti-Japanese protests and demonstrations. "It's a scary country," Japan's trade minister, Shoichi Nakagawa, said of China this week, following demonstrations in several Chinese cities by thousands of protesters, some of whom smashed the windows of Japanese shops and restaurants and threw stones at Japanese diplomatic buildings. The protests first turned violent in the south-western city of Chengdu on April 2nd, and erupted with particular fury in Beijing a week later. They were the biggest to take place in China since tens of thousands took to the streets across the country in 1999 in response to the bombing of China's Belgrade embassy by American aircraft during the Kosovo war. In a country where public protest is usually quickly suppressed, anti-Japanese sentiment has proved hard for the authorities to handle. The authorities' dilemma is reflected in their handling of these protests, which began as a show of opposition (on the grounds that Japan has failed to show sufficient contrition for its wartime atrocities) to Japan's campaign for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. China's government worries that if it is seen as too weak towards Japan, or cracks down too hard, the protesters could turn against the party. In the last century, pro-democracy unrest in China was often closely linked with patriotic demonstrations. Many participants in the recent protests have been university students, a group kept under particularly close watch by the authorities since the student-led protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989. The nationalist genie, once unbottled, could prove hard for China to restrain.

The article discusses relations between South Korea and Japan. A long and tedious disagreement over sovereignty erupted into open anger recently after Shimane, a Japanese prefecture, passed a bill designating February 22nd as "Takeshima day", to mark the date in 1905 when Japan first claimed some volcanic islets that lie between Korea, where they are known as Tokdo, and Japan, where they are called Takeshima. Outraged South Koreans responded with a show of nationalistic fervour. The government fulminated that Japan's claim was tantamount to invasion. Despite four decades of ever-closer bilateral ties, and trade now worth almost $70 billion, Japan and South Korea have notoriously prickly relations. Although the first historical references identify the islands as belonging to an ancient Korean kingdom, after Japan's annexation of the peninsula at the beginning of the 20th century they became part of its imperial territory until the end of the second world war. Beyond wounded pride, South Korea has some economic reasons for maintaining its claim.

Focuses on Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and his proposed visit to the Yasukuni shrine in August 2001. Expectation that the visit will provoke protests; Efforts of Koizumi to promote a more active role for Japan in its security alliance with the United States; Background on Koizumi's conservative roots and nationalist ideas; Topic of international complaints about revisions to Japanese history textbooks.

Focuses on efforts of Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to amend Article 9 of the constitution to allow Japan to have an army rather than self-defense forces. Concern of neighboring countries about Japan maintaining armed forces and Koizumi's pledge to visit Yasukuni shrine, which is a symbol for nationalism.

Reports on criticism of Japan's Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori from within his own political party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Statements by Mori which have indicated that he favors the nationalism of pre-World War II Japan and emperor worship; The rate at which Mori's popularity has fallen; Fear among the LDP that it will lose its ruling position in Japanese politics.

The article focuses on Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and examines why his public approval ratings fell below 50% in Japan in July of 2014. Topics include Abe's reinterpretation of Japan's security policy, the public's acceptance of Abe's ultranationalist policies, and Abe's perceived bullying of the pacifist coalition partner the New Komeito political party.

The article focuses on the increase in nationalism in popular culture in Japan in 2014 and discusses how the practice of 'patriotic education' instills nationalism in Japanese students, as well as the history of nationalism in Japan.

Presents information on various criticisms of the imperial family in Japan. Focus on the punishment that the Imperial Household Agency imposes on royal reporters who step out of line; Discussion on breaches of media protocol; Description of examples of nationalist attacks on journalists and others who criticized the imperial family.

Asserts that the most important result of Japan's recent general election may be the prevention of a resurgence of a worrying kind of nationalism. What has traditionally happened following periods of openness in Japan; Why a few sign of a harder national mood are emerging.

The article focuses on the popularity of the film "Eien no Zero" ("The Eternal Zero") in Japan in 2014, which depicts a kamikaze pilot during World War II. Topics include why young Japanese have made the film so popular, nationalism in Japan in 2014, and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's friendship with Naoki Hyakuta, author of the book on which the film is based.

The article focuses on Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his plan to amend the Japanese Constitution. Topics include the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) efforts to replace the active 1946 constitution, the public support for constitutional amendments, and the Abe's focus on 'public order' and nationalism.

The author offers opinions on politics, government and foreign relations in Northeast Asia. Noting that the election of Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister of Japan means that the leaders of that country, North Korea, South Korea and China all have fathers or grandfathers who were influential public officers, the author states that these family backgrounds could result in strong opposition to Abe's nationalistic foreign policy from the other three countries.

The author argues that the Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe and his cabinet are not making effective long-term policy decisions as of January, 2013. According to the author, the proposed Japanese budget does not support long-term financial discipline, conflicts are growing between Japan, Russia, South Korea, and China, and the political influence of historical revisionists and nationalism in Japan is destructive.

The article looks at how the actions of some Japanese nationalists may hurt Japan's foreign relations and its economy. Topics include Shintaro Ishihara, governor of Tokyo, Japan, whose efforts to buy the Senkakus (or Diaoyus) islands enraged the Chinese; comments from nationalist politician Shinzo Abe, a prime ministerial candidate, downplaying past Japanese war crimes; and Takeju Ogata, president of the think-tank Nipon Foundation, who wants to amend Japan's pacifist constitution.

The author offers opinions on China's foreign relations. A dispute with Japan over a collision of a Chinese fishing boat with Japanese naval ships in the East China Sea is seen as evidence of China's aggressive and at times bellicose approach to issues related to its sovereignty. It is seen as likely that this policy will result in other Asian nations cooperating to limit China's influence in the region.

The article focuses on Japan's foreign relations with China. Disputes between the two countries over fishing rights in the East China Sea and possession of what Japan calls the Senkaku Islands in the sea are discussed, particularly Japan's arrest of the captain of a Chinese fishing boat. The effects on relations of rising nationalist sentiment in China are considered.

This article focuses on the anti-Japanese sentiment in China. Both the Chinese and Japanese governments are stepping up efforts to defuse the anti-Japanese unrest that has erupted in several of China's biggest cities since early April. At an Asia-Africa summit in Jakarta last week, Japan's prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, reiterated Japan's apology for its wartime behaviour. Koizumi also met China's President Hu Jintao easing growing concerns that a relationship vital to East Asian stability could enter a freeze. Meanwhile, the Chinese government has begun to ratchet up pressure on the demonstrators. It has expressed particular concern about the use of mobile phones and the Internet to organise unauthorised demonstrations. As a result, well-wired Chinese nationalists have been given a choice: carry on using mobile phones and computers to organise anti-Japanese demonstrations and face the wrath of officialdom, or call a halt to the biggest protest movement of recent years. Most of the protesters have been students and office workers whose ability to mobilise using these tools has clearly unnerved the authorities, who are concerned that their next target might be the Communist Party.

The article examines how economic links are driving new diplomacy in North-East Asia. Japan's prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, met China's president, Hu Jintao, twice last year. Now Japan, China and South Korea have decided, as Yoriko Kawaguchi, Japan's foreign minister, announced this week, to start holding their own three-way gathering every year. The question, of course, is whether they will find anything constructive to talk about. Although history and nationalism grab the headlines, however, there is another way to view all of this bluster. Instead of showing that closer ties are impossible, the mutual accusations and demands for apologies may be more in the nature of ritualistic display, while better relations are quietly constructed. Fast-growing trade and investment links, after all, are rapidly pulling North-East Asia's economies into closer contact.

Reports that Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi will visit the Yasukuni shrine, which is a memorial to the war dead of Japan. Nationalist symbolism of the shrine; Idea that his visit to the shrine may have been a political concession; Criticism from the opposition over his visit, which angered the governments of China and South Korea.

Reports the January 23, 2000 meeting of Japanese ultra-nationalists at the Osaka International Peace Center. The ultra-nationalists' claims that the so-called Rape of Nanking during 1939, when Japanese soldiers swept through mainland China killing thousands, did not occur; Scholarly work on the subject, including estimates of the number of Chinese killed; Publication of `The Rape of Nanking,' by Iris Chang, and its contentions; Relations between Japan and China.