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The article examines the economic and societal benefits of nanotechnology. Topics mentioned include the National Nanotechnology Initiative launched in 2000 to advance nanotechnology research, development and commercialization, its structure and funding agency and program component area, and the implications of nanotechnology to the environment, health, and safety. Other selected issues discussed include competitiveness, scientific papers, and patents, as well as nanomanufacturing.

The article discusses the cross-country empirical study by Djankov et. al. on the Laffer curve and the impact of U.S. corporate tax rates on investment, entrepreneurship and wages. The authors cite that the Djankov study is a single cross section and therefore does not allow for analysis of fixed country effects, and comment on theoretical problems with the study, which includes the use of a hypothetical firm and cash flow tax rate variable that are not representative of situations.

Over the past 10 to 15 years, the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition. China's actions in the SCS-including extensive island-building and baseconstruction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands, as well as actions by its maritime forces to assert China's claims against competing claims by regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam-have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China's maritime forces at the Japanadministered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS) are another concern for U.S. observers. Chinese domination of China's near-seas region-meaning the SCS and ECS, along with the Yellow Sea-could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. Potential broader U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: fulfilling U.S. security commitments in the Western Pacific, including treaty commitments to Japan and the Philippines; maintaining and enhancing the U.S.-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, including U.S. security relationships with treaty allies and partner states; maintaining a regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies and partners; defending the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes and resisting the emergence of an alternative "might-makes-right" approach to international affairs; defending the principle of freedom of the seas, also sometimes called freedom of navigation; preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia; and pursing these goals as part of a larger U.S. strategy for competing strategically and managing relations with China. Potential specific U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: dissuading China from carrying out additional baseconstruction activities in the SCS, moving additional military personnel, equipment, and supplies to bases at sites that it occupies in the SCS, initiating island-building or base-construction activities at Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, declaring straight baselines around land features it claims in the SCS, or declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the SCS; and encouraging China to reduce or end operations by its maritime forces at the Senkaku Islands in the ECS, halt actions intended to put pressure against Philippine-occupied sites in the Spratly Islands, provide greater access by Philippine fisherman to waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal or in the Spratly Islands, adopt the U.S./Western definition regarding freedom of the seas, and accept and abide by the July 2016 tribunal award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China. The issue for Congress is whether the Administration's strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS is appropriate and correctly resourced, and whether Congress should approve, reject, or modify the strategy, the level of resources for implementing it, or both. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nanoscale science, engineering and technologycommonly referred to collectively as nanotechnologyis believed by many to offer extraordinary economic and societal benefits. Congress has demonstrated continuing support for nanotechnology and has directed its attention primarily to three topics that may affect the realization of this hoped for potential: federal research and development (R&D) in nanotechnology; U.S. competitiveness; and environmental, health, and safety (EHS) concerns. This report provides an overview of these topicswhich are discussed in more detail in other CRS reportsand two others: nanomanufacturing and public understanding of and attitudes toward nanotechnology. The development of this emerging field has been fostered by significant and sustained public investments in nanotechnology R&D. Nanotechnology R&D is directed toward the understanding and control of matter at dimensions of roughly 1 to 100 nanometers. At this size, the properties of matter can differ in fundamental and potentially useful ways from the properties of individual atoms and molecules and of bulk matter. Since the launch of the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) in 2000, Congress has appropriated approximately $9.9 billion for nanotechnology R&D. More than 60 nations have established similar programs. In 2006 alone, total global public R&D investments reached an estimated $6.4 billion, complemented by an estimated private sector investment of $6.0 billion. Data on economic outputs that are used to assess competitiveness in mature technologies and industries, such as revenues and market share, are not available for assessing nanotechnology. Alternatively, data on inputs (e.g., R&D expenditures) and non-financial outputs (e.g. scientific papers, patents) may provide insight into the current U.S. position and serve as bellwethers of future competitiveness. By these criteria, the United States appears to be the overall global leader in nanotechnology, though some believe the U.S. lead may not be as large as it has been for previous emerging technologies. Some research has raised concerns about the safety of nanoscale materials. There is general agreement that more information on EHS implications is needed to protect the public and the environment; to assess and manage risks; and to create a regulatory environment that fosters prudent investment in nanotechnology-related innovation. Nanomanufacturingthe bridge between nanoscience and nanotechnology productsmay require the development of new technologies, tools, instruments, measurement science, and standards to enable safe, effective, and affordable commercial-scale production of nanotechnology products. Public understanding and attitudes may also affect the environment for R&D, regulation, and market acceptance of products incorporating nanotechnology. In 2003, Congress enacted the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act providing a legislative foundation for some of the activities of the NNI, addressing concerns, establishing programs, assigning agency responsibilities, and setting authorization levels. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate remain actively engaged in the NNI. Legislation has been introduced in the House (H.R. 554) that would amend the act. The 111th Congress may opt to address policy issues related to the NNI through this or other legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the current state of employment in the U.S. manufacturing sector, as of May 2017. Topics include decline in employment in the manufacturing sector during the recession that began in 2001; the number of worker currently working in the sector; a graph depicting employment and output in manufacturing from 2001 to 2017; and a graph depicting growth in employment and output since Cyclical Trough.

The article discusses the role of surviving startup businesses in net job creation in the U.S. It states that startups in the first two years of operation has much higher rates of job creation compared to older businesses. It notes that startups have larger role in net job creation. It mentions that the barbell effect of business takes place with younger businesses and older and larger companies.

The article offers information on Modern Monetary Theory, which suggests that deficit financing can be used without harmful economic effects in circumstances of low inflation rates and low interest rates. It mentions about money supply and demand, and the determination of output and interest rates. It also informs on consumption and labor a function of the interest rate.

The article presents the report on the job creation programs of the U.S. Small Businesses Administration (SBA). It states the assessment of economic research on net job creation to identify the business that create the most jobs. It notes that startups play important role in job creation. It mentions that the influence of small business startups on net job creation varies according by the size of the company.

The article reports that trade plays an essential role in the U.S. economy, as it provides employment, wages and standard of living. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the U.S.-European Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) were negotiated by former U.S. President Barack Obama.The current president Donald Trump's administration is also working on revising U.S. free-trade agreement (FTA) through North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and U.S.-South Korea (KORUS) FTA.

The article talks about the effect of trade and trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), on the U.S. economy and employment. It states that an economy benefits when it deals in open trade. It also notes that higher level of economic growth is also related to higher international trade.

The article discusses various aspects of America's farm commodity programs as of 2018, and it mentions how the U.S. Agricultural Act of 2014 (2014 farm bill) eliminated the Average Crop Revenue Election program and several other commodity support payment programs that were contained in a 2008 farm bill. Farm produce prices for wheat, rice, and soybeans are assessed, along with Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) payments.

The article highlights the report of U.S. Congressional Research Service on Generalized System of Preferences. Topics discussed include GSP renewal reauthorization; role of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in GSP eligibility criteria; information on other U.S. trade preference programs including the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI); and effects of the U.S. GSP Program on developing countries and the U.S. Market.

The article focuses on the economic impact of the gold clause cancellation in the U.S. in 1933 which mentioned the small effect on the ability of the U.S. Treasury to borrow from the financial markets and the bringing of the gold back to the government due to improved balance of trade.

The article discusses insights into the effectiveness of patent boxes, or tax breaks for business income resulting from the commercial exploitation of qualified intellectual property (IP). Topics covered include the importance of design elements such as the nature of the tax incentive and the scope of eligible IP and IP income, indicators of success such as employment, IP rights ownership, and tax revenues, and patent boxes' effect on the geographic distribution of patent applications.

The article presents the federal citations to the social cost of greenhouse gas (SC-GHG) in the U.S. Topics include an overview of SC-GHG, its use in calculating its benefits, its versions cited in regulatory actions, and a chart listing the regulatory or related actions referring to the social cost of carbon in the country.

The article focuses on the views and objectives of the U.S. on the challenges and goals within the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) negotiations. Topics included an overview of T-TIP, the European Union's protection of its registered geographical indications for food and wine monopoly, and the protection of the right to use traditional food names.

As the rules of global Internet develop and evolve, digital trade has risen in prominence on the global trade and economic agenda, but multilateral trade agreements have not kept pace with the complexities of the digital economy. The economic impact of the Internet was estimated to be $4.2 trillion in 2016, making it the equivalent of the fifth-largest national economy. According to one source, the volume of global data flows grew 45-fold from 2005 to 2014, faster than international trade or financial flows. Congress has an important role to play in shaping global digital trade policy, from oversight of agencies charged with regulating cross-border data flows to shaping and considering legislation to implement new trade rules and disciplines through ongoing trade negotiations, and also working with the executive branch to identify the right balance between digital trade and other policy objectives, including privacy and national security. Digital trade includes end-products like movies and video games and services such as email. Digital trade also enhances the productivity and overall competitiveness of an economy. According to the U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S. domestic and international digital trade added 3.4 - 4.8% ($517.1-$710.7 billion) to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011. The Department of Commerce found that in 2014, digitally delivered services accounted for more than half of U.S. services trade. The increase in digital trade also raises new challenges in U.S. trade policy, including how to best address new and emerging trade barriers. As with traditional trade barriers, digital trade constraints can be classified as tariff or nontariff barriers. In addition to high tariffs, barriers to digital trade may include localization requirements, cross border data flow limitations, intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement, unique standards or burdensome testing, filtering or blocking, and cybercrime exposure or state-directed theft of trade secrets. Digital trade issues often overlap and cut across policy areas, including IPR and national security; this raises questions for Congress as it weighs different policy objectives. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) points out three potentially conflicting policy goals in the Internet economy: (1) enabling the Internet; (2) boosting or preserving competition within and outside the Internet; and (3) protecting privacy and consumers more generally. While no comprehensive agreement on digital trade exists in the World Trade Organization (WTO), other WTO agreements do cover some aspects of digital trade. Recent bilateral and plurilateral agreements have begun to address digital trade rules and barriers more explicitly. For example, the potential Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), and plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) are expected to address digital trade to varying degrees. Digital trade norms are also being discussed in forums such as the Group of 20 (G-20), the OECD, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), providing the United States with multiple opportunities to engage in and shape global developments. With workers in the high-tech sector in every U.S. state and congressional district, Congress has an interest in ensuring the global rules and norms of the Internet economy are in line with U.S. laws and norms, and in establishing a U.S. trade policy on digital trade that advances U.S. interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although "too big to fail" (TBTF) has been a long-standing policy issue, it was highlighted by the financial crisis, when the government intervened to prevent the near-collapse of several large financial firms in 2008. Financial firms are said to be TBTF when policymakers judge that their failure would cause unacceptable disruptions to the overall financial system. They can be TBTF because of their size or interconnectedness. In addition to fairness issues, economic theory suggests that expectations that a firm will not be allowed to fail create moral hazard--if the creditors and counterparties of a TBTF firm believe that the government will protect them from losses, they have less incentive to monitor the firm's riskiness because they are shielded from the negative consequences of those risks. If so, TBTF firms could have a funding advantage compared with other banks, which some call an implicit subsidy. There are a number of policy approaches--some complementary, some conflicting--to coping with the TBTF problem, including providing government assistance to prevent TBTF firms from failing or systemic risk from spreading; enforcing "market discipline" to ensure that investors, creditors, and counterparties curb excessive risk-taking at TBTF firms; enhancing regulation to hold TBTF firms to stricter prudential standards than other financial firms; curbing firms' size and scope, by preventing mergers or compelling firms to divest assets, for example; minimizing spillover effects by limiting counterparty exposure; and instituting a special resolution regime for failing systemically important firms. A comprehensive policy is likely to incorporate more than one approach, as some approaches are aimed at preventing failures and some at containing fallout when a failure occurs. Parts of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) address all of these policy approaches. For example, it created an enhanced prudential regulatory regime administered by the Federal Reserve for non-bank financial firms designated as "systemically important" (SIFIs) by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and banks with more than $50 billion in assets. Over 30 U.S. bank holding companies and a larger number of foreign banks have more than $50 billion in assets, and FSOC designated three insurers (AIG, MetLife, and Prudential Financial) and GE Capital as systemically important. MetLife's designation was subsequently rescinded by a court decision, and GE Capital's was rescinded by FSOC. A handful of the largest banks face additional capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements stemming from Basel III, an international agreement. The Dodd-Frank Act also created the "orderly liquidation authority" (OLA), a special resolution regime administered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to take into receivership failing firms that pose a threat to financial stability. This regime has not been used to date, and has some similarities to how the FDIC resolves failing banks. Statutory authority used to prevent financial firms from failing during the crisis has either expired or been narrowed by the Dodd-Frank Act. The fact that most large firms have grown in dollar terms since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act has led some critics to question whether the TBTF problem has been solved. (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remain in government conservatorship and have not been addressed by legislation to date.) Legislative proposals amending these Dodd-Frank Act provisions include repealing or modifying the designation process for non-bank SIFIs, the $50 billion threshold for banks, the Volcker Rule, and the Fed's Section 13(3) authority to provide emergency assistance to non-banks. Another proposal would repeal OLA and replace it with a new chapter in the bankruptcy code for financial firms. Others would reinstate provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act that prohibit a firm from undertaking both commercial and investment banking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the economic impacts of barriers to U.S. trade in services. Topics include the liberalization of trade in services, trade restrictions established by nontariff barriers for services related to digital trade and data flows, and a study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) about the relationship among barriers to trade in services, cross-border trade in services, and trade in downstream goods.

The length of time a congressional staff member spends employed in a particular position in Congress--or congressional staff tenure--is a source of recurring interest to Members, staff, and the public. A congressional office, for example, may seek this information to assess its human resources capabilities, or for guidance in how frequently staffing changes might be expected for various positions. Congressional staff may seek this type of information to evaluate and approach their own individual career trajectories. This report presents a number of statistical measures regarding the length of time House office staff stay in particular job positions. It is designed to facilitate the consideration of tenure from a number of perspectives. This report provides tenure data for a selection of 16 staff position titles that are typically used in House Member offices, and information on how to use those data for different purposes. The positions include Administrative Director, Casework Supervisor, Caseworker, Chief of Staff, Communications Director, Counsel, District Director, Executive Assistant, Field Representative, Legislative Assistant, Legislative Correspondent, Legislative Director, Office Manager, Press Secretary, Scheduler, and Staff Assistant. House Members' staff tenure data were calculated as of March 31, for each year between 2006 and 2016, for all staff in each position. An overview table provides staff tenure for selected positions for 2016, including summary statistics and information on whether the time staff stayed in a position increased, was unchanged, or decreased between 2006 and 2016. Other tables provide detailed tenure data and visualizations for each position title. Between 2006 and 2016, staff tenure appears to have increased by six months or more for staff in three position titles in House Member offices, based on the trend of the median number of years in the position. For 13 positions, the median tenure was unchanged. These findings may be consistent with overall workforce trends in the United States. Pay may be one of many factors that affect an individual's decision to remain in or leave a particular job. House Member office staff holding positions that are generally lower-paid typically remained in those roles for shorter periods of time than those in generally higher-paying positions. Lower-paying positions may also be considered entry-level roles; if so, tenure for House Member office employees in these roles appears to follow national trends for other entrylevel jobs, which individuals hold for a relatively short period of time. Those in more senior positions, where a particular level of congressional or other professional experience is often required, typically remained in those roles comparatively longer, similar to those in more senior positions in the general workforce. Generalizations about staff tenure are limited in some ways, because each House office serves as its own hiring authority. Variations from office to office, which might include differences in job duties, work schedules, office emphases, and other factors, may limit the extent to which data provided here might match tenure in another office. Direct comparisons of congressional employment to the general labor market may have similar limitations. An employing Member's retirement or electoral loss, for example, may cause staff tenure periods to end abruptly and unexpectedly. This report is one of a number of CRS products on congressional staff. Others include CRS Report R43947, House of Representatives Staff Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Offices, 1977-2016 and CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2014. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States is considering two mega-regional free trade agreements that its participants argue are comprehensive and high-standard: the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) among the United States and 11 other countries, and the U.S.-European Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), still under negotiation. The 12 TPP countries signed the agreement in February 2016, but the agreement must be ratified by each country before it can enter into force. In the United States, this requires implementing legislation by Congress. Discussions of these and other FTAs often focus on trade balances, particularly U.S. bilateral merchandise trade balances with its FTA partner countries, as one way of measuring the success of the agreement. Although bilateral merchandise trade balances can provide a quick snapshot of the U.S. trade relationship with a particular country, most economists argue that such balances serve as incomplete measures of the comprehensive nature of the trade and economic relationship between the United States and its FTA partners. Indeed, current trade agreements include trade in services, provisions for investment, and trade facilitation, among others that are not reflected in bilateral merchandise trade balances. This report presents data on U.S. merchandise (goods) trade with its Free Trade Agreement (FTA) partner countries. The data are presented to show bilateral trade balances for individual FTA partners and groups of countries representing such major agreements as the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Central American Free Trade Agreement and Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR) relative to total U.S. trade balances. This report also discusses the issues involved in using bilateral merchandise trade balances as a standard for measuring the economic effects of a particular FTA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the tax reform for exploration of corporate integration by reducing the additional taxes as per announced by the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Orrin Hatch. It mentions that traditional system of taxation is inefficient as corporate income is taxed twice. It also discusses issues like effective tax rate, debt, and stock of assets for corporate and non corporate sector and reports several approaches to integration.

The article examines the changing character of the U.S. manufacturing work. It discusses the manufacturing employment based on occupation, worker education, and gender. Other topics mentioned include the decline of employment in other occupations within the sector notably office clerical work, the increasing demand for skills in the sector which is most visible in the diminished use of team assemblers, and the little increase of female employment since 2010 even as male employment has risen.

Invented and pioneered in the United States shortly after World War II, semiconductors are the enabling technology of the information age. Because of semiconductors new industries have emerged and existing ones, such as aerospace and automotive, have been transformed. Semiconductors have contributed in powerful and unique ways to nearly all fields of science and engineering, and semiconductors' economic and military importance has made the industry's health a focus of congressional interest for nearly 70 years. In July 2015, Congress formed the Semiconductor Caucus, a group that seeks to advance policies that support the U.S. semiconductor industry. The federal government played a central role in the creation of the U.S. semiconductor industry. World War II funding for electronics and materials research and development (R&D) provided essential support for the invention and refinement of semiconductors. Federal investments in computing advances also created an important application for semiconductors and federal acquisitions for defense, space, and civilian applications made up the lion's share of the early semiconductor market. In the face of formidable competition from Japanese companies in the 1980s, Congress co-funded SEMATECH, an industry research consortium devoted to developing the technologies needed by U.S. firms to remain competitive. Today, Congress continues to provide funding for R&D and development of scientific and engineering talent in support of the industry. In 2015, Congress acted to make the R&D tax credit permanent, a policy priority of the industry. An ongoing issue of congressional interest is the retention of high-value semiconductor manufacturing in the United States. In 2015, semiconductor manufacturers directly employed 181,000 workers, who earned an average wage of $138,100, more than twice the average wage for all U.S. manufacturing workers. Increasingly, however, U.S. firms are building semiconductor fabrication plans (fabs) abroad, primarily in Asia. In addition, some semiconductor firms are going 'fab-less," focusing corporate resources on chip design and relying on contract fabs abroad to manufacture their products. At year-end 2015, there were 94 advanced fabs in operation worldwide, of which 17 were in the United States, 71 in Asia (including 9 in China), and 6 in Europe. The Chinese government regards the development of a domestic, globally competitive semiconductor industry as a strategic priority with a stated goal of becoming self-sufficient in all areas of the semiconductor supply chain by 2030. China faces significant barriers to entry in this mature, capital-intensive, R&D-intensive industry. Because the primary market for U.S.-based semiconductor firms is located outside the United States (83% in 2015), passage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement and successful conclusion of the ongoing Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations with Europe are top industry priorities. In 2015, exports of U.S. semiconductors and related devices totaled $41.8 billion, making it the nation's fourth-largest overall exporting industry. The 2015 expansion of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Information Technology Agreement (ITA), a plurilateral tariff-cutting agreement focused on trade in information technology goods, is considered a major success for the U.S. semiconductor industry. Semiconductor manufacturing also raises national security concerns, including secure access to trusted suppliers of advanced semiconductors and other critical technology components that are important for certain defense and national security applications. The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations held a hearing on this issue in October 2015. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents information on the flow of remittances in the U.S. and around the world. It discusses the increase in remittances, the economic benefit of remittances to developing and poor countries, factors that contributed to the growth in remittances, and data from the World Bank on official remittance outflows from the U.S.

The Military Selective Service Act (MSSA), first enacted as the Selective Service Act of 1948, provides the statutory authority for the Federal government to maintain a Selective Service System (SSS) as an independent federal agency responsible for delivering appropriately qualified civilian men for induction into the Armed Forces of the United States as authorized by Congress. The annual budget for the agency is just under $23 million and the budget has remained stable at about $25 million in current dollars since the 1980s. One of the SSS's main functions is to maintain a database of registrants in case of a draft. The agency stores approximately 78 million records in order to verify registration status and eligibility for certain benefits that require certification of registration for eligibility. The SSS has a staff of approximately 125 full-time employees, which is complemented by a corps of volunteers and military reservists. The MSSA requires most males between the ages of 18 and 26 who are citizens or residents of the United States to register with Selective Service. Women in the United States have never been required to register for the draft. Men who fail to register may be subject to criminal penalties, loss of eligibility for certain federal or state employment opportunities and education benefits, and denial of security clearances. Documented or undocumented immigrants who fail to register may not be able to obtain United States citizenship. Registration compliance rates were as high as 95% in 2015. While individuals may still register at U.S. post offices, the SSS attributes high compliance rates to a system of automatic electronic registration supported by state legislation and interagency cooperation. Throughout most of the 20th century the U.S. government has, by law, obligated most male residents to register for a draft administered by an agency of the federal government. The Federal government has episodically used draft calls and lotteries to mobilize military manpower from the time of the Civil War until June 30, 1973 when the statutory induction authority expired and the military transitioned to an all-volunteer force. However, the SSS is charged with maintaining the capacity to draft young men if and when Congress authorizes conscription. The MSSA does not currently authorize the use of a draft for induction into the Armed Forces. When the draft has been implemented, it has been met by some public resistance. Such resistance to the draft drives much of the opposition toward maintaining the SSS and the registration requirement. Even some who are not opposed to the government's use of conscription in a time of national need are opposed to maintaining the current SSS agency infrastructure. They argue that a stand-alone agency is unnecessary and expensive and that there are a number of alternatives that could more effectively and efficiently enable the country to reestablish conscription, if necessary. Others counter that, at the cost of $23 million annually, maintaining the SSS is a relatively inexpensive insurance policy should the draft need to be quickly reinstated. They also argue that maintaining the SSS sends a signal to potential adversaries that the United States is willing to draw on its full national resources for armed conflict if necessary. Some are concerned that the registration requirements are inequitable, arguing that it is unfair to men that women can voluntarily serve in all military occupations but are exempt from the registration requirement and the prospect of being drafted. In additional, statutory penalties impose hardships on certain groups, particularly those with fewer financial resources who also might be least aware of their obligation to register. Some contend that MSSA and associated statute should be amended to remove penalties for failing to register. Others argue that weakening or removing penalties would cause registration compliance rates to fall to unacceptably low levels. In response to these issues, Congress may consider a number of options for amending, repealing, or maintaining the MSSA and associated statutes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides information on the refunding of the adoption tax credit, highlighting the interest of policymakers in the expansion of eligibility for the tax credit. It discusses the tax liability for the nonrefundable tax credit, foster care adoptions, and the compliance increase of taxpayers. A chart of the tax bracket for adoption tax credit is also included.

The article presents a sociopolitical overview of Turkey in 2014. Topics discussed include the political leadership of the AKP Party and the country's transition to a civilian-led system that emphasizes the rise of the middle class, support for market economics, and the promotion of conservative Islamic values. Increased economic confidence in the country and how this extends to Turkey's influence in the region are also mentioned.

The article discusses the role of the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) in job creation. It states that the aim of SBA was to support small businesses and provide credit to small businesses to allow them to provide additional employment. It mentions that the SBA argued that improving the access of small businesses to credit is an important step in supporting economic recovery and job creation.

The article discusses energy use by U.S. facilities that treat and deliver water to end users and also dispose of and discharge wastewater. Topics addressed include the reciprocal relationship between water and energy resources, water savings resulting from energy efficiency initiatives and vice versa, and carbon emission reductions achieved by saving water. Also mentioned are barriers to improved energy efficiency by water and wastewater utilities.

The article describes how the U.S. Federal Reserve execute monetary policy. It cites the agency's reliance on three instruments to conduct monetary policy, the ways of the agency to expand or contract money and credit, and the ways to measure the stance of monetary policy. It also discusses the short- and long-term economic effects of monetary policy and explains the differences between fiscal and monetary policy.

The article focuses on U.S. interests toward Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of economic, political, security, and humanitarian issues. The U.S. government is said to have responded to natural disasters in the area, like the aftermath of Haiti's earthquake in 2010. One of the priorities of U.S. President Barack Obama for the region is promotion of economic and social opportunity. Obama confirmed initiatives to expand economic opportunity at the 6th Summit of the Americas in April 2012.

The article discusses various trade concepts. As indicated in economic theory, the occurrence of trade is mutually enriching as it has a positive economic effect that results in increased economic efficiency. David Ricardo, who developed the idea of comparative advantage early in the 19th century. argued that specialization and trade are mutually beneficial even if it is more efficient for a country to produce everything than its trading partners.

The article discusses trade concepts, U.S. trade performance, formulation of U.S. trade policy, and U.S. trade and investment policy issues. Based on economic theory, trade occurs because it is mutually enriching that results in a positive economic effect that increases economic efficiency and allows greater output from scarce productive resources. Comparative advantage, developed by David Ricardo early in the 19th century argues that specialization and trade are beneficial.

The article outlines the policy and assistance programs of Millennium Challenge Corp. (MCC). The implementation of MCC programs moves chronologically through a number of steps. It discusses the elements of the process for program implementation includes selection of candidate countries, formulation of eligible country selection criteria, selection of eligible countries for compact and threshold programs, and the development, approval and funding of compact programs.

The article discusses the antecedents to trade adjustment assistance (TAA), which emerged in the shift from protectionism toward trade opening in U.S. domestic, trade and foreign policies in the 1930s. This was reportedly rooted in a concern for domestic economic welfare and possible retaliation for imports inhibition. It is shown that the Randall Commission considered a proposal for government assistance in 1953, and that the tariffs of 61 items had been cut below their peril point by 1961.

The article reports on Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and its role in U.S. trade policy in 2011. The TAA reportedly aims to help in the adjustment of workers and firms to the economic dislocation caused by trade liberalization and its equity, efficiency and budgetary issues are still being debated on. It states that extending the TAA through December 31, 2013 and its inclusion as part of a trade agreement implementing bill is being considered by the 112th Congress.

The article reports on the background and congressional options of a balanced budget constitutional amendment in 2011. The accumulation of large deficits in recent years has reportedly led to the necessity of requiring a balance between revenues and expenditures. It is stated that debates on the issue are interrelated, and that proponents have focused on the economy and the harm of large deficits, while opponents have concentrated on the difficulty of implementing any amendment.

The article discusses the economic implications of the earthquake and tsunami that devastated Japan on March 11, 2011 for the U.S. Aside from damages to infrastructure, thousands of persons have reportedly been killed or gone missing after the calamity. The devastation brought concerns such as where to find the source of funds to be used for rebuilding and how the country can regain its economic activity. The business operations of companies Sony Corp., Hitachi Vehicle Energy Ltd. and Nippon Chemi-Con Corp. have been disrupted by the said disaster.

The United States and Mexico have a close and complex bilateral relationship, with extensive economic linkages as neighbors and partners under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). U.S.- Mexican relations are characterized by strong commercial and cultural ties and cooperation on a range of bilateral and international issues. In recent years, security issues have dominated the bilateral agenda, as the United States has supported Mexican President Felipe Calderón's campaign against drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). Immigration and border security have also returned to the forefront of the bilateral agenda since Arizona enacted a controversial state law against illegal immigration (SB 1070) on April 23, 2010, a measure opposed by President Barack Obama. On May 25, 2010, in response to rising state and local concerns about border security, President Obama authorized sending up to 1,200 National Guard troops to support law enforcement efforts along the U.S.-Mexico border. Now in the fourth year of his six-year term, President Calderón of the conservative National Action Party (PAN) is focused on restarting the Mexican economy, which contracted by 7% in 2009 (largely as a result of the U.S. recession), and combating drug traffickers and organized criminal groups in Mexico. Although the Calderón Administration has arrested several top drug kingpins, the persistent and increasingly brazen violence committed by the DTOs has led to significant criticism of Calderón's anti-drug strategy. As the 2012 presidential elections approach, the Mexican Congress, which is now dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), could be reluctant to give President Calderón any major legislative victories. In recent years, U.S.-Mexican relations have grown stronger as the two countries have worked together to combat drug trafficking and secure their shared border. President Obama met with President Calderón in Mexico on April 16-17, 2009, to discuss counterdrug cooperation, immigration reform, and climate change. The leaders met again in August 2009 alongside Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper at the North American Leaders Summit in Guadalajara, Mexico to discuss how to coordinate their responses to the global economic crisis, climate change, and security issues. On May 19, 2010, President Calderón traveled to Washington D.C. for a state visit with President Obama during which both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to working together on a wide range of bilateral issues. The 111th Congress has maintained an active interest in Mexico with counternarcotics, border, and trade issues dominating the agenda. To date, Congress has appropriated some $1.3 billion in assistance for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative, an anti-crime and counterdrug package first funded in FY2008. The Senate-passed version of, H.R. 4899, the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations measure, would provide $175 million in additional assistance for Mérida-related programs in Mexico. The House is reportedly considering inserting additional funds for justice sectors programs in Mexico and for border security into its version of the supplemental measure. The Obama Administration asked for $346.6 million in assistance for Mexico in its FY2011 budget request, including $310 million in Mérida-related funding. Congress is likely to maintain a keen interest in how implementation of the Mérida Initiative and related border security initiatives are proceeding, particularly now that the President has authorized National Guard troops to be sent to the Southwest border. Congress may also consider proposals for comprehensive immigration reform. On the trade front, Congress is likely to maintain interest in how the Obama Administration moves to resolve the current trucking dispute with Mexico now that P.L. 111-117 would permit the resumption of a U.S.- funded pilot program for Mexican trucks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the author's insights on the basics of trade, as well as its concepts. The author states that trade can increase economic well-being according to economic theory, and the benefit of trade is linked to the product received. He mentions that British economist David Ricardo develops the idea of comparative advantage in the 19th century and its was influenced by the actions of the government.

The article discusses the economic benefits of employment eligibility verification and worksite enforcement in the U.S. wherein it help reduce unauthorized immigration across the country. It states that the employment eligibility verification system examines the background of the new hired employees to get eligible for the job position. It also notes that the verification system would apply to hiring, recruitment and referral of the workers.

The article discusses the importance of transparency to the decision-making process of the Federal Reserve on the disclosure of confidential information. It highlights the efficacy of monetary policy on the categories of transparency such as the disclosure of policy decision making and the disclosure of borrowers and counterparties. It also cites the economic impact of the loss of investor confidence to the stability of the institution's debt and equity.

Organized crime threatens multiple facets of the United States, including the economy and national security. In fact, the Organized Crime Council was recently reconvened for the first time in 15 years to address this continued threat. Organized crime has taken on an increasingly transnational nature, and with more open borders and the expansion of the Internet, criminals endanger the United States not only from within the borders, but beyond. Threats come from a variety of criminal organizations, including Russian, Asian, Italian, Balkan, Middle Eastern, and African syndicates. Policymakers may question whether the tools they have provided the federal government to combat organized crime are still effective for countering today's evolving risks. In the wake of the economic downturn, organized crime could further weaken the economy with illegal activities (such as cigarette trafficking and tax evasion scams) that result in a loss of tax revenue for state and federal governments. Fraudulent activities in domains such as strategic commodities, credit, insurance, stocks, securities and investments could further weaken the already-troubled financial market. On the national security front, experts and policymakers have expressed concern over a possible nexus between organized crime and terrorism. Despite the difference in motivation for organized crime (profit) and terrorism (ideology), the linking element for the two is money. Terrorists may potentially obtain funding for their operations from partnering directly with organized crime groups or modeling their profitable criminal acts. Even if organized crime groups and terrorist organizations do not form long-term alliances, the possibility of short-term business alliances may be of concern to policymakers. In light of these developments, several possible issues for Congress arise. One issue centers on whether the evolving nature of organized crime requires new enforcement tools. Some policymakers have suggested that current laws may not be effective at countering present threats from organized crime. As organized criminals threaten American society from both within and outside U.S. borders, should Congress expand law enforcement's extraterritorial jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute these criminals, and to what extent should Congress encourage multilateral—both domestic and international—crime fighting efforts? Legislation has been introduced in the 111th Congress (H.R. 1793, S. 49, S. 378, and S. 386, for example) that would expand the list of predicate offenses under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), clarify the definition of money laundering, and expand the international money laundering statute. Another possible issue for Congress concerns whether the resources that the federal government allocates to organized crime matters are adequate and appropriately allocated to counter the threats it poses. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, national priorities and federal resources shifted away from more traditional crime fighting—including that of organized crime—toward counterterrorism and counterintelligence. For instance, the number of federal agents actually working on organized crime matters and the number of organized crime cases opened in FY2004 decreased relative to levels before September 11, 2001. This report will be updated as needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Health care reform has emerged as an issue in the 111th Congress, driven by growing concern about widely discussed problems. Three predominant concerns involve coverage, cost and spending, and quality. Commonly cited figures indicate that more than 45 million people have no insurance, which can limit their access to care and their ability to pay for the care they receive. Costs are rising for nearly everyone, and the country now spends over $2.2 trillion, more than 16% of gross domestic product (GDP), on health care services and products, far more than other industrialized countries. For all this spending, the country scores but average or somewhat worse on many indicators of health care quality. These concerns raise significant challenges. Each of the concerns is more complex than might first appear, which increases the difficulty of finding solutions. For example, by one statistical measure, far more than 45 million people face the risk of being uninsured for short time periods, yet by another, substantially fewer have no insurance for long periods. Insurance coverage and access to health care are not the same, and it is possible to have one without the other. Having coverage does not ensure that one can pay for care, nor does it always shield one from significant financial loss in the case of serious illness. Similarly, high levels of spending may be partly attributable to the country's wealth, while rising costs, though difficult for many, may primarily mean that less money is available for other things. Solutions to these concerns may conflict with one another. For example, expanding coverage to most of the uninsured would likely drive up costs (as more people seek care) and expand public budgets (since additional public subsidies would be required). Cutting costs may threaten initiatives to improve quality. Other challenges include addressing the interests of stakeholders that have substantial investments in present arrangements and the unease some people have about moving from an imperfect but known system to something that is potentially better but untried. Health care reform proposals will likely rekindle debate over perennial issues in American health care policy. These include whether insurance should be public or private; whether employment- based insurance should be strengthened, weakened, or left alone; what role states might play; and whether Medicaid should be folded into new insurance arrangements. Whether changes to Medicare should occur at the same time may also be considered. Concerns about coverage, cost and spending, and quality are likely to be addressed within the context of these issues. The 111th Congress has already begun work on health care reform. Hearings have been held, and staffs of the committees of principal jurisdiction are working to draft coordinated bills. Some comprehensive reform bills have already been introduced, such as H.R. 15 (Representative Dingell), H.R. 193 (Representative Stark), H.R. 676 (Representative Conyers), H.R. 956 (Representative Kaptur), H.R. 1200 (Representative McDermott), H.R. 1321 (Representative Eshoo), S. 391 (Senator Wyden), and S. 703 (Senator Sanders). This report does not discuss or even try to identify all of the concerns about health care in the United States that are prompting calls for reform. Other concerns may also be important, at least to some, and will likely contribute to the complexity of the reform debate. The report may be updated to include other health care reform issues as the debate in Congress unfolds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the most recent National Threat Assessment, the global financial crisis and its geopolitical implications pose the primary near-term security concern of the United States. Over the short run, both the EU and the United States are attempting to resolve the financial crisis while stimulating domestic demand to stem the economic downturn. These efforts have born little progress so far as the economic recession and the financial crisis have become reinforcing events, causing EU governments to forge policy responses to both crises. In addition, both the United States and the EU likely will confront the prospect of growing economic and political instability in Eastern Europe and elsewhere over the impact of the economic recession on restive populations. In the long run, the United States and the EU likely will search for a regulatory scheme that provides for greater stability while not inadvertently offering advantages to any one country or group. Throughout the crisis, the European Central Bank and other central banks have assumed a critical role as the primary institutions with the necessary political and economic clout to respond effectively. Within Europe, national governments, private firms, and international organizations have varied in their response to the financial crisis, reflecting differing views over the proper policy course to pursue and the unequal effects of the financial crisis and the economic downturn. Initially, some EU members preferred to address the crisis on a case-by-case basis. As the crisis has persisted, however, leaders have begun looking for a systemic approach that ultimately may affect the drive within Europe toward greater economic integration. Within the United States, Congress has appropriated funds to help recapitalize financial institutions, and adopted several economic stimulus measures. In addition, Congress likely will be involved in efforts to reshape institutions and frameworks for international cooperation and coordination in financial markets. European governments are also adopting fiscal measures to stimulate their economies and wrestling with failing banks. The financial crisis has demonstrated that financial markets are highly interdependent and that extensive networks link financial markets across national borders, which is pressing EU governments to work together to find a mutually reinforcing solution. Unlike the United States, however, where the federal government can legislate policies that are consistent across all 50 States, the EU process gives each EU member a great deal of discretion to decide how they will regulate and supervise financial markets within their borders. The limits of this system may well be tested as the EU and others search for a regulatory framework that spans a broad number of national markets. Governments that have expended considerable resources utilizing fiscal and monetary policy tools to stabilize the financial system and to provided a boost to their economies may be required to be increasingly more inventive in providing yet more stimulus to their economies and face political unrest in domestic populations. Attention likely will also focus on those governments that are viewed as not expending economic resources commensurate with the size of their economies to stimulate economic growth. This report will be updated as events warrant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On January 14, 2009, the Navy announced that it wants to transfer one of its nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs) to the Navy home port at Mayport, FL, known formally as Naval Station (NAVSTA) Mayport. Mayport is located in northeast Florida, on the Atlantic Coast, near Jacksonville. The Navy states that a key reason it wants to transfer a CVN to Mayport is to hedge against the risk of a catastrophic event that could damage the Navy's CVN homeporting facilities at Norfolk, VA, and nearby Newport News, VA. All CVNs based on the Atlantic Coast are currently homeported at Norfolk and Newport News. The Navy's desire to transfer a CVN to Mayport has become an issue of interest to some Members of Congress. Many observers expect that transferring a CVN to Mayport would result in a CVN being transferred out of Norfolk, known formally as NAVSTA Norfolk. Transferring a CVN from Norfolk to Mayport would shift from Norfolk to Mayport the local economic activity associated with homeporting a CVN, which some sources estimate as being worth hundreds of millions of dollars per year to the economy of the home port area. Transferring a CVN to Mayport would require congressional approval of Military Construction (MilCon) funding for dredging and construction work to make Mayport capable of homeporting a CVN. If Congress approves the funding needed to transfer a CVN to Mayport, the ship could be transferred to Mayport as early as 2014. The Navy's desire to transfer a CVN to Mayport was announced during the final days of the George W. Bush administration, and Obama administration officials testified in January 2009 that they will review the issue. Since a key reason the Navy wants to transfer a CVN to Mayport is to hedge against the risk of a catastrophic event that could damage the Navy's CVN homeporting facilities in Virginia, potential questions for Congress to consider include the following: • What is the risk of a catastrophic event damaging Atlantic Coast CVN homeporting facilities, and how might that risk be altered by homeporting a CVN at Mayport? • If a catastrophic event were to damage Atlantic Coast CVN homeporting facilities, what would be the operational impact on the Navy, and how quickly could the Navy repair the damage and return to normal operations? • Are the costs associated with homeporting a CVN at Mayport worth the benefits in terms of hedging against the risk of a catastrophic event damaging Atlantic Coast CVN homeporting facilities? In assessing these and other questions relating to the Navy's desire to transfer a CVN to Mayport, Congress may consider several specific issues, including the following: the projected size of the Navy and its allocation between the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets; recurring and nonrecurring costs for homeporting a CVN at Mayport; transit times from Norfolk and Mayport to key destinations; the vulnerability of Norfolk and Mayport to natural and man-made catastrophes; other factors that might differentiate Norfolk and Mayport; the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) on Mayport homeporting options; potential options for Mayport homeporting other than those studied in the FEIS, and alternative uses of the funding that would be required for homeporting a CVN at Mayport. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Broadband network deployment projects represent large scale, long term investments that affect the overall productivity of economic activity in the geographic areas in which they are built, and thus fit the conventional definition of infrastructure. But they also have several characteristics that distinguish them from traditional infrastructure projects. These unique characteristics may dictate that government programs in support of broadband deployment be structured differently than conventional infrastructure programs. Virtually all broadband networks in the United States are privately owned and financed through private capital markets. In most geographic markets, there are two or more broadband networks offering competing services over their own facilities, rather than a single provider. The competing broadband networks generally employ different technologies. Currently, each of these technologies has somewhat different capabilities. But each also is experiencing rapid technological progress, so it is not possible to predict which technology will prove most successful from a technical or commercial perspective. Because the capabilities of these technologies are at various stages of development, some broadband network technologies may be better able than others to meet a stimulus package requirement to be quickly deployable, though perhaps at the expense of long term productivity and innovation. Most broadband network providers are vertically integrated into the production of downstream services (applications) that they provide to customers over their own networks. These applications compete with the offerings of independent applications providers that also must ride over the broadband networks to reach customers and therefore are dependent on access to those networks. In some rural areas, a combination of limited demand and high costs preclude private capital markets from funding broadband network infrastructure absent government intervention. In these areas, where even a single network provider might not be able to achieve sufficient scale economies to be able to offer ?affordable? service, it would be inefficient to subsidize multiple providers. Not to do so, however, might leave residents with inferior broadband service choices relative to urban residents. While upgrades to traditional infrastructure tend to have a quantitative impact on the services that ride over that infrastructure (for example, increasing the number of cars that can ride over a highway or the speed of a train riding over a rail bed), upgrades to broadband infrastructure also potentially have a transformative impact on the services that ride over that infrastructure, by allowing for the creation of entirely new applications. The leadership in both houses of Congress as well as the Obama administration have announced plans to include a broadband component in the infrastructure portion of any economic stimulus package. At the least, the unique characteristics of broadband infrastructure impose very complex policy objectives for any broadband infrastructure program ? to foster infrastructure investment that would not otherwise be made and to create additional jobs and spending, without distorting competition among the different broadband network technologies, without discouraging investment and innovation by independent applications providers that need access to broadband networks, and without subsidizing multiple inefficient providers unnecessarily. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interest in using federal government spending to stimulate U.S. economic recovery has intensified recently in response to indicators showing significant deterioration of the economy. Policymakers at all levels of government are debating a range of options to address these problems. Some favor using traditional monetary and fiscal policies. Others, however, favor making accelerated investments in the nation?s public infrastructure in order to create jobs while also meeting infrastructure needs. This report is an overview of policy issues associated with the approach of using infrastructure as a mechanism for economic stimulus. When most people think about infrastructure, they probably have in mind systems that are publicly provided and are important to the productive capacity of the nation?s economy. Today, policymakers define the term more broadly to include both publicly and privately owned systems and facilities and categories that vary considerably in the degree of historic federal investment in building or rebuilding physical structures. A relatively new dimension in today?s context is the notion of coupling public works with investments in environmentally friendly systems that incorporate renewable technologies or energy efficiency?called ?green infrastructure.? Academics, economists, and policymakers debate two issues concerning the contribution of infrastructure investment to the economy. One is the effects of infrastructure investment on productivity and growth, including job creation. The second related issue is the role of infrastructure spending, which is typically a long-term activity, as a short-term mechanism to stimulate a faltering economy. Research conducted over time has resulted in a general consensus that there can be positive returns on productivity of investing in infrastructure. Many experts now argue that infrastructure spending could be an important source of stimulating labor demand and enhancing U.S. productivity through investments in roads, bridges, water systems, etc. Still, some analysts are cautious about the effectiveness of this type of fiscal stimulus because of one key issue: timing. By definition, the goal of stimulus spending is to get money into the economy swiftly. But that objective can conflict with the reality of building infrastructure projects that typically are multiyear efforts with slow initial spendout. Spending advocates counter that because the current recession is expected to be of long duration, projects with extended timeframes can still contribute to the economy?s recovery, and that investments that improve long-term productivity are preferable to options that focus on consumption as a stimulus tool. The overriding question in debating infrastructure spending as part of economic stimulus is, what will the stimulus buy? Two important considerations are, will the proposal produce stimulus quickly, and will it produce a significant amount of stimulus, relative to its budgetary cost. Because of the urgency of responding to the recession, stakeholder groups have been preparing lists of projects that are ?ready to go,? but the criteria for developing these lists are largely unknown. There is tension between the goal of funding activities that will create jobs quickly and the desire to invest in projects that will have sustained value that contributes to U.S. productivity. A critical issue for all levels of government is ensuring accountability for funds that will be spent through a stimulus program, to assure the public that decisions involving public dollars are made quickly yet with transparency, efficiency, and sufficient accountability. This report will not track legislative developments; other CRS reports referenced here will do so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the late 1990s, the military services were facing considerable recruiting and career retention problems. In responding, Congress was mindful of how inadequate pay had contributed to decreased recruit quality in the late 1970s. It authorized larger pay raises, increased special pays and bonuses, provided more recruiting resources, and repealed planned military retired pay reductions for future retirees. In the spirit of national unity following the attacks of September 11, 2001, recruitment improved. The programmatic changes noted above also helped recruiting substantially. However, the grueling pace of deployments to and from Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the dangers of combat, began to cause long-anticipated recruiting problems for the All-Volunteer Force. In 2005, the Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve all fell short of their recruiting goals. An infusion of additional recruiters and a congressional increase in the maximum enlistment bonus from $20,000 to $40,000, contributed to the active Army meeting its 2006, 2007 and 2008 recruiting targets. Career retention of servicemembers beyond their initial period of obligated service is difficult to measure, due to the suspended separation and retirement of many personnel since September 11, 2001, but so far retention is reported to be more than satisfactory. However, the services anticipate a challenging recruiting year in FY2009. Debate continues over what kinds of pay and benefit increases are best for improving recruiting and retention. Of particular interest is the balance between across-the-board pay raises on the one hand, and ones targeted by grade, years of service, and occupational skill, on the other; and between cash compensation on the one hand and improvements in benefits such as housing, health care, and installation services on the other. The issue of pay comparability between military and civilian pay, commonly referred to as the "pay gap," continues to receive emphasis. While. . . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]