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Recent academic endeavours have questioned whether the rapidly unfolding Payments for Environmental Services (PES) may have profound influence on land tenure which would in turn impact the conservation efficacy of PES. This paper developed a game-theory model in the context of rural China, which describes the endogenous formation of land rights as a bargaining process between ordinary villagers and village leaders. This model gave rise to theoretical predictions pertaining to the implications of two PES schemes in China for land tenure, namely the Sloping Land Conversion Programme (SLCP) and the Ecological Public-Benefit Forest Compensation Programme (EPBFCP). The theoretical predictions were tested using primary data collected through large-scale field surveys. These data were analysed using the Propensity Score Matching method and panel data models. Both the theoretical analysis and the empirical results find that the SLCP has likely enhanced land tenure security by increasing the bargaining costs of village leaders' attempts to reallocate SLCP lands to other households. On the other hand, villagers tend to have less motivation to de-collectivise those forest lands enrolled in the EPBFCP, which somewhat stands in the way of the country's agenda to further de-collectivise communal forests and allocate them to individual households. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Firms investing in environmental issues often suffer from increased operating costs and reduced profits. Therefore, rigorous environmental legislation is required to motivate firms to conduct more green innovations. This paper takes the promulgation of China's New Environmental Protection Law as an ideal quasi-natural experiment to investigate the effect of rigorous environmental legislation on corporate green innovations. By reconsolidating the "compensation effect" and the "crowding-out effect", we find that China's New Environmental Protection Law promotes the quantity of corporate green innovations, but inhibits the quality of green innovations. The potential mechanisms regarding green innovation quantity and quality are strikingly different. China's New Environmental Protection Law promotes green innovation quantity mainly through alleviating government favoritisms and increasing the risk of environmental litigations. However, since high-quality innovations require higher investment costs and greater tolerance for failure, China's New Environmental Protection Law also tightens financing constraints and exacerbates managerial myopia, which crowds out high-quality green innovations. Moreover, China's New Environmental Protection Law causes short-term corporate performance losses, but it indeed promotes environmental performances. Our results are crucial to comprehensively understand the effectiveness of environmental legislation and provide policy inspirations for the government concerning the environment. • Based on China's New Environmental Protection Law, we test the effect of environmental legislation on quantity and quality of green innovations. • The law promotes the quantity of corporate green innovations, but inhibits the quality of green innovations. • The law promotes the quantity of corporate green innovations by alleviating government favoritisms and increasing environmental litigation risks. • The law inhibits the quality of green innovations by tightening financing constraints and exacerbating managerial myopia. • The law causes short-term corporate performance losses, but it indeed promotes environmental performances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Firms investing in environmental issues often suffer from increased operating costs and reduced profits. Therefore, rigorous environmental legislation is required to motivate firms to conduct more green innovations. This paper takes the promulgation of China's New Environmental Protection Law as an ideal quasi-natural experiment to investigate the effect of rigorous environmental legislation on corporate green innovations. By reconsolidating the "compensation effect" and the "crowding-out effect", we find that China's New Environmental Protection Law promotes the quantity of corporate green innovations, but inhibits the quality of green innovations. The potential mechanisms regarding green innovation quantity and quality are strikingly different. China's New Environmental Protection Law promotes green innovation quantity mainly through alleviating government favoritisms and increasing the risk of environmental litigations. However, since high-quality innovations require higher investment costs and greater tolerance for failure, China's New Environmental Protection Law also tightens financing constraints and exacerbates managerial myopia, which crowds out high-quality green innovations. Moreover, China's New Environmental Protection Law causes short-term corporate performance losses, but it indeed promotes environmental performances. Our results are crucial to comprehensively understand the effectiveness of environmental legislation and provide policy inspirations for the government concerning the environment. • Based on China's New Environmental Protection Law, we test the effect of environmental legislation on quantity and quality of green innovations. • The law promotes the quantity of corporate green innovations, but inhibits the quality of green innovations. • The law promotes the quantity of corporate green innovations by alleviating government favoritisms and increasing environmental litigation risks. • The law inhibits the quality of green innovations by tightening financing constraints and exacerbating managerial myopia. • The law causes short-term corporate performance losses, but it indeed promotes environmental performances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1980s Chinese economic reform has greatly accelerated its economic growth while in contrast China's environment is increasingly degraded. The Chinese government has recognized that environmental protection and sustainable economic development can promote mutual and sustainable co-development of the economy and the environment as a basic national principle. This paper examines the interactions between economic development and environmental change in China that were compared and analyzed for the years 1996 and 2000. Net primary production (NPP) was selected as a proxy evaluator of ecosystems and gross domestic product (GDP) was chosen as a proxy evaluator of economic development. An NPP change map was produced with Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) summed annual NPP imagery products. The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program's Operational Linescan System (DMSP/OLS) nighttime imagery was used to produce a Chinese GDP change map. An integrated map was produced to exhibit the combined changes of NPP and GDP. This map showed that in the regions with increased GDP, NPP decreased but the regions with no GDP change were smaller in area for NPP increase while larger in area for NPP decrease. The changing pattern of NPP varied with the developing level of GDP at province level. A province's development of GDP is controlled by its accessibility to natural resources. Interactions between NPP and GDP are greatly affected by factors of spatial location aside from human factors and natural systems'' characteristics. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Promotion is an overwhelming motivation for local cadres in China. In the past, local cadres used to compete in economic tournaments for career advancement. As the central government shifts to emphasizing environmental protection, it is critical to examine whether the changed incentive structure drives local cadres to pursue environmental protection. Adopting a database covering cadres and pollution discharge for prefecture-level cities from 2003 to 2016, this paper investigates the relationship between environmental protection tournaments and cadre promotion and explores the mechanism of environmental protection tournaments. The results show that environmental protection tournaments have contributed to cadres' promotion since 2007, when the central government's attention shifted to environmental protection. Environmental protection tournaments mitigate pollution in a "strong" way, through direct policy intervention. Our findings indicate that the existing incentive structure for local cadres' environmental protection is necessary but insufficient. • Political incentive promotes local cadres to conduct environmental protection tournament. • Local cadres strategically implement environmental protection policy. • Environmental protection tournament mitigates pollution by coercive means instead of adopting optimization of industry structure and innovation of technology. • Existed incentive structure for cadres' environmental performance is necessary but insufficient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]