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In this article, Maryland's non-legal-tender paper money emissions between 1765 and 1775 are reconstructed to determine quantities outstanding and redemption dates, providing a substantial correction to the literature. Over 80 per cent of this paper money's current market value was expected real asset present value and under 20 per cent was liquidity premium. It was primarily a real barter asset and not a fiat currency. The liquidity premium was positively related to the amount of paper money per capita in circulation. This paper money traded below face value due to time-discounting, rather than depreciation. Past scholars have simply confused depreciation with time-discounting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the tensions inherent in the 'speeding up' of methods of manufacturing paper by hand in Europe. Earlier in 1732, a dynamic administrator hoping to revive the fortunes of the small-paper maker centre near Clermont-Ferrand in France, facilitated the placing of an exceptional order by a Parishian printer. The contract was not large enough, but the high quality required for the luxury edition of the works of a great scholar offered a unique chance for paper makers to display their skills and renew their links with the capital's profitable markets. The mill owners, readily set to work, but they also immediatedly and repeatedly asked their protector to find an outlet for the paper that would inevitably remain after the best realms had left for Paris. The claim was legitimate not only because these paper makers were in need for assistance, but it was impossible for anyone engaged in that business to limit production to the finest paper only. Papers of different qualities inevitably accumulated on their sorting tables.

The article describes the colonial monetary standard in Massachusetts in the 1600s. It discusses the establishment of a commodity standard in 1640 and the official prices of commodities in Massachusetts during the 1600s. The article details the development of the paper-money standard in 1690. It comments on the topics covered by most recent studies of the monetary system of the American colonies. The establishment of a mint in Boston in 1652 is reported. By 1737 the price of silver had risen. In 1750, the Massachusetts Assembly restored specie payments. The article also considers the objections to the continuation of paper-money issues.

This paper qualitatively and quantitatively examines the development of the sovereign debt market in Prewar China under different governments. During the Beijing Era (1912–26), accompanied by the establishment of necessary financial institutions, the sovereign debt market emerged to meet fiscal needs. Surprisingly, the Nationalist government, in power from 1927, successfully cultivated a robust market characterized by its expanding size and liquidity. Setting itself apart from its predecessors, the government established credibility as a borrower in two key ways. Firstly, it demonstrated unwavering commitment to debt service by settling previous debts and offering well‐structured new ones, even during challenging times. Furthermore, the government escrowed fiscal revenue, pledged for debt repayments, to a semi‐independent committee of private bankers on behalf of debtholders, enhancing public confidence. Secondly, the government showcased its ability to secure tax revenues for debt repayments. However, starting from 1931/2, the debt market experienced a decline due to the government's compromised ability to pay resulting from external wars and shifting political priorities that weakened its commitment to debt repayments. Empirical evidence confirms the market's responsiveness to regime shifts and policy changes. This paper sheds light on how a nascent autocratic government can successfully borrow from the public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the history of contractual choice in coffee plantations of São Paulo, Brazil. It focuses on the consolidation of non‐captive labour markets in the early phases of the transition from slavery in the country, particularly in the 1840s–50s. Vis‐à‐vis the alternatives of fixed rents and fixed payments per time worked or piece rates, the paper examines the rationale for the adoption of sharecropping arrangements with European bonded labourers. New archival evidence suggests that sharecropping had no obvious productivity advantage over alternative labour–rental arrangements in this period, and that the adoption of sharecropping arrangements resulted from the positional advantage of its first proposers, who influenced later choices of contractual design. A credit‐labour tie‐up long outlived the original sharecropping arrangements, in turn allowing for the immigration of poor and credit‐constrained Europeans, paving the way to insert Brazil into the circuits of mass migration without promoting institutional reforms to attract non‐bonded immigrants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the issue of the Lend-Lease declaration in Great Britain on September 10, 1941. There were two closely linked factors which caused the dramatic reduction in Britain's overseas trade. First, large sections of Britain's manufacturing industry had to be converted to war production, thus reducing the capacity for manufactured exports. By June 1944, 33 percent of Britain's labor force was engaged in war duties and a further 22 percent was in the armed forces. Secondly, America supplied Britain with food, raw materials, industrial and military equipment, without cash payments, under Lend-Lease. The responsibility for Lend-Lease in the early days was delegated to Harry Hopkins, the person in charge for Lend-Lease, though the official head of the agency in charge of Lend-Lease was nominally General J.H. Burns. Despite Hopkins's renowned energy and drive, Lend-Lease supplies to Britain during 1941 only played a marginal role in the war effort. There was an unavoidable time lag between the inception of Lend-Lease and the American economy's ability to produce the goods.

From its foundation as a private corporation in 1694, the Bank of England extended large amounts of credit to support the British private economy and to support an increasingly centralised British state. The Bank helped the British state reach a position of geopolitical and economic hegemony in the international economic order. In this paper, we deploy recalibrated financial data to analyse an evolving trajectory of connections between the British economy, the state, and the Bank of England. We show how these connections contributed to form an effective and efficient fiscal–naval state and promote the development of a system of financial intermediation for the economy. This symbiotic relationship became stronger after 1793. The evidence that we consider here shows that although the Bank was nominally a private institution and profits were paid to its shareholders, it was playing a public role well before Bagehot's doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper provides a detailed analysis of excess mortality during the 'Spanish Flu' in a developing German economy and the effect of poverty and air pollution on pandemic mortality. The empirical analysis is based on a difference‐in‐differences approach using annual all‐cause mortality statistics at the parish level in the Kingdom of Württemberg. The paper complements the existing literature on urban pandemic severity with comprehensive evidence from mostly rural parishes. The results show that middle‐ and high‐income parishes had a significantly lower increase in mortality rates than low‐income parishes. Moreover, the mortality rate during the 1918 influenza pandemic was significantly higher in highly polluted parishes compared with least polluted parishes. Furthermore, the paper provides a detailed description of mortality statistics in Württemberg and new excess mortality rate estimates for Germany and its states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I show inter alia that, by one barely known but official measure, imports of goods into the United Kingdom towards the end of the Second World War were more than twice the best‐known measure. The lower measure is that found in the historical British national accounts and in the Bank of England's A millennium of macroeconomic data. That invaluable compendium in fact has both these measures, and indeed another one also, but this is not clear, and there is no proper explanation of the differences between these series. The differences matter. What I will show to be the most obvious, though not the only legitimate, measure of wartime goods imports suggests that real imports were higher at the end of the war than in the 1930s, and higher as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP). By contrast the national accounts figures show an absolute real‐terms fall, and a larger still fall as a proportion of GDP. This really mattered in an economy already exceptional for its high imports. In this paper I clarify the nature of the different measures of imports and how they have resulted in a radically different understanding of the British war effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to a growing literature on state capacity with reference to the early modern Asian empires. The historiography of these states, and especially the Mughal empire of South Asia, has moved away from an image of unrestrained despotism towards that of a constrained state, but has yet to explore fully what these constraints were and what the state did to overcome them. Using a new dataset on conflicts in Mughal South Asia, and an analytical model, the paper shows how forgiving rebel leaders was used as a strategic tool to secure stability, in a setting where high information costs made intermediaries indispensable to the state. The paper also offers some comparison between Asian empires on the role of intermediaries in shaping state constraint and fiscal policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]