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Consider a situation in which individuals –the buyers –have different valuations for the products of a given set. An envy-free assignment of product items to buyers requires that the items obtained by every buyer be purchased at a price not larger than his/her valuation, and each buyer's welfare (difference between product value and price) be the largest possible. Under this condition, the problem of finding prices maximizing the seller's revenue is known to be APX -hard even for unit-demand bidders (with several other inapproximability results for different variants), that is, when each buyer wishes to buy at most one item. Here, we focus on Envy-free Complete Allocation , the special case where a fixed number of copies of each product is available, each of the n buyers must get exactly one product item, and all the products must be sold. This case is known to be solvable in O (n 4) time. We revisit a series of results on this problem and, answering a question found in Leonard (1983), show how to solve it in O (n 3) time by connections to perfect matchings and shortest paths. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce Shortest Connection Game , a two-player game played on a directed graph with edge costs. Given two designated vertices in which the players start, the players take turns in choosing edges emanating from the vertex they are currently located at. This way, each of the players forms a path that origins from its respective starting vertex. The game ends as soon as the two paths meet, i.e., a connection between the players is established. Each player has to carry the cost of its chosen edges and thus aims at minimizing its own total cost. In this work we analyse the computational complexity of Shortest Connection Game . On the negative side, Shortest Connection Game turns out to be computationally hard even on restricted graph classes such as bipartite, acyclic and cactus graphs. On the positive side, we can give a polynomial time algorithm for cactus graphs when the game is restricted to simple paths. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this work we address a game theoretic variant of the shortest path problem, in which two decision makers (players) move together along the edges of a graph from a given starting vertex to a given destination. The two players take turns in deciding in each vertex which edge to traverse next. The decider in each vertex also has to pay the cost of the chosen edge. We want to determine the path where each player minimizes its costs taking into account that also the other player acts in a selfish and rational way. Such a solution is a subgame perfect equilibrium and can be determined by backward induction in the game tree of the associated finite game in extensive form. We show that the decision problem associated with such a path is PSPACE-complete even for bipartite graphs both for the directed and the undirected version. The latter result is a surprising deviation from the complexity status of the closely related game Geography . On the other hand, we can give polynomial time algorithms for directed acyclic graphs and for cactus graphs even in the undirected case. The latter is based on a decomposition of the graph into components and their resolution by a number of fairly involved dynamic programming arrays. Finally, we give some arguments about closing the gap of the complexity status for graphs of bounded treewidth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]