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To motivate public participation in climate change mitigation, both "carrot" policies that create positive incentives for mitigated carbon and "stick" policies that create negative incentives for emitted carbon have been widely applied. Given the joint deployment of these measures, a key question is whether they are compatible with each other. Focusing on the Low-Carbon Reward Scheme (LCRS) and carbon taxes, two prominent proposals on China's climate policy agenda, this study evaluates how one incentive policy affects public support for the other. The results of a large survey experiment with Hangzhou residents indicate a two-way crowding-out effect, wherein introducing the LCRS diminished support for the tax, albeit primarily among LCRS proponents, and introducing the tax reduced support for the LCRS. Aligning with the proposed account, crowding out was driven by a decrease in policy effectiveness and fairness perceptions. These findings reveal a contradictory relationship between carrot and stick policies at the citizen level and illuminate the underlying mechanism. • Both carrot and stick policies are applied to motivate climate mitigation behaviors. • We identify a two-way crowding-out effect between these policies in public opinion. • Introducing a stick (carbon tax) reduces support for a carrot (low-carbon reward). • Introducing a carrot reduces support for a stick among people favoring the carrot. • Crowding out is driven by weakened policy effectiveness and fairness perceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ambitious goals to limit global warming can only be reached with a broad acceptance and participation of the general public. This paper relies on surveys among citizens in China, Germany and the U.S. and investigates the determinants of the acceptance of national and international adaptation and mitigation efforts. The empirical findings indicate that specific beliefs and environmental awareness are important drivers in all three countries, while political attitudes and socio-economic characteristics are the main sources of cross-country heterogeneity. The study thereby points at important starting points and target groups for raising the acceptance of national and international climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) forest projects are perceived as an attractive way to both help mitigate climate change and transfer income to rural poor. However, to engender participation of small-scale producers, a CDM forest project must offer sufficient incentives, while minimizing their costs of participation, all the while respecting the need for additionality. Property rights, social capital and contractual rules are critical in the success of CDM forest projects. In this paper, we ask what factors affect participation in the world's first CDM project, established in Guangxi Province, China. Using village-level surveys, we find that although the project facilitates participation through carbon pooling and a share-holding system, much of the project land remains unforested. We find that the primary reasons for the unforested regions are constrained contractual rules, property rights allocation disputes and low levels of social capital in some villages. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]