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This article analyses changes in diplomatic practices brought by twenty-first century communications technologies. There exists a close relationship between communications technologies and diplomatic practices. Since the invention of the telegraph at the end of the nineteenth century, diplomacy has been conducted at a progressively faster pace. The most recent technological developments associated with Internet have increased the speed and reach of communications, with consequences in international politics that International Relations scholars have yet to understand. Building on existing scholarship in diplomatic studies, the analysis adopts a historical perspective on the use of technology in diplomacy, examines the impact of digitalisation on diplomatic practices, and suggests new research questions that scholars need to answer. All this shows that International Relations scholars would be well-served by looking at the transformative impact of new communications technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This analysis suggests nation branding" as a useful category for the study of international relations and international history. In the past 15 years, entrepreneurs have invented nation branding as something new and modern, and governments the world over have signed up for cost-intensive campaigns to brand their countries' images abroad. However, practices of nation branding have been around much longer. Indeed, the history of nation branding avant la lettre needs writing. That history provides a major encasement for the multitude of individual studies dedicated to soft power, public diplomacy, and cultural relations across time and space. This analysis looks first the at current experts and discourses on nation branding. Second, it sketches nation branding's emergence from the end of the early modern period to the present. Third, it suggests a number of historical examples to inspire future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1953, the Brazilian government decided to advance a plan for the demilitarisation and internationalisation of Jerusalem within a 50-kilometre radius. After consultations, the Holy See initially perceived the Brazilian initiative as agreeable. Also approached, the United States and Britain distrusted the plan, thinking they were dealing with a Papal overture. Israel suspected the Holy See to be behind the initiative and distrusted its intentions. For a few months, rumours stirred concern in the interested parties. After confusing mutual consultations, the Holy See did not really support the initiative and finally rejected and abandoned it. The fate of Brazil's plan is relevant to understand the stalemate about the fate of Jerusalem, divided by Israel and Jordan, in the early years of the Cold War. Washington and London had already abandoned efforts to solve the issue through the United Nations but were unable to produce an alternative. Although attached to the prospect of internationalisation, the Holy See did not entertain the possibility of negotiating the city's future. Brazil was making its initial foray into a more universalistic foreign policy and experimenting with different possible identities—Catholic, Western, peaceful—to substantiate its interest in making a broader contribution to international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Vietnam War exacerbated the already tense relationship between Charles de Gaulle and Lyndon B. Johnson; and Franco–American relations reached a nadir in winter 1966–1967 when de Gaulle vetoed a proposed visit to Hanoi by Jean Sainteny, a former colonial official, who Washington had desired to probe North Vietnam’s position. This analysis adds a new wrinkle to the story. Building on research for Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam (2012), the author reveals that French knowledge of only the Polish version of that peace initiative’s failure, fully blaming the Americans, further soured de Gaulle’s view of Johnson’s handling of the war and American sincerity in seeking peace. The analysis also unveils a new dimension of Henry Kissinger’s involvement in Vietnam diplomacy—prior to the Nixon White House—missing from earlier accounts. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The role of Great Powers in processes of secession and recognition has attracted increasing attention from scholars in recent years. This analysis examines how Britain rallied international opposition to the November 1983 unilateral declaration of independence [UDI] of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” [TRNC]. The British Government tried hard to prevent the UDI. Once it occurred, Britain led efforts to condemn the move. It resulted in United Nations Security Council Resolution 541, which declared the TRNC illegal and called on states not to recognise it. As well as exploring the diplomacy behind the counter-secession efforts, this examination also answers a long-standing question as to whether any countries aside from Turkey ever recognised the TRNC. It also challenges the widely held view amongst Greek Cypriots that Britain invariably supports the Turkish Cypriots on the Cyprus Problem. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Throughout the 1920s, distrust and contention marked Anglo- Soviet relations, culminating in the diplomatic break in 1927. In 1929, the incoming Labour government successfully pursued its objective of re-establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow, but the follow-up in terms of ambassadorial appointments was far from routine for either side. This analysis shows that internal pressures complicated decisions about whether to appoint career diplomats or choose political figures. Resisting both claims from enthusiastically hopeful Labour backbenchers and criticisms from the left wing media, the British foreign secretary, Arthur Henderson, chose a Russian-speaking career diplomat. On the Soviet side, the first choice was a controversial politician, but then replaced by a financial expert, albeit one tainted as a defeated political opponent of Josef Stalin. Whilst both ambassadors could be considered "professionals," neither was able to have a deep impact on the relationship, which remained troubled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In “J.M. Keynes and the Personal Politics of Reparations,” Parts I and II, published in Diplomacy and Statecraft (2014), the American historian Stephen Schuker claims that Keynes’ scientific arguments against the policy of reparations were distorted by both political passion and his emotional attachment to the German banker, Dr. Carl Melchior. He provides no evidence for this argument, and Keynes’ analytic positions emerges without reference to either. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Based on oral history accounts of surviving members of Israel[#x02019]s first International Squadron and organisers of the military airlift to Yemen in 1964, this analysis examines the origins of the squadron, its mission to Yemen, and its impact on Israeli foreign policy in Africa. The founding of the International Squadron in 1963 incorporated the Boeing 377 Stratocruiser into the Israeli air force and gave the military and Foreign Ministry the country[#x02019]s first long-distance transport capability. The initial successful military airlift to Yemen in May 1964 opened the possibility for additional clandestine military aid missions to sub-Saharan Africa and Kurdistan and marked the beginning of an era of Israeli [#x0201C]weapons diplomacy.[#x0201D] The Squadron[#x02019]s incorporation of more advanced transport planes during the 1970s presented the Foreign Ministry with the capability of reaching Latin America and Asia, an essential factor in Israel[#x02019]s expanding global arms market and later humanitarian missions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The birth of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Near East Refugees (UNRWA) in 1949 represented the culmination of two years of international diplomacy to solve the Palestinian refugee problem. The United States, Britain, and the international community not only sought an agency to take charge of refugee relief, but also envisaged a body to facilitate direct programmes for public works to wean the refugees away from aid dependency whilst also contributing to the economic productivity of host Arab nations. It was hoped this would support the refugees on a self-sustaining basis and even lead to their re-settlement and re-integration into the region. This analysis examines how and why Britain, the United States, and international bodies established UNRWA and identifies why UNRWA, by 1951, was unable to fulfil the task for which it was initially conceived. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Initially, recognition of the vital role played by regional diplomacy did not accompany NATO’s substantial commitment to economic and political development in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. Pakistan in particular had a major influence on the conduct of reconstruction efforts and NATO’s efforts to lay the institutional foundations in Afghanistan. Canada, an early and committed participant in the International Security Assistance Force, would by 2005 come to recognise the vital importance of the role of Pakistan in the outcome of the mission. However, regional limits to the influence of the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and Canada made comprehensive efforts unattainable. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

After the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, conducted a series of negotiations between Israel and its Arab adversaries, culminating in three disengagement agreements. As successful as these were, by late 1975 Kissinger’s step-by-step approach had stagnated. New approaches seemed essential to push the peace process forward. Throughout 1975, a Brookings Institution study group wrote a report on how the United States could better approach Arab–Israeli peacemaking. It recommended a comprehensive approach, aimed at solving all outstanding questions, by including all the parties within the same framework. The recommendations advocated including the Soviet Union in the peace process and that the Palestinians should represent themselves. The report was highly influential on President Jimmy Carter’s subsequent approach towards the Arab–Israeli conflict—and many of the report’s authors staffed his Administration. Carter’s perceived adaptation of the report aggrieved the Israelis, whilst for others the Brookings report served as a normative benchmark for the Carter presidency. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Arthur de la Mare, an under-secretary of state at the British Foreign Office, wrote in 1967 that the ending of the Malaysia–Indonesia Confrontation of 1963–1966 was “the greatest success of British diplomacy in East Asia in recent years.” However, historians generally believe British influence in the process to end this conflict was extremely limited, as it has been widely accepted that this conflict ended through bilateral negotiations between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. On one level, this view is accurate, but “Confrontation” took months to end and, during this process, British, American, and Malaysian officials hoped to encourage a change in leadership in Jakarta and an eventual end to the conflict. Confrontation was an anti-colonial and a regional dispute greatly affected by the Cold War environment in Southeast Asia and, therefore, not immune from international events or actors, especially the final phase of the conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This analysis takes its cue from Richard Langhorne's contribution on the continuities of diplomacy and the nature of the European Union [EU] as a diplomatic actor. It traces the institutional changes following the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, looking at the rationale for and the foreign policy roles of the president of the European Council, the High Representative, and, particularly, the European External Action Service [EEAS]. The creation of the EEAS has been especially contested, largely as a product of continuing competition amongst European institutions and the member states. The outcome, however, has been a more visible European diplomatic service that increasingly provides authoritative information to member states, many of whom have limited representation of their own. Whilst that potentially strengthens the role of the High Representative in policy-making, it still leaves many member states determined to see EU diplomacy in support of rather than as a substitute for their own. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the aftermath of the Great War, British diplomats were criticised for their earlier failure to pay due attention to international economic developments. However, as this essay reveals, in an effort to contain Germany's peaceful penetration of Ottoman Turkey after May 1906, Britain's foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was ready to commit his department's Secret Service money to the joint Anglo–French purchase of the Constantinople Quays Company. The venture proved less than profitable, and it was not, as some diplomats hoped, the precursor of a successful “industrial entente” between Britain and France in the Near East. Indeed, if anything, it highlighted the difficulties faced by diplomats in seeking to reconcile the interests of business and state in the conduct of foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Of the five diplomats who held the post of British ambassador to Berlin during the interwar period, the two-year embassy of Sir Ronald Lindsay, 1926–1928, has received least attention by historians. This article charts three main aspects of Lindsay's career in Berlin. The first of these is his relationship with the Foreign Office, which is consistently good although Treasury comments on his reports about Germany's continuing financial problems expose some of the friction within the British government about how best to deal with the German reparation problem. The second area explored by the article examines Lindsay's views on the “German question,” and suggests that the post-Locarno period did not witness a significant growth of trust between Britain, France and Germany on questions concerning international security. Finally, the article examines how Lindsay's thinking about German affairs compares to his predecessor and his successors and explores Lindsay's views about the likely trajectories of German foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Clerks employed in the Foreign Office before 1906, and in the offices of the secretaries of state before 1782, were scribes rather than advisers; often little is known about either their opinions or influence. An interesting exception is Sir David Nairne, who worked for many years for the secretaries of state in exile employed by King James II and his son, King James III. Nairne's career falls into three unequal parts: 1689–1713, when little more than a clerk carrying out the instructions of his superiors; 1713–1719, when promoted as one of James III's principal advisers; and 1719–1728, when demoted once again to a clerk, albeit with enhanced status. Yet even when one of James III's two most influential advisers, he remained primarily an assistant rather than a councillor putting forward his advice with caution. For both James II and James III, Nairne was not a civil servant in the modern sense but, rather, a domestic or household servant employed and used as circumstances demanded. For a short time, Nairne had a significant diplomatic career, but he always remained primarily a servant. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In 1898 Governor William Bradford's early history of the Plymouth Colony was returned to Massachusetts through diplomatic, and sub-diplomatic, efforts. This marked an important stage in the growing Anglo–American rapprochement. It also illustrates an early episode of cultural diplomacy, as well as of repatriation of a cultural object. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The analysis examines the origins and implementation of the Greek diplomatic initiative for multilateral co-operation amongst the Balkan states in the aftermath of the Helsinki Act of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Notwithstanding pressing domestic and security concerns,détenteand, in particular, the spirit of the CSCE process significantly influenced Greek Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis’ decision to instigate Balkan co-operation on a multilateral and not just on a bilateral level. The “Helsinki spirit” opened a window of opportunity for regional Powers from different blocs to come together. Despite its limited results, the political significance of the Athens Conference lay in the fact that it took place at all in view of Cold War realities and inter-Balkan rivalries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article reconsiders the negotiations between the United States and Britain at the outbreak of the 1982 Falklands War. The Reagan Administration did not support Britain, its staunchest NATO ally, and on the contrary assumed an even-handed position that recognised Argentina as a key ally as much as Britain. Not only did American mediation fail; it also caused a major crisis in Anglo-American relations. The underlying reason for the American decision was the obsessive importance that the Administration attached to fighting communism in Latin America after establishing covert co-operation with the Argentinian military junta in 1981. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted to partition Palestine into two independent states, Jewish and Arab, with Jerusalem as a corpus separatum under international control. The General Assembly then established the United Nations Palestine Commission to implement partition. Amongst other things, the Commission was to establish “armed militias” under UN supervision to help realise the plan. The analysis examines various aspects of the sequence of events related to this idea, from its conception in the General Assembly to its death in February 1948. It demonstrates that under the militia clause, the United Nations intended to rely on the Jews’ main military organisation – the Haganah– to establish the Jewish state and shows how and why this plan went awry despite the converging interests of the Jews and the United Nations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Brazilian energy diplomacy intensified from 2003 to 2010. In this case, this intensification was related to the structure of more convergent preferences of Itamaraty—Brazil's Foreign Ministry—other related ministries, and agencies with foreign government preferences for engagement in energy security and/or integration. Co-extensive with these preferences were those of most Brazilian domestic actors on the diversification of the state's energy supplies, enhancement of access to markets or reserves, stimulus for sustainable production and use—mainly in developing states—and strengthening of strategic international partnerships—mostly with developed states—for training and the competitive insertion in the international market. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Small states often seek power by exercising authority beyond their borders. Sweden, a prominent protagonist of the global projection of moral values, established itself as a champion of humanitarian internationalism in the post-Second World War period, especially during the Vietnam War. By voicing criticism of the American war effort and putting moral purposes beyond itself, Sweden tried to change American policy. Years of vehement criticism provoked strong reactions in the United States, leading to bilateral diplomatic crises and long-lasting political conflicts. Even though part of a wave of international criticism and based on the power of the better argument and conveyed through open advocacy, Sweden's public diplomacy had little bearing. Its confrontational style was counter-productive; its content badly synchronised with the domestic American debate and lacking originality and centrality; and the criticism generally considered irrelevant. Attention fell on Swedish verbal activism when more conspicuous elements of Swedish Vietnam policy were in focus. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Diplomatic correspondence between Washington and the American Embassy in Islamabad published by the National Security Archive shows that during the last 35 years of the twentieth century American diplomacy toward Pakistan faced a mutually de-escalating relationship. Pakistan wanted American economic and military assistance as well as support in its conflicts with India. The United States was ready to aid Pakistan, but only so far as Islamabad respected American demands. These focused on containing Soviet influence in the region and, more recently, fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The United States also asked Pakistan to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons. To enforce this policy, successive American administrations showered Pakistan with sanctions. These sanctions were lifted again and again, because they undercut American diplomatic influence with the Pakistani government. Washington did not intend to support Pakistan in its conflicts with India. Pakistan let down the United States by not using its leverage over the Taliban to capture Osama Bin Laden. Mistrust resulting from this roller coaster relationship should have warned American diplomats not to take Pakistan's support in the war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda and the Taliban for granted. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

During the Second World War, the American State Department prepared a Korean trusteeship plan with a view to mitigate Great Power rivalry over Korea after Japanese defeat. To achieve this goal, the Department recommended that American leaders consult with Russian leaders to manage the joint trusteeship whilst maintaining the administrative unity of Korea. However, amid a sharp rise of threat perception over Soviet expansion and the expectation of the development of an atomic bomb, the Truman Administration delayed diplomatic consultations with the Russians after April 1945. Furthermore, due to a lack of proper co-ordination in Washington's bureaucracy, a valuable opportunity for diplomatic compromise on Korean trusteeship was missed when Harry Hopkins visited Moscow in late May 1945. Although the Potsdam Conference offered the final opportunity for compromise, James Byrnes chose to pursue a unilateralist policy to secure a separate zone of occupation below the 38th parallel with Truman's full support. This article examines American decision-making and diplomacy whilst taking into account its leaders' threat perception as well as their confidence derived from the atomic monopoly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nicolae Ceauşescu of Romania was well-known during the Cold War as a non-conformist voice in the Communist bloc, especially because of his opposition to the Soviet Union and spectacular foreign policy initiatives. But was that line Ceauşescu's creation? This analysis examines the sources of Romania's dynamic and autonomous foreign policy in the Cold War and shows that the origins of this foreign policy can be traced back to Ceauşescu's predecessor, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. The shock caused by de-Stalinisation and Nikita Khrushchev's reformist policies saw the Romanian party leadership limit its dependence on the Soviet Union, both politically and economically. Romania's foreign policy experienced a revival starting from the tumultuous moments when Gheorghiu-Dej listened to Khrushchev's Secret Report at the 20th Congress in February 1956. Fearing the loss of his position in power, Gheorghiu-Dej saw relations outside the Communist bloc as a source of stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The early- to mid-1940s leading to the establishment of the United Nations have often been cited by historians and international relations scholars as a critical historical juncture where the concept of Great Power responsibility became institutionalised into the fabric of international society. How such a concept came about, however, and how ideas about their roles and responsibilities were debated and projected by the Great Powers themselves, have been given less prominence in the literature. In particular, China's role in negotiating a post-Second World War order has been largely neglected. This analysis thus explores projections of China's Great Power role as well as examines how China conceptualised, negotiated, and used notions of Great Power responsibility and how this interplayed with wider notions in international society. Despite the operational constraints China faced, there was more Chinese agency and deliberation than is traditionally portrayed, with China bringing some important ideas to the negotiating table. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the administration of U.S. President Richard Milhous Nixon, focusing on European relations in 1973 under the leadership of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Kissinger announced 1973 as the Year of Europe initiative, which backfired as European leaders saw the program as the U.S.'s way to garner additional international power at the expense of its European allies. Other topics considered include rising interest in the European Community, the impact of the Yom Kippur War on Western relations, and the role of French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert in spoiling American-European relations.

Professor Kathleen Burk has worked on some of the key themes in the history of diplomacy for more than three decades. Foremost amongst them has been the role of financial strength in the projection of power, and other key themes have included the role of the individual in making state policy; the concept and practice of “imperialism”; and the importance of non-state actors, such as banks, businessmen, and even tourists in the interplay between nations. As this article demonstrates, she has attempted throughout to strike a historiographical balance, moved more by her empirical sense of the evidence than the fashions that have come and gone during her career. She worked on transatlantic relations before “Atlantic History” came to the fore; transnationalism before the movement of ideas across frontiers became an obsession; and imperialism before the recent recrudescence of interest in this arena too. In this special issue of Diplomacy and Statecraft, Professor Burk's former colleagues, collaborators, and pupils demonstrate how they have adopted and adapted her techniques: from the history of decolonisation to histories of charities to human rights, and covering topics as diverse as British defence policy and twentieth century Americans' concepts of what “Europe” is or might become. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Regular meetings of heads of state and government seem, in 2012, a common feature of international affairs. About forty years ago, however, such meetings did not really exist: ad hoc summits were the rule. Comparing the emergence of the European Council in 1974 and the G7 in 1975, this article explains why and how summitry has become routine in international politics. To do so, it examines the common roots of both summits, points out the first differences between the two institutions, and, finally, underlines the common challenges they faced and the logic they shared. Taken together, these three parts underline how, despite their obvious differences, the European Council and the G7 created a new dimension of international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The seize mai crisis of 1877 was the occasion for last of the three war scares that punctuated Franco–German relations in the 1870s. However, it has not been given the detailed scrutiny it deserves. It was not only important for the amount of influence that Bismarck exerted during a six month period to influence the course of French domestic politics at a critical juncture. This crisis also provides a cipher for understanding the earlier crises of 1873–1874 and 1875 since the German Chancellor pursued his key objective of supporting the establishment of a republic much more openly in 1877 and his tactics are much better documented than in the earlier scares. A closer look at the events of 1877 reveals more continuity in both the means and ends used by Bismarck in his dealings with France during the mid-1870s than was previously thought. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

From 1931 to 1941, when China and Japan were at undeclared war, China's propaganda was fairly well-circulated in America through her American friends who played a leading role in shaping American opinions on the Far Eastern crisis. But the United States State Department maintained a neutral stance toward the Sino-Japanese conflict until after 1939 and considered the pro-Chinese opinion not so much a national consensus for policy consideration as a partisan view propped up by propaganda groups. Thus, the State Department guarded its Asian policy from the pressure of propaganda activities and partisan opinions on the Asian conflict, whilst utilising them occasionally as tools of diplomacy toward China and Japan. This article examines the State Department's attitude toward public opinion and propaganda on the Far Eastern conflict from 1931 to 1941 to illustrate how American officials handled partisan opinions on a foreign crisis when most of the information on foreign policy was privately initiated and circulated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The League of Nations is primarily remembered for its failures in the 1930s. Indeed, the established perception of its history usually emphasizes weaknesses. Failing to settle the question of which Power should possess the former Ottoman province of Mosul after the First World War, Turkey saw the dispute addressed to the League in summer 1924. Within a short time, a multi-leveled negotiation process that involved a large number of politicians, diplomats, and lawyers was put in motion. Sixteen months and many crises later, the League Council awarded the entire Mosul province to Iraq. The arbitration had been based upon data collected by two enquiry commissions comprising representatives from eight different Powers, the work of both numerous mediators, and a Council sub-committee. Though certainly not perfect, the League's role averted war and renewed disaster. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventionally, it was Palmerston's political nemesis, Lord Aberdeen (foreign secretary 1841–46), who brokered an entente cordiale with François Guizot and France in the early 1840s, which the belligerent and unequivocally “English” Palmerston then systematically destroyed when he returned to office in 1846. However, not only is this a distortion of the relationship between Britain and France prior to 1846, it also fails to appreciate the nuances of Palmerston's approach to Anglo–French politics. Naval scares and rhetorical constructions of English and British identities certainly drew Palmerston to adopt aggressive positions towards France on occasion, but against this must be set his close personal ties with leading French statesmen, not least Napoleon III himself, and his desire to maintain peaceful harmonious relations with France in order to free Britain's diplomatic hand elsewhere in the world. Although superficially swinging between extremes of amity and enmity, therefore, Anglo–French relations under Palmerston's guidance were in fact far more cordial and close than has sometimes been allowed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the uses of the expression balance of power and demonstrates how they influenced the direction of British diplomacy in the interwar period from late 1922 to late 1937. Role of senior members of the Foreign Office in the making and implementation of British foreign policy; Concept of the balance of power; Information on the Foreign Office's alliance diplomacy in the late 1930s.

The article offers brief profiles of historians Michael Collins, David French, and Matthew Jones, who contributed to the writing of the journal.

A list of editorial board members for "Diplomacy & Statecraft" is presented which includes editor B. J. C. McKercher, review editor John Fisher, and editorial assistant Luca Trenta.