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At first sight, Kenya seems to have had more scope than other African countries to emulate the development trajectory described in the World Bank study, The East Asian Miracle. These assets did not, however, result in sustained growth - an outcome this article aims to explain using a negative turning point in the early 1990s. The most striking difference between the East Asian and Kenyan experiences was the acceptance - and even exacerbation - of socio-economic inequality as an immutable reality of development, plus the weak belief in the integrity of Kenyan institutions. A constitutional review process is one possible political solution for this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivation: In 2020, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) was merged with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). This policy move strengthens the trend to "securitize" development, whereby the provision of aid is motivated by national security concerns. Purpose: Many researchers have raised concerns about the securitization of aid and its consequences for development, but little research has examined its impact on aid‐recipient countries. Approach and Methods: This study evaluates 144 securitized aid projects implemented by DFID between 2000 and 2018 in Kenya, Nigeria and South Sudan, using the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. Findings: Our analysis finds that although most of the projects assessed were "relevant", i.e. formally aligned with recipient and funders' objectives, many struggled to achieve their intended outputs ("effectiveness"). Few of the projects had a positive "impact". We conclude that the securitized projects reviewed did not significantly strengthen the recipient countries' institutions, stability, or security but had some negative side effects. Policy Implications: In view of the merger of DFID with the FCO and the decision to reduce aid from 0.7% to 0.5% of Gross National Income (GNI), the UK is likely to draw an even closer connection between domestic security priorities and its development aid. In view of our empirical findings, the UK government needs to be more aware of the limitations of development interventions undertaken in the name of security and consider other means of enabling development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivation: Many countries in sub‐Saharan Africa (SSA) experience thwarted economic development and corrupt public administration. As the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) focuses on implementation mechanisms in SSA, there is a need to examine the causes of the setbacks affecting these mechanisms, looking at the current trends of corruption and their impact on socioeconomic development. Purpose: This article focuses on assessing setbacks in anti‐corruption strategies to advance economic development in SSA, primarily looking at how and in what conditions UNCAC prevents corruption and manages responses in SSA. Approach: This article adopts a descriptive and an explanatory perspective, using case studies of Kenya and Nigeria to explain and show how far the objectives of anti‐corruption strategies have been met, and assessing the causes of setbacks. In this context, the article also explores the challenges facing the UK's Department for International Development (DFID). Conclusions: Socioeconomic development in SSA is hard to separate from maladministration and large‐scale corruption. The findings reveal the gravity of this impact and its interrelated factors of "active" and "benign" corruption. This article concludes that for SSA to create sustainable economic environments, the causes of the failure to stamp out corruption need to be addressed, and dishonesty, maladministration, illicit activities, nepotism curtailed, along with corrupt influences on anti‐corruption legislation. Policy implications: The article concludes that if governance does not prevent the failures of anti‐corruption strategies, an interventionist response will only weaken national endeavours, making it difficult to reach UNCAC's vision of sustainable and corruption‐free economic environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to rent-cycling theory, low rent aligns the interests of the elite and the majority in providing public goods and efficiency incentives to promote economic growth, while high rent risks deflecting the elite into self-enriching rent deployment, which distorts the economy and triggers a collapse from which recovery is protracted because rent recipients resist reform. The theory also predicts, however, that this collapse will self-correct by shrinking per capita rent, which strengthens incentives for wealth creation. This article tests the prediction in Mauritius, Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire where intensifying land scarcity has shrunk per capita rent; Mauritius meets the prediction, but Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire do not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]