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Questions about when it is right for police forces to investigate alleged offences committed in the more or less distant past have become increasingly pressing. Recent widely publicized cases of child sexual abuse (CSA) and exploitation, sometimes involving high profile individuals, have illustrated the ethical, psychological, and forensic complexities of investigating non-recent child sexual abuse. Hannah Maslen and Colin Paine have developed the Oxford CSA Framework to assist police to weigh the various ethical considerations that militate for and against initiating a CSA investigation. While such a tool is to be welcomed, and while there is much that is helpful in Maslen and Paine’s approach, we suggest that the Oxford CSA framework could be strengthened. Our first suggestion is to abandon a proposed distinction between a set of considerations that is said to generate a “presumption” in favor of investigation and other considerations that may supplement or oppose this presumption. Our second suggestion is to review the weightings applied to the considerations within the model, which lack clear justification and create problematic effects. Finally, we suggest that referring the Oxford CSA Framework to a panel with lived and professional experience of CSA could serve important procedural justice goals and enhance the Framework’s recommendations.

The killings of Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, Alton Sterling, Philando Castile, and others have instigated widespread debate concerning the ethics and politics of police b...

This article is a companion to an article by the same author in issue 33.3 of Criminal Justice Ethics on the question of the standard by which the severity of punishment is determined to be proportional to the seriousness of the crime for which it is inflicted. Its chief argument is that basing the determination on what the offender deserves to suffer is morally problematic because it conflicts with principles of humanity that call for our taking the good of human beings as our end. By contrast, it is also argued, basing the determination on promoting public safety or preserving civil order is not similarly problematic because punishment inflicted to serve either of these ends is compatible with principles of humanity. The article concludes with a comment on how the harsh sentencing laws enacted in the United States in the past 40 years should be seen as a product of the former mode of determining punishment and not the latter.

In this paper my concern is with the collective moral responsibility of criminal investigators for the outcomes of their investigations, bearing in mind that it is important to distinguish collecti ...

For any profession, establishing codes of ethics that are both practically relevant and up to date is an ongoing challenge. Law enforcement is no exception to this as agencies are faced with an evolving modern environment. With changes in technology, types of policing, and sources of societal conflict there is a potential array of new or evolving ethical considerations that confront the profession. Attempts to distill and prescribe law enforcement ethics at the international level have resulted in the creation of the “Law Enforcement Code of Conduct” of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the “Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials” of the United Nations (U.N.). However, both these codes were created decades ago, so they do not cover some of the more contemporary ethical issues that have arisen. This article compares the content of the IACP and UN codes and identifies a range of ethical issues either absent or insufficiently addressed. Normative themes and issues are organi...

An integrity system is an assemblage of institutional entities, mechanisms, and procedures whose purpose is to ensure compliance with minimum ethical standards and to promote the pursuit of ethical...

On 26 March 20091, I introduced in the U.S. Senate a piece of legislation designed to establish a National Criminal Justice Commission. The Presidential level blue-ribbon commission would be charge...

(2006). Commentary: Disabled prisoners and reasonable accommodation”. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 2-55.

In loving memory of Louis Pojman (1935-2005) One view about police gratuities that has acquired the status of ethical dogma is that their acceptance violates policing's "democratic ethos." This position was first expressed in 1985 by Michael Feldberg, (1) and has become one of the least-contested arguments against police gratuities. I believe the argument to be both highly original for its time, and well-intentioned, but also a victim of its own significant intuitive appeal. That Feldberg's argument has this appeal has meant that it has not been analytically parsed out to reveal its moving parts and assumptions. I will argue that when we do this, we find that the "democratic ethos" argument makes several important assumptions that are worth examining closely. I will consider how the implied reasoning behind Feldberg's arguments might be more systematically restated, and how it responds to a variety of critiques as a result. I believe that some of the challenges it faces are serious. Nonetheless, police gratuities remain problematic. I will offer an alternative, prudential rationale for prohibiting their acceptance, but conclude by suggesting that, to accord with both the philosophy of community policing and the tightly-held sensibilities of many police officers, the acceptance of gratuities of de minimis value be permitted provided that officers are thoroughly and effectively trained in the potential hazards of accepting them. The Narrow and Broad Conceptions of a Democratic Ethos The democratic ethos argument can be interpreted narrowly or broadly. The narrow conception does a lot of work, but it does it in a wide range of cases that are not likely to be very controversial, and so I consider it more briefly than the broad conception. This conception entails that it is ethically wrong for a person to intentionally offer the police gratuities in order to get either enhanced service in the form of their increased presence or a pass on minor violations that might otherwise be enforced, such as not ticketing the double-parked customers of the store that routinely offers the gratuity. In cases such as these, Feldberg correctly asserts that "bribes and payoffs serve precisely the same function as gratuities: they are rewards to the officer for his or her willingness to perform--or not perform--duties according to the wishes of the payer." (2) For example, it is wrong for a cafe owner to entice police officers to her shop by offering them free coffee and pastries in the hope that these officers will not issue tickets to double-parked customers who run into her store to pick up a few items. As a police officer working in crime-ridden areas in Brooklyn, I have been offered discounted food by business owners and frankly told that "it's great to see police officers in here. It lets criminals know that this is a place not to mess around with." To accept gratuities offered with this rationale would violate a democratic ethos because police resources are a social good paid for from the common purse of a democratic government. People should not be able to garner additional service because they have the resources to pay a surcharge in the form of gratuities. It is even more serious an ethical transgression to overlook minor violations of the law because one feels indebted to the giver of a gratuity. It is true that the violations we most often think of are indeed the ones over which officers have substantial discretion, such as parking and moving violations. If an officer accepts discounted food or free beverages from a shopowner, this introduces two potential problems. One of them is the simple one of a feeling of indebtedness to the person who gives you things for free, along the lines of the maxim that "there is no such thing as a free lunch." The other problem is that the actual giving of a gratuity--the act of proffering something to eat or drink--is only one small component of the exchange that actually takes place. …

It is flattering to be invited to respond to critics of my previous work in Criminal Justice Ethics, (1) and it would be even more flattering were those critics not so critical, or were my work truly original. The position I have taken with regard to police accepting gifts and gratuities was not originally mine but was based on many earlier discussions of the topic. I have repeatedly noted that the agency in which I served in the 1970s allowed its officers to accept small gifts and taught us to distinguish them from the conditional gratuities that the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) code taught us to reject. As I examined these matters as a graduate student, I found arguments and evidence in support of this position in the views of such distinguished criminal justice scholars as Dorothy Heid Bracey, Herman Goldstein, and Albert J. Reiss, Jr. This is not to say that they openly advocated the position I took, but what they and others presented in their reasoned discussions fortified me in staking out the position I did in 1988, defended again in 1994, (2) and still support. Primary among my theoretical predecessors is Bracey. She wrote about why corruption persists in spite of a broad consensus against it and serious efforts to eradicate it. (3) She saw that gratuities serve functions beyond the improper personal enrichment of corrupted officials, such as agency solidarity and good relations with some elements of the public. She seemed quite able to distinguish gratitude from corruption, and still recognizes the value of gift exchange in building and solidifying good police-community relations. (4) This viewpoint has been supported by Joseph A. Schafer and others as they see the value of acceptance of minor gratuities within community policing efforts. (5) For example, Herman Goldstein saw some gratuities as sincere expressions of appreciation for lawful services appropriately rendered. (6) Even Edwin Delattre, who is clearly outspoken in his opposition to gratuities, (7) acknowledged that the "slippery slope" was not inevitable and that some forms of hospitality shown to police were not wrongful: My experience leads me to conclude that, for some police, the small kindness--like making fresh coffee when the police arrive in the middle of the night--is just that. It is not like a tip for a bellhop, and is not the beginning of a slippery slope. Since the intentions of the restaurant personnel are often equally innocent, police acceptance and appreciation are not illicit. (8) Reiss was an early researcher on police violations of law and regulations, supervising ride-along observational studies of actual police behavior. (9) His observers witnessed few serious violations of law, but did see a substantial number of violations of police anti-gratuities policies: Many businessmen in a community engage in exchanges or practices with police officers that from the standpoint of the law could bring charges of bribery. A variety of such practices were uncovered in our observations of the police including almost daily free meals, or cigarettes, the profferment of gifts marking anniversaries and holidays, and discounts on purchases. Such practices are specifically prohibited by the rules and regulations of any police department and subject to disciplinary action if "officially" discovered. (10) His observational data confirmed my own more limited personal police experiences. I knew that minor gifts and gratuities were commonplace in my agency and in the agencies I studied in researching my dissertation. Those establishments not offering them were few, and the very few officers not taking them were clearly the exceptions. The exchanges matched Reiss's carefully worded description about a "profferment" of gifts, and not a solicitation of gifts, although it would be shamefully naive to believe that police officers never solicit such gifts. The Knapp Commission's 1972 report addressed various payments to police, observing that "[a] third category of payments to the police is that of gratuities, which the Commission feels cannot in the strictest sense be considered a matter of police corruption, but which has been included here [in the report] because it is a related--and ethically borderline--practice, which is prohibited by Department regulations, and which often leads to corruption. …

(2003). Policing the brass: A case study in command malfeasance. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 32-37.

What William Giannetti describes is, on the surface at least, not a case of criminal justice ethics but of crime plain and simple. Though I shall eventually discuss some ethical issues, I must first focus on the crimes, in part because they lead to the ethical issues, but also because much in the story is less clear than it initially appears. On February 12, 1998, about 11 p.m., Philadelphia Police Captain James Brady, off duty, left a bar (apparently) drunk, got into his department-issued Grand Fury, and headed home. The moment his car entered the street he was guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), a summary offense punishable by a fine of no more than $300, imprisonment for no more than ninety days, or both. (1) Brady had no justification or excuse for driving that night. He could have left his car at the bar and taken a cab instead. Cabs are easy to get in Philadelphia and well within the means of a police captain. A few blocks from the bar Brady collided with a parked car, causing substantial damage both to his car and to the Honda Civic he hit. He was, that is, involved in an accident. He left the scene of the accident almost immediately ("as soon as it was safe to do so"). He later claimed to have checked to make sure no one was injured, but there is no way to verify that he did and, given other facts, some reason to doubt it. He did not claim that he left his name and address on the Civic, that he called in the accident on his police radio, or that he did anything else others could verify. He seems to have behaved like a scared drunk, not like an experienced police officer. Whether he checked for injuries or not, he did not do what the law requires in case of a traffic accident. Where no one is injured, "hit and run" is a summary offense as serious as DUI. (2) Brady did, however, switch on his hazard lights and drive slowly after the accident, so slowly in fact that his driving caught the attention of Philadelphia police. Officer Colon pulled Brady over within a few blocks of the accident. Following standard procedure, Colon notified police radio that he was stopping a car. The stop was now part of the official record and Colon would have to turn in a report on it. Also following standard procedure, the dispatcher sent a backup, Officer Yatcilla. Meanwhile, Colon approached the stopped car. As he did, Brady got out of the car and identified himself with his captain's badge, not with his civilian driver's license. Why Brady chose to identify himself with his badge is not stated. The obvious inference, especially among police, is that he was asking for special treatment, the "professional courtesy" due a fellow officer. Colon may have responded as Brady expected. Seeing that Brady's walk was "wobbly," his speech "slurred," and his pants "wet around the inseam" (that is, the crotch), Colon radioed for a supervisor. There are two (more or less compatible) interpretations of this act. One is that Colon radioed for a supervisor because he did not want to take responsibility for charging a police captain with DUI. He might have reasoned, "when in doubt, call in a supervisor." The other interpretation is that Colon was merely following ordinary practice for DUI. Colon had neither the authority to make the final determination of drunkenness nor a way to test for blood alcohol. Since he had radioed in the stop, his only (legitimate) alternative to calling in a supervisor was to write a report explaining why he let the captain go. There could be no DUI charge without a blood alcohol test, and only a supervisor could authorize taking a motorist to a hospital for a test. (3) Within a few minutes, Lieutenant DiLacqua, a 25-year veteran of the force, arrived. He ordered Yatcilla to place the car against a pillar, radioed in an "auto accident" involving a "fixed object," and then ordered Colon to write a report indicating that Brady had swerved to avoid an oncoming car, mounted the sidewalk, and struck the pillar. …

(2003). Commentary / The place of positive discipline. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 50-53.

(2003). On the decriminalization of drugs. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 30-33.

(2001). Commentary: Imprisoning the Mentally Ill: Does it Matter? Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 2-66.

(2000). Commentary: Miranda, Dickerson, and the problem of actual innocence. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 2-55.

(1999). Declaring life at the crossroads of death: Victims’ anti‐death penalty views and prosecutors’ charging decisions. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 41-57.

(1998). The liberal critique of the harm principle. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 3-18.

There is likely to be a genuine process of moral awareness and sensitization involved in this task [of teaching criminal justice ethics] ... with.., the effect ... of "conscientizing" and "empowering" those who engage in such activity. -- John Kleinig(1) The Supreme Court is really the keeper of the conscience. And the conscience is the Constitution. -- Justice William O. Douglas(2) How may we teach criminal justice ethics so as to avoid both excessively abstract and mundane curricula while eschewing sterile moral guidance by either indoctrination or indifference? Informed by a literature on public interest ethics and constitutionalism, I wish to posit a constitutional public interest approach that may help to resolve debates on the teaching of criminal justice ethics. Traditional approaches to moral instruction have a tendency either to indoctrinate students or to take a so-called neutral approach.(3) Both fail to "conscientize" criminal justice students adequately to moral practices.(4) Further, traditional approaches to moral instruction tend to be excessively abstract or mundane when applied to criminal justice ethics.(5) For though ethics courses now abound in criminal justice curricula,(6) they are everywhere in the chains of approaches that either take an abstruse "high road," a mundane "low road," or at best an incomplete "middle road."(7) High Road, Low Road, Middle Road The "high road" offers the wonderfully rich literature of philosophy, humanistic psychology, and the social sciences on ethics. Building logically upon centuries of sustained inquiry, it can render a systematic understanding of current moral "conscientizing" through contemporary phenomenology, ordinary language philosophy, pragmatism, and other currents of thought. And it can overcome the abuses of indoctrination or indifference in moral inquiry. Although this literature enriches all inquiry into ethics, it is an overwhelming challenge to students and faculty in a one-term course. In a recent survey, criminal justice ethics faculty complained that this highly general material was too difficult for students.(8) Another interpretation of the same survey data summarized this as faculty frustration in "getting students to appreciate abstract theories."(9) The high road could be made more teachable were criminal justice undergraduates required to complete several courses in philosophy in preparation for the study of ethics. Other disciplines (for example, public administration) have toyed with such curricular notions but have found that a sequence of several courses in philosophy, humanistic psychology, and so forth would require up to an additional year of academic study and that these courses were therefore unlikely to be accepted as curricular additions. Similarly, given the demands upon our undergraduate curriculum, we are unlikely to offer courses in general or moral philosophy as prerequisites to applied ethics study. Further, out-sourcing such courses to a philosophy or political science department would run the very real risk of a wholly irrelevant curriculum. In any case, such courses are simply unthinkable in our police and corrections academies and training programs. But the rigors of the high road demand that ethics study be founded upon and related to broad understandings of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, linguistics, psychology, and social and political theory. This is what makes the high road both wonderful and frustrating. It is imprudent, however, to demand such a broad pre-requisite understanding of undergraduate criminal justice majors, much less of professionals in police or corrections academies. The micro-smattering of philosophy that is now taught in criminal justice ethics courses is unfair to the students and to philosophy itself. Although the graduate education of future scholars and educators in criminal justice ethics must include such broad understandings, we must provide some other foundation for the basic course in ethics for criminal justice professionals. …

John Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. viii + 335pp.

(1996). Commentary: The death penalty: A personal view. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 2-75.

Introduction Since the end of the Cold War, much of the attention of citizens and politicians in the United States has swiveled inward upon other issues of life and death, in particular the crime and violence on their own streets. Cries for action in this domestic arena appear to be growing, as evidenced by the past decade's call to arms in a so-called war against drugs and by Washington's recent, torrid advocacy for a crime bill and for more police officers in the "war" against crime. Indeed, such trends have led one observer to remark credibly: "We are a nation at war with ourselves: a civil war. The war of law enforcement against the forces of crime."(1) At the same time, however, several highly-publicized incidents, which may or may not have arisen from such an aggressive approach to dealing with crime, have provoked public alarm and scrutiny; and therefore reflection and assessment is called for to consider whether and how this kind of "war" ought to be waged. One notorious incident involved an African-American male named Rodney King. While driving on the evening of March 3,1991, King was pulled over by and had a confrontation with Los Angeles police officers, who proceeded to arrest him on a number of charges. On the surface this sort of incident occurs frequently and could have been reported as a routine traffic arrest, except for the additional fact that it was filmed by a bystander with a video camera. Indeed, the video showed all who watched the replays on the news media how several of fifteen uniformed officers repeatedly beat, bruised, and lacerated King. Although shocking to many Americans, one criminal justice expert writes: "That beating was not unique in the history of policing. It probably has kin in every state in the Union, in every country, and indeed in every significant police force as far back as we can trace the police function."(2) To be sure, considering the prevalence of violence in our culture, and given the rote adoption of the "war" model or paradigm for law enforcement by the government, such incidents are likely to be less rare. In fact, researchers estimate that police officers kill about 600 criminal suspects yearly, shoot and wound an additional 1,200, and fire at and miss another 1,800.(3) This being the case, the issue of the use of force, especially deadly force, by law enforcement officials in the performance of their duties deserves vigilant scrutiny. How are such uses of force justified and restrained? Is there a uniform approach? What model for restraint would be most appropriate for law enforcement in the U.S.? If police forces are in a war against crime, how do they determine when to use force and when it is excessive? What can prevent another Rodney King incident from happening? Is there a way to restrain the use of force among our police, and if so, what is its ethical basis? Such questions are certainly formidable and are attracting, in the light of incidents like King's, a burgeoning interest and attention which is evident among social scientists, criminologists, and increasingly, philosophers. For example, criminal justice ethicist Lawrence Sherman proposes that, on the one hand, many issues in police ethics are "in fact clear-cut, and hold little room for serious philosophical analysis," while on the other hand, the use of force deserves such attention since it is "very complex, with many shades of gray."(4) Furthermore, Sherman sweepingly asserts: "The most basic question of all criminal justice ethics, of course, is whether and under what conditions one can reconcile doing harm to others with our widespread norms against harm."(5) At this juncture, he muses that the literature on pacifism, non-violence, and conscientious objection may be relevant, but adds that he has unfortunately not seen such an approach applied to the domestic use of force by police. Moreover, he queries: "Can a pacifist be a police officer or a judge? Can a Christian? Can a Rawlsian? …

This paper reports an Australian study of public attitudes to police gratuities. Police ethics have become a major public concern in Australia following corruption scandals in the 1970s and 1980s. Elsewhere, studies of police ethics have associated serious corruption, such as protection rackets, with the apparently less serious issue of the acceptance of gratuities. Much of the writing on police gratuities involves philosophical analysis with some speculation about public views - usually favoring the author's opinion. in response to the absence of empirical data on public attitudes to the issue, a survey was conducted covering a range of questions about perceptions of the ethical standing of gifts to police.(1) The results of the survey support the claim of many theorists that acceptance of gratuities undermines public confidence in the impartiality of the police and is incompatible with the concept of democratic policing. The literature indicates that although official police guidelines reflect public opinion, police attitudes and practices frequently do not. Police administrators need to find more effective means of fulfilling community expectations in this area. Police Attitudes to the Acceptance of Gratuities Most police departments now explicitly prohibit gratuities in statements of ethics. The peak body, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, has completely rejected gratuities in its Law Enforcement Code of Ethics. The Code states, in part, that, "I will enforce the law courteously and appropriately without fear or favor, malice or ill will, never employing unnecessary force or violence and never accepting gratuities."(2) The main rationale for this position is that gratuities threaten the impartiality of police operations. This is elaborated in the Canon of Ethics for Police Officers. Article 9, "Gifts and Favors," states that The law enforcement officer, representing government, bears the heavy responsibility of maintaining, in his own conduct, the honour and integrity of all governmental institutions. He shall, therefore, guard against placing himself in a position which any person can reasonably assume that special consideration is being given. Thus, he should be firm in refusing gifts, favors, or gratuities, large or small, which can, in the public mind, be interpreted as capable of influencing his judgment in the discharge of his duties.(3) In opposition to the official view, the feeling on the part of many police is that gratuities are an acceptable part of the job. An advocate of police discretion in the area of gratuities, former police officer Kania, illustrates the situation from his experience: Like most police officers who have completed a modern, progressive police academy program I knew the conventional ethical standard obliged me to forgo taking any gratuities. When I arrived on the street, paired with a veteran officer, I was quickly shown that the supposed unethical behavior was the social norm for the police and the merchants alike.(4) In a recent study by Barker, a majority of police expressed willingness to report serious misconduct by fellow officers, but very few were willing to report the receipt of gratuities, even though it involved violation of department regulations.(5) A similar result was found by Miller and Braswell, who classified recruit views on accepting free coffee and meals at restaurants as "less ethical" on an ethical continuum, with a slight deterioration in standards on the part of serving officers.(6) Felkenes' study of police ethics produced a different result. Only 17% of police agreed that "it is not wrong for an officer to accept small gifts from the public." Twenty-one percent were neutral and 62% disagreed.(7) Hyams found that 45% of officers believed gratuities were acceptable compared to 21% of recruits.(8) This is in accord with the commonly observed reduction in the initially high public service ideals of recruits, a change which begins in training and continues into service. …

(1994). Emotions, reason, and character. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 83-92.

(1992). Penalty enhancement for hate crimes. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 3-6.

(1992). Bias crimes: What do haters deserve? Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 20-23.

(1992). Commentary: Why we should establish a police code of ethics. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 2-100.

(1992). First amendment challenges to hate crime legislation: Where's the speech? Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 6-20.

(1992). Commentary: The lex talionis before and after criminal law. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 2-62.

(1991). Discretion, punishment, and juvenile justice. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 3-7.

(1991). A note on the death penalty as the best bet. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 7-10.

(1991). The orthodox model of the criminal offense. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 20-23.

(1991). The actus reus requirement: A qualified defense. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 11-17.

(1990). Crime, minorities, and the social contract. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 16-24.

(1990). The ACLU philosophy and the right to abuse the unborn. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 48-51.

(1998). Commentary: Why drug legalization should be opposed. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 2-2.

(1986). Constructing a theory of impossible attempts. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 53-69.

(1984). Lawyer‐client confidences under the A.B.A. model rules: Ethical rules without ethical reason. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 3-8.

(1986). Undercover operations: Some moral questions about S.804. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 16-22.

(1984). Bibliographical essay / legal positivism, natural law, and the Hart/Dworkin debate. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 68-85.

(1982). Frustration: The mold of judicial philosophy. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 20-26.

(1984). Confidentiality, rules, and codes of ethics. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 8-14.

(1987). Marxist ideology, communist reality, and the concept of criminal justice. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 3-29.

(1988). Should we tell the police to say “yes” to gratuities? Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 37-49.

(1983). Commentary: Defending the indigent in capital cases. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 2-66.

(1987). The insanity defense, innocent threats, and limited alternatives. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 61-76.

(1986). Punishment, the criminal law, and Christian social ethics. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 31-54.

(1989). Commentary: Ethics in public service: Higher standards and double standards. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 2-83.