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The article discusses China's approach to managing its exchange rate, highlighting the inherent challenges posed by the monetary-policy "trilemma," which involves balancing a stable currency, free capital flows, and an independent monetary policy. China has been easing its monetary stance in response to economic challenges, but this has led to a weakening of the Yuan. While a weaker currency can boost exports and prevent deflation, China also desires yuan stability to prevent further declines.

The article analyzes why policymakers in China are willing to let the Chinese yuan decline against the U.S. dollar. It refers to China's reliance on exchange-rate stability, tighter capital controls without forgoing monetary independence and economic fundamentals as factors to its choice to devaluate the yuan. An overview of the measures imposed by China to stabilize its currency in 2015-16 that included sale of foreign exchange reserves and bank reserve requirement is provided.

The article presents a discussion of Chinese monetary policy. China's currency, the yuan, had been held at an artificially cheap exchange rate by the country's Communist rulers, according to members of the U.S. Congress. China's central bank, the People's Bank of China, had changed this policy slightly as of June 19, 2010, and began allowing the value of the yuan to vary by a fraction of a percentage point from day to day.

The article examines the yuan, China's national currency. An increase in the valuation of the yuan compared to that of the U.S. dollar, Japanese yen and the euro of the European Union monetary union from 2003-2013 is examined, and attributed to rapid economic development, higher wages and higher interest rates.

The article focuses on China's current-account surplus (CAS) and the valuation of the Chinese yuan. It states that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) slashed its forecasts for China's CAS to 2.3 percent of gross domestic product in 2012. It mentions that the IMF believes China's real trade-weighted exchange rate will not change through 2017. It comments on the effect higher inflation has had on the depreciation of the yuan's nominal rate against the U.S. dollar.

The article assesses the potential impact of an increase in the U.S. interest rate on the value of the Chinese yuan. Investors are warned about the plan of the U.S. Federal Reserve to raise the interest rate again. Also discussed is the decision of the Chinese central bank to lower the yuan's opening rate against the U.S. dollar.

The article looks at economic policy in China, focusing on the country's exchange rate policy for the yuan. It offers figures on net investment outflows, or capital flight, and on the country's foreign trade balance. Other topics include capital controls and the likely extent of the impact of allowing the yuan to depreciate on Chinese exports.

The article focuses on the possibility for a reserve-currency status to weaken yuan. It mentions that transit fees for passing the Suez canal are denominated in Special Drawing Rights, a basket of currencies used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as its unit of account. It notes that the decision of the IMF will force companies around the world to buy yuan-denominated assets as soon as possible.

The article discusses China's yuan. Three weeks after China abandoned its decade-old peg to the dollar and moved to a managed float of the yuan against a basket of currencies, Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People's Bank of China, revealed which currencies the basket contains. However, China's openness has limits: it is keeping to itself the weights attached to each currency. Zhou said that the dollar, the yen, the euro and the South Korean won have the biggest weights, but the basket also includes the currencies of Singapore, Britain, Malaysia, Russia, Australia, Thailand and Canada. The Hong Kong and Taiwanese dollars are conspicuously absent. Even so, the basket is much broader than expected. Most analysts had bet on only the dollar, the yen and the euro. The choice of currencies, said Zhou, depended not only on the pattern of China's trade but also on the sources of its foreign direct investment and the currency composition of its debt. It is still unclear how the system will actually operate. In theory, if the dollar falls against the other currencies, the People's Bank of China should let the yuan rise against the dollar in order to hold the overall value of the basket steady.

The article focuses on China's currency. The combination of rising political pressure from America and technical adjustments to China's foreign-exchange trading system has convinced investors that the Chinese authorities are about to end the yuan's decade-old peg at around 8.28 to the dollar. In fact, diplomatic niceties matter less to the Chinese authorities than does national pride. They do not want to be seen to bow to foreign pressure about the yuan, and are loth to reward speculators. Both factors suggest that China will try to move when markets and foreign governments least expect it. In any case, any shift in the yuan's peg may prove underwhelming. Though details differ, most economists reckon China has three broad options. On balance, incrementalism is likely to win out. That implies that the eventual change will be less monumental for the world economy than many expect. Further, a small Chinese revaluation would have virtually no impact on America's vast external deficit. More uncertain is how a Chinese currency shift would affect asset prices, particularly of American bonds.

The article focuses on the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) declaration in May 2015 that the yuan was no longer undervalued. It reports that U.S. Senators passed legislation earlier in May that could result in sanctions against foreign nations believed to manipulate their currency. It mentions the yuan has gradually appreciated and climbed by a third against the dollar over ten years. It comments that the IMF has called for China to implement a floating exchange rate by 2018.

The article discusses the performance of the yuan currency in China as of March 2014, focusing on fluctuations in exchange-rate values as compared to the U.S. dollar currency. Topics include foreign-direct investments, monetary policy in China, and a meeting of Chinese authorities that ended February 28, 2014.

The article discusses the psychology of exchange rates as of June 2012 with a focus on the value of the Hong Kong dollar compared to the Chinese yuan.

The author discusses economic indicators and the Big Mac index, which predicts exchange rates by comparing prices of hamburgers in different countries. The author suggests that burgernomics can help investors and governments understand which currencies, such as the euro and the yuan, are overvalued and undervalued. Also described are other economic indexes related to the number of cranes seen in cities, the amount of lipstick purchased, and the use of the word recession in newspapers.

The article discusses U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner's decision to postpone an April 15, 2010 decision on whether or not to declare China a currency manipulator and delay a semi-annual report on China's exchange rate. In the article the author offers his opinion on the decision and on China's plans to strengthen the national currency, the yuan.

The article discusses the economic conditions in Asia. The Asian economies have showed more signs of economic recovery than any other region following the global financial crisis but their currencies are severely undervalued and this calls into question exchange rates. The Chinese yuan was 21% above the American dollar in 2008 but as of October 2009 it is valued the same and its trade-weighted value has dropped 10%.

This article focuses on the inflation rates coming from China and how those rates affect the economies of America and other developed countries. The author states that the reason for China's inflation is that the value of the yuan has increased, while the value of the American dollar has decreased.

The article explains the difficulty in determining if a currency is undervalued. Recent legislature passed by the U.S. Congress aims at protecting the U.S. dollar from what it sees as purposeful undervaluation of the Chinese yuan. The article explains that there are three ways of determining the correct value of a currency: purchasing power parity, sustainable trade position, and the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER).

The article looks at how China's revaluation of the yuan has affected other Asian currencies. China competes with most of the countries in the region, and its maintenance of a fixed exchange rate with the American dollar had helped to justify similar systems in Malaysia and Hong Kong. But so far the knock-on effects from China's currency adjustment have been modest. With the exception of Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore, most countries already had flexible exchange rates. Malaysia took advantage of China's move to scrap its own currency peg. To the extent that the revaluation promotes China's stability and demonstrates its improving macro-economic management, it opens the door a crack to what Tim Condon, chief economist at ING Financial Markets, calls "the endgame" for the Hong Kong dollar: an eventual currency union with China.

This article comments on the need for China to allow more flexibility in its exchange rate. The Chinese government says that it intends, eventually, to make its exchange rate more flexible and to liberalize capital controls. In the past year or so, it has already eased some controls on capital outflows and officials have said recently that they will open the capital account further this year. On the exchange rate, much less has been done. The yuan has been pegged to the dollar for a decade, and the government is loth to change much until the country's banking system is in healthier shape: this week the prime minister, Wen Jiabao, said that a shift would be risky. But is China putting the cart before the horse? Other countries' experience suggests that it is, and that it is better to loosen the exchange rate before, not after, freeing capital flows.

The article discusses the impact of China's exchange rate on the United States' trade deficit. Many western policy makers and businessmen hope that there will be new thinking in Beijing to revalue the Chinese yuan, which is pegged to the falling dollar. The yuan is grossly undervalued and represents the biggest obstacle to a reduction in the U.S. current-account deficit. A revaluation of the yuan would have little impact on America's deficit, and the more that foreigners pressure China to act, the harder it is for China do so. China accounts for only 10% of America's total trade, so a 10% revaluation would reduce the dollar's trade-weighted value by a mere 1%. The American government needs to borrow less and households must save more and spend less. Li Ruogu, the deputy governor of the central bank, made clear that China would adopt a more flexible exchange rate, but in its own time, not under pressure.