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Greenberg et al. (Econ Theory 40:91–112, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0349-5) offered a solution concept of a "mutually acceptable course of action" (MACA) for situations in which rational individuals with different beliefs and views of the world agree to a shared course of action. In this paper we investigate epistemic conditions for MACA, in terms of information, beliefs, and rationality. Within a semantic framework, we formulate and show, using the notion of "lexicographic probability system" (LPS) introduced by Blume et al. (Econometrica 59:61–79, 1991a), that MACA is the logical consequence of "perfect" rationality, common belief in "perfect" rationality, and correct mutual belief in agreement on the shared course of action. We also demonstrate how epistemic characterizations for "perfect" versions of solution concepts can be derived from our epistemic characterization for MACA, by varying the degree of completeness of the shared course of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We offer a game-theoretic framework that enables the analysis of situations whereby rational individuals with different beliefs and views of the world agree to a shared course of action. We introduce a new solution concept: a mutually acceptable course of action, which can be viewed as an (incomplete) contract or a social norm that free rational individuals would be willing to follow for their own diverse reasons. We show that by varying the degree of completeness of the underlying course of action, our concept can be related to commonly used solutions, such as perfect equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, (rationalizable) self-confirming equilibrium, and rationalizable outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]