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To motivate public participation in climate change mitigation, both "carrot" policies that create positive incentives for mitigated carbon and "stick" policies that create negative incentives for emitted carbon have been widely applied. Given the joint deployment of these measures, a key question is whether they are compatible with each other. Focusing on the Low-Carbon Reward Scheme (LCRS) and carbon taxes, two prominent proposals on China's climate policy agenda, this study evaluates how one incentive policy affects public support for the other. The results of a large survey experiment with Hangzhou residents indicate a two-way crowding-out effect, wherein introducing the LCRS diminished support for the tax, albeit primarily among LCRS proponents, and introducing the tax reduced support for the LCRS. Aligning with the proposed account, crowding out was driven by a decrease in policy effectiveness and fairness perceptions. These findings reveal a contradictory relationship between carrot and stick policies at the citizen level and illuminate the underlying mechanism. • Both carrot and stick policies are applied to motivate climate mitigation behaviors. • We identify a two-way crowding-out effect between these policies in public opinion. • Introducing a stick (carbon tax) reduces support for a carrot (low-carbon reward). • Introducing a carrot reduces support for a stick among people favoring the carrot. • Crowding out is driven by weakened policy effectiveness and fairness perceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The IPCC's 6th assessment report (AR6) has provided a wide range of variables and scenarios that meet climate targets of varying ambition. Many variables reported in the AR6 affect human welfare through climate change and mitigation, including but not limited to economic output, the natural environment, human health, and food and energy supply. In some of these dimensions, trade-offs exist between better performance in welfare-relevant dimensions and reaching more ambitious climate targets. Here, we apply recent advances in the theoretical multidimensional measurement of welfare, like the Human Development Index, to the AR6 database. The welfare metric is based on a welfare function approach, simple to apply, and intuitive. We apply a range of specifications of the welfare metric, aiming to derive robust rankings of climate policy targets that perform best in terms of the multidimensional welfare index. Across a large range of weights on welfare-relevant variables, we find that lower temperature is associated with higher welfare in 2100 unless there is a high weight on food supply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores how rising economic costs of climate mitigation policies differentially shape climate policy support among the political left and right. To this end, we randomly manipulate how much consumption costs increase as a result of four different climate mitigation policies and study how different cost scenarios influence policy support among a sample of 1,597 Swedish adults. We find that more costly climate policies induce greater climate policy polarization, since right-leaning participants display both lower baseline and more cost-sensitive climate policy support. In addition, we investigate how policy costs affect participants' concerns about the climatic consequences of consumption. While inconclusive, the results indicate that right-leaning participants, in some instances, display less concern about the climatic consequences of consumption when policy costs rise. This pattern can be understood through the lens of motivated disbelief, which holds that people adjust their beliefs in order to support their preferred actions. The present study provides novel insights as to how and when material conditions influence climate policy preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Energy efficiency measures are a key element in the fight against climate change. However, their effectiveness is threatened by so-called rebound effects—behavioral changes that lead to increased use and thus to lower-than-expected absolute savings. The moral licensing bias might cause rebound effects on the individual level: When people implement energy efficiency measures, they may feel that they have done something good for the climate and thus license themselves to less climate-friendly behavior later on. We test this prediction with three pre-registered experiments (total n = 2315). While our manipulated efficiency does increase the feeling of having done something good for the climate, no negative effects emerge on subsequent climate-friendly behavior—contrary to the predictions derived from the moral licensing literature. Climate-friendly behavior is thus not hampered by prior energy efficiency behavior; rather, demographics (women and older people act in a more climate-friendly manner) and environmental attitude determine it. Our results imply that the literature suggesting moral licensing is probably not transferable to the field of energy efficiency, and thus moral licensing may not lead to rebound effects in this context. We discuss possible explanations, implications for climate policy making, and needs for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is argued that the political feasibility of climate mitigation policies depends heavily on their distributional effects. This paper therefore studies the distributional effects of the European Commission's Fit-for-55 package at the household level in seven EU countries, analyzing a carbon tax on transport and heating fuels as well as variations of a lump-sum refund. Based on the resulting income distributions, different inequality measures are computed. The paper aims to extend previous methodological approaches by including inequality measures such as the Theil index and Atkinson index and comparing the results of carbon taxes on transport and heating fuels for seven EU countries in a consistent manner. I find that a household-size specific lump-sum refund not only mitigates the negative distributional effects of a carbon tax but also reduces overall inequality compared to the baseline scenario without a tax. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]