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Water quality policy for agricultural lands seeks to improve water quality by changing farmer behavior. We investigate farmer behavior in three water quality regimes that differ by rule structure to examine the fit and interplay of each policy within its social-ecological context, important aspects for improving water quality. Vermont, USA's practice-based policy requires the adoption of specific practices, whereas New Zealand's Lake Taupo and Lake Rotorua performance-based policies require farmers to meet a numeric limit for nutrient loss on their farm. Across the three regions we interviewed 38 farmers to elicit mental models of nutrient management changes. We utilized the social-ecological systems (SES) framework to guide mental model elicitation, drawing on farmers' perceptions of the SES to identify salient aspects for behavior. Mental models were grouped by region and analyzed using network analysis. Farmers in all regions self-report high levels of behavior change and cite the policies as key drivers of behavior. This suggests that each policy fits in that it is achieving desired behavior change. However, different behavioral patterns emerged across the regions that we hypothesize have implications for biophysical fit: structural changes dominate in Vermont (e.g., buffers) and system changes in Taupo (e.g., switch from dairy support to beef cattle). The interplay of the policy in each setting, such as with incentive programs in Vermont and a market for nitrogen in Taupo, contributed to the different behavioral patterns. Additionally, access to capital in some form is required for farmers to achieve changes associated with higher biophysical fit. The social fit of the policies also varied, evidenced by dramatic upheaval in Taupo to mostly neutral perceptions of the policy in Vermont. We conclude that regions considering a shift to water quality rules for farms should carefully consider behavioral dynamics in policy design to achieve water quality goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on several aspects of sustainably managing freshwater resources. It mentions that the involvement in monitoring has increased wider community awareness of condition of local fresh waters and decision-making processes for freshwater management. It also mentions need for enduring relationships between local government and Māori.

Deliberating on policy design to manage natural resources with clarity and precision is a difficult task, even for professional and highly experienced policy practitioners. These difficulties are exacerbated by confounding the crafting of policy instruments to change resource use (a behavioral matter related to resource management) with the consequential issue of who bears the cost of changing resource use (an equity matter). The confounding of behavioral and equity issues is not surprising because equity is commonly suggested as a criterion in the literature on policy instrument choice, and inequity in access to resources may also be one of the initial drivers of policy intervention. Here, we restate the microeconomic analysis of "open access" resources and highlight the fundamental difference between efficiency (including allocative inefficiency) and equity that emerges from that analysis. We then discuss the implications of this difference for the choice of policy instruments to resolve problems in natural resource management, at least for instruments that entail changing the behavior of primary producers. This discussion is centered on three key decisions for formulating policy: (1) choosing the preferred portfolio of uses for a natural resource, (2) choosing a policy instrument to change that portfolio, and (3) choosing a mechanism to distribute the costs of change fairly. To illustrate how these decisions may play out in a real-world example, we apply the decisions to a freshwater policy process in New Zealand. By articulating the distinction, microeconomics draws distinctions between efficiency and equity as policy objectives. Linking that distinction with the Tinbergen's principle regarding the matching of instruments to objectives, we aim to reduce the conflation of the decision-making criteria employed in policy formulation decisions. In doing so, we hope to assist policy makers to avoid policy failure by reducing the potential for the influence of self-interested parties, or concern about their welfare, to introduce process failures into the policy formulation and decision-making stages of the policy cycle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]