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We test in an experiment if a monetary incentive or a charity incentive can motivate people to fill in the German organ donor card and thereby increase the number of organ donors. We find that a monetary incentive significantly increases the number of organ donors whereas the charity incentive does not.

We estimate the distribution of exit reservation prices in a dictator game. The mean exit reservation price equals 82% of the dictator game endowment and only 36% of subjects have exit reservation prices consistent with selfish or social preferences.

In a one-shot Prisoners’ dilemma experiment, female participants are highly sensitive to the social frame. Male participants are not.

We find that the actual willingness to pay for various consumer goods can be manipulated by an uninformative anchor, replicating Ariely et al. (2003). We furthermore demonstrate that the anchoring effect decreases but does not vanish with higher cognitive ability.

We carry out a double blind dictator game experiment where the anonymous recipients are randomly drawn from the Swedish general population, and any donations are mailed to the recipients. About a third of the subjects donate some money.

Gneezy [Gneezy, U., 2005. Deception: the role of consequences. American Economic Review 95, 384–394.] recently showed that lying is costly. Using the same experimental design we test whether there is a gender difference in deception. We find that men are significantly more likely than women to lie to secure a monetary benefit.

We compare hypothetical and real payments in a Vickrey auction. The use of hypothetical payments overestimates the real willingness to pay. The results cast doubt on the validity of hypothetical willingness to pay questions for the typical respondent.