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American policy toward Germany in the years before Pearl Harbor can be approached from any number of angles. A rich literature already exists that emphasizes the geopolitical dimension of the German-U.S. relationship, as well as its economic and ideological complexities. I shall here explore an interpretative line that has been less fully developed in the historiography, namely, the viewpoint of U.S. diplomats posted in Berlin. Their experience in the 1930s throws into vivid relief the dilemmas posed by the Third Reich to FDR's America and its equivocal response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how policy-makers during the Second World War attempted to “learn the lessons” of history from the reparations settlement imposed after the First World War. It shows how these lessons were developed and articulated in the formulation of, in particular, American foreign policy, and also their consequences for foreign policy during and after the Second World War. The paper demonstrates the important role of European advisors in shaping American policy, thereby illustrating that not all American lessons of history were born in the USA. It also draws out how many of these lessons have found an echo in the historiography of German reparations that has emerged over the past fifty years. In both periods the issues of enforcement and compliance, the issues that concern us generally in this volume, dominated the debate between advisors and policy-makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses the episode of the Kapp putsch in March 1920 to isolate and analyze a number of high policy themes that dominated the period from the signature of the Treaty of Versailles through to the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr. These included: the questions of what mechanisms existed to enforce the treaty; the sanctions available to the victorious governments to enforce their will; the position and problems of the German government; the relationship and suspicions existing between Britain and France and the differing aims, ambitions, and approaches of the major participants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the reparations question from the perspective of its role in the post-1924 period. Particular attention is paid to the work of Albert Ritschl on the reparations regimes between 1924 and 1934. He stresses the competition between Germany's public and private debts and the importance of Germany's role as a sovereign debtor that could not commit national suicide by fulfilling its obligations at any social and political price but that sought to maintain its credit by giving primacy to its private obligations at the expense of reparations. There was some learning from the past after 1945. The London Debt Agreement of 1953 precluded a conflict between private and public debts by an exclusive concentration on private debts and the restoration of German credit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the diplomatic implications of United States troop movements in Germany before and after V-E Day. Existing accounts emphasize American good will and Soviet refusal to cooperate, pointing to the example of an American convoy en route to Berlin in June 1945. Citing an “agreement” of which the American convoy commander had never heard, the Russians would allow only one-half of his troops to proceed. The agreement did exist, however, and the episode must be seen against the backdrop of Soviet suspicions regarding Western willingness to withdraw from the Soviet occupation zone. United States President Harry S. Truman did overrule British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill's calls to link withdrawal to concessions from the Soviets, but he waited two months before doing so. Prior accounts have ignored the delay's effects on Soviet perceptions. The article argues that American actions had the unintended consequence of reinforcing Soviet Chairman Joseph V. Stalin's belief in Western bad faith. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 3 September 1939 the passenger liner Athenia, sailing from Liverpool to Montreal, was sunk by the German submarine U-30 with a loss of 112 lives. This action, while not intended by the German government, was in violation of Germany's commitments under the London Naval Treaty and it complicated its desire to keep hostilities confined to Poland. The British government and Admiralty, confronted with an attack on an unarmed passenger liner within nine hours of the declaration of war, and several freighters shortly thereafter, concluded that the German Navy intended to wage unrestricted submarine warfare. This article shows that as a result of the sinking of the Athenia, the government and the Admiralty implemented convoys within the first week of the war, sooner and more completely than had been intended. Naval ship building priorities were also subsequently adjusted to quickly provide escort vessels for the newly organized convoys. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that Sir Eric Phipps’ reputation as an “anti-appeaser” of Germany during his Berlin embassy 1933–1937 is not accurate. While Phipps was not in favor of placating Hitler by making territorial concessions, he had much in common with those who had sought a rapprochement with Germany in the 1920s through a policy of inclusion and reconciliation. Particular importance is placed on Phipps’ attitude towards the League of Nations, with detailed consideration also being accorded to his relationship with the British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials of the period, as well as his views on the Entente Cordiale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the agonizing appraisals made by the U.S. and Great Britain's commitment to European security in 1953 and 1954 if the rearmament of West Germany through the European Defence Community (EDC) came to nothing. Views of U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on the EDC; Position of Great Britain on European integration; Support provided by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to the EDC; Role of the Bermuda Conference in responding to the peace offensive launched by Soviet leaders.

Examines the charge that, especially during the period when Sir Robert Vansittart, was Permanent Under-Secretary, the Great Britain Foreign Office was anti-German in its orientation. Analysis of the role played by three consecutive ambassadors, Sir Horace Rumbold, Sir Eric Phipps and Sir Nevile Henderson in influencing the Foreign Office perception of Germany; Foreign Office's attitude to the anti-Nazi Germany opposition.

Discusses the claim of U.S. statesman Dean Acheson on the adoption of the single package tactic, the U.S. policy on German rearmament in 1950. Organization of the German troops; Details on the German rearmament.

Restitution of cultural objects was one of the topics covered in the Treaty of Versailles and the related peace treaties. Britain made specific claims in Article 246 relating to the Koran of Caliph Othman and the Skull of Sultan Mkwawa, whilst the Foreign Office considered other claims. Britain's policy on cultural restitution influenced growing international norms, but it should also be seen in the context of Britain's wider diplomatic concerns, stretching from the time of Castlereagh into the post-Second World War era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a defeated Great Power, Germany faced exceptional challenges after the First World War. These ranged from domestic revolution to grudging compliance with a peace treaty whose terms Germans almost universally regarded as unjust and unworkable. Franco-German relations quickly assumed particular significance in this regard as each country sought to secure its vital interests at the other's expense; a confrontation that culminated in the Ruhr Crisis. However, there had been intermittent attempts to address security concerns through collaboration rather than confrontation and, after the Ruhr Crisis beginning in January 1923, these efforts rapidly gained momentum. The German and French foreign ministers, Gustav Stresemann and Aristide Briand, developed a trusting relationship as they strove to locate Franco-German rapprochement within the wider context of European integration. Stresemann's death in 1929 did not stop this process that, under severe pressure from the Great Depression, finally imploded in early 1932. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

British war aims concerning Germany developed haphazardly during the Great War of 1914–1918. The vicissitudes of unexpectedly conducting total war–one lasting more than four years–periodically deflected their consideration. Inter-Allied diplomacy and pressures from non-governmental lobbyists from Central–Eastern Europe seeking independent states to succeed the Habsburg, Romanov, and Wilhelmine empires forced reconsideration at crucial moments, for instance, after the advent of the nascent Bolshevik regime in Russia in late 1917 to early 1918. So, too, did British public opinion. Nonetheless, the British government had a clear general strategy: return stability on the European continent. In this context, the prime minister after December 1916, David Lloyd George, became central. Beyond the general aim, however, he wanted to avoid firm commitments over a range of issues touching Germany to give him flexibility in negotiating with the other Allied leaders at the eventual Peace Conference. Thus, less concerned with the minutiae of transforming war aims involving German territorial losses, disarmament, and paying for the war, he looked to make deals that might lack strategic purpose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When established in 1951, the West German Foreign Office resembled its pre-1945 Berlin Ministry predecessor in many ways. Notably, about 45 percent of Bonn’s diplomats came from the old service. Such continuities raised concerns about a restoration of old diplomatic traditions and attitudes. However, significant changes in German diplomacy—its West German variant—soon became evident, not least in terms of diplomatic style and methods. This analysis explores how the Foreign Office’s staff adopted, promoted, or rejected such changes. It assesses institutional processes of transformation and examines why diplomats were willing to “re-learn” diplomacy after the Second World War. Likewise evaluated are the problems and limits of re-orientation. By focussing on (dis)continuities within the Foreign Service in the 1950s and 1960s, the analysis contributes to the general field of research on processes of transition in West Germany after the end of the Third Reich. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some observers still regard John Maynard Keynes’ polemic against the Treaty of Versailles as serious economic analysis. In fact, Keynes continued to play an unacknowledged partisan role in reparation diplomacy during the 1920s. He suggests in a memoir that he never saw the Hamburg banker Carl Melchior alone again after October 1919. Using German sources not exploited by Keynes’ principal biographers, this analysis shows that the intimate relationship continued. Melchior drew Keynes into the highest governing circles of the Reich. Keynes supported the 1922–1923 German hyper-inflation on political grounds and helped craft the German reparations note of June 1923. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article considers the ministerial career of Douglas Hogg, first Viscount Hailsham, during the 1930s and, in particular, his attitude towards the appeasement of Germany. Although Hailsham was a leading Conservative in the inter-war period and held key posts during the 1930s, his role in Britain's policy of appeasement has been overlooked. He was consistently wary of the Nazi menace and as Secretary of State for War from 1931–1935 he urged a firm line towards Hitler's Germany. As the decade progressed, however, the inescapable realities of Britain's international predicament drove Hailsham to support the government's appeasement policy, at least until September 1938. Although he forecast the near inevitability of the Second World War, he could not devise a viable alternative to the appeasement of Germany. Hailsham's experience thus offers a significant addition to the historiography of appeasement and to understanding the distinctions between “appeasers” and “anti-appeasers.” [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

During the First World War, the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) supplied occupied Belgium with food, provoking discord between military and political leaders on both sides. The CRB's work undermined the Allies' economic blockade of the enemy, attracting military criticism. In Germany, politicians favoured sustaining the food supply to prevent unrest, whilst the Army wanted to exploit Belgium's resources. From 1916 onwards, the CRB became a bone of contention in Germany in the dispute between military and political leaders about unrestricted submarine warfare. It also loomed large in the political and military debate about the attitude to neutral countries: the Allies wanted them to brave the German threat and cooperate with the blockade policy-otherwise, food imports from Allied countries would be forbidden. Tonnage and food for the CRB were incorporated into the negotiations with neutral countries about their imports and the use of home-grown produce. The debates about the CRB thus exemplify the relationship between military events and the war's economic and social significance. This study of the CRB shows that political/diplomatic historiography can bridge the gap between the military and socioeconomic history of the First World War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the pivotal, but largely neglected 1977-1978 German neutron bomb (ERW) controversy in its broader domestic and international contexts. It explains how a domestic ideological intra-Social Democratic Party (SPD) argument over “security” and “Germany” between chancellor Schmidt and SPD executive party secretary Bahr turned a secret governmental issue—the question of ERW production and deployment—into a highly politicised public debate. Internationally the ERW affair revealed a deep Euro-Atlantic rift and rapidly worsening East-West relations which could threaten the “German” situation. On the domestic scene Bahr used the opportunity to stimulate moralist-pacifist thinking within his party and among the wider public by which he not only risked association with Soviet peace diplomacy, but also challenged Schmidt's political authority and strained the government coalition beyond repair. Above all, however, it provided the political context for Schmidt to embrace an international leadership role by verbalising his initial ideas of what in 1979 would become NATO's landmark “dual-track decision.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The January 1933 appointment of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor of Germany marked the beginning of the end of the fragile post-war peace throughout Europe. The Polish leadership had good reason to fear his threats of revising the Treaty of Versailles. Realising that Hitler was too dangerous to remain in power, the Polish leadership led by Marshal Jozef Piłsudski prepared for a preventive war against Germany. Unfortunately, the appeasement policy among the Western Powers condemned this plan to failure and forced Poland into signing a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1934; thus dooming Poland's existence. To test his premonitions about Hitler, Piłsudski created several international “incidents” concerning the Free City of Danzig, designed to test both Germany and whether the Western Powers would fight to uphold the Treaty of Versailles. Piłsudski's efforts offer proof that Poland deserves more credit for its determination to deal with a rising tide of Nazi Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the existence of close cordiality between Britain, France and Russia before the Great War. Boundaries were defined and disputes were settled between the British and French over the areas they had occupied. These agreements made an impact on European politics and the idea was to alienate the Germans. The Entente Cordiale signified the French-British relations in their better time with common political and cultural outlook.

Post-1918 Germany was gripped by severe foof shortages that devastated the health of urban children in particular. German politicans and officials became increasingly convinced that a state of near famine and the accompanying scourges of social and political disorder could not be adequately addressed given the demands placed on public finances and the wider economy by the reparations regime. While the British reacted by counselling a moderation of the reparations regime, the French accused Germany of instrumentalizing domestic crisis to undermine reparations and thereby compromise the Versailles Settlement. French sanctions culminated in an invasion of the Ruhr District in January 1923, which served to create a devastating famine in the region and to intensify popular antipathy in Germany to the reparations regime. The article concludes by considering briefly links between the perceived perfidy of reparations and the subsequent resonance of Nazi ideology and policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the local reactions to the Versailles negotiations and final settlement along the north-eastern frontier of France, discussing both immediate reactions to the post-war conditions, as well as longer-term trends in identity formation within the region. It shows that the practical considerations of rebuilding after the war outweighed desire for revenge upon Germany, and that on average they were less interested in forcing Germany to pay more, than ensuring the short term costs were met whoever paid them. It also shows that the peace settlement did have a concrete effect in solidifying the border as a marker of identity, with increasing distinction made between the French Flemish and the neighbouring Belgian population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assesses the Council of the League of Nations' crisis over the proposed entry of Germany in 1926 and the key role of Brazil in the crisis. Reasons for the decision of Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and the U.S. to withdraw from the league; Information on the dilemma faced by Brazil; Behavior of Brazil at the peace conference.

Questions the relationship of Germany with communist states. Debate within the West German Foreign Office about intensifying relations with Eastern European communist states; Expansion of economic ties with the communist states; Discussion on the use of trade as an instrument to promote relations with communist states.

The author responds to a review by Frank Magee of his book "Our Man in Berlin: The Diary of Sir Eric Phipps, 1933-1937," which was published in a previous issue. He discusses the book's focus on diplomatic relations between Germany and England during the 1930s and comments on Magee's assertions that the diaries presented in the book should not be classified as diaries as defined by archivist Allen Packwood. The author comments that the book is composed of diplomat Eric Phipps' dispatches during World War II and states that Magee failed to discuss the book's content.