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The article deals with the implementation of the rule by the Advisory Council on Public Records under the provisions of the Public Records Act of 1967 in Great Britain. Most contemporary historians saw the First World War as a historical watershed from which time onwards the activity and potential role of governments in influencing British economic and social development were much enhanced. As a result, particular areas of historical research, such as diplomatic history and historical studies of social and economic policy, were given enormous stimulus. For all historians access to records is essential. New records are almost always welcome and any restriction on access to information is generally deplored or regretted. In the initial euphoria at the release of so much new material comparatively little attention was paid to the status of the public records as research evidence. In 1970, however, doyen of British interwar historians, the late G. L. Mowat, referred to a part of the new material with characteristic shrewdness.

Numerous Acts of Parliament changed the financing of transport infrastructure in eighteenth-century England. This paper examines the economic effects of turnpike acts, which greatly improved road infrastructure by introducing tolls. It shows that turnpike trusts increased property income in local areas by at least 20 per cent. The findings shed light on why local property owners promoted and managed turnpikes. They also show that turnpike trusts accounted for at least 20 per cent of the total growth in real land rents between 1690 and 1815, and added at least 1.65 per cent to national income in 1815. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article paper is concerned with the similarity of the growth performance of the British economy during the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties and with the usefulness of the "new-old" industry dichotomy in illuminating the trends of the inter-war period. The inter-war years emerge as a period of growth almost as rapid as any of comparable length in British measured history. The exact rating of the performance naturally varies slightly with the growth criterion adopted and the termini used for the other periods; the simplest way to establish the validity of the conclusion and at the same time leave it open to the reader's judgment is to draw in the inter-war trends on the Matthews graph. The similarity of the growth performance in the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties is largely maintained even when activity is divided into Goods production and Service production. Services get their unity partly from their physical intangibility as final products, partly from supposed differences in income demand elasticities or productivity improvement possibilities, partly, and increasingly, from the statistical difficulties of arriving at satisfactory real output series.

Late Victorian Britain was very important in the development of British dominance in light consumer goods industries, such as fermented liquors and spirits; detergents and perfumery; bicycles and other carriages; paper, stationery, and bookbinding; and games of all kinds and sports goods. Firms developed technology-based innovations and marketing-based innovations, creating abnormal peaks of trademark registrations in certain industries. This article investigates those peaks and shows that factors usually pointed out as explaining British economic decline in heavy industries did not impact on the development of light consumer goods industries, and on the contrary encouraged their fast growth during this period. Trademark registrations are shown to provide new insights into the debate on British relative decline, when combined with other industry and firm-level data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines major privately owned British railway companies before the First World War. Quantitative evidence is presented on return on capital employed (ROCE), total factor productivity (TFP) growth, cost inefficiency, and speed of passenger services. There were discrepancies in performance across companies but ROCE and TFP typically fell during our period. Cost inefficiency rose before 1900 but then was brought under control as a profits collapse loomed. Without the discipline of either strong competition or effective regulation, managerial failure was common. This sector is an important qualification to the conventional wisdom that late Victorian Britain did not fail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a restatement of the economists N.F.R. Crafts and C.K. Harley's views on the output growth and the British industrial revolution. Authors stress that the considerable volume of work since their original papers does not provide any serious quantitative challenge to their main findings nor does it go any distance towards reinstating economists P. Deane and W.A. Cole's view, which was the previous orthodoxy. The authors accept that measurement of growth yields only a range of best guess estimates. Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the degree of uncertainty. The authors have made revisions to their earlier estimates in the course of the paper; these are generally fairly small and tend to reduce slightly the estimated growth rates. They demonstrate that total factor productivity estimation is much less problematic than the critics claim. They also accept that their approach to the industrial revolution has been shaped by the pursuit of particular questions and that other approaches are both valid and potentially important. Finally, they reaffirm the importance of the industrial revolution as an historical discontinuity.

The Glorious Revolution has been linked with Britain's economic development in the eighteenth century. This article argues that it contributed to the early transport revolution. First, it shows that the regulatory environment became more favourable for undertakers, with their rights being better protected. Second, it shows that investment in improving roads and rivers increased substantially in the mid-1690s shortly after the Glorious Revolution. Regression analysis and structural breaks tests confirm that there was a change in investment even after controlling for other determinants of investment. The results have implications for debates on the role of political change in British economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The long relative decline of Great Britain's industrial economy has produced a voluminous literature, both polemical and academic, seeking to illuminate its causes. Recent contributions have stressed the deleterious effects of inappropriate and inconsistent government policies, in particular the deadweight of an inefficient public sector, and the contempt for industrial production on the part of a Treasury-dominated civil service elite obsessed with macroeconomic issues. They have also cited the anti-modernization ethos of the post-1945 political consensus. In a longer term perspective great stress has also been laid on the socio-cultural environment antipathetic to the industrial spirit, which, supposedly, had animated the business and investing classes in the pre-1850 phases of industrialization. The purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of the new institutional approach as an explanation of Great Britain's relative economic decline in the twentieth century. The discussion will focus on economists B. Elbaum and W. Lazonick thesis as a reference point for assessing alternative formulations of institutional rigidities.

The article criticizes the exchange rate crisis of July 1917 in Great Britain. Interest in economist J.M. Keynes has, not unnaturally, centered on the development of his theories and their influence on policy-makers and the years before 1919 have not attracted the same attention as the later period. It has been taken for granted that the practical problems of the war years must have influenced Keynes's development. Keynes's main duties during the war were concerned with external finance, essential in particular to Britain's overseas purchases. In this capacity he had to come to terms with Britain's growing dependence on the U.S. and the influence that the latter could bring to bear on the British exchange rate. It has been noted that Keynes was deeply committed to the policy of the peg, that is, to paying out the gold necessary to keep up the exchange rate of the pound against the dollar; this contrasts with the attitude he assumed in the 1920s against the return to the gold standard at the prewar parity of 4.86.

Abstract: Clark's claims about the scale of English agricultural output from the 1200s to the 1860s flout historical and geographical reality. His income‐based estimates start with the daily real wages of adult males and assume that days worked per year were constant. Those advanced in British economic growth make no such assumption and instead are built up from the output side. They correlate better with population trends and are consistent with an economy slowly growing and becoming richer. Clark's denial that such growth occurred, his assertion that substantially more land must have been under arable cultivation, his belief that conditions of full employment invariably prevailed in the countryside at harvest time, his concern that the wage bill would have exceeded the value of output in British economic growth, his refusal to consider the possibility that the working year was of variable length, and his assertion that output per acre must have been equalized across arable and pasture are all shown to be figments of his ‘Malthus delusion’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A review of several articles for the period 400-1100 AD is presented including one by Naismith on currency, link social and economic developments among the English, one by Lane on urban life at Wroxeter into the 6th and 7th centuries, and one by Lavelle on the policy of King Eadwig.

This article uses newspaper advertisements to chart the changes in speeds and fares of stage coaches, identifying the main periods of increasing speeds among London coaches as the 1760s-80s and 1810s-20s, separated by a period when speeds declined. It then measures productivity growth. Fares of London coaches in 1835-6 were about 27 per cent of what they would have been but for improvements in horses, vehicles, and roads from 1750, and the two main periods of productivity growth correspond to those of rising speeds. Speeds and productivity of regional coaches increased more smoothly. The rising productivity firmly identifies road transport as one of the modernizing sectors of the economy. New figures are put forward for the growing number of London and regional coaches, indicating rapid growth in passenger miles. While turnpike trusts had little impact before the 1750s, their increasing effectiveness, together with the use of steel springs and improved horses, was crucial to the rising productivity of the 1760s-80s, and even more so to that of the 1810s-20s. The cross roads were apparently poorer than London roads in the late eighteenth century, but thereafter the gap narrowed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic growth and change in eighteenth-century Britain, both the expansion of pre-industrial commercial society and the industrial revolution itself, have been explored using a variety of approaches. This article highlights a relatively ignored aspect of the problem, arguing that the state, politics, and political economic ideology played a central role. In particular, the early eighteenth-century political victory of a version of political economy associated with the Whig party, which centred on manufacturing and consumption, was a prerequisite for the economic developments later in the century. The article begins by describing a political economy of manufacturing and its rival, a political economy of re-exporting associated with the Tory party. It then explains how and why a political economy of manufacturing became dominant, examining both political elites and ordinary voters and petitioners. The growth of manufacturing and consumption must be understood, therefore, as political as much as economic events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The imposition of the world's first modern income tax in 1799 prompted a revival of interest in national accounting. This article examines the extent to which William Pitt the Younger, who proposed the new tax, modelled his estimates of national wealth on those produced a century earlier by the pioneers in this field, Sir William Petty, Charles Davenant, and Gregory King. In addition, the calculations of Benjamin Bell and Henry Beeke, two of Pitt's contemporaries, are analysed in detail to highlight the fragility of these contemporary estimates of national income. This analysis has important implications for economic historians who have used this material to try to establish the structure and growth of national output. National accountants during the long eighteenth century were not, for the most part, concerned with structural change. Rather, their descriptions of economic structure should be understood as reflecting a particular set of a priori claims about what they deemed to be the proper mode and distribution of taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the composition and geographies of individual wealth holding in England and Wales in the late nineteenth century. It draws on various forms of death duty records to determine the individual ownership of wealth including both personal property and real estate. By combining information on these different kinds of property, it is possible to explore how different strata of wealth holders accumulated specific forms of wealth at the time of their death. The article then examines how the composition of that wealth varied according to the wealth holder's location in the urban hierarchy and distance from London. It points out important geographical differences in both the scale and nature of wealth holding and raises questions about the implications of these findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid rise of England's colonial commerce in the late seventeenth century expanded the nation's resource base, stimulated efficiency improvements across the economy, and was important for long-term growth. However, close examination of the interests at play in England's Atlantic world does not support the Whiggish view that the Glorious Revolution played a benign role in this story. In the decades after the Restoration, the cases of the Royal African Company and the Spanish slave trade in Jamaica are used to show that the competition between Crown and Parliament for control of regulation constrained interest groups on either side in their efforts to capture the profits of empire. Stuart 'tyranny' was not able to damage growth and relatively competitive (and peaceful) conditions underpinned very rapid increases in colonial output and trade. The resolution of the rules of the Atlantic game in 1689 allowed a consolidated state better to manipulate and manage the imperial economy in its own interests. More secure rent-seeking enterprises and expensive wars damaged growth and European rivals began a process of catch-up. The Glorious Revolution was not sufficient to permanently halt economic development but it was sufficient to slow progress towards industrial revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers an examination of the patterns and motivations behind parish apprenticeship in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century London. It stresses continuity in outlook from parish officials binding children, which involved placements in both the traditional and industrializing sectors of the economy. Evidence on the ages, employment types, and locations of 3,285 pauper apprentices bound from different parts of London between 1767 and 1833 indicates a variety of local patterns. The analysis reveals a pattern of youthful age at binding, a range of employment experiences, and parish-specific links to particular trades and manufactures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores why Great Britain became an industrialized and urbanized economy long before France. On the eve of the Great War, agriculture, according to official censuses of population, continued to provide employment for up to 41 per cent of the workforce in France and generated around 35 per cent of the country's national income. In Britain only 8 per cent of the workforce could be officially classified as employed on the land, and agriculture accounted for a mere 5 per cent of gross domestic product. Around 1911, 35 per cent of the population of France resided in towns containing populations of 3,000 and above, while the comparable proportion for Britain was 78 per cent. Structural change in France was in large measure predetermined by a combination of geographical endowments and a system of property rights inherited from its feudal past. Both constraints, operating within the context of pre-chemical and pre-mechanical agricultural systems, so limited the scale and scope of French endeavours to follow the path taken by Britain between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, became almost irrelevant to conditions in France.

The article explores the historical origins of the depressed areas in Great Britain before 1914. The depressed areas are those regions of Britain whose persistent economic difficulties have, for most of this century, constituted the regional problem. This is examined through an analysis of alternative sources of early regional unemployment statistics. Patterns of unemployment in the pre-1914 period are then related to census-derived statistics of regional growth and employment structure. Before 1914, the north was the region of high growth, based on the prosperity of the export-oriented industries created by the industrial revolution, especially engineering, shipbuilding, textiles and mining. Unemployment was primarily a problem of the south, with its stagnant agricultural sector and of London, where the old handicraft industries were making their final stand. Following the war, shifts in world trade caused a sudden drop in export demand, mainly affecting the staple industries of the north. This shift in trade was a clear exogenous shock to the British regional economic system, causing a sudden drop in demand for labour in previously prosperous areas and a reversal in the pre-war pattern of unemployment.

The article focuses on the economic, social, and political changes that occurred as European societies ceased to be primarily agrarian in economic structure and devoted proportionately more of their resources and labor to the production of non-agricultural commodities and services. Industrialization is not identical either with economic growth or economic development, although it is closely associated with both. The process of economic growth, including in the modern era the special case of industrialization, involves the interaction of four broad classes or categories of factors--population, resources, technology, and institutions. In conclusion, there was not one model for industrialization in the nineteenth century. Coal and human capital were the two basic ingredients, but in combination with one another and with other elements they produced a variety of patterns of industrialization. The customary depiction of an industrial revolution in Great Britain and its repetition in continental Europe and elsewhere distorts the historical record.

The article focuses on the effect of rearmament policy on the economic condition of Great Britain in 1930s. The author remarks that the role of rearmament in the interwar economy has aroused little controversy. It was claimed that Britain's rearmament programme is the greatest public works programme ever devised in time of formal peace. Nevertheless, the rearmament boom is generally regarded as having had a beneficial effect on the level of economic activity, especially during the minor slump of 1937-8. According to the author, no great speed for the general tenor of the programme was gradual, limited by the belief of the government that financial and economic risks were more dangerous than military uncertainties, and were likely to be accentuated by increased public expenditure. The major advantage of rearmament over an alternative public works strategy based on the construction industry appears to have been its strong linkages to the staple industries and, through this, to the depressed regions.

The article discusses the total factor productivity growth in Great Britain after 1870. The confusion over which industries witnessed entrepreneurial shortcomings remained until the use by new economic historians of geometric and arithmetic total factor productivity indexes to test directly Aldcroft's hypothesis that Britain's rate of technical progress was inferior to that of America or Germany. Productivity indexes measure output per unit input. Unlike partial productivity indexes, principally the output-labor ratio, total factor productivity indexes measure the rate of growth of output not accounted for by the growth of all factor inputs. After subtracting the rate of growth of weighted factor inputs from the rate of growth of output, what is left unexplained is labelled technical change or productivity. In this case, the index is a residual and, more properly, has been called a measure of our ignorance. By comparing total factor productivity growth in Britain after 1870 with best practice American efficiency growth, both lagging British productivity and the entrepreneurial failure thesis were subjected to an unambiguous test.

The article outlines a transition from active intervention to a more passive response by the British Government in its grain market of the seventeenth century. It is often easier to assess the reasons for government action than for government inaction, since action is frequently accompanied by justifications whilst inaction is cloaked in documentary silence. Much has always had to be inferred, but some inferences are perhaps more soundly based than others. It is wrong to think that the Privy Council was losing faith in intervention before the end of the sixteenth century; the early 1630s saw the most intensive (and last) attempt to intervene comprehensively. Nor, possibly, can one argue that the subsequent disappearance of the old-style dearth program can be explained in terms of the disappearance of the Privy Council. An opportunity for the latter to intervene was presented in 1637/8, before its abolition, and small executive councils never totally disappeared. There is not very convincing evidence for the view that changes in London's needs and role influenced directly the timing of the policy changes.

The article focuses on typologies and evidence that serve as a guide to economic growth in Europe during the nineteenth century. There has also been increased reliance on comparative methods by historians seeking to achieve a cross-fertilization of explanatory ideas. For both purposes it is desirable, for the first purpose essential, that any historical generalizations called into aid should be not only true of several particular instances but also should be very widely applicable. It could be harmfully misleading if what looked to be proclamations of universal relationships turned out to be no more than accounts of one or two highly individual cases, disguised in the language of generality. All the chief schemes expounding alleged universalities in the history of economic growth have received plenty of criticism, both appreciative and hostile, but it is doubtful whether they have often been starkly confronted by the question whether the evidence they use is comprehensive enough to provide a secure foundation of genuine history for edifices as vast as they have grown to be. They have been challenged on grounds of unclarity or inappropriateness in their basic concepts, or because they have been inaccurate on some specific points, or because some particular case may be more convincingly interpreted by postulating a different chain of causation.

The article measures the effect of public finance during the period 1793-1815 on the rate and direction of Great Britain's economic development. It explores the country's involvement in war during the period. One aspect of the war which has intermittently attracted economists" attention from the time of the "bullionist" controversy is the effect of the expedients that were adopted in the field of public finance. The article describes the sources of data which economic historian can use to be able to fairly measure the effect of the country's finance on the rate and direction of economic growth. An analysis on the economic indicators during the period is presented.

The object of this article is to demonstrate that economic analysis used in conjunction with the data employed by researcher R.B. Sheridan yields the conclusion that the possession of the British West Indies actually had the effect of retarding the growth of Great Britain. Sheridan contends that the West Indies in general, and Jamaica in particular, yielded an economic surplus, which contributed in no small way to the growth of the metropolitan economy. In the course of his argument, Sheridan constructs an estimate of the wealth of Jamaica during the 1770's and expands it to include all the British West India sugar colonies. Sheridan's argument contains two types of error that, when corrected, vitiate his conclusion. One type of error, an error of measurement, occurs both in his attempt to measure the wealth of Jamaica and in his acceptance of an estimate of income generated by this wealth. The more serious mistake, however, is an analytical error. Sheridan implicitly considers the extensive growth of the sugar colonies as a measure of their contribution to the economic growth of the mother country.

The article compares the responses of handloom weavers to Chartism in Great Britain. The response of the working classes to the Chartist Movement of the 1830's and 1840's has perhaps too often been seen in the light of revolt against economic distress. It has been assumed that poorly paid and ill-fed workers, struggling under the pressure of the new industrial capitalists or, in the handwork trades, against the competition of machinery, saw in Chartism the opportunity to improve their economic condition and therefore gave it their wholehearted support. To a large extent this is undoubtedly true, since there is considerable correlation, during the relevant period, between economic distress and radical activity. Certainly individual Chartists and neo-Chartists encouraged their listeners at public meetings by suggesting that the attainment of the "People's Charter" would revolutionize the existing society and ensure that the labouring man obtained his due. But this is not the whole story, for many groups in dire economic distress ignored the movement.