16 results
Search Results
2. Part I: U.S. Policy on "One China".
- Author
-
Kan, Shirley A.
- Subjects
CHINA-United States relations ,GOVERNMENT policy ,INTERNATIONAL relations ,LANGUAGE & languages - Abstract
The article examines the "one China" policy from the perspective of the U.S. Congressional push for changes in policy is discussed in relation to conflicting views and concern over cross-strait tension. Five key documents on U.S. policy statements on Taiwan are identified including the Shanghai Communique, Normalization Communique and Taiwan Relations Act. Complications about the language are discussed involving the definition of China, Taiwan' status and the possible use of force by China.
- Published
- 2013
3. China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy--Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.
- Author
-
Kan, Shirley A.
- Subjects
GOVERNMENT policy ,INTERNATIONAL relations ,CHINA-United States relations ,AMBIGUITY - Abstract
The article discusses the 2013 report from the Congressional Research Service on the "one China Policy" of the U.S. as it impacts China and Taiwan. A summary is provided which emphasized the ambiguity and susceptibility of the U.S. "one China" policy to different interpretations. Topics discussed include congressional concerns over this policy, and highlights of key statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. A chart summarizes cabinet-level visits to Taiwan after 1979.
- Published
- 2013
4. Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations.
- Author
-
Manyin, Mark E.
- Subjects
BOUNDARY disputes ,JAPANESE politics & government - Abstract
The article offers information on the dispute of China, Taiwan and Japan over the ownership of Senkaku Island (SI), in addition to the obligation of the U.S. to intercede due to a 1960 security agreement it signed with Japan. It discusses the administration of SI by the Japanese government and the presence of an estimated 50,000 American troops at bases throughout Japan. It examines the view of the U.S. on the claims of the dispute.
- Published
- 2013
5. Part I: U.S. Policy on "One China".
- Author
-
Kan, Shirley A.
- Subjects
CHINA-United States relations ,INTERNATIONAL relations - Abstract
The article discusses the history of the "one China" policy as it pertains to the U.S. as of June 2011. It states that the issue began in 1971 under former U.S. president Richard Nixon, when the People's Republic of China (PRC) made the "one China" policy a condition for creating ties with other countries. It reports that in the 1990s, the U.S. assisted Taiwan during military exercises in the region with Congressional approval, causing tensions with China, which remain to date.
- Published
- 2011
6. Part II: Highlights of Key Statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.
- Author
-
Kan, Shirley A.
- Subjects
CHINA-Taiwan relations ,INTERNATIONAL relations - Abstract
The article presents the transcripts of conversations and dictums between the U.S. and Chinese leaders regarding the "one China" policy as it pertains to Taiwan. It presents both individual speeches, transcripts of conversations, as well as televised proceedings, from 1971 till 2011. Those quoted include former U.S. presidents Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan, as well as China's Chairman Mao Zedong, President Chiang Ching-kuo, and Marshal Ye Jianying.
- Published
- 2011
7. China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy--Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.
- Author
-
Kan, Shirley A.
- Subjects
CHINA-United States relations ,TAIWAN-United States relations ,INTERNATIONAL relations - Abstract
The article discusses the U.S.' relationship with Taiwan and China. It states that prior to 1971, the U.S. recognized only Taiwan, but when it acknowledged China in 1978, it set up a non-diplomatic arrangement with Taiwan. It reports that this was to accede to China's demand that it had sovereignty over Taiwan, without having to compromise the latter's independence. It states that as of June 2011, the U.S. still has no official stance on the issue regarding the one China policy.
- Published
- 2011
8. Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990: RL30957.
- Author
-
Kan, Shirley A.
- Subjects
SECURITY Assistance Program ,DEFENSE industries ,TAIWAN-United States relations - Abstract
This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. Congress has oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, which has governed arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Two other relevant parts of the "one China" policy are the August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the "Six Assurances" to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. The United States also has expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996. However, there is no defense treaty with Taiwan. At the U.S.-Taiwan arms sales talks on April 24, 2001, President George W. Bush approved for possible sale diesel-electric submarines, P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the submarine sale), four decommissioned U.S. Kidd-class destroyers, and other items. Bush also deferred decisions on Aegis-equipped destroyers and other items, while denying other requests. Afterward, attention turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian officials, and legislators from competing political parties debated contentious issues about how much to spend on defense and which U.S. weapons systems to acquire, despite the increasing threat (including a missile buildup) from the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as described in the Pentagon's reports to Congress on PRC military power. In February 2003, the Administration pointed Taiwan to three priorities for defense: command and control, missile defense, and ASW. Some in the United States questioned Taiwan's seriousness about its self-defense, level of defense spending, and protection of secrets. The Pentagon broadened its focus from Taiwan's arms purchases to its regular defense budget, readiness for self-defense, and critical infrastructure protection. Blocked by the Kuomintang (KMT) party in the Legislative Yuan (LY) that opposed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)'s president (2000-2008), the Special Budget (not passed) for submarines, P-3C ASW aircraft, and PAC-3 missile defense systems was cut from $18 billion in 2004 to $9 billion (for submarines only) in 2005. In March 2006, Taiwan's defense minister requested a 2006 Supplemental Defense Budget (not passed) in part for submarine procurement, P-3Cs, and PAC-2 upgrades (not new PAC-3 missiles). In June 2007, the LY passed Taiwan's 2007 defense budget with funds for P-3C planes, PAC-2 upgrades, and F-16C/D fighters. In December 2007, the LY approved $62 million to start the sub design phase. After the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou became President in May 2008, Taiwan retained the requests but has cut the defense budgets. Attention also turned to U.S. decisions on pending arms sales. In 2008, congressional concerns mounted about a suspected "freeze" in President Bush's notifications to Congress on arms sales. On October 3, 2008, Bush finally notified Congress. However, he submitted six of the eight pending programs (not a "package") for a combined value of $6.5 billion. Despite the concerns in 2008, President Obama continued that process to decide on submissions for congressional review at one time (on January 29, 2010) five programs with a total value of $6.4 billion. Presidents Bush and Obama did not notify the submarine design program (the only one pending from decisions in 2001) and did not accept Taiwan's request for F-16C/D fighters (pending since 2006). Congress might further assert its legislated role in any objective, ongoing determinations of Taiwan's self-defense needs and oversight of President Obama's adherence to the TRA. Legislation in the 111th Congress include: National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, P.L. 111-84; H.Res. 733 (Gingrey); H.Con.Res. 200 (Andrews); H.R. 4102 (Ros-Lehtinen); and H.Res. 927 (Barton).… [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2010
9. China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy--Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei: RL30341.
- Author
-
Kan, Shirley A.
- Subjects
CHINA-United States relations ,TAIWAN-United States relations - Abstract
Despite apparently consistent statements in almost four decades, the U.S. “one China” policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the “one China” policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. In Part I, this CRS Report discusses the “one China” policy since the United States began in 1971 to reach presidential understandings with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing. Part II documents the evolution of policy as affected by legislation and articulated in key statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Taiwan formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC). This report will be updated. Policy on the “one China” concept covers three major issue areas: sovereignty over Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion against Taiwan; and cross-strait dialogue. The United States recognized the ROC government in Taipei until the end of 1978 and has maintained an official relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the PRC government in 1979. The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States “acknowledged” the “one China” position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. U.S. policy has not recognized the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan; has not recognized Taiwan as a sovereign country; and has considered Taiwan’s status as undetermined. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed the U.S. relationship with Taiwan, in the absence of diplomatic recognition. The TRA stipulates the U.S. expectation that the future of Taiwan “will be determined” by peaceful means. The TRA specifies that it is U.S. policy, among the stipulations: to consider any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan’s future “a threat” to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of “grave concern” to the United States; “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;” and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” jeopardizing the security, or social or economic system of Taiwan’s people. The TRA provides a congressional role in determining security assistance “necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” In addition, just before issuing the August 17, 1982 Communique, President Reagan offered “Six Assurances” to Taipei, including questions about any U.S. role in cross-strait talks. Since the mid-1990s, U.S. interests in the military balance as well as peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait have been challenged by the PRC’s military modernization, resistance in Taiwan by the Kuomintang (KMT) party to raising defense spending, and moves perceived by Beijing as promoting de jure independence under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (when Chen Shui-bian was President in 2000-2008). President Clinton deployed two aircraft carriers near Taiwan during the 1995-1996 crisis. President Bush did not support Taiwan’s independence or membership in the U.N. and opposed referendums on membership in the U.N. for Taiwan during its presidential election on March 22, 2008. For that election, President Bush positioned two aircraft carriers near Taiwan, whose largely symbolic referendums were targets of the PRC’s belligerent condemnation. The referendums failed to be valid, and KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou won. After May 2008, President Ma resumed the cross-strait dialogue (after a decade)—beyond seeking detente. Still, Taiwan’s security is challenged by the build-up of missiles and other forces by the PRC’s military. Congress has oversight of President Obama’s policy, covering arms sales, bilateral contacts, Taiwan in international organizations, and implications of the changing crossstrait ties for a possible policy review. On March 24, 2009, to commemorate the TRA’s 30th anniversary, the House passed H.Con.Res. 55 and 30 Senators sent a letter to Obama. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2009
10. China-U.S. Relations: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy: R40457.
- Author
-
Dumbaugh, Kerry
- Subjects
CHINA-United States relations ,INTERNATIONAL economic relations - Abstract
The bilateral relationship between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China (PRC) is vitally important, touching on a wide range of areas including, among others, economic policy, security, foreign relations, and human rights. U.S. and PRC interests are bound together much more closely now than even a few years ago. These extensive inter-linkages have made it increasingly difficult for either government to take unilateral actions without inviting far-reaching, unintended consequences. The George W. Bush Administration addressed these increasing inter-linkages by engaging with China, regularizing bilateral contacts and cooperation, and minimizing differences. The Administration of President Barack Obama has inherited not only more extensive policy mechanisms for pursuing U.S.-China policy, but a more complex and multifaceted relationship in which the stakes are higher and in which U.S. action may increasingly be constrained. Economically, the United States and the PRC have become symbiotically intertwined. China is the second-largest U.S. trading partner, with total U.S.-China trade in 2008 reaching an estimated $409 billion. It also is the second largest holder of U.S. securities and the largest holder of U.S. Treasuries used to finance the federal budget deficit, positioning the PRC to play a crucial role, for good or ill, in the Obama Administration's plans to address the recession and the deteriorating U.S. financial system. At the same time, the PRC's own substantial levels of economic growth have depended heavily on continued U.S. investment and trade, making the Chinese economy highly vulnerable to a significant economic slowdown in the United States. Meanwhile, other bilateral problems provide a continuing set of diverse challenges. They include difficulties over the status and well-being of Taiwan, ongoing disputes over China's failure to protect U.S. intellectual property rights, the economic advantage China gains from not floating its currency, and growing concerns about the quality and safety of exported PRC products. The PRC's more assertive foreign policy and continued military development also have significant long-term implications for U.S. global power and influence. Some U.S. lawmakers have suggested that U.S. policies toward the PRC should be reassessed in light of these trends. During the Bush Administration, Washington and Beijing cultivated regular high-level visits and exchanges of working level officials, resumed military-to-military relations, cooperated on anti- terror initiatives, and worked closely on the Six Party Talks to restrain and eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons activities. Although these and other initiatives of engagement are likely to continue in some fashion under the Obama Presidency, their direction and format are still being formulated in the Administration's early days. Still, in what some see as a significant Administration signal about China's importance for U.S. interests, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton included the PRC in her first official trip abroad as Secretary in February 2009, which included stops in Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and China (February 20-22). This report addresses relevant policy questions in current U.S.-China relations, discusses trends and key legislation in the current Congress, and provides a chronology of developments and high- level exchanges. It will be updated as events warrant. Additional details on the issues discussed here are available in other CRS products, noted throughout this report. For background information and legislative action during the 110th Congress, see CRS Report RL33877, China- U.S. Relations in the 110th Congress: Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Kerry Dumbaugh. CRS products can be found on the CRS website at http://www.crs.gov/. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2009
11. China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy -- Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei: RL30341.
- Author
-
Kan, Shirley A.
- Subjects
INTERNATIONAL relations ,PRESIDENTS of the United States ,FOREIGN relations of the United States ,NATIONAL security ,DEMOCRACY - Abstract
Despite apparently consistent statements in over three decades, the "one China" policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the "one China" policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. In Part I, this CRS Report discusses the "one China" policy since the United States began in 1971 to reach presidential understandings with the PRC government. Part II documents the evolution of policy as affected by legislation and articulated in key statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. This report will be updated. Policy on the "one China" concept covers three major issue areas: sovereignty over Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion against Taiwan; and cross-strait dialogue. The United States recognized the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taipei until the end of 1978 and has maintained a relationship with Taiwan since recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing in 1979. The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States "acknowledged" the "one China" position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. U.S. policy has not recognized the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan; has not recognized Taiwan as a sovereign country; and has considered Taiwan's status as undetermined. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed the U.S. relationship with Taiwan, in the absence of formal diplomatic recognition. The TRA stipulates the U.S. expectation that the future of Taiwan "will be determined" by peaceful means. The TRA specifies that it is U.S. policy, among the stipulations: to consider any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan's future "a threat" to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of "grave concern" to the United States; "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;" and "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion" jeopardizing the security, or social or economic system of Taiwan's people. The TRA provides a congressional role in determining security assistance "necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." In addition, just before issuing the August 17, 1982 Communique, President Reagan offered "Six Assurances" to Taipei, including questions about any U.S. role in cross-strait talks. Since the mid-1990s, U.S. security interests have been challenged increasingly by the PRC's military modernization and moves in Taiwan perceived by Beijing as promoting de jure independence. President Clinton deployed two aircraft carriers near Taiwan during the 1995-1996 crisis. President Bush does not support Taiwan's independence or membership in the U.N. and opposes unilateral changes to the "status quo" (including a referendum on U.N. membership for Taiwan during its presidential election on March 22, 2008). Congress has oversight of the TRA and U.S. management of the Taiwan Strait situation. Members of Congress have supported continued arms sales to Taiwan, expanded contacts with Taiwan's senior officials, and Taiwan's participation in international organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2007
12. Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990: RL30957.
- Author
-
Kan, Shirley A.
- Subjects
AMERICAN military assistance ,INTERNATIONAL security ,FOREIGN relations of the United States ,INTERNATIONAL relations - Abstract
This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Two other relevant parts of the "one China" policy are the August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the "Six Assurances" made to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. In addition, the United States has expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996. However, there is no defense treaty or alliance with Taiwan. At the U.S.-Taiwan arms sales talks on April 24, 2001, President George W. Bush approved for possible sale diesel-electric submarines, P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the submarine sale), four decommissioned U.S. Kidd-class destroyers, and other items. Bush also deferred decisions on Aegisequipped destroyers and other items, while denying other requests. Since then, attention has turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian officials, and legislators from competing political parties have debated contentious issues about how much to spend on defense and which U.S. weapons systems to acquire, despite the increasing threat (including a missile buildup) from the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as described in the Pentagon's reports to Congress on PRC military power. In February 2003, the Administration pointed Taiwan to three priorities for defense: command and control, missile defense, and ASW. Some in the United States increasingly have questioned Taiwan's seriousness about its self-defense, level of defense spending, and protection of secrets. The Pentagon also has shifted its focus from Taiwan's Special Budget to its regular defense budget and raising readiness for self-defense. Blocked by the opposition-controlled legislature, the Special Budget for submarines, P-3C ASW aircraft, and PAC-3 missile defense systems had been reduced from about US$18 billion in 2004 to US$9 billion (for submarines only) in December 2005. Then, in March 2006, Taiwan's defense minister decided to request a Supplemental Budget for the 2006 defense budget in part for submarine procurement, P-3Cs, and PAC-2 upgrades (not new PAC-3 missiles). Now, U.S. policymakers and firms are waiting to see how Taiwan's legislators might resolve the pending U.S. arms sales and increase spending in the 2007 defense budget during their fall session. Several policy issues are of concern to Congress for legislation, oversight, or other action. One issue concerns the effectiveness of the Administration in applying leverage to improve Taiwan's self-defense as well as to maintain peace and stability. Another issue is the role of Congress in determining security assistance, defense commitments, or policy reviews. A third issue concerns whether trends in the Taiwan Strait are stabilizing or destabilizing and how the Administration's management of policy has affected these trends. The fundamental issue is whether the United States would go to war with China and how conflict might be prevented. On June 29, the House passed H.R. 5672 with Sec. 801 to relax restrictions on senior military visits to and other contacts with Taiwan, but the Senate's version does not have the language. Also, in conference, the House receded from its sections boosting ties to Taiwan in the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2006
13. Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990: RL30957.
- Author
-
Kan, Shirley A.
- Subjects
MILITARY assistance ,DEFENSE industries ,MILITARY readiness -- Government policy ,MILITARY policy ,FOREIGN relations of the United States ,MILITARY relations - Abstract
This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Two other relevant parts of the "one China" policy are the August 17, 1982 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the "Six Assurances" made to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. In addition, the United States has expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996. However, there is no defense treaty or alliance with Taiwan. At the U.S.-Taiwan arms sales talks on April 24, 2001, President George W. Bush approved for possible sale: diesel-electric submarines, P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the submarine sale), four decommissioned U.S. Kidd-class destroyers, and other items. Bush also deferred decisions on Aegis-equipped destroyers and other items, while denying other requests. Since then, attention has turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian officials, and legislators from competing political parties have debated contentious issues about how much to spend on defense and which U.S. weapons systems to acquire, despite the increasing threat (including a missile buildup) from the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as described in the Pentagon's reports to Congress on PRC military power. In February 2003, the Administration pointed Taiwan to three priorities for defense: command and control, missile defense, and ASW. Some in the United States increasingly have questioned Taiwan's seriousness about its self-defense, level of defense spending, and protection of secrets. The Pentagon also has shifted its focus from Taiwan's Special Budget to its regular defense budget and raising readiness for self-defense. Blocked by the opposition-controlled legislature, the Special Budget for submarines, P-3C ASW aircraft, and PAC-3 missile defense systems had been reduced from about US$18 billion in 2004 to US$9 billion (for submarines only) in December 2005. Then, in March 2006, Taiwan's defense minister decided to withdraw the Special Budget and requested supplemental funds out of the regular 2006 defense budget for subs (with a design phase as supported by Representative Rob Simmons), P-3Cs, and PAC-2 upgrades (not new PAC-3 units). (The Special Budget is not yet withdrawn.) Several policy issues are of concern to Congress for legislation, oversight, or other action. One issue concerns the effectiveness of the Administration in applying leverage to improve Taiwan's self-defense as well as to maintain peace and stability. Another issue is the role of Congress in determining security assistance, defense commitments, or policy reviews. A third issue concerns whether trends in the Taiwan Strait are stabilizing or destabilizing and how the Administration's management of policy has affected these trends. The fundamental issue is whether the United States would go to war with China and how conflict might be prevented. On May 3, 2006, the House Armed Services Committee reported H.R. 5122, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007, after approving amendments with relevance for Taiwan that were introduced by Representative Simmons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2006
14. Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990: RL30957.
- Author
-
Kan, Shirley A.
- Subjects
ARMS transfers ,DEFENSE industries ,SUBMARINES (Ships) - Abstract
This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Two other relevant parts of the "one China" policy are the August 17, 1982 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the "Six Assurances" made to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. In addition, the United States has expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996. However, there is no defense treaty or alliance with Taiwan. At the U.S.-Taiwan arms sales talks on April 24, 2001, President George W. Bush approved for possible sale: diesel-electric submarines, P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the submarine sale), four decommissioned U.S. Kidd-class destroyers, and other items. Bush also deferred decisions on Aegis-equipped destroyers and other items, while denying other requests. Since then, attention has turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian officials, and legislators from competing political parties have debated contentious issues about how much to spend on defense and which U.S. weapons systems to acquire, despite the increasing threat (including a missile buildup) from the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as described in the Pentagon's reports to Congress on PRC military power. In February 2003, the Administration pointed Taiwan to three priorities for defense: command and control, missile defense, and ASW. The United States increasingly has questioned Taiwan's seriousness about its self-defense, level of defense spending, and protection of secrets. The Pentagon also has shifted its focus from Taiwan's Special Budget to its regular defense budget and raising readiness for self-defense. On the eve of a full Legislative Yuan (LY) vote on December 23, 2005, the Defense Ministry announced it will also remove the request for P-3s (after already removing the request for PAC-3 missile defense) to further reduce the Special Budget to one request of US$9 billion, about half of the original Special Budget, for submarines. Then, in February 2006, the military decided to withdraw the Special Budget and request funds out of the regular defense budgets for P-3s and subs. The opposition KMT party has not issued its long-awaited arms purchase and defense policy despite the chairman's visit in Washington on March 22-23. Several policy issues are of concern to Congress for legislation, oversight, or other action. One issue concerns the effectiveness of the Administration in applying leverage to improve Taiwan's self-defense as well as to maintain peace and stability. Another issue is the role of Congress in determining security assistance, defense commitments, or policy reviews. A third issue concerns whether trends in the Taiwan Strait are stabilizing or destabilizing and how the Administration's management of policy has affected these trends. The fundamental issue is whether the United States would go to war with China and how conflict might be prevented. In December 2005, the House agreed to the conference report on the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163), after receding on two provisions that would have directed U.S. flag and general officers and senior defense officials to visit Taiwan. The Senate's bill did not have this language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2006
15. Taiwan: Findings of a Congressional Staff Research Trip, December 2000: RS20798.
- Author
-
Lum, Thomas
- Subjects
DEMOCRATIZATION ,ELECTIONS ,NATIONALISM ,INTERNATIONAL relations - Abstract
This report summarizes findings from a congressional staff trip to Taiwan (Republic of China), December 10-17, 2000, with supplemental material from other sources. The staff delegation met with Taiwan government and military officials, political party representatives, leading private citizens, and United States officials and business persons in Taipei, the capital. The findings include major factors that have shaped relations between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) since Chen Shui-bian's election as President of Taiwan in March 2000. Taiwan's democratization and the growth of cross-strait economic ties have, in some respects, helped to stabilize relations in the short run. Taiwan's legislative elections in December 2001 will likely focus largely on domestic issues; its impact on cross-strait relations is uncertain. Chinese nationalism and military modernization in the PRC will likely continue to contribute to tensions. This report will not be updated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2001
16. Introduction.
- Subjects
BOUNDARY disputes ,JAPANESE politics & government - Abstract
The article reports on the long-standing dispute of China, Taiwan and Japan over the ownership of Senkaku Islands (SI) and the campaign of Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara in for the purchase of three of the eight islets from their owner. It discusses the violent encounters that occurred when the Japanese government completed the sale for an estimated 26 million U.S. dollars. It examines the assertion of China that SI is part of its territory.
- Published
- 2013
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