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Commentators of Plato tend to assume that the philosopher changed his perception of rhetoric over time. Generally, such commentators focus on the critiques against rhetoric in the Gorgias and the claim of a philosophical rhetoric in the Phaedrus to display a fundamental discontinuity in Plato’s treatment of rhetoric. In contrast, I aim to demonstrate a fundamental continuity of Plato’s considerations on rhetoric, supplanting the textual evidence commonly analyzed in this debate with some passages from the Apology, Symposium, and Laws. Both in an early dialogue, such as the Apology, and in a much later one, such as the Laws, the same procedure is at work: a careful distinction between genuine rhetoric and its counterfeits. If rhetoric allies itself with philosophy, turns into a τέχνη, and is guided by the truth and the good, Plato embraces it. On the other hand, if rhetoric rejects this alignment, foundation, and orientation, it is condemned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the experience of coordinating an academic writing workshops program, this text explores a way of conceptualizing how impurity reverberates in academic writing from the transformation of the political landscape in higher education in the last decade in Brazil. By interweaving Michel Foucault’s interviews with Eduardo Coutinho’s documentary Jogo de Cena, we aim to investigate the contours of academic writing experience through the enchantment of words introduced by the genre essay, which introduces fictional effects, reverberates an imagery of uncertainty, and calls into question the notion of truth, reality, and subject. As a matter in suspension, always changing, it is impossible to inscribe the movement of transformation in the form of the order of discourses, unless a way of impurely living writing is created, capable of capturing the incorporation of voices and versions that are always others, and in constant process of variation and change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the course “The hermeneutics of the subject”, Michel Foucault proposes a reflection on two conceptions of philosophy that found their anchor points in the figures of Socrates and Descartes, respectively. On the one hand, the “care of the self”, which sees the philosophical exercise as a way of life that articulates the epistemic, ethical, political and aesthetical dimensions as a constant construction of self; on the other hand, the “self-knowledge”, that circumscribes philosophy to the epistemic character of a search of the truth of the subject. The comparison and the contrast of these two ways of looking at philosophy, the subject and the truth, are energized by questions that start from the present time, to which Foucault belongs, and in front of which he stands when defending a “critical philosophy” of the present that promotes the creation of new forms of individual and collective existence capable of changing ourselves, modern subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the very concept of contemporary aesthetics out from two authors who, although coming from different philosophical traditions, converge on the radical exhaustion of the theoretical and artistic framework that based the traditional philosophical reflection about art and the need to reform it: Adorno and Badiou. In a comparative effort, therefore, we will present the concept, the challenges and the potentialities of contemporary aesthetics in both authors. Special attention will be given to the systematic and architectural function of the discipline within the broader framework of their philosophy, especially as regards the constellation formed by the terms thinking, art and truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main goal of this article is to interrogate how Foucault retakes the problem of the historic constitution of psychiatry on Discipline and Punish (1975). We intend to understand the ways this problem is thought by the author since de publication of History of Madness (1961), recurring particularly to the courses at Collège de France. Therefore, we intend to show how the theoretical-methodological project of Discipline and Punish constitutes itself from a severe self-criticism concerning History of Madness (1961). Along this process of self-criticism, the historical constitution of Psychiatry is retaken in such a way that we can comprehend how much Psychiatry itself, which, at the beginning of the 19st century, was restricted to the treatment of madmen in the interior of the psychiatric hospital, becomes during that century the discourse that establishes to all society the distinction between the normal and the pathologic. Alongside with Criminology and Criminal Law, psychiatric [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Em diversas ocasiões, Leibniz recorre à autoridade de Aristóteles a fim de roborar sua tese da verdade como inerência do predicado ao sujeito da proposição. Não é, contudo, evidente em que medida a filosofia aristotélica poderia oferecer amparo a essa reivindicação. Afinal, a Aristóteles tradicionalmente se atribui uma concepção de verdade diferente, consistente em uma relação de correspondência entre a proposição e a realidade que ela se destina a descrever. Sem discutir a conhecida tese da verdade como correspondência, este trabalho é dedicado a investigar em que medida os escritos de Aristóteles permitem que Leibniz respalde neles as suas afirmações. Para tanto, a presente investigação estará focada nos Primeiros e os Segundos Analíticos, obras em que Aristóteles expõe sua teoria do raciocínio e da demonstração. Visa-se averiguar se, e sob que condições, a noção de inerência ali mobilizada pode ser assimilada à noção leibniziana de inerência. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Não há, para Leibniz, separação entre uma esfera ética, na qual seriam consideradas as ações voluntárias dos homens e sua busca pelo bem, e uma esfera epistemológica, pela qual se explicaria a busca pela verdade. Partindo aqui deste pressuposto, procuramos mostrar, primeiro, em que sentido se pode dizer que o conhecimento é uma ação voluntária; e, segundo, como a ação moral só é verdadeiramente livre se fundamentada no conhecimento do verdadeiro. Por isso o modelo de homem livre é o homem sábio. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]