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The Lisbon Treaty introduces major reforms to the external action of the European Union. The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) is one of the most important of these innovations, carried out with a view to improving the effectiveness, consistency and visibility of the Union on the international stage. The search for greater coherence between the different fields of external action and between these and other EU policies is in fact one of the most important underlying reasons for the institutional reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The objective of this paper is to analyse the main points of interest raised by the creation of the EEAS, in order to determine to what degree the organisation and functioning of the EEAS will contribute to improving the coherence and effectiveness of the external action of the European Union.

This article focuses on the new opportunity for the national parliaments to get involved in the EU legislative process which is provided by the so-called yellow card mechanism introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. I start with a discussion of the incentives for national parliaments to seize the new opportunity to influence European decision-making. I argue that the importance of the mechanism goes far beyond its stated goal to enforce the subsidiarity principle. Its true significance will first be in the engagement of parliaments in debates on the substantive issues of European policy, and second in stimulating cooperation amongst the parliaments of different Member States. In turn, this engagement and cooperation of parliaments can be expected to bring about communication among the citizens across national public spheres and their engagement with substantive policy issues rather than merely arguing for or against integration as is the case today. Thus, this modest-looking mechanism promises to nurture a transnational network of public spheres and to become what may be called a demoi-cracy. I also argue that the creation of such a network democracy (post-national rather than supra-national) is the only available road for democratisation of the EU because it does not depend on a forged common identity or solidarity. In the final section, I discuss experience with the mechanism during its first year, which seems disappointing.

In European Union law, the existence of an effective remedy to challenge EU actions has been at the core of a heated ongoing debate, since individual applicants and NGOs often have a hard time obtaining locus standi in annulment proceedings, due to the restrictive interpretation given by the European Court of Justice to the standing requirements provided by (the former) Article 230(4) of the EC Treaty. The aim of this paper is to show how access to justice before the EU courts for environmental NGOs has been significantly curtailed up to the present, and to discuss the changes to the standing test brought by the Lisbon Treaty by analysing its content and the (to date) limited interpretation given by the European Courts to the term ‘regulatory act’ introduced by the Treaty. On the basis of this examination, it will be shown how the recent amendments have not changed the position of NGOs who wish to challenge EU environmental measures and how, therefore, a significant gap in judicial protection and a potential violation of Articles 9(2) and (3) of the Aarhus Convention still remain.

Although the status of the Lisbon Treaty is still pending, the possible impact that it can have on the EU’s immigration legislation is worth analysing and discussing. The importance of immigration, asylum and border control is evident in the fact that the topic is presented as early as in Article 3 of Title I of the Common Provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. It states that the Union ‘shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice’. The common area is supposed to exist without internal frontiers where the free movement of persons is ensured. In order to provide for these rights, measures should be taken in the field of border control, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime, as immigration raises problems in all these fields. The internal market is mentioned only after the issues of migration. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether or not these changes and the Lisbon Treaty can lead to the better management of immigration at the EU level and to see where Europe is heading in this regard. Competences, legislation making, and objectives are discussed in order to find answers to questions about the development of common EU immigration legislation.

The present paper aims to explore the boundaries of EU law following the Lisbon Treaty with specific regard to the internal market. Over fifty years since its inception, the underlying promise of the creation of an internal market remains a key parameter to test the progress of European integration. A constituent aspect of the European legislative agenda, the exact boundaries of a continually developing internal market have to date remained fluid and contested. This is readily exemplified by considering a provision situated at its heart, Article 95 EC, which enables Community institutions to adopt measures intended to promote the establishment and functioning of the internal market. It is notable that, despite initial suggestions to this effect, the pivotal Article 95 EC has been little altered by the Lisbon negotiations. Article 95 EC represents an important constitutional compromise between the ever-increasing Community competences and the regulatory autonomy of Member States, as well as between the often-conflicting interests of economic progress and welfare protection. This study will revise the complex Article 95 paradigm and outline some of the possible challenges facing this fundamental field in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty. Revisiting one of the key historical objectives of the European integration project would not only be conducive to greater determinacy in this specific field, but could offer a basis for a broader discussion of what values should characterise the European Union going forward. As the challenges following Lisbon are crystallising, there would appear to be no better time to revisit the strategy to be adopted in the continued pursuit of the effective establishment and functioning of the internal market.

This article looks at how the Lisbon Treaty will affect the management of the EU’s external borders. It examines the current treaty framework and the way in which the Community has made use of its powers in this policy field. It discusses the changes the Lisbon Treaty is likely to bring about and gives a short overview of how the future management of the external borders is taking shape in the absence of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The underlying theme of this contribution is the distinction between legislation and operational co-operation in this policy field. It points out a number of problems with the approach of fostering integration in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice through operational co-operation. It is argued that the Lisbon Treaty fails to provide a sounder legal framework for the EU’s joint operational activity in the AFSJ as a whole and the management of the external borders in particular.

The principle of subsidiarity is meant to demarcate the exercise of competences between the EU and its Member States and to balance the claim for regulatory power which these two legal worlds make. This article takes the view that subsidiarity has not proven so far to be a very useful touchstone in this regard. Moreover, there are still shortcomings in its envisaged application based on the legal framework provided by the Lisbon Treaty. It is therefore suggested that an approach beyond subsidiarity should be taken in future research in order to shed more light on how powers are balanced in practice in the EU. This approach submits for exploration the following hypothesis: the competences between the EU and its Member States are demarcated in daily practice by negotiating and balancing national discretionary powers, rather than defined through the legal framework and application of subsidiarity. In this view, two paths of research are proposed. The first identifies the Council, more specifically its de facto decision-making body, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), as an arena for using Member States’ national discretionary powers in the process of negotiating legislation at the ex ante EU law-making level. The second view suggests an analysis of how the powers are balanced at the ex post law-making level by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) when assessing the principle of proportionality and thereof the margin of discretion left to the Member States in protecting their national powers and interests. These two specific perspectives are to be placed in the broader perspective of achieving national interests while still contributing to the unity of EU law-making.

This article examines how the substantive changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty with regard to the scope and nature of Community competence and to decision-making rules in the field of the Common Commercial Policy fulfil the need for balancing internal and external action and stand up to the requirements of international economic regulation. It is argued that the Lisbon Treaty, building upon the premises of the current regime, constitutes a benchmark in the evolution of the Common Commercial Policy. The expansion of the scope of the Common Commercial Policy to trade in services, commercial aspects of intellectual property and, most importantly, foreign direct investment indicates that a common policy in the fields of goods, services, establishment and capital with regard to third countries is necessary in order to serve the goals of internal integration and to increase the competitiveness of Europe in the world. Furthermore, by “merging” the different aspects of the Common Commercial Policy and simplifying the provisions concerning the exercise of EU competence, the Lisbon Treaty ensures its effective application. However, the “merger” of the different aspects of the Common Commercial Policy does not affect the balance of powers that exists in the internal market with regard to the same areas of law. The only derogations from parallelism between internal and external powers concern the exclusive nature of EU competence and the role of the European Parliament. However, these are both necessary for preserving the effectiveness of Union policy and introducing legitimacy in the most important field of EU external relations.