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In the context of its 40th anniversary, this article analyses how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has sought to deal with the problem of drug production, trafficking and consumption in Southeast Asia. Reviewing more than three decades of cooperation, it asks whether an international regime against the illicit trafficking and abuse of drugs has been established in the region under the auspices of ASEAN. In particular, the paper discusses the ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD) as an attempt to create a framework of multilateral cooperation. It argues however that it is still premature today to characterise existing regional consultations as a working anti-drug regime. The existing cooperative structure has remained a loose forum for information sharing despite the strong Chinese involvement that has deepened consultations since the late 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines recent trends that have incrementally transformed the US-Philippine alliance as a hedge against an ascending China. It traces the revival of the alliance in the face of China's military modernization and expansionism in the South China Sea in the mid- 1990s. It then discusses the revitalization of the US-Philippine alliance post-9/11 in the fight against global terrorism before moving on to discuss China's attempts to drive a wedge between the two allies through its soft-power diplomacy. The US has deepened its security relations with the Philippines through the provision of military and economic assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), regular consultations and defence policy reviews between the two countries' defence departments, the conduct of combined military exercises and the implementation of new defence initiatives such as the Security Engagement Board (SEB) and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs). In conclusion, the article argues that the deepening of the alliance has two implications: first, it ensures that the US will remain the Philippines' sole strategic ally for the foreseeable future; and second, that the alliance has been transformed into a hedge against the challenge of growing Chinese power in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rivalry within interdependence is possible. Trade and investment ties alone are not sufficient to bring peace and security to a relationship, the responsiveness of the political leadership to economic interdependence is critical. Responsiveness can be influenced by a history of conflict in a relationship, national ambitions or by a military which espouses expansionist plans. Britain and Germany before 1914 demonstrated that interdependence and rivalry can coexist and may degenerate into war. This can happen when one side under the influence of a dominant military falsely assumes that the other would be constrained by interdependence from responding to its military action. Both Japan and China have become bound by a tight economic interdependence despite their historical animosities. These animosities could be exacerbated by military modernization and China's plans to develop a naval capability to protect its sealanes. Japan would be prompted to respond to the development of Chinese naval power which would aggravate existing rivalry with Beijing. To reduce the impact of this rivalry both ASEAN and the United States should clearly signal to Beijing that military action over Taiwan or naval expansion without transparency would be unacceptable. Otherwise false assumptions would arise in Beijing that interdependence would constrain responses to China's risk taking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent changes of government in Australia and Japan, and a pending one in the United States, signifies a historical crossroads in these three allies' security politics in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, all three countries have tended to rationalize their strategic collaboration on the need to build innovative and competitive-oriented "strategic geometries" as a means to counter China's growing power and to meet new types of threats in the region. Yet the Australian Government under John Howard simultaneously pursued a hedging strategy, exploiting its growing economic relationship with China while strengthening its diplomatic and strategic profile with the United States. Despite Tokyo's own substantial economic relationship with Beijing, recent Japanese leaders were unable to pursue the same type of "dual track" strategy to the same extent as Howard. With Kevin Rudd's election as the new Australian Prime Minister and Yasuo Fukuda's ascent to power in Japan, prospects for Australia and Japan to cultivate more independent politico-security ties with Beijing have strengthened. If so, the evolving regional security postures of both these US allies may compel the United States to reassess its own traditional skepticism towards multilateral security groupings in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]