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This paper studies the relationship between land revenue systems and returns to agricultural labour in colonial India. I provide the first district‐level comparative estimates of agricultural labour returns relative to average income, on the basis of wage/income ratios for 1916. I then use those estimates to analyse the impact of the land revenue systems established by the British colonial authorities. Results show that districts with a larger proportion of non‐landlord land revenue systems presented higher relative wages, closer to the average income. This effect was mainly driven by differences in land concentration connected to the type of landownership introduced by land revenue systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a case study of four late nineteenth-century share flotations of Indian railway companies. It highlights an important gap in the historiography of Indian railway finance, which has focused on the period up to 1875. The role of N. M. Rothschild as lead underwriter and its relationship with the India Office, managing agents, and investors is analysed. This gives an evolving picture of mutual dependence between the City and Whitehall in the financing of the British Empire's largest investment programme. Gentlemanly capitalists are shown to combine the self-reinforcing roles of arranger, investor, and informal government advisor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comments on analyst Carl Bridge's remarks about the article "Great Britain and the Indian Currency Crisis of 1930-1932." Views of Bridge on the nature, function, and composition of the Government of India's currency reserves; Discussion of the Paper Currency and the Gold Standard Reserve of India; Comment on some minor errors stated by Bridge in his commentary.

India's significance to Great Britain's prewar settlements network is well known, and the Indian contribution to the relatively trouble-free operation of the prewar gold standard, particularly after 1900, has also attracted attention. India was a large importer of gold for non-monetary uses. In the five years to 1914 it absorbed over one-quarter of the world's output of the metal, and this emerged as a major source of worry for financiers in London. During much of the interwar period, British policy makers looked to external sources of expansion to help mitigate the burden which their financial reconstruction agenda placed on domestic output and employment. It is informed that although India's wartime trade surpluses were not greatly higher than prewar levels, the manner in which they were financed changed. In the five years to 1914, imports of gold and silver had liquidated 36 and 10 percent respectively of the Indian trade surplus. In contrast, thanks to Great Britain's large and growing deficits with the U.S., the combined proportion of the two metals fell to about 14 percent of India's wartime trade surplus. A substantial portion of the surplus thus accumulated as increased holdings of securities in India's paper currency reserve.

The twentieth century saw the virtual elimination of famine across most of the globe, but also witnessed some of the worst famines ever recorded. The causes usually given for these twentieth-century famines differ from those given for earlier famines, which tend to be more often blamed on harvest failures per se than on human agency. This paper reassesses two of the last century's most notorious famines, the Chinese Great Leap Famine of 1959–61 and the Great Bengal Famine of 1943–4, in the light of these rival perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent scholarship has explored the process by which modern commercial and property law came into being in the non-western world, and has emphasized the role played by colonialism and conquest in this process. Using a case study from colonial India, this article suggests that the coding of commercial law was influenced more by commercialization than by the nature of the state, and was an endogenous response to the failure of local custom and common law to secure frictionless trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses agriculture decision making in one part of India, in Bihar, which was socio-economically backward yet deeply involved in commercial production during the nineteenth century. The combination of allegedly discordant characteristics is usually attributed to 'forced commercialization', the presumption being that the norm is free entry into the market. The term does not disturb the sway of most economic theories, which assume that capitalism was exported, and closed systems were opened out, as international trade expanded--a model which fits poorly with an agricultural system, previously but still incompletely market-involved, as in much of India. So-called commercialization differs case by case, therefore, because modes of production evolve within specific cultural and technical parameters. The findings of this paper modify some of the more sweeping interpretations of capitalism and of development. First, they contradict the idea that poorer, less commercial areas took little part in commerce and experienced little occupational diversity, and the opposite idea that commercialization necessarily implies economic advance. Scholars are understandably uncertain about classes in rural Bihar. Clearly, by the early 1800s or even earlier, some local producers already experienced competition from imported commodities, others suffered from a paucity of local demand when so many goods and services were exchanged through credit transactions, reflecting social prestige or in accordance with village custom.

The article deals with the reason of the British government to end the monopoly of East India Company in 1813 with India. The East India Co. (E.I.C.) Charter Act of 1813, which ended companies' monopoly of trade with India, has been viewed by historians as a significant event in the emergence of British commitment to free trade. The main concern of this article, however, is the reasoning behind the government decision to end monopoly in 1813, rather than the wider question of the efficiency of the E.I.C. It seeks to examine government motives behind the 1813 charter, and re-assesses the significance of the provincial campaigns against monopoly. In opening the India trade, the government was not merely responding to provincial demands for new markets, but was implementing a strategy of its own to combat economic difficulties at home. India was seen primarily as a source of raw materials, rather than as a potential market for British exports.

This article discusses the currency crisis in India and Great Britain from 1930 to 1932. The early 1930s were crucial years in the development of the imperial relationship between Great Britain and India. Many aspects of the relationship between Britain and India were altered by the great depression of the early 1930s and its political consequences. For example, as has only recently been pointed out, this period was one in which the attitude of British policymakers towards the problem of maintaining sales of British cotton goods in India underwent a fundamental change. The decision of the British government in September 1931 to take sterling off the gold standard and to impose a sterling standard on the rupee was momentous in itself. It is also important as illustrative of one important aspect of the imperial relationship. This article investigates the policies and actions of the British and Indian governments during the currency crisis of 1930-2 in an attempt to separate fact from fiction on these points. The Indian currency crisis of 1930-32 was a crisis of confidence in the rupee. Political uncertainty and economic depression stimulated a flight of capital from India and a decline in the market for her export staples.

The article examines the ryotwari tenure and Utilitarian rent developed by the British in western India in late 19th century. In western India the British developed ryotwari tenure and Utilitarian rent in their most explicit form, against a background some historians found the more promising precisely because crammed with the revenue tyrannies of native princes. Alexander Rogers, Bombay's historian of land revenue, portrayed a ruined province on the fall of the Maratha Peshwa, under whom every means of rigors and confiscation were employed to squeeze the utmost out of the people. Economist James Mill condemned Mughal revenue theory as having been ruinous, its gross produce assessments comprising the deleterious standard of rude governments. Mill believed that these appropriations made no allowance for allowance for variations in productivity of soils, and that by imposing outlandish tax burdens on impecunious areas, Mughal revenue officials prevented all but lands of a certain degree of fertility from being cultivated.

This article introduces a new dataset on wages in northern India (from Gujarat in the west to Bengal in the east) from the 1590s to the 1870s. It follows Allen's subsistence basket methodology to compute internationally comparable real wages to shed light on developments in Indian living standards over time. It adjusts the comparative cost‐of‐living indices to take into account differences in climate and caloric intake due to variances in heights. The article also discusses the male/female wage gap in northern India. It demonstrates that the 'great divergence' started in the late seventeenth century, and widened further after the 1720s and especially after the 1800s. It was subsequently primarily England's spurt and India's stagnation in the first half of the nineteenth century that brought about most serious differences in the standard of living. If the British colonial state is to blame—as often suggested by the literature on India's persistent poverty—the fault lies in its failure to improve the situation after the British became near‐undisputed masters of India in 1820. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India fell behind during colonial rule. The absolute and relative decline of Indian GDP per capita with respect to Britain began before colonization and coincided with the rise of the textile trade with Europe. However, the fortunes of the traditional textile industry cannot explain the decline in the eighteenth century and stagnation in the nineteenth century as India integrated into the global economy of the British Empire. Inadequate investment in agriculture and consequent decline in yield per acre stalled economic growth. Modern industries emerged and grew relatively fast. The reversal began after independence. Policies of industrialization and a green revolution in agriculture increased productivity in agriculture and industry. However, India's growth in the closing decades of the twentieth century has been led by services. A concentration of human capital in the service sector has origins in colonial policy. Expenditure on education prioritized higher education, creating an advantage for the service sector. At the same time, the slow expansion of primary education lowered the accumulation of human capital and put India at a disadvantage in comparison with the fast‐growing economies of East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British war effort in the Second World War depended on US Lend-Lease and the accumulation of sterling balances by other countries, including the Empire. By the end of the war outstanding balances were equivalent to 60 per cent of British net receipts under Lend-Lease. Of the total sterling balances, about a third was accumulated by India. This article seeks to evaluate the costs incurred by India in the reduction of balances after the war. The accumulation of balances and their use to repatriate India's sterling debt is described. British efforts to convince India to accept a partial cancellation of the balances are analysed, singling out the crucial role of Keynes. The negotiations after independence are detailed, including releases, transfers to Pakistan, settlement of pensions, purchase of military stores, and gold sales. The possible contribution of British divestment to reduce outstanding balances is assessed. The Indian case is compared with those of other holders, such as Portugal, Brazil, Argentina, and Egypt. The links between the accumulation of sterling balances and inflation are considered. In the end there was a significant reduction in the purchasing power of sterling balances, but not for the reasons anticipated by London. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can good policy overcome or alter the effects of history? This question is addressed in this article using unique district-level data for 148 districts of former British India. Controlling for observable differences in geography and income, the ordinary least squares estimates suggest a large and positive effect of colonial expenditures on rural primary education in 1911 on rural literacy up to 1991. However, instrumental variable estimates that control for the endogeneity of colonial investments suggest that the effects of historical spending are significant only up to 1971. Two policy changes can account for these findings: an increase in spending following the 1968 National Education Policy and a greater emphasis on the universal provision of public goods such as schools in the 1970s. Unlike recent studies documenting the persistent effects of historical investments on contemporary outcomes, this study emphasizes how effective policies can overturn the effects of history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Marriage is universal for women in India, but the marriage rate for men varies across regions, where the region is a proxy for shared cultural norms. A preference for sons results in a biased sex ratio towards men and creates a shortage of brides in the marriage market. Using the Indian census of 1931, the article finds that son preference was a regional phenomenon and led to a low marriage rate for men. Using caste-level information, the article finds no evidence that men from the upper castes enjoyed an advantage in the marriage market as the theoretical literature predicts. The regional differences in gender bias and marriage market outcomes have persisted over the twentieth century and indicate the persistence of cultural values. The long-run changes show that the marriage squeeze has reduced the surplus of men in all regions; however, the regional differences in son preference and marriage outcomes were still the same in 2001. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article develops data on the history of wages and prices in Beijing, Canton, and Suzhou/Shanghai in China from the eighteenth century to the twentieth, and compares them with leading cities in Europe, Japan, and India in terms of nominal wages, the cost of living, and the standard of living. In the eighteenth century, the real income of building workers in Asia was similar to that of workers in the backward parts of Europe but far behind that in the leading economies in north-western Europe. Real wages stagnated in China in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and rose slowly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth, with little cumulative change for 200 years. The income disparities of the early twentieth century were due to long-run stagnation in China combined with industrialization in Japan and Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Clark and Wolcott attribute the low productivity of Indian cotton textile workers to their preference for low work effort, and suggest that unions resisted an increase in work intensity. This article argues that low wages were due to surplus labour in agriculture. Low wages allowed the persistence of managerial inefficiencies and resulted in low productivity and work effort. It uses firm-level data from all the textile producing regions in India to examine the relationship between unions and labour productivity. The findings show that fewer workers were employed per machine in the unionized mills in Bombay and Ahmedabad, compared to the mills in less unionized regions. These findings suggest that unionization increased wages and compelled managers to raise productivity [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to answer three basic questions about the nineteenth-century cotton textile industry in Bengal that still remain unresolved in the literature; namely, when did the industry begin to decay, what was the extent of its decay during the early nineteenth century, and what were the factors that led to this? In the absence of data on production, this article seeks to settle the debate on the basis of the industry's market performance and its consumption of raw materials. It contests the prevailing hypothesis that the industry's perpetual decline started in the late eighteenth or the early nineteenth century. Instead, it is argued that the decline started around the mid-1820s. The pace of its decline was, however, slow though steady at the beginning, but reached crisis point by 1860, when around 563,000 workers lost their jobs. Regarding the extent of its decay, this article concludes that the industry was diminished by about 28 per cent by the mid-1800s. However, it survived in the high-end and low-end domestic markets. Evidence is also gathered in favour of the hypothesis that, although British discriminatory policies undoubtedly depressed the industry's export outlet, its decay is better explained by technological innovations in Great Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early eighteenth century, wages in Britain were more than four times as high as in India, the world's major exporter of cotton textiles. This induced the adoption of more capital-intensive production methods in Britain and a faster rate of technological progress, so that competitive advantage had begun to shift in Britain's favour by the late eighteenth century. However, the completion of the process was delayed until after the Napoleonic Wars by increasing raw cotton costs, before supply adjusted to the major increase in demand for inputs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the development of the London East India agency houses during the first half of the nineteenth century, and their evolving commercial and political relationships with merchants and manufacturers in the British provinces. It outlines the emergence of pressure groups in Britain concerned with influencing British economic policy in India and the Far East, and their role in shaping policy as the East India Company receded in importance following the Charter Acts of 1813 and 1833. What emerges is a complex picture of collaboration between interest groups in London and the provinces. This challenges and refines aspects of the gentlemanly capitalism thesis of Cain and Hopkins, which emphasizes both the supremacy of London-based financial and mercantile interests in the formation of British policy towards the empire, and the separateness of City-based ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ from provincial mercantile and industrial interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article suggests that Great Britain's financing of land warfare during the French wars could have been compromised without the accumulated credits from India transfers since 1757. It shows that limited information on trade and transfers can be reconciled with independent benchmarks on Britain's external position in 1770, 1775, 1800, and 1815. The two weaker benchmarks place Britain's net credits at £ 10 million in 1800 and at £ 30 million in 1815. From a wider range of conceivable scenarios, it remains apparent that the massive expenses abroad during the French wars required substantial improvement, at one time or another, in other components of the balance of payments. A British net credit well in excess of £ 10 million by 1800 has some support in contemporary literature; but the room for accommodation in the new estimates for 1772-1800 would not suffice to bridge the gap with the sounder benchmark for Britain's foreign debt in 1775. Potentially substantial credits include wealthy immigrants' transfers and net income and capital inflows from the British West Indies.

The article focuses on the material base that supported Great Britain's imperialist expansion between 1750 and 1850. The most obvious grounds for doubting the significance of manufacturing as a force behind British imperialism are provided by the course of events in India, the main field of conquest during the period in question, and the inducement or staging post for acquisitions elsewhere, such as Cape Colony, Singapore, Aden, and Hong Kong. The first major advance was made in Bengal, at about the same time as some experiments in Lancashire that would ultimately prove momentous but long before large-scale mechanization. From the 1790s the East India Company's armies made important advances, most notably against Mysore and Marathas, but these conquests were intended primarily as strategic responses to the threat from revolutionary France. Asia's share of British exports fell, only recovering in the 1820s, after the decisive conquests had been made, when Lancashire technology at last began to undercut Indian weavers in their local markets. It has been suggested that the rate of increase in industrial production per head may not have accelerated markedly until after 1815, rather than during the 1760s or 1780s, once conventional starting points for the industrial revolution.

This article discusses various issues related to the balance of payments for reconstruction between Great Britain and India in the nineteenth century, with specific reference to the imperial practices of Great Britain. British economic development in the nineteenth century was closely linked to the international economy. It was also inseparable from the naval and military strength, which tied economic relations to both formal and informal empire. As the largest and economically most important colony, an empire within an empire, India had the most to gain or lose from imperial exploitation or benevolence. British economic and political influence was not confined to the formal empire but extended to a large number of countries which were susceptible to the tenets of economic liberalism or which were closely tied to the British market. A statement of the transactions between a country and the rest of the world, the balance of payments, should measure at least some of the flows responsible for the transformations wrought by imperial relations, both formal and informal.

The article presents a study of investment in Indian stock during the period of territorial expansion, military success and political supremacy enjoyed by the East India Company after 1756. The acquisition of a territorial empire in north-eastern India had a profound effect upon the nature, scope, and distribution of joint-stock investment in the East India Company. It particularly affected the application of such investment to speculative and political activity: speculators of many types sought a share of the vastly increased profits thought to have been generated for the company by events in India, while politicians sought influence both within and upon the company. This reshaped patterns and rates of stock turnover, which in turn prompted a restructuring of the distribution and ownership of the stock. Thus in this case important economic changes at the heart of the empire were brought about by political and military events at the periphery in Bengal. The financial and political crises of the company in the 1770s were exacerbated by internal upheavals and instability that were closely related to the changing nature of stock ownership.

The article focuses on the Indian economic history with reference to the book "The Cambridge Economic History of India," vol. 1, "c. 1200-c. 1750," edited by Tapan Raychaudhuri and Irfan Habib and vol. 2, "c 1757-c 1970," edited by Dharam Kumar and Meghnad Desai. It analyzes two forms of change in the Indian society. First, the long-term shifts in economic structure and occupations which created a highly stratified peasantry out of the looser and more diverse social pattern of forest-dweller, nomad, peasant soldier and bondsman which prevailed at the beginning of the period. Secondly, it examines that particular type of periodic crisis which typically saw the convergence of jolts to trade and bullion flows coinciding with internal agrarian decline. The decline of shipping in the country occurred in the context of a drastic change in India's export schedule from a predominance of finished cloth goods to agricultural commodities such as opium, cotton and later jute. The early nineteenth century also saw a clear cyclical crisis in the economy which reflected international changes as well as internal realignments of resources.

The article provides information on the controversy of British colonialism and Indian poverty. In 1968 the controversy centred on an attempt by economist Morris D. Morris to question the most common view of the Indian economy, that at best it stagnated for much of the last century. In the case of agriculture, for example, the conclusion was that yields per acre were consistently low in terms of known techniques and in comparison with other underdeveloped countries, that absolute and proportionate expansion of non-food crops did not improve general productivity, that the proportion of the population directly dependent on agriculture increased, and that, except in the Punjab, cultivated area, production and national income declined relative to population growth after 1920. Morris dissented by suggesting that per capita income may have grown under British rule. His view was attacked by economist Tapan Raychaudhuri, among others. Raychaudhuri stressed Indian variety and the commercial development of some areas in the eighteenth century; he agreed that the nineteenth century probably saw an increase in per capita agricultural output, but doubted that it was substantial or fairly distributed, and attributed it largely to the shift to higher-value crops.

This article focuses on an analysis by economic analyst B.R. Tomlinson of the British policy in the Indian currency crisis of 1930 to 1932. In the first half of 1931 Sir George Schuster, the Indian Finance Member, was faced with the prospect of a massive budgetary deficit owing to the continued collapse in commodity prices which began the Great Depression. He feared that the government of India might not be able to meet its annual 30 million pounds sterling obligations in London and be forced to use her meager 46.8 million gold reserves. The Treasury refused, saying they did not wish to encourage profligate spending by the Government of India. Tomlinson says that there was no expectation that gold would leave India, and that the decision was made solely to avoid a run on the rupee and a consequent default which Great Britain would be liable to pay for. He only hints that there were fears for the pound too. The salaries of Englishmen in the Indian Civil Service would not be affected as they were fixed in sterling. Though more rupees would be needed to cover sterling remittances, they would be found in the increased revenue from land tax, income tax, and customs receipts.

The article addresses the issue of imperial preference and examines the state of the steel industry in India from 1924 to 1939. This article aims to take a closer look at the controversy over the differential duties in the steel tariff. In a broader context this involves an examination of several wider issues, such as the extent of the government of India's commitment to both fiscal autonomy and tariff protection, the response of the steel industry to the economic and political realities of the time, and the various pressures of different interest groups which shaped the government's policies with regard to protection and imperial preference. The question of imperial preference necessitates an understanding of the political economy of inter-war tariff protection. Fiscal autonomy did work during the inter-war period in the sense that Secretaries of State restricted themselves to making suggestions or requests to the Viceroys, and that tariff measures generally obtained the formal assent of the legislature before being implemented.

This article examines the negative effects of the World War I on the export of the cotton piece goods of Great Britain to India. When War broke out it was found that practically every industry in the country was dependent upon overseas supplies not only for its machinery and plant, but also for the stores and materials used in its daily working. This position seems to have come as a genuine surprise to British officials in India, and provided the reason for setting up the Indian Industrial Commission in 1916. For the cotton industry the war was an unparalleled opportunity, and it managed to increase its share of the domestic market from a little over 20 percent to around 40 percent. Yet is it perhaps not unfair to compare India with Japan. Japan's cotton piece exports raised twice as much as the Indian mills total output in the war years. The estimates of Indian handloom production given here are based on a method pioneered by the Indian Industrial Commission. This involves estimating the total weight of yarn available in India for the manufacture of cotton goods and then subtracting estimates of the amounts used in the cotton mills and amounts exported to yield a figure for the yarn used by the handlooms.

The article discusses the creation of by Portugal of an Indian company with the purpose of reviving the ailing Goa-Lisbon trade and scotching the force of English and Dutch competition. The creation by Portugal of an India Company with the purpose of reviving the ailing Goa-Lisbon trade and scotching the menace of English and Dutch competition constituted what was arguably the most drastic innovation in Portuguese commercial strategy on the Cape route since the pioneer voyage of Vasco da Gama to Calicut in 1497-9. The Portuguese naturally regarded the entry of the English and Dutch into the seaborne trade with Asia as unwarranted and illegal, and adopted a policy of uncompromising opposition to both nations whom they sought to expel from the region by every possible means. Thus the Portuguese India Company of the early 1630's was, if not exactly stillborn, born a weakling likely to succumb at an early age. It was a weakling largely because it failed to gain adequate financial backing from the crown and the municipal councils, or any backing at all from the private sector, and was therefore perilously undercapitalized from the start.

The article focuses on the economic policy of Ireland and India in the time of economist John Stuart Mill. The purpose of this article is to compare some of the main aspects of economic policy in Ireland and India in Mill's day, and to consider whether, as he believed, the paternal government of India was more successful than the semi-representative government of Ireland in its handling of the problems involved. At first sight, Ireland and India might seem to afford more grounds for contrast than comparison: but in the nineteenth century the similarity, remarked by Mill, between the economies of the two countries was quite considerable. In each, a growing population strained the resources of a backward agriculture, which was yet the only source of employment for the vast majority. Consequently, those charged with the government of both countries faced similar problems in regard to economic policy, arising eventually from the extreme poverty of the great mass of the people. It hardly needs to be emphasized that the policy-makers of that day did not see the problem of economic development as involving them in a concerted effort to raise levels of real income, as would their counterparts today. Nevertheless, in India certainly its British governors realized their responsibility for the welfare of the people, and recognized its economic dimension.

This article discusses the short-term fluctuations in India's external trade in the years before and after the termination of East India Co.'s trading activities in 1833. One of the most important features of the economic relationship between India and Great Britain in the nineteenth century was the crucial position, which India came to occupy in the British international payment system. Already, during the period under review, India was rapidly becoming the clearing-house for the reciprocal payments in the triangular trade between Britain, China, and the United States and also in that between Britain, China, and India herself, giving rise to a complex system of multilateral financial settlements. Transfer of funds on private account swelled, this amount still further, and the whole remittance problem imparted political overtones to all transactions connected with the Indian trade. The cessation of the company's trade was accompanied by the destruction of the old Agency Houses in Calcutta, which was shaken by an unparalleled credit crisis and economic depression during 1830-33.

The article discusses the government manipulation of Indian tariffs in the period 1859-1862 in the interest of the Lancashire, England cotton industry. The Indian finances had been put under a severe strain during the governor-generalship of James Andrew Broun-Ramsay better known as Lord Dalhousie, who left a legacy of budget deficits and a large debt to his successor, Charles John Canning. They became chaotic as a result of the Mutiny and the government of India was obliged to take urgent measures in order to restore the situation. Early in 1859 Canning warned Edward Geoffery Smith Stanley, who had become the first Secretary of State for India the previous September that the financial prospects for 1859-60 were not cheering. It appeared certain that recourse must be had to new taxes, and that they must be put into operation as quickly as possible. Apart from the ordinary expenses of government in India, there was an additional strain on the finances arising from railway works amounting to 4 million pound. Two new taxes immediately available were an increase in the tariff and an extension of the stamp duties. Canning said he had long ago expressed the opinion that import duties should be raised and the Court of Directors had more than once said that the whole matter was under consideration. Now there was no longer time to ask for instructions. The government of India intended to raise the customs duties, and trusted that the British government would support this step.

Discusses cotton exports and Indian agriculture between 1861 and 1870. Quantities of raw cotton exported from India; Impact of American war on the production of cotton in India; Statistics showing increase in land under cotton and under all crops.