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This paper presents a hypothesis for understanding democratic stability based on the distinction between politicized and meritocratic bureaucracies. We argue that in a politicized administration, the professional careers of large numbers of government officials depend directly upon which party wins the elections. This increases the likelihood that the government will take opportunistic actions aimed at surviving in office at any cost; that is, benefiting core supporters at the expense of other groups. In turn, this may foster pre-emptive actions from the opposition, such as military coups. Conversely, in democracies with meritocratic administrations, incumbents are credibly constrained from undertaking partial policies because their hands are tied in terms of managing the staff policy of the state apparatus. Consequently, countries with meritocratic bureaucracies have greater prospects for democratic stability. Empirically, we illustrate the mechanisms with two well-documented cases of democratic transitions that enshrined a politicized administration – Spain (1876–1936) and Venezuela (1958–1998) – and one transition that kept a meritocratic bureaucracy, Spain (1975–). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article argues that patterns of civil society in post-authoritarian democracies are the result of divergent pathways to democracy. Through a comparison between contemporary Portugal and Spain, it is shown that revolutionary pathways to democracy have a positive impact on the self-organizing capabilities of popular groups. Two mechanisms contribute to this. First, the fact that the masses are the key actor in the revolutionary process results in greater legal recognition and institutional embeddedness between civil society organizations and the state. Second, as a consequence of changes in the social and economic structure, revolutions engender more inclusive democracies. This all leads to greater opportunities and resources for the civic action of the common people during the subsequent democratic regime. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]