Search

This paper models the effects of economic incentives on woodland planting on UK farmland, and the spatially-varying impacts on three avian species. The economic model uses an agent-based approach: "farmers" in each parcel compare economic returns from keeping their current agricultural land use with the economic incentive for woodland planting. An ecological model then predicts the effects of both parcel-level and local landscape-level woodland cover on species distributions. We compare results from two case study areas which vary in terms of the spatial correlation of opportunity costs and ecological potential. As the per-hectare value of the subsidy for woodland planting is increased, the values of our biodiversity indicator increase, but at rates which vary by case study area and by species. The cost-effectiveness of the economic instrument varies according to the sign of the spatial correlation between opportunity costs and ecological potential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Benefit distribution in Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) and REDD+ involves the disbursement of cash or in-kind incentives to local participants that opt to manage their land in ways that increase or maintain ecosystem service provision. For decades, existing benefit distribution approaches have been debated by academics, and presented challenges for conservation practitioners. In passing through long chains of project actors, payments incur high transaction costs and are susceptible to elite capture and corruption. A new type of financial technology (FinTech) – ‘mobile money’ – could offer a novel and available solution to these challenges, at what is now a critical stage in PES and REDD+ implementation. Mobile payments (made via cell phones) have been used successfully in development projects related to micro-credit, micro-insurance, and aid relief, and this commentary considers their possible advantages and drawbacks for PES/REDD+ schemes. Several countries e.g. Cambodia, China, Tanzania, and the Philippines demonstrate both high PES/REDD+ uptake, and high mobile money penetration. In certain circumstances benefit distribution via FinTech may lower transaction costs, enable higher frequency payments, and provide new socioeconomic benefits. It could also improve the privacy, transparency, traceability, and security of disbursements, contributing to more efficient and equitable PES and REDD+ schemes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes and analyzes three policy instruments which can be used to enhance farmers' compliance with individual water allocations in a decentralized management context. Three regulation strategies are proposed for the case of groundwater allocations for irrigation: the first relies on economic instruments; the second is based on tools designed to promote pro-social behaviors; and the third combines assumptions from the first two approaches. They are evaluated through 16 scenario workshops involving 124 stakeholders and farmers in five French groundwater basins. Stakeholders' perceptions are analyzed, disentangling the ethical, economic, institutional, social and technical perspectives underlying the stakeholders' arguments for or against the proposed instruments for groundwater-use regulation. The analysis reveals a preference for the strategy that combines economic and social incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to advance our understanding of the extent to which the use of economic incentives can undermine (“crowd out”) or reinforce (“crowd in”) people's intrinsic motivations to engage in biodiversity and ecosystem conservation. We first synthesize and classify the psychological mechanisms behind motivation crowding effects. Then we conduct a systematic review of empirical studies that test for motivation crowding effects triggered by economic incentives to encourage nature conservation. Based on eighteen empirical studies, we identify evidence of motivation crowding out and, to a lesser extent, crowding in effects. Finally, we discuss the implications for environmental policy and research. We note that the limited comparability of results across studies, the lack of baseline information about pre-existing intrinsic motivations, and a complexity stemming from cultural and contextual heterogeneity appear to be the main challenges when it comes to establishing more conclusive evidence. We conclude that, as economic instruments for conservation are increasingly being used worldwide, it is crucial to assess existing intrinsic motivations and expected changes in people's motivational structures prior to large-scale implementation. We call for caution with economic incentives in situations involving considerable uncertainty regarding the detrimental impacts on intrinsic motivation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Small-scale farmers face numerous challenges to invest in natural resource management practices. The problems are interlinked, with such perverse economic problems as high transaction costs and risk rooted in the lack of comprehensive institutional and organizational services to farmers for risk reduction and incentive creation. Failure to address such a missing link undermines success in natural resource management. This paper ponders the importance of such a missing link and proposes analytic framework that explicitly integrates the economics of natural resource management into institutional and organizational analysis. The framework features the instrumentality of integrated institutional and organizational innovation to create opportunities and incentives to small-scale farmers to encourage investment in natural resource management practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Agricultural landscapes hold tremendous potential for producing a diverse stream of ecosystem services. Yet, because the spatial configuration of particular ecosystems is critical to the supply of many services, realizing this potential requires that farms be managed in a coordinated way across landscapes rather than as independent units. Under existing incentive programs, this level of coordination is typically neither required nor encouraged. Here we explore how to achieve such coordination from an institutional perspective using voluntary incentives rather than regulation. We focus on three services operating at contrasting scales, from local to global: pollination, hydrologic services, and carbon sequestration. First, we briefly illustrate how agricultural practices can diminish or enhance their provision. Next, we show how all three services require coordinated, landscape-scale management because provision depends upon particular spatial configurations, of which we provide several stylized examples. Finally, based on these stylized configurations, we evaluate the relative merits of three incentive designs–the “cooperation bonus,” the “entrepreneur,” and the “ecosystem service district”–to promote cross-farm cooperation to enhance service provision. All three incentive systems rely on rational self-interest, have cooperative configurations to promote ecosystem services across different scales, use tiered reward systems, and have a major voluntary element. They are distinct in certain key features. The cooperation bonus system rewards conservation even without cooperation but adds a bonus for cooperation. In the entrepreneur incentive, all tiers of reward are contingent upon cooperation. The ecosystem service district scheme is only partially voluntary and forces cooperation of all landowners once the district is formed. Our analysis of these heuristic alternatives integrates biophysical, economic, and institutional factors with the aim of addressing the suite of institutional barriers for landscape-scale management. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The Kyoto Protocol represents an initial step in terms of solving the problem of global climate change. However, as with most first steps, the Kyoto Protocol must be followed by a full journey in order to reach the desired goal of preventing catastrophic global warming. The Kyoto Protocol does not lead to the necessary decline in the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, particularly because emissions of developing countries are not specifically addressed in the Protocol. We suggest a new agreement based on carbon taxes as a possibility to build upon the Kyoto Protocol and eventually freeze atmospheric concentrations at a level that prevents catastrophic climate change. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Biodiversity Offsets (BO) and Payments for Environmental Services (PES) are sometimes used interchangeably to characterize innovative economic tools to conserve or restore biodiversity, ecosystems, or their services. We assume that a confusion between PES and BO can have negative implications for biodiversity conservation. In this paper, we argue that these two tools follow different targets and have different founding principles, and thus, their basic mode of functioning would only coincide under special circumstances and institutional contexts. Here, we propose a new definition of BO, delimiting them more clearly from PES, and use practical examples to underscore conceptual differences. Both tools require specific policy framework conditions, in terms of rights, responsibilities, and enforcement. If unmet, however, the implications for biodiversity conservation outcomes are stronger for BO than for PES since BO are explicitly linked to biodiversity losses, while PES typically are not. PES experiences can certainly inform BO implementation vis-à-vis contract design and enforcement, but these PES lessons need to be enacted vis-à-vis BO specific requirements, in order not to underestimate generic risks in their implementation: if a PES scheme fails, payments can be stopped; if a BO fails, biodiversity losses remain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]