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The Andalusian olive grove in South Spain is employed as a case study to assess the environmental and economic effects of the green architecture (eco-schemes) of the Common Agricultural Policy in relation to low carbon agriculture under different soil management policy scenarios to support more efficient agri-environmental policy making. To do so, we adopted a multidisciplinary approach in which we used: (i) an integrated modelling framework comprising geographic information systems (GIS); (ii) the RothC model; and (iii) a cost-benefit analysis. Results show that eco-schemes provide a significant increase of soil organic carbon (SOC) relative to cross-compliance. Practices involving vegetation covers are more efficient than using pruning residues as mulching. SOC accumulation increases rapidly in the first five-ten years to slow down afterwards. The cost-benefit ratios of eco-schemes policy implementation are higher than one when only SOC is considered. Nonetheless, the inclusion of additional co-benefits has the potential to invert this scenario and enhance policy efficacy. Various insights on optimizing the design and application of eco-scheme efficiency are provided. • The new eco-schemes CAP instrument proposed for woody crops contribute to increase SOC • Mowing cover crops leads to the highest SOC stocks, whereas pruning debris maintains SOC stocks. • Tillage and no-tillage with bare soil systems lead to a significant depletion of SOC stocks. • The economic benefits of eco-schemes would not off-set the costs borne by public authority • Environmental externalities are key to reach the profitability of the policy instruments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An efficient climate policy is based on cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and equates marginal abatement costs across all forcing agents affecting climate change. In CBA, the agents' contributions to radiative forcing (RF) must be consistently priced (i.e. the social cost of RF, occurring at a specific time, must be the same regardless of the agent causing it). We present a concept that enables doing so. The Social Cost of Forcing (SCF) is the monetary value of the social damage caused by marginal RF at a given instant (Wm − 2 ). Any forcing agent whose temporal decay profile and radiative efficiency are known can be priced based on it. Prices obtained for distinct agents are consistent in CBA, as long as the same SCF and discounting assumptions are applied. Hence, the SCF is a concise way to communicate social cost information: mutually consistent prices for any set of forcing agents can be obtained based on a single Integrated Assessment Model output, the SCF. We explain the theoretical foundations of the concept and illustrate its practical applications with two examples: (1) we derive SCF-based prices for CO 2 and CH 4 , and (2) we estimate the social cost of albedo changes in a boreal forest stand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In cost-benefit analysis of climate policy there are two main approaches to discounting, each with implications conflicting with our moral intuitions. Thus, discounted utilitarianism implies that we hardly need to protect future generations against climate change, while classical utilitarianism implies that we should reduce our consumption across the board to benefit future generations. The insolubility of the debate derives from the fact that both classical and discounted utilitarianism permit only a single discount rate for all consequences occurring in the same future year, while our intuitions clearly do distinguish between consequences, depending on whether we cause adverse effects on other people's interests and violate their rights. Most people share the moral intuition that we ought to refrain from harming others, and ought to compensate them if we were unable to prevent harm. To regain a reflective equilibrium between such deontological intuitions and economic theory there is a need to accept different discount rates for different situations: a zero consumption discount rate in the case of cost-benefit analysis of measures to prevent wrongful harm to future generations, and standard discounting in all other cases. Applying a zero consumption discount rate means that future generations are automatically largely compensated for climate damage that remains unmitigated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]