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In this historical analysis of U.S. trade policy, we apply the median voter model to explain legislative decision making. In this model, the level of tariff protection is expected to change with changes in the median legislator. We show that this simple model does a remarkable job of explaining trade policy until the mid-1930s, when it breaks down. We offer several possible explanations for the breakdown of this model, focusing particularly on the impact of domestic and international institutional changes that may have altered the role of the median legislator in trade policy formation., I. INTRODUCTION Tariff and trade policies have an interesting and dynamic history in the United States. Of critical importance to this history is the role played by the U.S. Congress. [...]

In 1984 Congress amended the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, mandating that the International Trade Commission (ITC) 'cumulate' imports across countries when determining injury. We estimate that cumulation increases the probability of an affirmative injury determination by 20 to 30 percent and has changed the ITC's decision (from negative to affirmative) for about one-third of cumulated cases. We also show that the protective effect of cumulation increases as the number of countries involved increases, holding import market share constant. That is, cumulated imports have a super-additive effect on ITC decision-making., I. INTRODUCTION In recent decades, the rise in international competition has led many U.S. firms to seek protection from foreign imports. Particularly noteworthy in the 1980s was the increased use [...]