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Your search keyword '"Markov perfect equilibrium"' showing total 3 results
Start Over Descriptor "Markov perfect equilibrium" Journal economic inquiry
3 results on '"Markov perfect equilibrium"'

1. Dynamic preferential trade agreement formation and the role of political economy.

Author

Chi, Eric Conglin and Yildiz, Halis Murat

Subjects
*FREE trade, *INTERNATIONAL trade, *CUSTOMS unions
Abstract

Using a dynamic preferential trade agreement (PTA) formation model, we show that political biases in exporting and import‐competing sectors substantially impact the extent of PTA formation. While both exclusion and free riding incentives constrain the expansion to global free trade in a free trade agreement (FTA) game, only the former incentive arises in a customs union (CU) game. When we endogenize the choice between FTAs and CUs, the tension between the flexibility benefit of FTAs and the coordination benefit of CUs reveals that FTAs always serve as PTA building blocks while CUs may serve as PTA building or stumbling blocks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2024
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2. CAN SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM THREATS FOSTER COOPERATION? AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF FINITE-HORIZON FOLK THEOREMS

Author

Lisa Bruttel, Ulrich Kamecke, Vera Angelova, and Werner Güth

Subjects
Physics::Physics and Society, Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory, Economics and Econometrics, Symmetric equilibrium, General Business, Management and Accounting, Subgame perfect equilibrium, Subgame, Markov perfect equilibrium, Equilibrium selection, Economics, Repeated game, Quantitative Biology::Populations and Evolution, Folk theorem, Solution concept, Mathematical economics
Abstract

This paper considers extended prisoners' dilemma games in which a second pure strategy equilibrium in the stage game allows for mutual cooperation in all but the last round of the finitely repeated game as an equilibrium outcome. We distinguish a strict and a weak extension of the prisoners' dilemma game in a long and a short horizon treatment. A comparison with the corresponding finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games shows that the strict additional equilibrium increases cooperation rates while the weak does not. This result is robust to the variation of the time horizon. (JEL C73, C91)

Published
2011

3. INFORMATION AND MARKET EQUILIBRIUM*

Author

William R. Porter

Subjects
Economic efficiency, Microeconomics, Economics and Econometrics, Markov perfect equilibrium, General equilibrium theory, Partial equilibrium, Market clearing, Market saturation, Market price, Economics, Frictionless market, General Business, Management and Accounting
Published
1975

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