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This article sketches a case for the importance of allowing and protecting civil disobedience in a democratic society. There are weighty reasons for non-enforcement of certain laws under certain circumstances, which undermines the legalistic claim that justice requires police to faithfully (try to) enforce all laws at all times. Furthermore, questions about how the police should respond to disobedient demonstrations are not settled by popular theoretical treatments of civil disobedience. Police responses to disobedient demonstrations should be guided by a principle of proportionality. This proportionality requirement is more stringent in cases of self-generated needs for self-defense. Common police tactics like "skirmish lines" predictably escalate interactions and create a need for further defensive force, thereby violating the proportionality requirement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ethics of policing currently neglects to provide a framework for analysing the morality of deliberate inactions to prevent harm, even though these are often adopted tactically by police as a means of preventing greater harms. In this paper we argue (a) that police have special moral obligations to prevent harm, grounded both in a contractarian account of police legitimacy and in the interpersonal morality of associations and (b) that police are morally culpable for failures to fulfil these special obligations when these are neither proportionate nor necessary to the prevention of greater crime-related harms. Our claims have implications both for the morality of policing and for its regulation and governance under human rights legislation, which we argue should be reformed so as to recognise police culpability not only for inflictions of harm, but also for failures to prevent it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper advocates for a general policy of penal leniency: judges should often sentence offenders to a punishment less severe than initially preferred. The argument's keystone is the relatively uncontroversial Minimal Invasion Principle (MIP). MIP says that when more than one course of action satisfies a state's legitimate aim, only the least invasive is permissibly pursued. I contend that MIP applies in two common sentencing situations. In the first, all sentences within a statutorily specified range are equally proportionate. Here MIP applies directly. In the second, judges reasonably believe that one of the sentences within the range is the most proportionate, but can't identify it with any certainty. In these cases of sentencing uncertainty, judges must be indifferent between their preferred sentence and a softer one, and this indifference triggers MIP. MIP thus frequently mandates some degree of leniency. I conclude with some comments on statistical uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers of criminal punishment disagree about whether infliction of punishment for negligence can be morally justified. One contending view holds that it cannot be because punishment requires culpability and culpability requires, at a minimum, advertence to the facts that make one's conduct wrongful. Larry Alexander and Kim Ferzan are prominent champions of this position. This essay challenges that view and their arguments for it. Invoking a conceptual distinction between an agent's being blameworthy for an act and their deserving punishment (or suffering) for that act, it explains that an agent can be blameworthy for negligent conduct, and thus liable to reasonable blaming practices, even if negligence is not culpable, hence not sufficient to ground negative desert. Turning from conceptual inquiry to substantive questions of political morality, it then argues that a faulty actor's lack of culpability does not render them immune from just punishment, but does significantly limit the severity of punishment that may be inflicted, for punishment should not be disproportionately severe relative to an agent's culpability in relation to wrongdoing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Efforts to apply the principle of proportionality to criminal sentences are notoriously problematic. But even though they are daunting, only a few legal philosophers believe we should give up trying to do so. Perhaps we can make progress overcoming some of the many legal difficulties by attending to how the principle is applied in non-legal contexts—that is, in contexts I call personal life. Proportionality, I believe, is an attractive principle in penal sentencing because it is an attractive principle in ordinary situations in which persons are sanctioned for wrongdoing. I briefly mention several familiar non-legal contexts in which sanctions have recently been imposed on celebrities or public figures for real or perceived wrongdoing. My hope is that sensitivity to how the principle of proportionality is interpreted in these contexts might facilitate efforts to apply this principle to sentencing domains. At first glance, proportionality as applied in non-legal contexts appears to differ from its penal analogue. I describe some of these alleged differences. Among the foremost is that judgments of proportionality in personal life often respond to how the transgressor has behaved apart from the particular incident that has attracted media attention. Penal sanctions, by contrast, are said to be imposed only for the particular crime(s) charged. I argue that this difference is more apparent than real. I conclude that we can reach a few modest insights about how to apply the principle of proportionality in criminal sentencing by attending to its counterpart in personal life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers of criminal punishment widely agree that criminal punishment should be "proportional" to the "seriousness" of the offense. But this apparent consensus is only superficial, masking significant dissensus below the surface. Proposed proportionality principles differ on several distinct dimensions, including: (1) regarding which offense or offender properties determine offense "seriousness" and thus constitute a proportionality relatum; (2) regarding whether punishment is objectionably disproportionate only when excessively severe, or also when excessively lenient; and (3) regarding whether the principle can deliver absolute ("cardinal") judgments, or only comparative ("ordinal") ones. This essay proposes that these differences cannot be successfully adjudicated, and one candidate proportionality principle preferred over its rivals, in the abstract; a proportionality principle only makes sense as an integrated part of a more complete justificatory theory of criminal punishment. It then sketches a proportionality principle that best fits the responsibility-constrained pluralist theories of criminal punishment that currently predominate. The proportionality principle it favors provides that punishments should not be disproportionately severe, in noncomparative terms, relative to an agent's culpability in relation to their wrongdoing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers have raised difficulties for any attempt to proportion punishment severity to crime seriousness. One reason for this may be that offering a full theory of proportionality is simply too ambitious. I suggest a more modest project: setting a lower bound on proportionate punishment. That is, I suggest a metric to measure when punishment is not disproportionately severe. I claim that punishment is not disproportionately severe if it imposes costs on a criminal wrongdoer which are no greater than the costs which they intentionally caused to others. I flesh out the implications of this Lower bound by discussing how to measure the costs of crime. Methodologically, I claim that different costs should be compared by considering preferences. Substantively, I claim that many proportionality judgements undercount the costs of crime by focusing only on the marginal and not the average cost. I suggest that we may hold defendants causally responsible for their contribution to the costs of that type of crime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the proportionate punishment for conduct that is neither harmful nor wrongful? A likely response to that is that one ought not to be punished at all for such conduct. It is, however, common for the state to punish harmless conduct the wrongfulness of which is not always apparent. Take, for example, the requirement that those who give investment advice for compensation do so only after registering as an investment advisor. Advising a person on how to invest his or her funds and accepting a fee for the advice without registering with the government does not seem harmful or wrongful, so long as no fraud is involved, the relevant parties understand the relevant risks, and so on. But practicing investment advising without registering is a crime for which one may be convicted and punished. When one thinks of crimes, paradigmatic offenses are crimes like murder, rape, and robbery, but offenses like failure to register as an investment advisor are different. But in what way? One standard explanation is the distinction between two types of offenses, malum in se and malum prohibitum. Some offenses, like murder, are wrongs "in themselves" ("in se") whereas other offenses, like investment advising without registering as an advisor, are wrongs because they have been prohibited ("prohibitum"). The question this Essay asks is how we should think about proportionality of punishment when punishing such mala prohibita offenses. This Essay presents a framework for such proportionality determinations and raises some challenges such a framework would need to confront. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the paper is to investigate how retributivists should respond to the apparent tension between moral desert and proportionality in punishment. I argue that rather than attempting to show that the term 'proportionate punishment' refers to whatever penal treatment the offender morally deserves, retributivists should maintain two things: first, that a punishment is proportionate when it is commensurate to the seriousness of the crime; second, that offenders morally deserve proportionate punishments. This view requires adopting a local theory of desert as opposed to a holistic one. In the second part of the paper, I argue that there are indeed good reasons to adopt a local theory of desert. Once retributivism is seen through the lens of local desert, there is no obvious mistake in saying that offenders morally deserve punishments that are proportionate to the seriousness of their crimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criminal theorists struggle to account for the "totality principle"—the idea that no matter how many small crimes you commit, your punishment should not exceed that for a more serious offense. Andrew Ashworth, for instance, argues that "overall proportionality" should be preserved but that this is a "pragmatic" solution. This paper argues that a retributivist can accept overall proportionality without abandoning her retributivism. I offer two lines of defense. The first is to show that the unit that we are aggregating may be more complex than first appears. The second relies on insights from the headaches versus lives literature, and how we should rescue one person dying before preventing one million people from headaches. The harms that we impose on others, and the harms that defendants suffer because of punishment, do not exist on one single scale. Hence, the true problem, I maintain, is not how culpability functions, but how our particular mode of punishment does. When we only have one primary mechanism to punish (particularly once we start aggregating)—put people in prison—then aggregating offenses appears as though it must quickly lead to numerous acts of littering being punished more than arson. With a more nuanced punitive response, we can punish minor offenses every time without surpassing the kinds of punishment we impose on more significant offenses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article details the degree to which the ideal of punishment proportional to desert forces changes in how we think of deontological morality. More specifically, the proportionality ideal forces us to abandon the simple, text-like view of deontological moral norms, and it forces us to acknowledge that those norms are not uniformly categorical in their force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theorists treat liberty as a great equalizer. We can't easily distribute equal welfare, but we can purport to distribute equal liberty. In fact, however, nothing about "equal liberty" is meaningfully equal. To demonstrate, I turn not to familiar cases of distributing positive goods but to the distribution of a negative good, namely carceral punishment. Many theorists believe we should impose proportional punishment by depriving offenders of liberty in proportion to their blameworthiness. In this manner, equally blameworthy offenders are said to receive equal punishment when incarcerated for the same period of time. Equal periods of incarceration do not yield equal punishments, however, because liberty cannot serve as the great equalizer theorists hope for. Pretending it can prevents us from justifying the full harms of punishment or leads to such counterintuitive results that it makes proportional punishment an unattractive goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I argue that punishment should be proportional to desert; that desert turns solely on culpability and not on results: that culpability is a function of what the actor perceives are the risks of his act to others' interests and the reasons he perceives that might justify, excuse, or aggravate taking those risks; that because culpability is a complex function, ordinally ranking acts in terms of culpability is quite difficult; that converting the ordinal ranking into cardinal measures of deserved punishment must perforce be controversial; and that deserved punishment, which is deserved suffering, must somehow deal with the fact that the actor may have already suffered undeservedly (or may have benefitted undeservedly). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I am very grateful to Justin Coates, Adina Roskies, and Costanza Porro for their thoughtful and challenging comments on my book, The Limits of Blame: Rethinking Punishment and Responsibility (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2018). My response is organized around their discussion of four main topics: moral competence, proportionality, restorative justice, and excessive punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I describe how our understanding of some of the central principles long held dear by most (but certainly not all) criminal theorists may have to be interpreted (or re-interpreted) in light of the need to devise lenient responses (that may or may not amount to punishments) for low-level offenders. Several of the most plausible suggestions for how to deal with minor infractions force us to take seriously some ideas that many legal philosophers have tended to resist elsewhere. I briefly touch upon four topics: (1) whether informal (that is, non-state responses) can substitute for or count against the appropriate state sanction; (2) the significance of repeat offending for sentencing; (3) whether punishment for culpable public wrongdoing has intrinsic value; and (4) the scope of police powers in a liberal democratic state. The context for this discussion is R. A. Duff's insightful examination of whether and under what conditions we should criminalize a public wrong or respond to it in some other manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay explores the case against strict liability offenses as part of the more general debate about proportional punishment. This debate takes on a very different look in light of a formal result derived by the authors elsewhere, that is briefly summarized and whose implications are pursued here. Traditional objections that consequentialists have mounted against the deontologists’/retributivists’ defense of proportionality fall by the wayside, but a new threat to the proportionality requirement replaces it: the ease with which any such requirement can be circumvented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Retributivism may seem wholly uninterested in the fit between penal policy and public opinion, but on one rendition of the theory, here called ‘popular retributivism,’ deserved punishments are constituted by the penal conventions of the community. This paper makes two claims against this view. First, the intuitive appeal of popular retributivism is undermined once we distinguish between context sensitivity and convention sensitivity about desert. Retributivism in general can freely accept context sensitivity without being committed to the stronger notion of convention sensitivity. Second, it is not obviously a merit of popular retributivism that it admits a gradual lowering of punishments by softening public opinion. Retributivists have reason to be skeptical of softening public opinion if it comes at the price of undermining the extent to which offenders are thought to deserve censure. In sum, in this paper, I argue that there are ways of making retributivism sensitive to public opinion without arriving at the conclusion that popular penal conventions should govern retributive justice itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With a focus on the Common Law jurisdiction of England and Wales and the Civil Law jurisdiction of Vietnam, this article provides an analytical framework to address the uncertain jurisprudence of minor offence processes. The article’s approach is to seek an account of crime and criminal process that is most suitable for practice and most compatible with the broad notion of ‘criminal charge’ under international human rights instruments. It is argued that minor offences should be considered forms of less serious crimes that are subject to short periods of imprisonment or non-custodial punishments and dealt with by summary procedures. The fragmentation of minor offences demands an approach to procedural pragmatism and procedural proportionality; that is, the procedure for each type of offence should be proportionate to the severity of punishment and fair as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With some qualifications, this article endorses Brian Leiter's argument that religious accommodation should not shift burdens from believers to non-believers. It argues that religious believers should take responsibility for their beliefs and for meeting the demands of their beliefs. It then examines the implications of that argument for British law on indirect discrimination (disparate impact) as it relates to religion or belief: burden-shifting from believers to employers and providers of goods and services should be deemed acceptable only insofar as the burden incurred by the employer or provider is 'insignificant'. Legal exemptions should satisfy a similar test. Why should there be religious accommodation at all, even if it entails no significant burden-shifting? The author agrees with Leiter in finding the most plausible answer in the claims of conscience rather than in general theories of equality or features special to religion. Those claims can reasonably be made in respect of liberty of conscience but also when conscience is merely disadvantaged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses the components of the presumption of innocence and tries to clarify some of the conceptual and logical difficulties surrounding the notion of 'innocence' and the structure of legal presumptions. It is argued that all conceivable literal interpretations of the maxim make little or no sense, and that the presumptions form is, as such, devoid of original content: presumptions do not explain nor justify anything but are auxiliary norms which refer to the legal consequences spelled out in other norms. Therefore, the presumption of innocence can be used to express any kind of requirement and standard for the criminal process and the treatment of suspect citizens only in a tautological, albeit rhetorically forceful, way. This instrumental use of the presumption of innocence is theoretically without merit but can be practically beneficial as long as there is no developed system of fundamental rights and protections of individual freedoms in a given legal order. Finally, a functional understanding of the presumption of innocence is proposed which gives it an original, though limited field of application as a guarantee of the procedure itself, in particular of the openness of the outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a retributive argument against punishment, where punishment is understood as going beyond condemnation or censure, and requiring hard treatment. The argument sets out to show that punishment cannot be justified. The argument does not target any particular attempts to justify punishment, retributive or otherwise. Clearly, however, if it succeeds, all such attempts fail. No argument for punishment is immune from the argument against punishment proposed here. The argument does not purport to be an argument only against retributive justifications of punishment, and so leave open the possibility of a sound non-retributive justification of punishment. Punishment cannot be justified, the paper argues, because it cannot be demonstrated that any punishment, no matter how minimal, is not a disproportionate retributive response to criminal wrongdoing. If we are to hold onto proportionality-that is, proportionality as setting a limit to morally permissible punishment-then punishment is morally impermissible. The argument is a retributive argument against punishment insofar as a just retributive response to wrongdoing must be proportionate to the wrongdoing. The argument, that is, is concerned with proportionality as a retributive requirement. The argument against punishment is set out on the basis of a familiar version of the 'anchoring problem', according to which it is the problem of determining the most severe punishment to anchor or ground the punishment scale. To meet the possible criticism that we have chosen a version of the anchoring problem particularly favourable to our argument, various alternative statements of the anchoring problem are considered. Considering such statements also provides a more rounded view of the anchoring problem. One such alternative holds that the punishment scale must be anchored not just in the most severe punishment, but in the least severe punishment as well. Other alternatives hold that it is necessary and sufficient to anchor the punishment scale in any two punishments, neither of which needs to be the most or least severe punishment. A further suggestion is that one anchoring point anywhere along the punishment scale is sufficient, because it is possible to 'project' from such a point, so as to determine the correlative punishments for all other crimes, and so derive a complete punishment scale. Finally, the suggestion is considered that one can approach the issue of a punishment scale 'holistically', denying any distinction between anchoring and derived (or 'projected') punishments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The doctrine of proportionality seeks to limit arbitrary and capricious punishment in order to ensure that offenders are punished according to their ‘just desert’. In Australian sentencing law, proportionality goes some way toward achieving this ‘balanced’ approach by requiring a court to consider various and often competing interests in formulating a sentence commensurate with offence seriousness and offender culpability. Modification of sentencing law by the introduction of victim impact statements or the requirement that sentencing courts take explicit account of the harm done to the victim and community has generated debate, however, as to the extent to which offenders may be now subject to unjustified, harsher punishments. This article proposes that in order to overcome the controversy of the modification of offender and victim rights in sentencing, sentencing courts adhere to a doctrine of proportionality that is explicitly sensitive to the needs of victims and offenders in a model of restorative justice that focuses on the consequences of crime as against the individual, rather than the state. The extent to which proportionality, as the current constitutive principle of Australian sentencing law, may be modified to better encourage a dialogue between victim and offender is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I attempt to describe the several costs that criminal theory would be forced to pay by adopting the view (currently fashionable among moral philosophers) that the intentions of the agent are irrelevant to determinations of whether his actions are permissible (or criminal). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]