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This paper approaches comparative legal history in light of the life and work of John H. Wigmore. This paper first presents a definition of comparative legal history. Secondly, this paper addresses a mosaic of interests that Wigmore lived and experienced. It therefore presents a main dialogue of this jurist with the law of evidence, another dialogue with auxiliary disciplines, and a common thread that is represented by his interest in legal history and comparative law. This paper therefore points to the role that different actors may have in the development of an autonomous discipline, while they interact with other actors in other jurisdictions.

This paper analyzes the debate that arose in the Peruvian legal system about whether the term that the State has to collect civil compensation in cases of judgments arising from criminal procedures for offenses against public administration is one of expiration or prescription. The difference is not minor because while the prescription period allows for interruptions, the expiration period is not interrupted even when the debtor performs dilatory maneuvers to avoid payment. This last situation is recurrent in the context of the prosecution of the crimes against the public administration, as they sanction state corruption. In this paper, we intend to contribute to the aforementioned debate based on the revision of the figure of civil compensation and its capacity to combat and prevent corruption. Also, the definition, scope and differences between the figures of the expiration and the prescription will be studied to indicate, on the end, that this last institution is the one applicable to the supposed matters of examination.

This paper suggests reassessing the teachings of the Roman method of creation of law, based on the understanding of the ius as ars boni et aequi, which makes evident that the law has a practical purpose and, consequently, topics is the knowledge itself of the law, in which the centrality of the case is highlighted and the realization of justice in terms of what we would today call «effective protection of rights». The text argues that such an understanding presupposes the understanding of the dynamic nature of law, of its artificial nature as created by human beings and, therefore, perfectible, of the active role of the jurist in the construction of a more equitable right, which makes possible the realization of the balanced equality in the preservation of the values of reasonableness that good faith proposes, by considering the requirements of the case, in harmony with the principles that govern the system, in a permanent reconstruction of the balance between topic and system. In rethinking the application of law according to its nature, to the essential function of serving coexistence, and of making the values of a social State of Law a reality, the paper analyzes the experience of Peruvian jurisprudence in the «precedents» of the Supreme Court of Justice, examining several of its most emblematic judgments, under the perspective of topics and, in general, of the Roman method of creating the law.

This paper is intended to address in a synthetic way but with recent citations of the doctrine and jurisprudence some general principles of law, in order to contribute to the systematization, content, and affirmation of the general principles of law, and so, achieve the goal of a better law, the development of legal science and the progress of society. This paper makes particular emphasis on Colombian law, but it is projected as well inside the civil law tradition.

This paper shows a mismatch between a real and pressing demand for a philosophical analysis that allows us to explain the emergence of new phenomena in law, and the limited supply of theoretical tools to satisfy this demand by the traditional model of positivistic science of law. After an initial diagnosis of a mismatch between supply and demand, the resistance of legal positivism to accept practical rationality stands out as a core problem of the traditional model of positivistic science of law and the viability of this way of rationality is defended. The paper concludes with a proposal for the reinvention of the philosophy of law of the 21st century that incorporates new objectives and rethinks its method.

This paper aims to explore the functions of the theory of legal argumentation (TLA) on Constitutional States and will especially focus on the political and self-reflective functions of the TLA within the framework of a neo-constitutionalistic legal theory. The first part of the paper includes a definition of the TAL and an analysis of its main functions. At the end of the paper the author provides the bases for the development of a neoconstitutionalistic legal theory.

Based on the theory of the emotions proposed by Martha Nussbaum, the present paper proposes a theory of rationality and judicial reasonability that includes emotions as a necessary element. With this, it is possible to pass from a purely deliberative-abstract model of judicial argument to a narratively open one, in which empathy and literary imagination play a fundamental role. I will argue that emotions have a concrete manifestation in at least three relevant circumstances: the value of testimony, that of empathy, and that of literary imagination. However, the place of emotions for the project of judicial rationality is subject to institutional restrictions such as rules of law, procedures and precedents. With this in mind, a sketch of theory on the narrative rationality in judicial contexts is presented in the last section of this paper.

My goal for this paper can be presented as follows: I will attempt to show that objections to intuitionism, although they are serious, do not undermine entirely its fertility for knowledge and moral reasoning. This is probably the perception of contemporary philosophers like David Enoch, Robert Audi, Russ Shafer-Landau or John McDowell. In order to fulfill the objective mentioned above, I will do the following. First, I will outline broadly two of the paradigmatic features of moral intuitionism in order to identify it as a particular metaethics doctrine. Secondly, I will summarize some of the main objections that have been raised in order to discredit the value of moral intuitionism as a source both of moral knowledge and of valid support for moral reasoning. In third place, I will try, also briefly, to explain some of the possible (not all of course) answers to the objections previously mentioned in the paper. Fourth, I will recapitulate the more fruitful aspects of intuitionism, especially in regard to moral reasoning.

This paper presents a proposal of interdisciplinary approach between analytic psychology and law. From the basis of Carl G. Jung’s theoretical framework, we argue that the law is animated by psychic contents of archetypical nature, which shape the way in which humans relate with rules and authority and impact how we regulate as a society. The paper introduces myth interpretation as a means to comprehend that animic dimension of law and describes the concepts, techniques and cares that should guide the analysis. An interpretation of the fall of Adam and Eve is conducted as an example of the proposed interdisciplinary approach. The analysis leads us to argue that the psychic tendency to separate the inner self from the outer self, with the relegation of the former, derives in the domination of the masculine over the feminine and in a relationship characterized by distance and fear between humans and the authority. The regulation that arises from that context is one also marked by separation, fear of sanctions and is focused on the external behavior. The image of Jesus is thus presented as compensatory one since it tends to the reunion of the inner with the outer and of the feminine with the masculine, which derives in a regulation substantially different from that of the Old Testament.