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We analyze optimal pricing when a monopolistic firm sells a good on a congestible network with countervailing incentives. We show that the network capacity level is crucial to determine the optimal tariff.

This paper purports to study the non-linear pricing problem when a budget constraint limits the magnitude of the monetary transfer. We show that distortions even affect consumers for which the constraint does not bind.

This paper compares the optimal selling strategies with symmetric and asymmetric information when monopolist’s cost function depends both on individual and aggregate production. We show how standard underproduction and higher exclusion with incomplete information are affected.

We study the optimal non-linear pricing when an uniformed monopolist wants to change its current technology by a less costly one. With asymmetric information, we show that it has no interest to produce entirely with a more efficient technology.

We derive the optimal non-linear pricing when a monopolist has no direct prior beliefs about the consumers' preferences but only indirect prior beliefs about their utility levels and analyze the ensuing distortions.